The following is the background of how we got to where we are today.
There are many ways to contain the social problems of casino gambling. Unfortunately we are hampered by the current poorly thought-out levy system which was proposed by a group of young inexperienced Admin Service officers pretending to be gurus.
If you look through the files, the main thinking was simply to "equalize" the cost of visiting the IRs with the cost of going to Genting. The $100 24hr levy was therefore calculated based on the cost of transport to Genting. The annual $2k levy in turn was simplistically derived by the upper quartile of visits by Singapore visitors to Genting (statistics courtesy of the Genting group which was then bidding for a license).
Given the large amount of money which had to be invested to build the IRs, it was felt that it was necessary to provide a commercial guarantee so bidders could have a time frame to recoup their investments. The levy amounts were therefore written in the CCA to remain valid for a period of 10 years from 2006. This 10 year commitment was made in spite of the lack of any serious research or experience as to whether the levy system would work.
Shortly after the IRs were open, it became apparent that that while the $100 daily levy was having the desired effect of discouraging casual casino visits, the annual levy was a gaping loophole for regular casino goers to significantly exceed the desired number of casino visits. In effect, the levy system was keeping out those who were not really in danger while letting in problem gamblers who would gamble their lives away.
Looking back at the assumptions behind the annual levy, it became obvious how naive and simplistic the assumptions were. It also emerged that there were better ways than levies to control problem gambling in Singapore. Good examples of this are Visit limits/ Loss limits based on declared income. Unfortunately because of the 10 year commitment in the CCA, nothing could be done to fundamentally correct the annual $2k levy policy mistake. Instead, the best which could be done was to pretend there is no problem and introduce piece-meal tweaks that give the impression that the Singapore government is "doing a lot" to prevent problem gambling from taking root in Singapore.
At this point in time, it is unknown what will happen when the 10 years expire. After the novelty has worn off, both RWS and MBS are in the doldrums. The market for high rollers has failed to take off because of the strict controls against the main junket players who all have triad links. Relaxation on this front is impossible because of political reasons. As is, it is already tough enough to conceal news from Singaporeans of the Sands group involvement with the triads in their Macau operations. The hope that the casinos will be able to attract premium foreign players on their own has failed. The extension of credit by the casinos directly to some premium players have resulted in a number of unwanted lawsuits against players who lose and then refuse to pay. Hence even before correcting the S$2k annual levy policy mistake, there are doubts as to whether RWS/MBS can remain commercially viable. If action is taken to correct the failed levy system, there is a good chance of insolvency of one if not both casinos.
How does Macau and KL handle social ills arising from gambling? I think they just accept higher crime and broken families as a permanent feature.
