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UOB up lorry soon ? Straits Times painted a very bad picture of UOB
- Thread starter Boonsiong
- Start date
PM
SINGAPORE – A large wager on Hong Kong and China real estate is backfiring on one of Singapore’s top banks, which is facing mounting troubles in the region’s deteriorating property markets.
UOB over the years financed real estate abroad including hillside luxury homes in Hong Kong, a five-star hotel overlooking the city’s central harbour, shopping malls and a Shanghai life science park.
It lent to Chinese developers. Over 40 per cent of the loans its Hong Kong branch made were property-related as at June, a higher concentration than that of some other banks in the Chinese territory.
SINGAPORE – A large wager on Hong Kong and China real estate is backfiring on one of Singapore’s top banks, which is facing mounting troubles in the region’s deteriorating property markets.
UOB over the years financed real estate abroad including hillside luxury homes in Hong Kong, a five-star hotel overlooking the city’s central harbour, shopping malls and a Shanghai life science park.
It lent to Chinese developers. Over 40 per cent of the loans its Hong Kong branch made were property-related as at June, a higher concentration than that of some other banks in the Chinese territory.
In 2025, UOB has had to work through multiple deals that borrowers struggled to refinance or defaulted on, and is paring its overall Greater China exposure.
UOB jolted investors in early November when it booked $615 million in general provisions for commercial real estate (CRE) loans that could go bad in the future, pushing up its total allowance for credit and other losses to $1.9 billion in the first nine months of 2025. The bank said it took proactive steps in the light of continued “sector-specific headwinds” in Greater China and the US.
In the weeks since the results, investors have fixated on UOB’s CRE risk and the bank’s “kitchen-sink” clean-up, said Autonomous Research analyst Ivan Ng.
UOB jolted investors in early November when it booked $615 million in general provisions for commercial real estate (CRE) loans that could go bad in the future, pushing up its total allowance for credit and other losses to $1.9 billion in the first nine months of 2025. The bank said it took proactive steps in the light of continued “sector-specific headwinds” in Greater China and the US.
In the weeks since the results, investors have fixated on UOB’s CRE risk and the bank’s “kitchen-sink” clean-up, said Autonomous Research analyst Ivan Ng.
Even though UOB said the charge will not affect its dividend and buyback programme, “investors remain sceptical, fearing that further CRE-related provisions could eventually pressure capital returns”, Mr Ng wrote in a report in December.
A significant portion of UOB’s troubled property exposure is in Hong Kong, which is in the throes of a multi-year CRE downturn, with prices of office units down about 50 per cent from peak levels.
A significant portion of UOB’s troubled property exposure is in Hong Kong, which is in the throes of a multi-year CRE downturn, with prices of office units down about 50 per cent from peak levels.
That has eroded the value of the collateral backing many property loans, in some cases resulting in losses for banks when borrowers default.
The situation in mainland China is worsening.
UOB’s Hong Kong branch had more than HK$69.2 billion (S$11.5 billion) in total property development and property investment loans as at June 2025, according to a regulatory filing. They made up 43 per cent of the unit’s gross loans and advances to customers, the filing showed.
UOB’s latest filings showed the group had $48 billion in total customer loans in Greater China at the end of September, with a non-performing loan (NPL) ratio of 3.1 per cent, up from 2 per cent a year earlier. The group’s overall NPL ratio was 1.6 per cent as at September.
The Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA), the city’s de facto central bank and financial regulator, has been monitoring lenders’ exposures to the property sector.
UOB has had discussions with the HKMA about its lending mix and diversifying its portfolio, said people familiar with the matter who asked not to be identified sharing non-public information.
An HKMA spokesperson said it does not comment on the affairs of individual banks, and that it has all along required banks to prudently manage their credit risk.
Loan extensions
UOB has held off on demanding repayment on some Hong Kong and China real estate loans that matured in the past year, and has worked with clients to renegotiate loan terms and roll over their debt, according to people familiar with the matter.
“UOB is committed to doing right by our customers through the ups and downs of economic cycles,” a bank spokeswoman told Bloomberg News.
“We take a long-term view of banking relationships and work closely and constructively with customers facing challenges, offering appropriate solutions while safeguarding the interests of our stakeholders,” she added.
The situation in mainland China is worsening.
UOB’s Hong Kong branch had more than HK$69.2 billion (S$11.5 billion) in total property development and property investment loans as at June 2025, according to a regulatory filing. They made up 43 per cent of the unit’s gross loans and advances to customers, the filing showed.
UOB’s latest filings showed the group had $48 billion in total customer loans in Greater China at the end of September, with a non-performing loan (NPL) ratio of 3.1 per cent, up from 2 per cent a year earlier. The group’s overall NPL ratio was 1.6 per cent as at September.
The Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA), the city’s de facto central bank and financial regulator, has been monitoring lenders’ exposures to the property sector.
UOB has had discussions with the HKMA about its lending mix and diversifying its portfolio, said people familiar with the matter who asked not to be identified sharing non-public information.
