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Chitchat The winds of war is blowing: Trump to recall 1000 combat pilots to active service!

pakchewcheng

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No Joke?!
“阿拉神灯” Landing Lamps on new Chinese aircraft carriers
http://mil.news.sina.com.cn/china/2017-10-22/doc-ifymzzpv9178572.shtml


中国自主研发“阿拉神灯”装置 助力舰载机成功着舰
2017年10月22日 17:24 军报记者

Aircraft need special guiding to land on carrier. Done by optical landing system (OLS) (nicknamed "meatball" or simply, "Ball") is used to give glidepath information to pilots in the terminal phase of landing on an aircraft carrier.

Wiki optical landing system (OLS)

Quite likely since those 3 from National Supercomputing Tianjin Center , the system they did must be based on the telemetry approach of the aircraft coupled with the light display to get a proper landing (used to be done manually if you read above)

That being said, USA already managed to take off and land UAV X 47B drone on carriers. Let us face it that while China is catching up, USA is still top notch on carrier operations. But China is catching up very rapidly.

I do not doubt in a short time, this too will be done by China as well, leading to totally automatic landing onto the carrier. But man will always be in charge in case of EMP interference with signals.

 

kryonlight

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B-52s seen returning to the famous "Christmas Tree" concrete pads at the ends of runways for easy departure.

DMxgtSWXkAAozhc.jpg


BARKSDALE AIR FORCE BASE, La. — The U.S. Air Force is preparing to put nuclear-armed bombers back on 24-hour ready alert, a status not seen since the Cold War ended in 1991.

That means the long-dormant concrete pads at the ends of this base’s 11,000-foot runway — dubbed the “Christmas tree” for their angular markings — could once again find several B-52s parked on them, laden with nuclear weapons and set to take off at a moment’s notice.

“This is yet one more step in ensuring that we’re prepared,” Gen. David Goldfein, Air Force chief of staff, said in an interview during his six-day tour of Barksdale and other U.S. Air Force bases that support the nuclear mission. “I look at it more as not planning for any specific event, but more for the reality of the global situation we find ourselves in and how we ensure we’re prepared going forward.”

Goldfein and other senior defense officials stressed that the alert order had not been given, but that preparations were under way in anticipation that it might come. That decision would be made by Gen. John Hyten, the commander of U.S. Strategic Command, or Gen. Lori Robinson, the head of U.S. Northern Command. STRATCOM is in charge of the military’s nuclear forces and NORTHCOM is in charge of defending North America.

Putting the B-52s back on alert is just one of many decisions facing the Air Force as the U.S. military responds to a changing geopolitical environment that includes North Korea’s rapidly advancing nuclear arsenal, President Trump’s confrontational approach to Pyongyang, and Russia’s increasingly potent and active armed forces.

Goldfein, who is the Air Force’s top officer and a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is asking his force to think about new ways that nuclear weapons could be used for deterrence, or even combat.

“The world is a dangerous place and we’ve got folks that are talking openly about use of nuclear weapons,” he said. “It’s no longer a bipolar world where it’s just us and the Soviet Union. We’ve got other players out there who have nuclear capability. It’s never been more important to make sure that we get this mission right.”

During his trip across the country last week, Goldfein encouraged airmen to think beyond Cold War uses for ICBMs, bombers and nuclear cruise missiles.
 

kryonlight

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Nelson Report (a reputable newsletter on NE Asia): Removing personal assets from #ROK now advisable, say sr. admin. officials.

DMoErdFXUAIQ0aA.jpg
 

pakchewcheng

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Analysis: F-35 vs. Chinese 5th Gen Stealth

The F-35 has limited range and ability for close combat, but unlike the Chinese and Russian fifth-gens that try to score kills on their own, the F-35 plays like a quarterba...



As the US starts to forward-deploy more of its F-35 Lightning, China and Russia have been putting the finishing touches on their own batches of fifth-generation aircraft — and they all express vastly different ideas about what the future of air combat will look like.

For the US, stealth and sophisticated networks define its vision for the future of air combat with the F-22 and F-35.

For China, the plan is to use range to take out high-value targets with the J-20.

For Russia, the PAK-FA shows that it seems to think dogfighting isn't dead.

Here's how the F-35 stacks up to the competition.

The F-35 Lightning II

the-f-35-lightning-ii.jpg

An F-35B begins its short takeoff from the USS America with an external weapons load.Lockheed Martin
The US's F-35 isn't an airplane — it's three airplanes.

And it isn't a fighter — it's "flying sensor-shooters that have the ability to act as information nodes in a combat cloud universe made up of platforms, not just airborne, but also operating at sea and on land that can be networked together," retired US Air Force Lt. Gen. David Deptula told Defense & Aerospace Report in November.

In a discussion with four F-35 pilots that was also produced by Defense & Aerospace Report, a clear consensus emerged: The difference between an F-35 and an F-15 is like the difference between an iPhone and a corded wall phone. Phones of the past might have had crystal-clear call quality and the ability to conference call, but the iPhone brought with it unprecedented networking and computing capability that has changed life as we know it.

Lt. Col. David "Chip" Berke, a former F-35 squadron commander, told Business Insider that "we don't even know 50-80% of what this airplane can do," as it's awaiting final software upgrades and pilots are finding new ways to use the data link and fused sensors.

That said, the F-35 doesn't offer any significant upgrades in range, weapons payload, or dogfighting ability over legacy aircraft, while its competition does.

The Chengdu J-20

the-chengdu-j-20.jpg

The Chengdu J-20, still mostly seen on the ground.CDD
China's Chengdu J-20 has one thing in common with the F-35 — it's not a fighter.

Malcolm Davis, a senior analyst at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, told Business Insider that the J-20 is "not a fighter, but an interceptor and a strike aircraft" that doesn't seek to contend with US jets in air-to-air battles.

Instead, "the Chinese are recognizing they can attack critical airborne support systems like AWACS" — airborne early-warning and control systems — "and refueling planes so they can't do their job," Davis said. "If you can force the tankers back, then the F-35s and other platforms aren't sufficient because they can't reach their target."

While the Chinese certainly engaged in espionage to steal some of the US's stealth technology, they haven't quite cracked stealth integration, which US companies have been developing for 60 years.

On the J-20's stealth, a senior US low-observable-aircraft design engineer working in the industry told Business Insider that "the J-20 has many features copied from US fifth-gen aircraft; however, it's apparent from looking at many pictures of the aircraft that the designers don't fully understand all the concepts of LO" — low-observable, or stealth — "design."

The real danger of China's J-20 lies not with its ability to fight against US fighters, but with its laserlike focus on destroying the slower, unarmed planes that support US fighters with its long range and long-range missiles, thereby keeping them out of fighting range.

The J-31

the-j-31.jpg

Shenyang J-31 (F60) at the 2014 Zhuhai Air Show.wc/Wikimedia Commons
China's J-31 looks a lot like the F-35, and one Chinese national has pleaded guilty to stealing confidential information about the F-35 program.

That said, the J-31 suffers from China's inferior composite-materials technology and its inability to build planes in the precise way a stealth airplane needs to be built. Additionally, there's reason to suspect the avionics in the Chinese programs significantly lag the F-35.

But the J-31, like the J-20, still poses a significant threat because China has developed long-range missiles, which combined with their ground-based radars and radar sites in the South China Sea could potentially pick off US stealth aircraft before the F-35s and F-22s could fire back.

Davis told Business Insider that the J-31 doesn't just seek to compete with the US militarily, but that the J-31 "very clearly is an F-35 competitor in a commercial sense." Nations that weren't invited to participate in the F-35 program may seek to buy China's cheaper and somewhat comparable J-31.

A fleet of J-31s in the hands of Iran, for example, could pose a serious threat to US interests abroad.

The PAK-FA/T-50

the-pak-fat-50.jpg

Wikipedia Commons
Russia's PAK-FA, also known as the T-50, has been criticized as being fifth-generation "in name only," but as Russia proves time and time again, it doesn't need the best and most expensive technology to pose a real threat to US aircraft.

The PAK-FA's greatest failure is in the stealth arena. While the PAK-FA has some stealth from the front angle, "it's a dirty aircraft," said a person who helps build stealth aircraft, speaking on condition of anonymity because of the classified nature of the work.

But stealth represents just one aspect of air combat, and the Russians have considerable counterstealth technologies. So while the PAK-FA fails to deliver the stealth or total networking capacity of the F-35, it is a fighter — and a damn good one.

The US's F-22 has 2D thrust-vectoring nozzles at the engines and is the most agile plane the US has ever built. The PAK-FA has 3D thrust-vectoring nozzles and is even more agile.

Additionally, the PAK-FA can be armed to the teeth with infrared missiles that focus on heat and ignore the US's stealth. So while the US's fifth generation hinges on controlling the battle from range and at the jump-off point, Russia's PAK-FA seems to focus on close-up fights, which the designers of the F-35 didn't concentrate on.

Conclusion

conclusion.jpg

The first F-35 to arrive at the 33rd Fighter Wing was on display during the aircraft's official rollout ceremony on August 26 at Eglin Air Force Base.Samuel King Jr./US Air Force
China and Russia have both shown the world something new in their fifth-generation aircraft. No longer will these rising powers look to advance the capabilities they currently have — they will actively seek to enter new areas of aerial combat.

Both Russian and Chinese entries seem to focus on key weak points in the US's force structure by using specialized aircraft.

But the US doesn't specialize. The F-35 does everything well and seeks the informational high ground with massive computing power, all-aspect stealth, and the ability to network with almost every set of eyes and ears in the US military.

The F-35 has limited range and ability for close combat, but unlike the Chinese and Russian fifth-gens that try to score kills on their own, the F-35 plays like a quarterback, sending targeting information to any platform available.

As the F-35 software develops, pilots will be free to take on more demanding missions, but China's and Russia's fifth-gens will still be confined to relatively narrow ones.

