SIX YEARS INTO HYFLUX's COLLAPSE: Where did the “missing” $3 Billion go? Some investigations drag out for years and such mysteries never get solved.

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A month later, it will be the 6-year anniversary of Hyflux's Collapse.

- Outright False Accounting:
$3 billion in assets valuation vanished overnight - KMPG, CFO, CEO, Directors not arrested for six years.

- Outright Conflict of Interest: Director Simon Tay brought his own firm, Wong Partnership to initiate the restructuring of the company and mocked investors. Hindered prospective foreign white knights by limiting information disclosure. Heliconia Capital sheltered former Hyflux Director and managers.

- Outright Non-Compliance of Listing Rules: Hyflux issued Dividends to ordinary shareholders before paying perpetual bond/preference shareholders

- Outright Misinformation: DBS issued retail bonds to bail out their secondary bond market accredited Hyflux investors, misled about nature of business and failure to disclose nature of business and primary risks in prospectus of retail bonds. MAS CLOSED TWO EYES.

- Outright Betrayal by The State: Regulator PUB confiscated Hyflux's largest asset for free, not to save retail investors. Government raped retail investors to save their own ass, in this PPP venture (Private-Public Partnership).

Where did the “missing” $3 Billion go? Some investigations drag out for years and such mysteries never get solved.
 
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Hyflux sought other funding sources for Tuaspring as it had problems getting bank loans: Prosecution​


Hyflux founder Olivia Lum arriving at the State Courts on Aug 11.


Hyflux founder Olivia Lum arriving at the State Courts on Aug 11.

Aug 11, 2025

SINGAPORE – Hyflux looked to mom-and-pop investors to fund its Tuaspring project because it had trouble getting bank loans, the prosecution said on the first day of the trial involving former senior executives of the failed water treatment plant.

Deputy Chief Prosecutor Christopher Ong noted that a group of banks initially said they were willing to finance the project. But in 2011, they raised concerns after learning of Hyflux’s strategy of selling electricity to subsidise the sale of water to PUB.

Hyflux eventually issued preference shares to fund the integrated water and power project. The company’s collapse left about 34,000 investors of perpetual securities and preference shares, who had sunk in a combined $900 million, with nothing.


In his opening statement to the State Court on Aug 11, Mr Ong said Lum did not disclose information about business risks because she did not want to detract from the positive news of winning a landmark water project, and feared deterring investors.

Hyflux had won a tender for Singapore’s second and largest desalination plant with the lowest submitted bid. It had proposed to sell water to PUB at a first-year tariff price of $0.45/m3, undercutting its competitors by at least 27 per cent.

“At this price, the desalination plant would operate at a loss,” Mr Ong said.

“To make the project financially viable, and also fulfil PUB’s requirement to procure or produce electricity for the desalination plant at Hyflux’s cost, Hyflux intended for the power plant to supply electricity to the desalination plant, while actually selling the vast majority of the power that it generated to the national grid.”

It was only from this sale that Hyflux would be able to make up for the desalination plant’s losses and make the project profitable.

But Hyflux had no prior experience in power generation, much less selling electricity. The Tuaspring project would be the first time Hyflux entered the electricity market, the prosecution said.


In total, seven people have been charged over Hyflux’s intentional failure to disclose information relating to Tuaspring, among other things.

Six of them – Hyflux founder and former chief executive Olivia Lum Ooi Lin, former chief financial officer Cho Wee Peng, and former independent directors Teo Kiang Kok, Christopher Murugasu, Gay Chee Cheong and Lee Joo Hai – are contesting their charges in a 56-day trial scheduled to run from Aug 11 to Feb 5, 2026.

The prosecution will proceed on 11 charges, including two of the six charges Lum faces. The remaining four charges against Lum are stood down.

It is expected to rely on testimony from former Hyflux employees and bank representatives who were involved in negotiations on financing the Tuaspring integrated water and power project.

To finance the Tuaspring project, which was initially projected to cost $890 million, Hyflux sought a term loan of about $527 million from a consortium of banks.

Six banks signed in-principle commitment letters in October 2010 indicating their willingness to finance the project. But they had not been told of Hyflux’s plan to build a power plant and sell excess electricity to the grid at the time, Mr Ong noted.


In November 2010, when they found out about Hyflux’s power strategy, they “raised serious concerns”. In January 2011, they told Hyflux that they could not lend it money on the terms previously indicated, as the power plant introduced new “merchant sale risk and operational risk”.

On 4 July 2011, only three of the original six banks - DBS, Mizuho Corporate Bank and Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corporation - extended Hyflux financing of $150 million for the construction of the desalination plant. This financing was eventually terminated by Hyflux.