An HKMA spokesperson said it does not comment on the affairs of individual banks, and that it has all along required banks to prudently manage their credit risk.
Loan extensions
UOB has held off on demanding repayment on some Hong Kong and China real estate loans that matured in the past year, and has worked with clients to renegotiate loan terms and roll over their debt, according to people familiar with the matter.
“UOB is committed to doing right by our customers through the ups and downs of economic cycles,” a bank spokeswoman told Bloomberg News.
“We take a long-term view of banking relationships and work closely and constructively with customers facing challenges, offering appropriate solutions while safeguarding the interests of our stakeholders,” she added.
She said the lender is doing its best “to support our clients to tide over short-term challenges, while ensuring that the bank’s prudent credit principles are not compromised”.
She added that UOB “adheres to strict credit standards and principles in full compliance with regulatory requirements”.
In November, UOB was among lenders that reached an 11th-hour agreement to extend the maturity date of a US$110 million (S$141.8 million) loan backed by a life science park in Shanghai. The property is controlled by Gaw Capital Partners, a private equity firm that UOB has financed many deals for.
During the recent deal negotiations, UOB and a few banks were prepared to grant a three-year extension that the borrower requested, but there was pushback from other lenders, according to people familiar with the matter.
In the end, the banks agreed to give the Gaw-managed fund an additional 18 months to repay the loan, whose principal was reduced slightly, with another 18-month extension if certain conditions are met, Bloomberg News reported.
In May, UOB was among lenders that amended and extended a loan backing two Hong Kong office towers called Cityplaza Three and Four that are also owned by a Gaw Capital fund.
UOB more recently led the refinancing of a US$940 million loan for cash-strapped Hong Kong builder Parkview Group following months of negotiations, people familiar with the matter said. The debt is tied to a Beijing shopping mall called Parkview Green, which has not been generating sufficient rental income to cover the loan’s interest payments, Bloomberg News previously reported.
The UOB spokeswoman said the bank cannot comment on individual deals due to client confidentiality. She added that “in general, loans for refinancing are often complex”.
There have been some defaults. In March, a consortium including Schroders Capital and an Asia fund managed by British investment firm Chelsfield failed to repay a HK$1.5 billion loan collateralised by an underground shopping mall called Worfu in Hong Kong’s North Point district when the debt matured.
UOB, which had a majority share of the loan, waited a month before sending a letter to the borrowers demanding repayment, according to people familiar with the matter. The banks appointed receivers for the asset in August.
Within UOB, there have been tensions over the outlook for the regions’ properties. Some credit officers have wanted business teams to examine struggling borrowers’ real cash flow and push for solutions, according to people familiar with the matter. Other staff have preferred to work out loan extensions in the hope that the market will recover, the people said.
Family ties
Singapore’s billionaire Wee family, who controls UOB, built much of their early fortune in property. They have long regarded real estate as a safe and reliable asset class, according to people familiar with the matter.
After China’s property downturn took hold, UOB chief executive officer Wee Ee Cheong said on a 2022 earnings call that the bank’s exposure to Chinese developers was manageable and not something he was overly concerned about. That year, UOB took over a loan to troubled Shanghai-based developer Shimao Group from other banks.
By 2024, UOB’s leadership spoke about challenges, accelerating provisions “on a few chunky accounts” they had previously hoped to restructure.
In September 2025, UOB extended the maturity of a HK$10 billion loan financing a Hong Kong luxury residential development called Beacon Peak that Shimao developed. It had earlier sought to offload the debt to private credit investors, Bloomberg News reported.
UOB’s expected losses from income-producing real estate loan exposures are the highest among Singapore’s big three banks, said Ms Rena Kwok, a Bloomberg Intelligence analyst. She added that the provisions taken in the recent third quarter will help “to cushion potential credit losses, given pockets of stress in its book”.
She added that UOB “adheres to strict credit standards and principles in full compliance with regulatory requirements”.
In November, UOB was among lenders that reached an 11th-hour agreement to extend the maturity date of a US$110 million (S$141.8 million) loan backed by a life science park in Shanghai. The property is controlled by Gaw Capital Partners, a private equity firm that UOB has financed many deals for.
During the recent deal negotiations, UOB and a few banks were prepared to grant a three-year extension that the borrower requested, but there was pushback from other lenders, according to people familiar with the matter.
In the end, the banks agreed to give the Gaw-managed fund an additional 18 months to repay the loan, whose principal was reduced slightly, with another 18-month extension if certain conditions are met, Bloomberg News reported.
In May, UOB was among lenders that amended and extended a loan backing two Hong Kong office towers called Cityplaza Three and Four that are also owned by a Gaw Capital fund.
UOB more recently led the refinancing of a US$940 million loan for cash-strapped Hong Kong builder Parkview Group following months of negotiations, people familiar with the matter said. The debt is tied to a Beijing shopping mall called Parkview Green, which has not been generating sufficient rental income to cover the loan’s interest payments, Bloomberg News previously reported.