 

pakchewcheng

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DF21D will also be air launched :- USA carriers got to remain in San Frisco Bay to remain safe

Pictures have surfaced from China's internet supposedly showing a new derivative of the People's Liberation Air Force's Xian H-6 bomber. This incarnation of the H-6, dubbed the H-6N, is designed to carry one weapon in particular—the DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missil


The article below is an indication of what China will be doing .
Of course, it is more diplomatic to say it is for peaceful purpose, to launch satellites and natural progression as space superpower.
But on the other hand, it will be so easy for them to fit the DF21D on plane instead of a rocket to launch satellite.

China plans to launch rockets into space from massive freighters and planes



The country wants to become a space superpower.

By Jeffrey Lin and P.W. Singer September 30, 2017



$

LONG MARCH 11

Thanks to its solid-fueled engine, the Long March 11 can be stored for a long time in a ready-to-fire mode.

Weibo

China's land-based Long March space launch rockets have been the backbone of its space program for more than 40 years. It looks like that's about to change, as the nation is making moves to launch from aircraft and ships.

Starting next year, China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASTC) will use 10,000-ton freighters as ocean-going launchpads for its Long March 11 launch rocket. The Long March 11 can carry up to 1,100 pounds into low-earth orbit. The plan is to bring the freighters to the equator, so the rockets require less fuel and can accommodate larger payloads.

Another alternative is from the air. The China Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology announced this month that they're developing a solid-fueled space launch rocket to be dropped from the Y-20. The rocket itself is expected to weigh about 60 tons (the Y-20's payload is 66 tons) and has a low Earth orbit payload of 220 pounds.

If you're dropping a rocket from an airplane, as opposed to the launching from ground, the rocket's first stage can be smaller, which means it'll be more efficient and could handle a larger payload. That means greater flexibility and a potentially quicker launch—both considerable military advantages.


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JILIN CONSTELLATION

When the Jilin satellite constellation is completed in 2030, China will have access to 138 small satellites ready to snap any place on Earth every 10 minutes.

Jilin Provincial Government

Much as with Elon Musk's SpaceX, Paul Allen's Stratolaunch, and various U.S. military plans, China's move to sea and air launches is an indicator of the country's ambitions for low Earth orbit satellite constellations primed for communications, navigation, and Earth observation.

Those ambitions also mesh well with the broader plan to become a space superpower. The country wants to develop Martian landers, manned moonshots, hypersonic spaceplanes, and reusable rockets.

 

pakchewcheng

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The chinks talk a lot of cock but nothing ever happens. They copy what the rest of the world does but their inferior products break down after just a few days of use.

https://news.nationalgeographic.com/2016/08/china-moon-rover-jade-rabbit-dead-yutu-space-science/

China’s ‘Jade Rabbit’ Moon Rover Declared Dead


Tell me.

The angmo F35 a lot better?
200 F-35 Unfit For Combat, can be civilian? SIA can buy Karuguni Cheap$?


Or their M1 Abrams needing to add petticoats of first the brick ERA, and now the Roman Soldier like Curved ERA and what next that much better?

M1 with 3 Protective Barriers

ROTFFLMFAO!
 

virus

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this pinoy pride is a smart bugger. without forking a single cent, he already have putin, eleven, modi, najob, widodo, the pope, god, dog, allah and trump eating out of his cock.

gay loong should learn from him.
 

virus

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pakchewcheng

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The chinks talk a lot of cock but nothing ever happens. They copy what the rest of the world does but their inferior products break down after just a few days of use.

https://news.nationalgeographic.com/2016/08/china-moon-rover-jade-rabbit-dead-yutu-space-science/

China’s ‘Jade Rabbit’ Moon Rover Declared Dead


Angmoh got it right all the time in space?

Challenger

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AP8601281739.jpg


And now to feed the fishes in Atlantic Ocean

You much better at tokking kok. Must be your Burmese ancestry.
 

pakchewcheng

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Chinese will enforce a no-go zone in the Eastern Pacific and the USA carriers dare not move past Haiwaii.
And the Chinese will take the 2nd island chain as well to the first island chain which is already China in all but the name.
island-chains-image1.gif


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US NAVY FEARS China's DF 21D missile WORLDS FASTEST ANTI SHIP MISSILE

images


A Chinese DF-21D ASBM costs only $5 to $10.5 million. China can afford to build hundreds of them.

df-21d-carrier-test.jpg

China Successfully Tests 'Carrier Killer' Missile In The Gobi Desert.
That was in 2013. The missile will be even more lethal by now and in future


China's 'Carrier Killer' Missile Test


I should add too that China got an even better anti ship missile, the DF-26

China's DF-26 Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile: What Does the Pentagon Really Think?


And thats only for starters. What then about supersonic Chinese anti ship cruise missiles by the thousands?

China's YJ-18 Supersonic Anti-Ship Cruise Missile: America's Nightmare?

And how about subsonic anti-ship cruise missiles? also by the thousands?
And yeah, stealth too.

$

GB-6A

The GB-6A, based on the GS-6 glide cluster bomb, has a turbojet engine (seen in the cutaway at the missile's rear) which could give it a range of 500-600 kilometers (that's about 311-373 miles). Its stealth would make intercepting it highly difficult.


GB-6A subsonic stealth cruise missile, like its American counterparts JSOW-ER, uses a stealth glide bomb (the GS-6) for its fuselage, attaching to a turbojet engine. At about 13-16 feet long, it would likely weigh one ton with a 500 kg warhead. The GS-6A can be launched by the J-10B multirole fighter, and presumably the J-16 and JH-7A strike fighters, and H-6K bomber. The cruise missile would increase China's A2/AD operations by providing a stealthy attack option against enemy bases and warships.


$

SWIFT DEATH

The CM-302, among the world's fastest cruise missiles, reportedly has a 90 percent chance of sinking a 5,000-ton warship with a single hit.


CM-302 supersonic antiship cruise missile, which has a 180-mile range to adhere to MTCR restrictions, is armed with a warhead of over 550 pounds, and thrust vectoring to enable terminal flight maneuvers to avoid close range defense systems of warships like destroyers and aircraft carriers. The CM-302 is the export version of the 250-mile range YJ-12, a highly capable ramjet Mach 4 anti-ship missile used by Chinese attack aircraft.

Thousands of missiles in addition to hundreds of DF-21D and hundreds of DF-26

I think enough to overwhelm whatever the fuck radar carriers got.
Maybe making them so kadang kaboh that the USA warships langar each other that they seem so good at.

I think safest place for USA to keep their carriers will be in San Francisco Bay.

So anymore talk cock about
Then take out China little by little. First thing first, the SCS... island chain around it. Enforce a no fly zone for ship and aeroplane.
Plot the downfall of Yuan.

:biggrin::biggrin::biggrin:

Kong langjeow wei

:biggrin::biggrin::biggrin:



Silkworms!
I am not talking of those go to make silk ties.

The Chinese Silkworms to go to sink ships, with warheads of 300-500 kg shape charges that bring good news to whatever the fuck they hit.

Obsolete in comparison to the newer toys above. Except China must have got a few thousands of those Silkworms
Proven to take out ships in war environment in Persian Gulf and on the Med sea.

That will likely be fired as decoys. Except they are not decoys as they can still bring good news to the ships. and cannot be ignored.
They will be seen as blips on radar by AEGIS travelling at near Mach 1 to M2 speed skimming the horizon. Together with a hundred blips of more powerful bearers of good news.
Many of the more powerful ones are stealth too.

So how the fuck to tell fast on-coming blips apart? Evven the kuching kurad Silkworms cannot be ignored as that might well be the big motherfucker coming their way.
And Silkworms got big bangs too. The radar operators and captains and pengkia and AEGIS computer will shit in their pants.

How many anti missiles missiles have the US of A fleet got?
It is also about maths that I talked about earlier.

Maybe making them so kadang kaboh that the USA warships langar each other that they seem so good at.

I think safest place for USA to keep their carriers will be in San Frisco Bay.
And for Dotard Trump to speak very nicely with Xi.

So anymore talk cock about
Then take out China little by little. First thing first, the SCS... island chain around it. Enforce a no fly zone for ship and aeroplane.
Plot the downfall of Yuan.

:biggrin::biggrin::biggrin:

Kong langjeow wei

:biggrin::biggrin::biggrin:
 

pakchewcheng

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The U.S. Navy’s Big Mistake — Building Tons of Supercarriers

The Pentagon behaves as if aircraft carriers will rule forever … they won’t


by DAVID W. WISE

“History,” it has been written, “does not repeat itself, but it rhymes.” Today it’s rhyming with Gen. Billy Mitchell. In the 1920s, Mitchell challenged conventional thinking by advocating air power at sea in the face of a naval establishment dominated by battleship proponents.

The hubris of the “battleship Navy” was such that just nine days before Pearl Harbor, the official program for the 1941 Army-Navy game displayed a full page photograph of the battleship USS Arizona with language virtually extolling its invincibility.

Of course, the reason that no one had yet sunk a battleship from the air — in combat — was that no one had yet tried.


1*sM5KaHIm9YBzwgMbVv8RNg.png

In fact, Mitchell sank a captured German battleship, the Ostfriesland, in an aerial demonstration back in 1921, but the Navy said that the test proved nothing. Two of the observers that day were officials from Japan.

In addition, the architect of the Pearl Harbor attack, Isoroku Yamamoto, was a student at Harvard at the time and no doubt read accounts of the event that were widely reported in the newspapers.

The aircraft carrier decisively replaced the battleship as the Navy’s sea control capital ship, but its reign in that capacity was, in reality, quite brief. The aircraft carrier established its ascendancy in the Battle of Midway and was the centerpiece of five major sea battles between 1942 and 1944.

Yet, following the Battle of Leyte Gulf in 1944, the U.S. Navy repositioned the aircraft carrier as a platform to project power ashore. The United States did not lose a fleet carrier in the war after the Hornet went down in 1942, because Japan’s surface fleet had been devastated. Nor did Tokyo effectively use its submarines.

