From http://www.ge2011.info/opinions/This_GE_should_be_a_referendum_on_the_electoral_system.htm
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This GE should be a referendum on the electoral system
Edmund Khor
03/05/2011
The PAP government has used ensuring the representation of minority race MPs in Parliament as the raison d'être for having GRCs, which were introduced in 1988. This was despite that the late JB Jeyaretnam of the Workers’ Party had beaten Chinese candidates from the PAP in the Chinese-dominated Anson constituency twice in the early 1980s.
But ensuring minority representation does not support the rationale of having 5 or 6 members GRCs with only one candidate that needs to be from minority groups. One can guarantee the same number of minority race MPs with the same number of 3-members GRCs. In addition, if the government is sincere in having a minimum number of MPs from each race, why group Indians together with Others?
The latest argument from the PAP for large GRCs is that they allow key new PAP candidates to have a smooth passage into Parliament. Again, that does not hold water. One can have safe seats with SMCs too. There are always constituencies with political leanings of the electorate that results in lower chance of the seat changing hands. In UK and other countries using the first-past-the-post (FPTP) system, party preferred new candidates are often placed in a safe seat.
Large GRCs have made it harder for opposition candidates, particularly smaller parties and independent candidates to run for election. That is why we would find that most of the time all the SMCs were contested and even multi-cornered fights in some, while the GRCs tended to have walkovers.
But more importantly, the GRC system dilutes voter's voice and does not promote representative democracy. Your vote to choose the MP in-charge of your local area is not respected, because it depends on the aggregate outcome of voting in other constituencies.
To illustrate that, let us look at the distribution of electoral support for the PAP in the past few elections shown in the table below.
In the 1984 election, PAP won 65% of the votes and 47 out of 49 (or 96%) of the contested seats. The standard deviation (a statistical measure of the variation) of PAP’s vote share was 9.5% - minimum 39.7% (Mah Bow Tan in Potong Pasir) and maximum 83.7% (Richard Hu in Kreta Ayer).
The FPTP system, used in UK and other Commonwealth countries, has the effect of exacerbating the number of seats won by the majority party versus its vote share. This is in contrast to proportional representation, where parties receive seats in accordance with the proportion of the electorate that voted for them.
When GRCs were implemented in 1988, the marginal seats tended to get bundled up. Thus the average electoral support for PAP in the GRCs was lower at 59.6% (versus the 65.1% for SMCs), but the standard deviation was lower at 7.4% (versus 8.5% for SMCs). The variation of PAP vote share in the GRCs was lower as the pockets of local opposition support were diluted. Thus that allowed the PAP to hold on to all the GRC seats despite the low electoral support.
As the GRCs got bigger to 5- and 6-members GRCs, we can see that the standard deviation of PAP’s vote share got lower – 3.4% in 2001 and 6.2% in 2006. The electoral support for PAP in GRCs also increased versus the SMCs, as all the GRCs were by then helmed by at least one minister.
This has the effect of killing the chance of opposition candidates winning any GRC. As for the SMCs, it is not helped by a gerrymandering electoral boundaries redrawing process whereby a SMC that an opposition party is targeting at can disappear overnight and merged into a GRC.
In a way, it is fortunate that in this GE the weak bench strength of the new PAP candidates and the strong calibre of several new opposition candidates have led Singaporeans to think about the deficiency of GRC system and our electoral system as a whole
Much ado has been made by the PAP Aljunied team on the Workers’ Party having placed the electorate in Aljunied GRC in a difficult position of having to vote out the Foreign Minister. But not Aljunied, then where? Is the opposition not allowed to win any of the GRCs. Should all PAP new candidates, even the featherweight ones, get auto-passage into the Parliament by piggybacking on the ministers?
To the PAP, it seems that maintaining its dominant power is more important than having a fair and representative electoral system that is crucial for the long-term political stability of Singapore. PAP has been placing its party interests above the good of Singapore, and things are unlikely to change from the party within.
It is only with our votes that the PAP can be put back in its place for the good of our nation.