The UOB spokeswoman said the bank cannot comment on individual deals due to client confidentiality. She added that “in general, loans for refinancing are often complex”.
There have been some defaults. In March, a consortium including Schroders Capital and an Asia fund managed by British investment firm Chelsfield failed to repay a HK$1.5 billion loan collateralised by an underground shopping mall called Worfu in Hong Kong’s North Point district when the debt matured.
UOB, which had a majority share of the loan, waited a month before sending a letter to the borrowers demanding repayment, according to people familiar with the matter. The banks appointed receivers for the asset in August.
Within UOB, there have been tensions over the outlook for the regions’ properties. Some credit officers have wanted business teams to examine struggling borrowers’ real cash flow and push for solutions, according to people familiar with the matter. Other staff have preferred to work out loan extensions in the hope that the market will recover, the people said.
Family ties
Singapore’s billionaire Wee family, who controls UOB, built much of their early fortune in property. They have long regarded real estate as a safe and reliable asset class, according to people familiar with the matter.
After China’s property downturn took hold, UOB chief executive officer Wee Ee Cheong said on a 2022 earnings call that the bank’s exposure to Chinese developers was manageable and not something he was overly concerned about. That year, UOB took over a loan to troubled Shanghai-based developer Shimao Group from other banks.
By 2024, UOB’s leadership spoke about challenges, accelerating provisions “on a few chunky accounts” they had previously hoped to restructure.
In September 2025, UOB extended the maturity of a HK$10 billion loan financing a Hong Kong luxury residential development called Beacon Peak that Shimao developed. It had earlier sought to offload the debt to private credit investors, Bloomberg News reported.
UOB’s expected losses from income-producing real estate loan exposures are the highest among Singapore’s big three banks, said Ms Rena Kwok, a Bloomberg Intelligence analyst. She added that the provisions taken in the recent third quarter will help “to cushion potential credit losses, given pockets of stress in its book”.
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UOB owed its success to old Wes’s balls licking LKY. The son is a moron who can’t even handle a school board much less a bank. And like old fart who also has a useless son as successor. Everything is unravelling and going to shit. They still got their billions no need to pity them.
UOB won't toh lah -PAP won't let it, don't be fucking stupid
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Someone famous, once said : " SG has room for only 2 Big Banks .... "
looks like coming true ...
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In Singapore's banking history, the sentiment that the city-state had room for only two or three "giant" banks was most famously associated with Lee Kuan Yew (then Senior Minister) and Lee Hsien Loong (then Deputy Prime Minister and Chairman of the Monetary Authority of Singapore).
The push for consolidation reached its peak between 1998 and 2001. At that time, the government’s stance was that the local "Big Six" (DBS, POSB, UOB, OUB, OCBC, and Keppel TatLee) were too small to survive global competition and needed to merge into larger, world-class entities.
Who said it and when?
While the exact phrase "room for only two" was a common industry summary of the era, the most significant declarations came from the top leadership:
- Lee Kuan Yew (1990s - 2001):He was a staunch advocate for bank consolidation. He famously warned that unless local banks merged to gain scale, they would be "eaten up" by global giants like Citibank or HSBC as Singapore liberalized its financial sector. In various interviews and dialogues, he expressed that a small market like Singapore could realistically support only two or three major local players with the "heft" to expand regionally.
- Lee Hsien Loong (June 1999 & June 2001): As Chairman of MAS, he spearheaded the banking liberalization program. In a landmark speech on June 29, 2001, titled "Consolidation and Liberalisation: Building World-Class Banks," he made it clear that the government would not protect local banks from competition forever. He stated that consolidation was "inevitable" and that local banks needed to merge to remain relevant.
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The "Big Six" that became the "Big Three"
At the start of the 1990s, the landscape was crowded. The consolidation happened in rapid waves:
- 1998: DBS acquired POSB (The Post Office Savings Bank).
- 1998: Keppel Bank merged with Tat Lee Bank to form Keppel TatLee Bank.
- 2001: The "Battle for OUB" broke out. DBS launched a hostile bid for OUB (Overseas Union Bank), but OUB's management preferred UOB (United Overseas Bank). UOB eventually won and swallowed OUB.
- 2001: OCBC acquired Keppel TatLee Bank.
Why did they say it?
The rationale provided by the government and news articles (such as The Straits Times and The Business Times during the 2001 merger wars) was:
- Economies of Scale: To afford the massive IT and technology investments needed for modern banking.
- Regional Ambition: To be "predators rather than prey" in the Southeast Asian market.
- Survival: Without size, local banks would lose their best corporate customers to foreign banks with larger balance sheets.
Result: Today, Singapore effectively has the "Big Three"—DBS, OCBC, and UOB—which is slightly more than the "two" sometimes whispered about in the 90s, but exactly the "strong core" the government intended to build.
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Shitty Times got balls to talk about Temasick?
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Temasek will never go broke because daft Sinkies replenish its coffers all the time, whether they like it or not.
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Every major global publication talking about tummy sick and geek losses last month nothing from fake new inoculant straight time. Glass houses throw stones and all that.
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