That track record, just as the boast in the Army/Navy game program, however, is not an indication that a carrier cannot be sunk — or put out of commission — but rather the fact that since 1945, the U.S. Navy has never engaged another navy in battle that tried.

“Projecting the past into the future is risky business — especially when we’re unsure what that past was,” James Holmes, a naval warfare expert at the U.S. Naval War College wrote.

Which brings us to today. The U.S. Navy has fallen into a troubling pattern of designing and acquiring new classes of ships that would arguably best be left as single ship — or at most in limited numbers. It’s also building several types of new aircraft that fail to meet specifications.

The Navy is developing a new class of supercarriers that cannot function properly, and has designed them to launch F-35 fighters that are not ready to fly their missions. This is all happening during an era of out-of-control budgets, which bodes poorly for American sea power and leadership ahead.

That the Navy is concentrating larger percentages of its total force structure on large, high signature and increasingly vulnerable ships endangers America’s future. Fortunately, there’s better options to the status quo if the Navy moves now.


1*N1MzGSNfG0Wj03G3RS5wbA.jpeg

At top — the USS Ronald Reagan at sea on Oct. 22, 2008. Above — the USS Gerald R. Ford at dock on Aug. 11, 2013. Navy photos
Too expensive
Before asking whether it makes sense to continue to invest in aircraft carriers, we must ask the question whether we can afford them.

The Pentagon commissioned the USS George H.W. Bush in 2009 at a cost of $6.1 billion. America’s most recent aircraft carrier, the USS Gerald R. Ford, will cost more than double that in constant dollars. The carriers’ air wings cost about 70 percent again the cost of the ship itself.

In an era when personnel costs — including healthcare and pensions — are consuming the military from within, the fact that these craft require 46 percent of the Navy’s personnel to man and support places them in the crosshairs in an extreme budget-constrained environment.

The Center for Budgetary and Strategic Assessments stated that being the most expensive piece of military equipment in the world makes “them a prime — and perhaps even a necessary target — in this era of belt tightening.”

If 11 carriers — as required by legislation — is the minimal number required to have an effective supercarrier force, then carrier proponents are hoist upon their own petard.

“If our fleet of small numbers is so fragile that it cannot afford the loss of a single ship due to budgeting, how will it survive the inevitable losses of combat?” Commander Phillip E. Pournelle wrote in Proceedings.

That day has already come. As of early 2014, the Navy only has 10 operational supercarriers. Sequestration delayed the deployment of the Harry S. Trumanand has the Navy scrambling to come up with funds to refuel the Abraham Lincoln, raising the question whether the latter will ever come back into service.

It appears dubious that the Ford will have overcome major development issues to come into service in 2016.

Furthermore, if sequestration persists, the Navy might have to mothball four of nine air wings, making the discussion of 11 carrier platforms moot. Due to these substantial constraints, the Congressional Budget Office and former Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel both floated the possibility of the Navy going down to as few as eight supercarriers.



The Navy, like the other services, has proven itself incapable of running an effective weapons acquisition program in recent decades. Instead, the services pay increasingly more money for progressively fewer units that often fail to meet original specifications.

The current shipbuilding plan calls for the Navy to have 306 ships while the actual number has dwindled 285. The CBO recently concluded that there is approximately a 30 percent gap between what the Navy would require to meet its shipbuilding plan and what it will likely obtain through the appropriation process.

The Navy’s own acquisitions chief recently told Congress that given the current trends and budget outlook, the Navy could slip to as few as 240 shipsin the next several decades.

The commitment to aircraft carriers is literally cannibalizing the rest of the Navy and simultaneously interfering with its ability to meet emerging requirements and threats.

Work began in 2005 on the Ford at an estimated procurement cost of $10.5 billion, which later increased to $12.8 and most recently to $14.2 billion and rising. Unfortunately, as the General Accountability Office noted in a recent report — issued when the Ford was 56 percent complete — that “our previous work has shown that the full extent of cost growth does not usually manifest itself until after the ship is more than 60 percent complete.”

Stating that the “plan may prove unexecutable,” the GAO added that the Fordwill be unlikely to fill the gap created by the scheduled decommissioning of the Enterprise. Worse, the Ford would “likely face operational limitations that extend past commissioning and into initial deployments.”

The already stretched multi-year procurement budget assumes that the Navy will spend $43 billion to procure the Ford and two other carriers of this class at the pace of one every five years, which does not include any additional cost overruns.

Unfortunately, cost estimates for the F-35Cs slated to fly off the Ford’s decks have almost doubled while performance concerns continue to mount.

Calling the Navy estimates “optimistic,” the GAO exhorted the service to “improve the realism” of the budget projections. Meanwhile the CBO has floated various options including canceling future procurement of Ford-class carriers. The Navy is currently trying to shift part of the funding for completion until after delivery of the first ship in an apparent attempt to obscure the extent of the overruns.

The surface fleet procurement program has suffered a massive disconnect between emerging capabilities and system design. Naval Operations chief Adm. Jonathan Greenert discussed the revolution in precision-weaponry such that “instead of sorties per aimpoint, we now commonly speak of aimpoints per sortie.”

But instead of leveraging this massive improvement in precision weapons, the Ford-class carriers were designed prior to his tenure and the costs have driven through the roof. This was in order to include new, untested technologies that dramatically increased the number of sorties that could be launched even though the performance ratios were going dramatically in the opposite direction.


1*smAMcvAMOzXlKkp2FG3ZUw.jpeg

An American aircraft carrier viewed through a Soviet periscope, circa 1974. Russian navy photo
Vulnerable to attack
The economies of scale that favored the carrier as a force projection instrument were made possible by the ability of such behemoths to operate close to shore with impunity. That age is drawing to a close.

The famed Adm. Horatio Nelson observed that “a ship’s a fool to fight a fort.” In the new age that is dawning, the “fort” is an increasingly sophisticated range of over-the-horizon anti-ship missiles that render surface ships vulnerable, and which will deny them proximity to the coastlines where U.S. carriers have reigned for decades.

These include ballistic missiles fired from a wide range of platforms, including easy to conceal mobile launchers. In a sweeping 2013 paper on the carrier’s future, Navy Capt. Henry Hendrix estimated China could produce 1,227 DF-21D ballistic anti-ship missiles for the cost of a single U.S. carrier.

Although one missile might not sink a carrier, a single missile might cause sufficient damage to take it out of commission.

Further, the radar signature of a 100,000-ton ship is very large and the sensors used on the carrier’s current defense systems only increase that signature.

In such an attack, the fleet must be able to defend against a large number of incoming weapons approaching on evasive trajectories at greater than twice the speed of sound, while the attacker needs to only score a few hits. These new anti-ship missiles “put U.S. forces on the wrong side of physics,” the U.S. Naval War College’s Andrew Erickson warned.

Emerging anti-ship technology also places the aircraft carrier on the wrong side of basic arithmetic.

In its capacity as a force projection platform, the carrier operates by launching various types of attack and tactical fighter aircraft from its decks. The unrefueled radius of the Navy’s current F/A-18E Super Hornet falls within 390–450 nautical miles. The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter will have an unrefueled combat radius of 730 nautical miles.

The Department of Defense, however, estimates that the range of the DF-21D anti-ship missile to be 1,500–1,750 nautical miles and some speculate the range to be greater.

Recognizing the fact that these numbers will require placing the carrier strike groups well outside of their range, former Naval War College Dean Robert Rubel observed that “a successful defense of a carrier does no good if the carrier cannot in turn succeed in attacking enemy naval forces.”

Although a sustained attack from land-based ballistic missiles would be more than a challenge for the Navy’s current “hard kill” defense systems, the situation is potentially more serious.

The Navy’s plan to disrupt ballistic missile command-and-control systems with electronic measures would be inhibited by the same “range” arithmetic that keeps such craft far from shore.

“Even more ominous,” military analyst Robert Haddick wrote, “are the squadrons of maritime strike fighters capable of launching scores of long-range, high-speed anti-ship cruise missiles, in volumes that threaten to overwhelm the most modern fleet defenses.”

A reality-check exercise would be to conduct a theoretical battle with the rapidly developing People’s Liberation Army Navy. The Chinese have around 100 fast missile boats — primarily of the Hubei class with stealth catamaran hulls — that carry eight anti-ship cruise missiles with current ranges of 160 nautical miles.

A coordinated attack would also likely include aircraft and Sovremenny-class destroyers and, in the next decade, an estimated 75–80 submarines — both nuclear and diesel — armed with torpedoes and some with wave skimming, supersonic anti-ship missiles supplied by or copied from advanced Russian models.

Russia has been developing sea- and bomber-launched anti-ship missiles for decades. Russia is also a major arms merchant, making these anti-access systems potentially among its most attractive wares. In addition, those that are not purchased could also be reverse-engineered. Iran has, for obvious reasons, a very strong interest in and an unknown arsenal of such weapons.

As the costs of these weapons come down, the rate of proliferation will increase and place this technology in the hands of smaller states and potentially non-state groups. With such proliferation, the latitude of carrier task groups to own the coastlines along which they wish to operate in a power projection role will evaporate.

A troubling sign of things to come is a Russian firm that is reportedly selling a “Club-K” cruise missile concealable in shipping containers deployable on trucks, rail cars or merchant ships.

Although the saliency of this issue is now greater due to rapid advances in capabilities, there is nothing new in the vulnerability of aircraft carriers in specific and surface ships in general. Like the battleship admirals prior to Pearl Harbor, carrier advocates take solace from an unblemished record resulting from “the Cold War [having] ended without a Leyte Gulf,” Holmes noted.


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Above left— Chinese Hubei-class fast missile boats. Photo via Chinese internet. Above right — a Club-K container ship cruise missile. Wikimedia photo. Below left — an illustration from Chinese media depicting a DF-1D attack on the U.S. Navy. Illustration via Chinese Internet. Below right — a Russian Sovremmeny-class destroyer. Wikimedia photo

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A U.S. carrier group only came face-to-face with a Russian carrier task force during the Cold War once. During the tensions surrounding the Yom Kippur war, the presence of a “locally superior Russian force” resulted in the American ships having to reposition further west in the Mediterranean.