Tuaspring was ultimately financed by a shareholder’s loan of $840.4 million by Hyflux in October 2011, which was in turn refinanced with Maybank Singapore and Maybank Kim Eng Securities in September 2013.

In January 2011, in the midst of their negotiations with the banks, Hyflux’s management began to contemplate issuing of preference shares to raise funds.

On 19 January 2011, Hyflux senior vice president, legal (business) Ms Yang Ai Chian informed the Board of the need to issue preference shares to “increase our funding options” for “several new major projects” that Hyflux was expected to win that year.

In reality, this money was meant to fund Tuaspring because of the challenges Hyflux faced in getting bank financing.

On 13 April 2011, Hyflux lodged an offer information statement with the Monetary Authority of Singapore to issue up to $200 million in 6% preference shares. These were oversubscribed and the offer amount was increased. Hyflux ultimately raised $400 million.

But the statement did not mention risks arising from Hyflux’s entry into the electricity business, or those associated with Hyflux’s strategy for Tuaspring, which could affect the company’s financial position or results, the prosecution said.

The information was omitted because Lum wanted to downplay Tuaspring’s significant exposure to the electricity market, both in Hyflux’s announcement that it had been named the “preferred bidder” for the desalination project, as well as in the offer information statement, the prosecution said.

“Lum was determined that Hyflux had to win the bid and cement its status as a global leader in the water treatment and desalination industry. Hyflux was facing setbacks in its Middle Eastern ventures and winning the Tuaspring bid was critical for strengthening the company’s order book,” Mr Ong said.

“She did not want to detract from the positive news of winning a landmark water project, by revealing the Tuaspring Project’s reliance on electricity sales, and the fact that the low tariff price – the key to winning the tender – was only viable because of such electricity sales.”

The prosecution also said Lum was well aware of the banks’ negative reactions regarding the power plant component of the project, and feared that full disclosure might deter investors and compromise Hyflux’s ability to raise funds through the planned preference shares.

This, in turn, could jeopardise financial close for the project and potentially result in losing the bid, the prosecution said.

The desalination plant of the Tuaspring Project became operational on September 18, 2013. But its power plant only became operational nearly two years later, on or around August 2015. It began selling electricity commercially on 18 February 2016.

In March 2011, the average Uniform Singapore Energy Price had been around $187 per megawatt hour (MWh). By February 2016, this had fallen to around $49.10 per MWh.

As the profitability of Tuaspring depended on electricity sales, this fall in electricity prices hit Hyflux hard. In its 2017 annual report, it reported a $115.6 million after tax loss.

The report stated that the weak power market in Singapore drove losses for the first time in Hyflux’s history, with the Tuaspring Project accounting for the majority of the losses.

On 21 May 2018, Hyflux suspended trading of its shares. The next day, Hyflux announced that it had applied to seek court protection for debt reorganisation.

On 18 May 2019, PUB took over the Tuaspring desalination plant. On 1 June 2022, a wholly owned subsidiary of Malaysia-based YTL Power International, YTL Powerseraya, completed its acquisition of the Tuaspring power plant.

By 16 November 2020, Hyflux entered judicial management and into liquidation on 21 July 2021.

Other witnesses include a lawyer from Stamford Law Corporation, who was Hyflux’s external legal counsel on the April 2011 offer information statement; an SGX representative who will provide evidence on the sequence of events that led to this case being investigated; and a PUB representative, who will testify to PUB’s dealings with Hyflux and its employees and management during the tender and award process for Tuaspring.

The Prosecution will also adduce evidence from a securities expert, Mr Kevin Gin who will address why the omitted information ought to have been disclosed by Hyflux.

The hearing continues.
 
Donch worry….wayang only. PAP courts will acquit Olivia Lum as instructed
 
But the statement did not mention risks arising from Hyflux’s entry into the electricity business, or those associated with Hyflux’s strategy for Tuas spring, which could affect the company’s
What do they call it now? Low flux?
They can easily jv with a reputable power operator to operate the power station. Or outsource the power station with a power buy back guarantee at a fixed cost over a period
 
Wow $3, 000,000,000. That's a lot of other people's hard earned money!
Did it get washed down the Tuas Spring Water already?
 
PUB took over the desalination plant in May 2019 at $0 cost, as its valuation was negative. This move aimed to safeguard Singapore's water security. However, the Tuaspring power station was sold to YTL Power International, a Malaysia-based utility group, for S$270 million in cash on June 1, 2022. Notably, the desalination plant posted a security concern, while the power plant's security is not mentioned.
 
A month later, it will be the 6-year anniversary of Hyflux's Collapse.

- Outright False Accounting:
$3 billion in assets valuation vanished overnight - KMPG, CFO, CEO, Directors not arrested for six years.