Sources:
http://www.temasekreview.com/2011/02/28/electoral-boundaries-review-–-pap-1-singapore-0
http://onesingaporean.wordpress.com...ng-vs-chen-show-mao-and-a-very-scary-thought/
http://www.facebook.com/pages/I-do-not-want-Tin-Pei-Ling-in-Parliament/144764052259319
==
This GE should be a referendum on the electoral system
Edmund Khor
03/05/2011
The PAP government has used ensuring the representation of minority race MPs in Parliament as the raison d'être for having GRCs, which were introduced in 1988. This was despite that the late JB Jeyaretnam of the Workers’ Party had beaten Chinese candidates from the PAP in the Chinese-dominated Anson constituency twice in the early 1980s.
But ensuring minority representation does not support the rationale of having 5 or 6 members GRCs with only one candidate that needs to be from minority groups. One can guarantee the same number of minority race MPs with the same number of 3-members GRCs. In addition, if the government is sincere in having a minimum number of MPs from each race, why group Indians together with Others?
The latest argument from the PAP for large GRCs is that they allow key new PAP candidates to have a smooth passage into Parliament. Again, that does not hold water. One can have safe seats with SMCs too. There are always constituencies with political leanings of the electorate that results in lower chance of the seat changing hands. In UK and other countries using the first-past-the-post (FPTP) system, party preferred new candidates are often placed in a safe seat.
Large GRCs have made it harder for opposition candidates, particularly smaller parties and independent candidates to run for election. That is why we would find that most of the time all the SMCs were contested and even multi-cornered fights in some, while the GRCs tended to have walkovers.
But more importantly, the GRC system dilutes voter's voice and does not promote representative democracy. Your vote to choose the MP in-charge of your local area is not respected, because it depends on the aggregate outcome of voting in other constituencies.
To illustrate that, let us look at the distribution of electoral support for the PAP in the past few elections shown in the table below.
In the 1984 election, PAP won 65% of the votes and 47 out of 49 (or 96%) of the contested seats. The standard deviation (a statistical measure of the variation) of PAP’s vote share was 9.5% - minimum 39.7% (Mah Bow Tan in Potong Pasir) and maximum 83.7% (Richard Hu in Kreta Ayer).
The FPTP system, used in UK and other Commonwealth countries, has the effect of exacerbating the number of seats won by the majority party versus its vote share. This is in contrast to proportional representation, where parties receive seats in accordance with the proportion of the electorate that voted for them.
When GRCs were implemented in 1988, the marginal seats tended to get bundled up. Thus the average electoral support for PAP in the GRCs was lower at 59.6% (versus the 65.1% for SMCs), but the standard deviation was lower at 7.4% (versus 8.5% for SMCs). The variation of PAP vote share in the GRCs was lower as the pockets of local opposition support were diluted. Thus that allowed the PAP to hold on to all the GRC seats despite the low electoral support.
As the GRCs got bigger to 5- and 6-members GRCs, we can see that the standard deviation of PAP’s vote share got lower – 3.4% in 2001 and 6.2% in 2006. The electoral support for PAP in GRCs also increased versus the SMCs, as all the GRCs were by then helmed by at least one minister.
This has the effect of killing the chance of opposition candidates winning any GRC. As for the SMCs, it is not helped by a gerrymandering electoral boundaries redrawing process whereby a SMC that an opposition party is targeting at can disappear overnight and merged into a GRC.
In a way, it is fortunate that in this GE the weak bench strength of the new PAP candidates and the strong calibre of several new opposition candidates have led Singaporeans to think about the deficiency of GRC system and our electoral system as a whole
Much ado has been made by the PAP Aljunied team on the Workers’ Party having placed the electorate in Aljunied GRC in a difficult position of having to vote out the Foreign Minister. But not Aljunied, then where? Is the opposition not allowed to win any of the GRCs. Should all PAP new candidates, even the featherweight ones, get auto-passage into the Parliament by piggybacking on the ministers?
To the PAP, it seems that maintaining its dominant power is more important than having a fair and representative electoral system that is crucial for the long-term political stability of Singapore. PAP has been placing its party interests above the good of Singapore, and things are unlikely to change from the party within.
It is only with our votes that the PAP can be put back in its place for the good of our nation.
Sources:
http://www.temasekreview.com/2011/02/28/electoral-boundaries-review-–-pap-1-singapore-0
http://onesingaporean.wordpress.com...ng-vs-chen-show-mao-and-a-very-scary-thought/
http://www.facebook.com/pages/I-do-not-want-Tin-Pei-Ling-in-Parliament/144764052259319