Soviet Adm. Sergei Gorchakov reportedly held the view that the U.S. had made a strategic miscalculation by relying on large and increasingly vulnerable aircraft carriers. The influential U.S. Adm. Hyman Rickover shared this view. In a 1982 congressional hearing, legislators asked him how long American carriers would survive in an actual war.

Rickover’s response? “Forty-eight hours,” he said.

Now let’s take a look at the unofficial record derived from war games. In 2002, the U.S. Navy held a large simulated war game, the Millennium Challenge, to test scenarios of attacks on the fleet by a hypothetical Gulf state — Iraq or possibly Iran.

The leader of the red team employed brilliant asymmetric tactics resulting in 16 U.S. ships, including two supercarriers, going to the bottom in a very short span of time. The Navy stopped the war game, prohibited the red team from using these tactics and then reran the exercise declaring victory on the second day.

As with Billy Mitchell and the Ostfriesland, according to the Navy the sinkings never happened. But, as Robert Gates noted in his memoirs, “the enemy always gets a vote.”

Ballistic missiles are just the most recent challenge to carrier vulnerability. “I would argue that you can put a ship out of action faster by putting a hole in the bottom [with a torpedo] than by putting a hole in the top [with a weapon like the DF-21],” former U.S. Naval Operations chief Gary Roughhead said.

This extends to diesel submarines. Although the number of simulated “sinkings” by ships of the Navy is officially unacknowledged, there are reports of around a dozen U.S. aircraft carriers being “sunk” in exercises with friendly countries including Canada, Denmark and Chile.

In 2005, the USS Ronald Reagan was “sunk” by the Gotland, an electric diesel sub that the U.S. Navy borrowed from Sweden between 2005 and 2007 and which was never detected in exercises by U.S. carrier groups during all that time.

Although it’s true that the Soviets and the Americans never faced off in an actual naval battle, there is every reason to believe that they would have had some success against the “invulnerable” carriers. As far back as 1968, a fast nuclear powered Russian submarine matched the Enterprise at top speed in the Pacific.

Buy ‘Ghost Fleet: A Novel of the Next World War.’
In 1995, Israeli Adm. Yedidia Ya’ri wrote in the 2005 Naval War College Review that the Russian SS-N-22 “Muskit” anti-ship missile “can probably penetrate any existing defense system, hard or soft-kill, especially when launched in salvos.”

In 2012, test of a slower and higher-flying surrogate of the Muski missile demonstrated that “the Aegis system could not be relied on for effective defense of itself or the aircraft carriers it was escorting,” Winslow Wheeler of the Straus Military Reform Project noted.

One carrier, the USS Kitty Hawk, used up three of its nine lives having been run into by an undetected Soviet sub in 1984, overflown by two undetected Russian planes — an Su-24 and an Su-27 — in 2000, and surprised by a Chinese Song-class attack submarine that surfaced undetected inside its perimeter and within torpedo range in 2006.

In March of this year, the French Navy reported that it had sunk the USSTheodore Roosevelt and half of its escorts in a war game, but hurriedly removed that information from its website.

The world, of course, is not standing still. Missile ranges and speeds will increase. Missiles will become more elusive and accurate — and could be nuclear-tipped. Sensors will see further and more accurately, significantly reducing the fog of war. Surface ships, no matter where located, will be increasingly vulnerable.

Supercavitating torpedoes — such as the Russian Shkval — already travel at 200 knots and can track ships for more than 1,000 kilometers. Above the surface, supersonic anti-ship missiles that currently travel at Mach 2 will be replaced by hypersonic missiles that will travel at Mach 5, and Mach 10 and Mach 25.

And well above the surface, newer electronic warfare weapons will reach into space and attack satellites and communications on which the modern information awareness of battle depends.


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The carrier-launched X-47B unmanned aircraft near USS George H.W. Bush on May 14, 2013. Navy photo
The future is drones and submarines
The modern aircraft carrier strike group stands at the very pinnacle in the history of warfare in terms of conventional lethality and sophistication. Unfortunately, in the modern context it resembles a Rube Goldberg device — the most complicated system that can be devised to perform a mission.

In order to deliver firepower on a target, the U.S. Navy fields an increasing unaffordable supercarrier which must be escorted by one Aegis cruiser, two destroyers, a nuclear attack submarine and a combined strike force crew of more than 6,000 to carry and launch an air wing of increasingly unaffordable airplanes with inadequate range.

The supercarrier requires an exponential and compounding set of very expensive investments. The total acquisition cost of a carrier strike group exceeds $25 billion, an air wing another $10 billion and the annual operating costs of perhaps $1 billion.

Yet, a cruise missile fired from a wide range of lower signature ships costs less than a third of each bomb delivered by a fighter from the deck of a carrier. Nor do these platforms require a carrier’s defensive shield — and they can launch from beyond the range of carrier-based aircraft.

In another time, the battles of Crecy and Agincourt signaled the end of the age of the armored knight who could be defeated from a distance with advanced, low cost, armor-piercing arrows. The age of the cavalry ended with advances in artillery, mechanized armor and the machine gun in World War I.

A similar shift is occurring now and will displace the modern equivalent of the dashing cavalry officer — the fighter pilot. The knight class never passes willingly — as they take justifiable pride in their acumen and truly believe in their mission. However, the carrier and its air wing cannot be allowed to drive strategy or procurement.

Nonetheless, the U.S. Navy continues to pursue the next generation of fighter, the F-35C, and the next two Ford-class carriers to launch them in spite of an explosion of costs and questions about performance, including its stealthiness.

In what seems like a perversion of logic, the air-Navy “union” has even proposed using some of the new unmanned systems being developed by the Navy, not to replace the fighter, but as an aerial refueling tanker to try to keep the manned aircraft relevant.

USNI News has also reported that the Navy plans to reduce the UCLASS drone to perform only surveillance functions in order to preserve manned fighters. More Rube Goldberg. It’s in no way to dishonor the bravery and skill of fighter pilots to recognize the facts of physiology and physics. Unmanned vehicles and missiles can operate at speeds and turn radiuses that are impossible for a human to withstand.

With the pilot no longer in the equation, the vehicles can also achieve greater stealth. Unmanned craft and missiles cost dramatically less and remove the loss of the pilot from the equation, thus opening up an entire range of strike options than would otherwise be unavailable or suicidal.

Although TV viewers were in awe of images of precision weapons during Desert Storm, precision guided munitions had improved in effectiveness by 12 to 20 fold by the time of the second Iraq war. Those improvements will continue to be matched by increases in range accompanied, in some instances, by hypersonic speed.

In the meantime, new passive and active methods– including the use of VHF and UHF from other sources — will make stealth increasingly elusive to achieve. Worryingly, Defense News has reported claims by Chinese sources that its DWL002 passive radar had already rendered the F-35 obsolete.

Concurrently, improvements and the ubiquitous placement of sensors feeding into massive computational systems will make total battlefield awareness — with the world being the battlefield — a reality. “Sooner or later most of the world’s oceans will fall under the shadow of land-based precision weaponry,” Holmes wrote.

The next two Ford-class carriers will not be completed for another decade — assuming the problems with the first vessel are resolved — and will have a life of 50 years. Can anyone possibly believe, given the pace of technological improvements, that by 2065 supercarriers and the manned aircraft that fly off of them will be anything other than relics?

Given these arguments, the Navy cannot and should not continue to pursue a force structure of 11 carriers. In 2013, an unmanned X-47B with a range three times the current carrier strike group — and twice that projected for the F-35C — landed on the deck of a carrier. Yet the Navy is spending too little on the revolution in unmanned systems.

In a recent joint think-tank symposium, both CSBA and Center for a New American Security called for decommissioning at least two carrier strike groups and possibly diverting savings from the F-35 program to “facilitate this revolution.”

In other words, over the next four or five decades the Navy would transition from large carriers launching fifth-generation fighters to supercarriers launching unmanned systems and to smaller amphibious assault ships — and other lower cost platforms — launching a variety of unmanned systems.


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Above left — the USS New Mexico in March 2010. Above right — an unmanned underwater vehicle during a Navy demonstration. Below left — the USNS John Glenn. Below right — concept art for the USNS Lewis B. Puller. Navy photos

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The Navy’s penchant for building ever larger and more complex carrier strike forces is analogous to an effort to build ever larger mainframe computers while the world is already moving from distributed systems to the cloud. Precise weapons can also be placed on a wide range of craft — even fishing boats — raising the specter of the USS Cole suicide attack on steroids.

“Because the most critical naval competition will be a battle of signatures, a small signature-controlled combatant with long-range precision strike will be a decisive component of any fleet,” Hendrix pointed out in Proceedings.

The economics and efficacy of substituting modular and expendable payloads for large hulking platforms is compelling. Such a naval force structure would “more distributed, networked, numerous, elusive, small, long-range and hard to find,” David Gompert and Terrence Kelly of the RAND Corporation noted.

Although the supercarrier would remain in the fleet until the Ford comes out of service, the Navy must move away from its carrier-centric architecture. Large surface ships are increasingly vulnerable, and the Navy should not be build and operate them if the costs are unacceptable.

New and very low-cost landing ships such as the USNS Montford Point and John Glenn can be built at about 1/25th to 1/30th the cost of a supercarrier and project advanced missiles, drones, helicopters, V-22 Ospreys or jump jets. Instead of an arsenal of 90 missiles on an existing Aegis craft, the new Afloat forward stage base ship Lewis B. Puller can hold 2,000 missiles at one-fourth the cost of an Arleigh Burke-class destroyer.

Another logical response to the strategic and technological realities facing the Navy would dictate a very marked emphasis on the improvement and development of a subsurface strategy — both manned and unmanned. Submarines are less vulnerable to cyber and electronic interventions than air- and surface-weapons.