- Outright Conflict of Interest: Director Simon Tay brought his own firm, Wong Partnership to initiate the restructuring the company. Hindered prospective foreign white knights by limiting information disclosure. Heliconia Capital sheltered former Hyflux Director and managers.

- Outright Non-Compliance of Listing Rules: Hyflux issued Dividends to ordinary shareholders before paying perpetual bond/preference shareholders

- Outright Misinformation: DBS issued retail bonds to bail out their secondary market accredited Hyflux investors, mislead about nature of business and failure to disclose nature of business and primary risks in prospectus of retail bonds

- Outright Betrayal by The State: Regular PUB confiscated Hyflux's largest asset for free, not to save retail investors. Government raped retail investors to save their own ass, in this PPP venture (Private-Public Partnership)

Where did the “missing” $3 Billion go? Some investigations drag out for years and such mysteries never get solved.


Heard only DSC knows the complete story.

 
PUB took over the desalination plant in May 2019 at $0 cost, as its valuation was negative. This move aimed to safeguard Singapore's water security. However, the Tuaspring power station was sold to YTL Power International, a Malaysia-based utility group, for S$270 million in cash on June 1, 2022. Notably, the desalination plant posted a security concern, while the power plant's security is not mentioned.
Shouldn't the desalination be sold to highest bidder even if it's valuation is negative.
YTL may bid for it as it runs Thames water in the UK.
 
Shouldn't the desalination be sold to highest bidder even if it's valuation is negative.
YTL may bid for it as it runs Thames water in the UK.
My primary concern is that the water desalination plant was deemed a security risk, prompting PUB to take measures to secure it, which is a reasonable decision. However, the same security risk should applies to the power plant as well, and I believe the authorities should take similar precautions to ensure its safety.
 
Heard only DSC knows the complete story.

1. Simon Tay is spared despite his arrogance toward the retail investors and deeds. I guess background is very important.

2. Disheartened when I saw Davinder Singh defending Olivia Lum. Davinder Singh is like the best legal eagle. haha, Olivia spent more efforts to save her ass than to save Hyflux.

3. I wished Davinder had a heart and helped us instead of Olivia. Looks like every pussy has a price, indeed.
 
Like Ong Beng Seng, the Hyflux trial is just a show for optics. Our country's regulators (PUB and MAS) are also clearly at fault, so everyone will just go through the motion and close case, who is going to return our hard-earned money? Where is our social safety net?
 
In financial context,
- The Issuer cheated. Hyflux
- The Underwriter cheated. DBS
- The Regulator covered up because they were scared of the underwriter.

Do you noticed that the liquidity and depth of our local SGD bond market crashed since the collapse of HYFLUX.
Tell me, who will trust our regulatory framework?
 
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Estimated Rates and Total for One Day Trial:

Hourly Rates (Based on Benchmarks):
Senior Counsel (e.g., Davinder Singh): SGD 1,500–2,500 per hour or more, reflecting his elite status and rankings as a "Star Individual" in dispute resolution.

Senior Associates: SGD 800–1,200 per hour.

Junior Lawyers: SGD 400–700 per hour.
Daily Team Cost Estimate: For a team of 3 (lead SC + 2 associates), assuming 8-10 billable hours per day:

Low-End: ~SGD 15,000–20,000 (e.g., based on adjusted 2015 figures of SGD 14,000 per day for a team, inflated for 2025).

Mid-Range (Most Likely): SGD 20,000–30,000, accounting for the trial's profile and Singh's direct involvement.

High-End: SGD 30,000–50,000+ if extensive same-day preparation or additional experts/disburseents are involved.

Additional Expenses: This estimate excludes GST (9%), disbursements (e.g., court filing fees, expert witnesses, transcripts—potentially SGD 1,000–5,000 per day), and any upfront retainers or deposits. Criminal trials like this may also involve fixed fees for the entire proceedings (potentially 6-figures total for a 56-day trial), but prorated per day would align with the above.


In summary, for one day of trial in the State Courts, Olivia Lum could expect to pay approximately SGD 20,000 to SGD 30,000 for her legal team from Davinder Singh Chambers, with the potential for higher costs depending on the day's intensity.

...Grok
 
Hard luck. If electricity price didnt collapse everyone laugh to the bank. Now electricity price 6x higher than 2016 when shit hit the fan. Fucking yeoh clan laughing to the bank.
 
Hard luck. If electricity price didnt collapse everyone laugh to the bank. Now electricity price 6x higher than 2016 when shit hit the fan. Fucking yeoh clan laughing to the bank.
Timing is crucial for a company, especially when it starts operating at the right moment. Unfortunately for Hyflux, it missed the mark in 2016, when electricity prices declined. On the other hand, if the company had launched in 2022, when fuel prices began to rise, it would have been well-positioned to generate significant profits.
 
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