“The sea acts as a massive electromagnetic barrier to interference and as a de facto armor against most forms of attack such as anti-surface cruise or ballistic missiles like the DF-21D ‘carrier killer,’” retired Commander Victor Vescovo stated in Proceedings.

The increasing vulnerability of carriers presents the U.S. in a crisis with a Hobson’s choice of acquiescence or possible exposure of the fleet to heavy losses and potential escalation.

The emerging doctrine of AirSeaBattle, besides possibly coming too late to be of use, would similarly present the U.S. with a policy option that seems to ensure escalation.

The pivot to Asia should result in a pivot in procurement to subsurface vehicles — including stealthy unmanned underwater drones and gliders — not with the objective of scrapping for a fight, but for deterrence and to preserve the peace.

Unfortunately, that’s not happening. The fleet of nuclear attack submarines — as opposed to strategic submarines armed with nuclear warheads — is now slated to drop from 54 in 2013 to cover the entire world to possibly as low as just 39 by 2030.

At present, the Navy is straining to build two attack submarines a year, while it could afford to build 10 at the cost of just one carrier and its air wing and, arguably, to much greater strategic effect. In addition, unlike most of the surface ship acquisition programs, attack submarine programs have had a generally good record for coming in on schedule and budget.

One of the most effective components of an effective submarine procurement program should be a back-to-the-future program involving very quiet diesel submarines. Diesel submarines are very hard to detect and can be procured at a rate of three or four per the cost of each nuclear submarine.

But here, as with Navy carrier policy, the leadership will encounter strong resistance from one of its “unions,” in this case the submariners who are committed to the nuclear Navy.

Sound policy will also require overcoming resistance to replacing manned subs with all manner of unmanned underwater vessels — from the very small to large-displacement unmanned vehicles.

Submarines, which were unsung game changers in both world wars, must continue to develop in terms of offensive capability as launchers of cruise missiles, non-nuclear ballistic missiles and eventually hypersonic missile.

The U.S. Navy is unquestionably the most powerful in the world today in the aggregate. Unfortunately, repeating that phrase like a standard campaign applause line isn’t helpful. While the entire U.S. Navy dominates in tonnage and sheer firepower, that may not be meaningful in a specific locale with the force on deployment.

Then again, although Navy war games often disallow this reality, the very fact that the American Navy is the most powerful to fight a specific type of naval engagement practically guarantees that a future opponent will be so rude as to play a different game.


Yet, the Navy projects into the future a force structure that really is an updated version of what fought in the Pacific in the 1940s, and which was really untested in the Cold War. The alternative force structure hinted at here would equip the Navy possibly for the next 30 to 40 years.

Projected advances in sensor technology, as Greenert noted, will “make stealth difficult to maintain above and below water.” So, too, will the increasing range and precision of hypersonic weapons and the disabling stealth of deniable cyber-attacks. At that point, going into the 2050s and 2060s yet a different force structure and battle concept will be required.

One thing is certain, however. The aircraft carrier will not be the relevant weapon in the second half of the century. Continued overinvestment in them only ensures that the nations and possibly non-state groups that understand the future will be the ones that control the waves.

 

pakchewcheng

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YJ-12 : US media’ exposure of China’s most dangerous missile so far, even more dangerous than DF-21D


YJ-12

DF-21D

DF-21D MIRV Version

YJ-12 Anti-ship Missile Regarded by US media as China’s Most Dangerous Missile
US War on the Rocks website published an article on July 2 titled “China’s Most Dangerous Missile (So Far)” by Robert Haddick, an independent contractor at U.S. Special Operations Command, that regards China’s YJ-12 anti-ship missile as China’s most dangerous weapon so far.
Haddick’s article is based Pantagon’s latest annual report that briefly mentions that anti-ship cruise missile (ASCM). He quotes the report as saying, “The new missile provides an increased threat to naval assets, due to its long range and supersonic speeds.”
According to Haddick, the report understates the danger of the missile to US Navy in Western Pacific because the missile constitutes a threat greater even than the much-discussed DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM).
YJ-12 missile is indeed China’s powerful weapon againt US aircraft carrier strike group, but his comparison between YJ-12 and DF-21D proves his ignorance about China’s weapon development.
Haddick said that DF-21D had “still apparently not tested against a moving target at sea”. This proves even the best informed US military expert does not really know China’s weapon development.
That is perhaps due to his inability to read Chinese military materials.

An article by Wang Genbin, deputy commander-in-chief of Department 4 of China Aerospace Science & Industry Corp. (CASIC), on a journal publicly available in China. Wang says in the article that in the two decades since 1988, China spent 3 billion yuan ($494 million) in successfully developing DF-21A, 21B, 21C and 21D missiles and completed the transition from development of only nuclear missiles to that of both nuclear and conventional missiles and from fixed target to low-speed target. In addition, the accuracy has been improved from several hundred to several tens of meters. The two decades from 1988 ended in 2008. What Wang says means that by 2008, DF-21D is able to hit low-speed target, i.e. a warship, with the accuracy of several tens of meters. Do you think Wang’s figure is not based on tests? In China, an officer of his rank will be in problem if the accuracy he mentioned is not based on tests.
For fear of being blamed for revealing the secret about the test results of DF-21D, important Chinese official media huanqiu.com says in its report : A US research institute believes that in 2011 and 2012, China conducted quite a few launches of DF-21D in the South China Sea and successfully hit and sank a simulated model of aircraft carrier made by transforming China’s Yuanwang 4 survey ship.
Return to YJ-12, Haddick says: Naval War College Review published a 2011 study that YJ-12 had the longest range of 400 km among all the ASCMs in the world. It enables Chinese attack aircraft to launch it outside the engagement range of US Navy’s Aegis Combat System and the SM-2 air-defense missiles. As a result US aircraft carrier strike group does not have enough time to respond to the attack.
Haddick describes in his article a realistic future scenario of China sending 48 Su-30 MKK or J-11B fighter jets to attack a US aircraft carrier combat group. The Chinese aircrafts are supersonic and have a combat radius of 1.500 km. They each can carry two to four YJ-12 missiles. As those aircrafts are roughly equal in strength to that of US F-15E fighter-bombers, the aircrafts from the US carrier can only shoot down a few of them. The 100 YJ-12s launched by them from various directions at very low altitude above sea surface will not be detected until they are so close that the US warships have only 45 seconds to engage them.
According to the conclusion of a study from the Naval Postgraduate School, surface warships on alert were only able to hit 32% of the attacking missiles. That means more than 32 of the more than 100 ASCMs will hit US warships, but US navy will be in trouble if only five of them hit US warships.
Haddick says that US Navy is well aware of the threat and plans to develop Navy’s long-range network engagement to destroy YJ-12s and the aircrafts launching them far away. However he believes that China may develop longer-ranged ASCMs with better target seekers. In this competition China “seems to possess the competitive cost and technology advantages”
This blogger’s Note: It is common sense that a warship is a much larger target than a missile; therefore, it is much easier to develop a missile to hit a warship than a missile to hit another missile. In addition, ASCMs are much cheaper than warships especially aircraft carriers.
Based on mil.huanqiu.com’s report “The US discloses China’s real aircraft carrier killer more formidable than DF-21D missile”, I said saturated cruise missile attack was more formidable than DF-21D. Let me quote the following paragraphs in the post:
US think tank International Strategy Research Institute recently published a report, stating that in spite of the great concern raised by PLA’s DF-21D anti-aircraft carrier missile, China’s anti-ship cruise missiles may finally be the greatest threat to US aircraft carrier combat groups.
Cruise missiles are cheap but accurate and can be launched from land, warships, submarines and aircrafts. Simultaneous attack of lots of cruise missiles can frustrate an aircraft carrier combat group’s Aegis air defense so that they can be used to destroy the group.
Due to their compact shape, supersonic speed, small radar signal and low-altitude flight, they can better penetrate enemy air defense. In addition, once launched, a cruise missile needs little support. It can hit its target even if the warship or aircraft that launched it has been destroyed.
Source: huanqiu.com “US media’ exposure of China’s most dangerous missile so far, even more dangerous than DF-21D” (summary by Chan Kai Yee)
 

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First Picture of China's New YJ-12A Anti-Ship Missile During Launch Revealed

Ahead of Airshow China 2016 due to start this week in Zuhai, the first ever picture showing a YJ-12A new generation surface launched anti-ship missile has been released. The YJ-12A is the latest supersonic anti-ship missile of the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN). It was unveiled for the first time last year during the victory day parade.

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The first ever picture of the PLAN's YJ-12A in its launch phase, with booster attached.


YJ-12A is the surface launched variant of the air launched YJ-12. YJ-12 first picture emerged in 2013. The missile appears somewhat similar in design to the Russian Kh-31 air to surface missile or to the US made GQM-163A Coyote which is a supersonic sea skimming target.

Like the missiles mentioned above, the Chinese missile uses ramjet technology: Airbreathing jet engine using the engine's forward motion to compress incoming air, without a rotary compressor. It allows missiles to reach very high speeds.


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The YJ-12A is a next generation Chinese supersonic anti-ship missile. It was unveiled for the first time last year during the victory day parade.


The YJ-12 (YingJi meaning Eagle Strike) was designed by the Third Academy of the China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation "CASIC" (HiWING Mechanical & Electrical Technology Corporation). It is fitted with liquid-fueled ramjet (with a combined booster and combustion chamber).

Its reported speed is around Mach 2 if launched from a low altitude and up to Mach 3.2 if launched from high altitude. According to Chinese sources, the YJ-12 maximum range is around 380 kilometers (the distance varies depending on launch altitude) and its terminal attack altitude is 15 meters. Finally the missile would be about 6,3 meters long with a diameter below 0,756 meters.

As we reported earlier, the PLAN is currently reffiting its Project 956E Sovremennyy destroyers with the YJ-12A. The future Type 055 Destroyer may be fitted with this anti-ship missile as well.


So anymore talk cock about
Then take out China little by little. First thing first, the SCS... island chain around it. Enforce a no fly zone for ship and aeroplane.
Plot the downfall of Yuan.

:biggrin::biggrin::biggrin:

Kong langjeow wei

:biggrin::biggrin::biggrin:
 

pakchewcheng

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It is interesting what China learned from the Falkland war. And other lessons you will be reading about
And above extracts what Chinese done to put in place lessons that they learned.

This was written in Jan 2015. China gone a lot lot further now, and will go even further in the near future.

Bear in mind the YJ83 is the obsolete Silkworm.
Even so . . . enjoy the reading.


So anymore talk cock about
Then take out China little by little. First thing first, the SCS... island chain around it. Enforce a no fly zone for ship and aeroplane.
Plot the downfall of Yuan.

:biggrin::biggrin::biggrin:

Kong langjeow wei

:biggrin::biggrin::biggrin:

The Real Military Threat from China: Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles
Posted: January 26, 2015 | Author: chankaiyee2 |



PLA’s new anti-ship cruise missiles

During the 1982 Falklands War, Argentina possessed a measly total of five Exocet anti-ship cruise missiles with which to face down the Royal Navy in the South Atlantic. Had that number been more like 50 or 100, that conflict might well have had a very different ending. This important lesson has not been lost on China’s military chiefs. Indeed, China has placed great emphasis on anti-ship cruise missile (ASCM) development over the last three decades and is now set to reap the strategic benefits of this singular focus.

Western defense analysts have taken up the habit of fixating on the “whiz-bang” aspects of Chinese military modernization, such as the anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM), or threats that are largely hypothetical, such as Beijing’s supposedly fearsome cyber arsenal. However, it will be unwise to ignore certain more mundane threats of proven lethality. These concern, at least in part, China’s emergent naval air arm and not the carrier-based part of that air-arm – which continues to be the red herring of Chinese naval development, at least for now. Flying from bases in the Mainland out to longer ranges with more sophisticated search radars and electronic countermeasures, the large fleet of land-based aircraft will now deploy some of the world’s most advanced anti-ship cruise missiles to boot. This rather mature capability might be described as “air-sea battle” with Chinese characteristics.

This edition of Dragon Eye probes a survey from the October 2014 issue of Mandarin-language defense magazine 舰载武器 [Shipborne Weapons] of “中国海军空基对海打击力量” [The Chinese Navy’s Air-Based Maritime Strike Force]. The magazine is published by a Zhengzhou institute of the China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation (CSIC), a primary actor in China’s ongoing naval modernization process.

Hardly Satisfied

The background sketch of this force reveals a keen appreciation by the Chinese analyst of the PLA Navy’s early difficulties in developing a naval air strike force. It is noted that the absence of such a force was plainly revealed during the 1974 battle with Vietnam for the Paracels in which Chinese supporting forces were totally absent in the air above the sea battle. With the initial deployment of the stubby Q-5 attack aircraft, as well as the low-performing H-6 bomber and J-7 fighter-bomber, China could be said to have a strike force, though admittedly one with rather pathetic capabilities. The Q-5 could hardly muster a combat radius of 300 km, the H-6 was too expensive, and the J-7 suffered from a weak radar, low survivability, and backward electronic systems.

A turning point in Beijing’s quest to develop a credible “air-sea battle” strategy occurred in 2004 with the arrival of 24 Su-30MK2s from Russia. For the first time ever, the Chinese Navy possessed a modern, capable strike platform. Not only could this aircraft fly well beyond the first island chain to a radius of about 1,300km, but these imported planes came equipped with the highly prized Mach 3 KH31 ASCM. At the same time, Chinese military leaders were not content to rely on imported weaponry and during the late 1990s pursued extensive upgrades for both the H-6 bomber and the J-7 fighter bomber.

The H-6 M/G joined the Chinese Navy in 2003-04 and featured an advanced search radar, fire control, navigation, communications, and electronic countermeasures systems. Similar improvements and a new engine were among the major alterations to J-7 that resulted in the JH7A, which became a major focal point of Chinese naval strike aviation for the last decade. The author of this analysis concludes: “… JH7A has received lot of resources from the Chinese Navy, and at this time there are already three regiments comprising more than 80 aircraft in service. Together with the 24 Su-30 MKK2 multi-role fighters, they form the foundation of the Chinese Navy’s tactical strike force against sea [targets].”

Above all, however, it is the widespread use of the YJ83 ASCM (C802) with a 150 km range in combination with the new, upgraded aircraft variants discussed above that has radically improved China’s ability to strike naval surface targets from the air over the last decade. A copy of this missile made headlines when one struck and achieved a mission kill against an Israeli corvette in 2006. Its effectiveness is further suggested by the many countries that have sought to purchase this particular Chinese ASCM. The article interestingly notes that while the YJ83 is subsonic, the imported Russian-made supersonic KH31 “in certain situations with respect to combat effectiveness” actually does not compare favorably to the YJ83. But this analysis also suggests that, actually, even in the scenario of a multi-axial attack the YJ83 is “less than ideal” against a carrier battle group or large-size air defense destroyer. Summing up the appraisal of China’s first generation aerial maritime strike forces, the author concludes candidly that compared to neighboring armed forces, that Chinese forces were “并不强大” [not especially impressive], but against USN carrier battle groups or against Japanese forces “更难以发挥什么作用” [they would hardly have any use at all].

China’s New Generation of Aerial Maritime Strike Forces

By contrast, according to this late 2014 Chinese analysis, “… the second generation of long-range aerial maritime strike forces … will be completely able to satisfy the Chinese Navy’s strategic combat requirements for the new century.” It continues that internet sources and photographs reveal that the “second generation forces are already equipping combat forces …”

The JH-7B fighter attack represents a further dramatic refinement of this workhorse of Chinese maritime strike aviation. A prototype first flew in 2012, and serial production is apparently expected to begin in 2015. The improved aircraft is said to increase the combat radius to as far as 1,800 km and even out to 4,500km since it has the aerial refueling capability that its predecessor lacked. Within the Chinese Navy’s developing “high-low mix,” this airframe will form the lower class platform and this analysis explicitly suggests the JH-7B’s “low price” is a factor in the acquisition strategy. A more high performance strike aircraft will be the J-16, which seems to be an indigenized version of the Su-30MKK2. This report claims, moreover, that it will be superior to the Russian aircraft in several respects, including its sensors. This new aircraft is said to be already entering service with the PLA Navy. Interestingly, the article notes that while a large strike platform is desirable, the PLA Navy nevertheless does not expect to continue improvements to the H-6 bomber, but rather prefers a complete redesign of an aircraft intended to carry 8-10 long-range anti-ship missiles out to ranges of 3,000 km or more.

But as anyone familiar with the B-52’s long run in service with the U.S. Air Force, maritime strike is not really about the aircraft, which will be by and large “shoot and scoot,” but rather about the missile. Here, the news is grim. This Chinese analysis yields up two new and potent arrows in the Chinese Navy’s quiver. The first is the Mach 3 YJ-12. This supersonic ASCM is capable of ranges up to 300 km. The second is a sub-sonic ASCM with a range of up to 800 km that is designated as YJ-100. Such capabilities imply that, as least for the near future, U.S. forces may be “outgunned” by China’s emerging ASCM inventory. Nor is it clear that U.S. defense analysts fully understand the nature of the threat. A 2014 U.S. government-sponsored study of the Chinese ASCM threat, for example, seems to largely neglect the “second generation” of aerial maritime strike platforms, both missiles and aircraft, discussed in this Chinese analysis.

According to this Chinese article, China aerial maritime strike has increased its combat efficiency in recent years by tenfold. It is noted that further breakthroughs are required (e.g. long range reconnaissance), but this Chinese author concludes: “The building of the second generation aerial maritime strike force will allow China to effectively control neighboring sea areas and sea lines of communication …” Future Chinese ASCM designs will seek to push the envelope on speed up to Mach 4 and even Mach 6, according to this analysis.

A standard response to concerns over Chinese aerial maritime strike forces is that U.S. aircraft and pilots are superior plane-for-plane and pilot-for-pilot. Perhaps that is still true. Hence, the Chinese attack aircraft will hypothetically be “splashed” before getting close enough to unleash their deadly array of missiles. Unfortunately, that perspective does not sufficiently account for not only the increasing range and sophistication of Chinese missiles, but also the likelihood that Chinese missiles will destroy air bases such as Kadena in the first phase of any conflict. That opening salvo from China’s Second Artillery could leave China’s large air forces a relatively free hand to establish air superiority and to hunt widely in the near seas and beyond for U.S. carrier battle groups and other adversary surface action groups. This Chinese article seems to provide even more of a basis for the argument to invest in the U.S. Navy’s submarine force, which is nearly invulnerable to Chinese ASCMs, or in the versatile F-35B that may yet succeed in hiding out and operating from remote and rugged airstrips around the Asia-Pacific. It also perhaps strengthens the argument for caution and restraint in our dealing with the Panda, which evidently has increasingly sharp claws.

The author of this article Lyle J. Goldstein is Associate Professor in the China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI) at the U.S. Naval War College in Newport, RI. The opinions expressed in this analysis are his own and do not represent the official assessments of the U.S. Navy or any other agency of the U.S. Government.

Editor’s Note: The following is part seven of a new occasional series called Dragon Eye, which seeks insight and analysis from Chinese writings on world affairs. You can find all back articles in the series here.

Source: The National Interest “The Real Military Threat from China: Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles”
 

pakchewcheng

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China's YJ-18 Supersonic Anti-Ship Cruise Missile: America's Nightmare?
Chinese_Kilo_in_service_1.jpg

A new challenge emerges for the U.S. Navy. TNI presents one of the first in-depth looks at this deadly weapon.

Lyle J. Goldstein
June 1, 2015

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Entering the Second World War, the United States dramatically underestimated the effectiveness of certain Japanese naval systems and operations. The tendency to look askance at Japanese naval prowess during the interwar period obviously impacted the failure to anticipate the Pearl Harbor attack. But it is less widely understood that U.S. intelligence similarly underestimated the strength of Japan’s primary naval fighter aircraft (the Zero), the dramatic effectiveness of its long-range torpedoes, as well as its dedication to mastering difficult, but essential operations such as night combat. Remarkably, these problems in assessment occurred despite a plethora of openly available information regarding Japanese naval development during that time.

There are many reasons, of course, that contemporary China’s maritime ascendancy is starkly different from that of Imperial Japan almost a century ago. In particular, there is hardly a shred of evidence (reef reclamation included) to suggest that Beijing is inclined to undertake a rampage of conquest similar to Japan’s effort to bring the whole of the Asia-Pacific to heel from 1931 to 1942. Still, the complex maritime disputes in the Western Pacific require that American strategists keep a close eye on the evolving military balance. In that spirit, this installment of the Dragon Eye series turns once again to focus a bright light on one of the newest elements of China’s missile arsenal: the YJ-18 anti-ship cruise missile (ASCM).

A test of the new Chinese YJ-18 supersonic ASCM from November 2014 is visible in this video clip, about one minute into this segment introducing China’s new nuclear submarine design. Even though we know that YJ-18 is part of a whole new generation of new and lethal Chinese ASCMs, it is curious that Chinese ASCMs generally go unmentioned in a recent TNI analysis of the “5 Most Deadly Anti-Ship Missiles of All Time.” Clearly, Chinese naval analysts, who have labeled the YJ-18 in an early 2015 analysis “最完美的反舰导弹” [the most perfect ASCM] would not agree with that rendering. A Chinese analysis of the YJ-18 appearing in the naval magazine 舰船知识 [Naval & Merchant Ships] published by the China State Shipbuilding Corporation (CSSC) in February 2015 is the main basis of this Dragon Eye discussion.

However, before turning to the insights from this recent Chinese analysis, let us return briefly to what has been revealed about this new missile from both the recent U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) report, as well as the annual Pentagon report on Chinese military power. The ONI report is generally well done, but curiously the new YJ-18 only rates a mention in two spare sentences. This report notes that the YJ-18 can be vertically-launched (generally from a surface combatant) or alternatively submarine-launched, but there is no discussion of its supersonic sprint vehicle. Since the U.S. Navy (USN) lacks a supersonic ASCM and will not have one in the foreseeable future, this omission is troubling. Similarly puzzling is the decision not to discuss the recent appearance of another supersonic ASCM, YJ-12, in China’s arsenal. True, such capabilities did exist earlier in other forms, namely as imported Russian systems, but the indigenization (and likely upgrade) of these capabilities is hardly insignificant and will mean they are much more widespread and employed with greater confidence and proficiency.

The 2015 Department of Defense report does offer a bit more detail and thus draws the proper attention to the YJ-18 threat, but again does not mention its supersonic sprint vehicle. The YJ-18 ASCM is described as a “significant step” and subsequently as a “dramatic improvement” over current missiles in China’s inventory. Perhaps most significantly, however, the DoD report puts the range of YJ-18 at 290 nautical miles – more than double that of its likely progenitor, the Russian SS-N-27 Klub ASCM (export version). If correct, moreover, this new range will, in the near term, more or less quadruple the range of the standard ASCM fired from most PLA Navy submarines.

The February 2015 Chinese analysis of YJ-18 is somewhat cautious in tone and hardly purports to be a comprehensive analysis. Perhaps fitting for an initial piece on a cutting edge system, the article’s introduction sports the rare caveat “…并不代表本刊观点” [does not represent the viewpoint of this magazine]. However, the title “‘鹰击’18 -- ‘俱乐部’导弹中国版?” [Is the Yingji-18 Simply a Chinese Version of the Klub?] asks the precise question that will be on the minds of many defense analysts examining the YJ-18. A decent amount of the article just reviews the development of the Russian Klub system and its different variants. It is noted, moreover, that China has had ready access to the Klub missile system since it imported the Type 636 Kilo-class conventional subs about a decade ago. Indeed, some had remarked that Beijing imported the submarine for the sole purpose of actually acquiring its superior missile system. Interestingly, the article does not report the much extended range outlined in the new Pentagon report.

This Chinese description relates that the missile’s great strength is its “亚超结合的独特动力” [subsonic and supersonic combined unique propulsion]. Another term applied to this design is “双速制反舰导弹” [dual speed control ASCM]. As explained in the article, it is projected that YJ-18 would have an initial subsonic phase estimated at .8 Mach similar to the Klub of about 180km, but 20km from the target would unleash the supersonic sprint vehicle at speed of Mach 2.5 to 3. The “dual speed” function allows the system to realize certain advantages of subsonic cruise missiles, such as their “relatively long range, light weight and universality …” but also takes the chief advantage of supersonic ASCMs as well, namely the ability to “大幅压缩敌方的反应时间” [radically compress the enemy’s reaction time].

The Chinese article relates another advantage of the “dual speed” approach. Just as the missile comes into contact with the ship’s defenses, it “sheds the medium stage …,” thus simultaneously and dramatically altering both its speed and also its radar reflection, “which would impact the fire control calculation.” The likelihood that YJ-18 improves upon the Klub missile’s “digitization, automation, as well as providing more intelligent flight control and navigation technology” is attributed in the Chinese article to a recent Jane’s report. A final interesting issue raised in the Chinese article concerns the “hot launch” technique suggested in the test video clip mentioned at the outset of this article (and illustrated in photos accompanying the Chinese article). Indeed, a new vertical launch system for the new 052D destroyer is confirmed as a “共架混装” [common rack for mixed arms] system with a citation in the article to PLA Admiral Qiu Zhiming, director of the Naval Armaments Research Academy. But it is not clear from the article that YJ-18 will rely on the hot launch versus the cold launch method--the latter being much more common for submarine launched missiles.

The article interestingly discusses recent Russian placement of additional Kilo-class submarines equipped with the Klub-missile systems into the Black Sea. These new submarines “based on the Crimean Peninsula, operating in harmony with air and land-based missile forces [can] … limit the deployment of NATO fleets into the Black Sea …” I have noted before in this column the seductive possibilities of the “Russian model” for Chinese strategists. This Chinese author concludes the piece, explaining that, “The YJ-18 will gradually replace the YJ-82 across the PLA Navy submarine fleet. That development combined with surface ship and air-launched missiles will create a comprehensive attack system of even greater combat power.” The implication seems to be that for China, in its various maritime disputes, the YJ-18 can play a role similar to the one that nearly identical Russian weapons have played in creating decisive local military superiority in the Black Sea area.

On the other hand, Beijing has been making noteworthy strides in military transparency of late, for example with the most recent white paper or the somewhat unusual discussion of the new Type 093G nuclear attack submarine in China Daily. Nevertheless, the gap in transparency continues to be quite wide when it comes to some of the most lethal weapons in China’s arsenal, such as the new YJ-18. Allowing the rumor mill to churn, spreading anxieties regarding Chinese capabilities hither and thither is really not in China’s interest and greater transparency, of course, is necessary.

For Washington, some additional attention seems warranted in future intelligence community studies with respect to Chinese ASCM development. The 2015 ONI study gave some attention to YJ-18, but omitted discussion of the supersonic YJ-12, the long-range subsonic YJ-100 or the CX-1 supersonic ASCM that are apparently now in development, according to Chinese sources. Renewed attention will help muster the necessary focus for the U.S. going forward to prepare its forces adequately. For all the ink spilled and Washington seminars convened to discuss China’s expanding coast guard fleet, it is obviously the ever-growing sophistication of the Chinese ASCM arsenal that poses the “clear and present danger” to American sailors.



So anymore talk cock about
Then take out China little by little. First thing first, the SCS... island chain around it. Enforce a no fly zone for ship and aeroplane.
Plot the downfall of Yuan.

:biggrin::biggrin::biggrin:

Kong langjeow wei

:biggrin::biggrin::biggrin:
 

pakchewcheng

Alfrescian
Loyal
USA also got Anti Ship Missiles.
Her best ASM is the Harpoon , state of art as at mid 1970s.
Carrying a bang of 221 kg. Do remember the obsolete Silkworms carry good news of 300 to 500 kg shaped charge.
Harpoon is sub sonic and USA felt all countries will roll over as USA dua dua kee.

Further more, USA felt they do not even need Harpoon and removed that and their launchers as surely they do not need that.
USA dua dua kee command and control the sky and their planes will fuck any ships that dare to sail against her.

That is no longer the case with the S300s and S400s. And HQ9 to HQ22, with large kill airspace ranges up to 150-170 km at an altitude from 50 to 27,000m which super adaptive anti-jamming capacity with several anti-jamming measures.


So anymore talk cock about
Then take out China little by little. First thing first, the SCS... island chain around it. Enforce a no fly zone for ship and aeroplane.
Plot the downfall of Yuan.

:biggrin::biggrin::biggrin:

Kong langjeow wei

:biggrin::biggrin::biggrin:


February 20, 2015
The US Navy's Cruise Missile Nightmare
By James R. Holmes
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The U.S. Navy has a problem. Or rather, it has two intertwined problems, one material and one intellectual and cultural. To all appearances, thankfully, the sea service has resolved to attack both of them. As psychologists say, admitting you have a problem is the first step toward solving it. And, I would add, it’s the biggest and most consequential step. Once you reorient yourself, deciding and acting constitute the easy part—relatively speaking, anyway. Ergo…

Huzzah!


The first of the navy’s woes is material. By and large American fighting ships and shipborne aircraft remain second to none as platforms. They’re festooned with state-of-the-art sensors, fire-control systems, propulsion plants, you name it. But the weapons they pack have fallen behind increasingly competitive times. Not since the early 1990s, for instance, has the surface navy procured a new anti-ship cruise missile (ASCM), its chief weapon for fleet-on-fleet engagements.

Time and technology moved on in the interim. Prospective competitors, notably China, have imported or manufactured missiles boasting greater reach, speed, and often times striking power than their U.S. counterparts. The U.S. Navy’s Harpoon missile, or standard ASCM, can strike at targets circa 76 miles distant. Impressive—except some Chinese ASCMs boast over triple that range, while the vast majority outrange the Harpoon by a sizable margin.

Which leaves American surface warriors—among whom I count myself despite the lapse of, ahem, a few short years—inhabiting an awkward spot.

Think about it in boxing terms. What happens when a short, stubby-armed boxer packing a crushing right squares off against a tall, rangy, equally musclebound opponent? It’s an unequal fight—never mind the apparent parity of strength. The long-armed pugilist jabs away from out of reach. He scores lots of points, and lands lots of blows. Sure, the brawny little guy may be a heavy hitter—but he takes a heckuva beating while closing the distance enough to counterpunch.

That takes its toll. Worse, the short-armed boxer may never get within reach. He could suffer a knockout before ever getting close enough to unleash that right. Likewise, never getting within missile range while an enemy pounds away is a Bad Thing in sea combat. Which antagonist fields the better platforms matters little if one fleet gets in range to deploy its principal armament and the other doesn’t.

Far better to lengthen your reach while amassing battle power—making yourself the tall, rangy, musclebound pugilist.

Which is why recent news out of the defense-technology world warms the heart of any American sailor. Last month off the California coast, a Tomahawk Block IV cruise missile repurposed for anti-ship missions slammed into a moving target at sea. It was fired from destroyer USS Kidd and guided by position data relayed from a F/A-18 Super Hornet aircraft overhead.

The reconfigured Block IV constitutes a new, old capability—the sort of undead U.S. mariners like. The navy leadership ordered Tomahawk anti-ship cruise missiles (TASMs) withdrawn from the fleet during the 1990s, when U.S. maritime supremacy appeared beyond challenge and the sea service turned its attention to projecting power ashore. That took a very, very long-range weapon out of the surface (and subsurface) navy’s arsenal—a weapon that would outdistance most if not all of its competitors on the high seas today.

Restoring that range advantage would restore the surface fleet’s fighting edge over competitors—matching superior platforms with superior combat power. Small wonder Deputy Secretary of Defense Bob Work touts the nouveau TASM as an inexpensive “game-changing capability.” The missile—the expensive component—exists. Fielding a new seeker to find and target shipping is relatively straightforward.

Still to come: a test of the Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM), a “bird” under development since 2009 under the auspices of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency—the Pentagon’s analogue to Q, the high-tech wizard from the James Bond films. If test-fired successfully from the vertical-launch system carried aboard surface combatants, the LRASM will add another arrow to the navy’s quiver in the not-too-distant future. Faster, please.

Neither bird is perfect. Both the Tomahawk and LRASM remain subsonic missiles, which means it takes them a long time to reach distant targets, which means the target may have moved by the time the missile reaches assigned coordinates, which means these weapons will presumably rely on airborne updates of the type used during last month’s test—even once perfected. Networking shooter with aircraft with missile opens up opportunities for mischief-making by adversaries who have every incentive to balk U.S. naval operations. Such is the reality of naval warfare.
 

pakchewcheng

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Loyal
Is This China's DF-21D Air Launched Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile Toting Bomber?
A anti-ship ballistic missile carrying H-6N could extend China's anti-access bubble even farther and put US naval strike groups at greater risk.
BY TYLER ROGOWAYAUGUST 15, 2017
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TYLER ROGOWAYView Tyler Rogoway's Articles
twitter.com/Aviation_Intel
Pictures have surfaced from China's internet supposedly showing a new derivative of the People's Liberation Air Force's Xian H-6 bomber. This incarnation of the H-6, dubbed the H-6N, is designed to carry one weapon in particular—the DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile.

The base H-6 is itself a derivative of the Tu-16 Badger, a Soviet designed aircraft from the dawn of jet age that took its first flight 65 years ago. China started building the Tu-16 under license as the H-6 in 1959. Since then the country has evolved the H-6 design somewhat radically, using new building materials and techniques, advanced avionics and updated turbofan engines to persistently modernize what is a relatively ancient design.

China has also adapted the H-6 for a huge variety of roles, including reconnaissance, electronic warfare, aerial refueling, and a wide array of testbed duties, in addition to its role as a bomber and cruise missile carrier. Now the H-6N, the latest variant of the most modern H-6 version, the H-6K bomber, will supposedly take on one of the most exotic roles of all—hauling anti-ship ballistic missiles to launching points far from Chinese shores.


China's DF-21D remains a somewhat shadowy weapon when it comes to its true abilities. Nevertheless it is now widely regarded as a game-changing anti-access/area-denial weapon system. The DF-21D is a conventionally armed, ground-launched medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM), with a range thought to be around 800 to 900 miles. How it differs from standard MRBMs is that it can maneuver dynamically during reentry and has the ability to target large vessels during the terminal phase of its flight.

In essence, it is a carrier killer that engages at hypersonic speeds and steep angles of descent, making most traditional defensive weaponry useless against it. Even advanced anti-ballistic missile capabilities would be hard pressed to intercept a DF-21D depending on its stage of flight.

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AP
Road mobile DF-21Ds being paraded through Tiananmen Square.

The DF-21D seems like an amazing weapon system—one that could help keep US carrier strike groups far enough from Chinese shores to make their fighter aircraft and cruise useless. But the system is only as good as the targeting information provided to it. The DF-21D's ability to track and engage its target is limited to its terminal attack phase via the use of radar and possibly infrared sensors installed aboard its reentry vehicle. Initial targeting and mid-course updates are supplied by external sources and data-linked to the launching platform just before flight and possibly to the missile during its midcourse phase of flight.

Back in 2010, when the DF-21D supposedly became operational, China's ability to target vessels far out to sea in the great watery expanses of the Pacific was limited. I wrote about this stark reality in 2011. Today the country's surveillance capabilities in space, on the ground, in the air, at sea, and under the sea have improved substantially. Any one or a combination of these sensors, which includes everything from ground based over-the-horizon radar, to surveillance satellites, to high altitude and long endurance (HALE) unmanned aircraft, can provide the targeting data that can get the DF-21D in the right area for executing its deadly terminal attack on a ship.

#PLA’s Shen Diao drone could track and guide DF-21D missiles to #USwarshipshttp://t.co/1WF0oPQBV6#China pic.twitter.com/HAxVW0uXNz

— Pedro Abreu (@pmsxa) September 30, 2015
With maturing and diversified sensor and hardened long-range communications networks beginning to coalesce, China may be more limited by the DF-21D's range than by the ability to target ships far from Chinese shores. The Chinese military seems to be attacking this issue in two key ways beyond the fielding of more capable nuclear fast attack submarines.

First is the supposed development of an anti-ship variant of the DF-26intermediate range ballistic missile (IRBM). The standard land attack DF-26 missile is nicknamed the "Guam Killer' because it would be used to barrage the American island stronghold and other US bases in the region during a conflict. It sports a range of roughly 2,000 to 2,500 miles. So an anti-ship variant of the DF-26 would likely have over double the range of the DF-21D.

PLA ‘sinks’ US carrier in DF-21D missile test in Gobi http://t.co/osGKZiNLq9pic.twitter.com/5mt81Ooz2R

— Rasheed Muhammad (@hiram1555) September 6, 2015
It still isn't clear what the operational status is of the anti-ship variant of the DF-26, but it is clearly an ongoing program for the Chinese military. Seeing that the DF-26 anti-ship missile concept would not be feasible without robust long-range naval targeting capabilities, its very existence is an indication that China has progressed significantly in this area over the last seven years or so.

DF-21Dの実験場??? pic.twitter.com/LeaLzZvyU4

— 545zp (@545zp) September 22, 2014
The other way China can extend its anti-ship ballistic missile capability is to take the DF-21D and deliver it to launch points far out to sea via aircraft. Although having heavy aircraft launch ballistic missiles is not common, it is not unprecedented. The idea was toyed with during the Cold War and today C-17s drop ballistic missiles as targets for anti-ballistic missile tests. Still, there are no operational combat systems that do this, but then again the job of creating a giant anti-access bubble around one's country and attacking ships with ballistic missiles is somewhat different than using the technique to launch traditional nuclear-tipped ballistic weapons.

This is supposedly the job of China's newest derivative of the H-6, the H-6N—to haul an air-launched version of the DF-21D out towards the existing edges of China's anti-access bubble and put enemy ships at risk nearly a thousand more miles out from that point. The H-6N also clearly features an aerial refueling probe, which can extend its range dramatically when paired with China's IL-76/78 tankers or even older HY-6 tankers.

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CHINESE INTERNET
The H-6N will carry the DF-21D ventrally.

The ground-launched DF-21D weights roughly 32,000lbs. It isn't clear if the H-6N will be able to lug that much weight on a single hardpoint, but it is possible, if not probable, that the air-launched version of the DF-21D will be lighter due to not needing to climb the first 30,000 plus feet during its boost phase. If the H-6N can haul the same weapon configuration as the ground-launched DF-21D then it will be have substantially more range due to its higher launch altitude.

The H-6N may also be able to launch other rocket systems, which could put small satellites in orbit or even carry anti-satellite payloads into low earth orbit. China has had a high interest in this capability as of late and utilizing the H-6N for the lower-end of the air-launch rocket concept would make a lot of sense.

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LI PANG/WIKICOMMONS
HY-6 is a aerial refueling variant of the H-6 bomber.

It is likely that the H-6N will also be able to carry anti-ship cruise missiles as it appears to have pylons to do so. It looks to also carry a large radar in its nose, which would allow for organic targeting for its cruise missiles during closer-range anti-ship engagements.

Regardless of if the aircraft photographed does indeed end up toting around an air-launched version of the DF-21D or not, the concept is in development, and it definitely represents an unprecedented conventional anti-ship threat, especially to American carrier and amphibious strike groups. If an anti-ship variant of the DF-26 can reach out at least 2,000 miles, and the air-launched DF-21D can reach out roughly another 1,000 miles farther from that threat horizon, in total the two systems combined could provide a continuous anti-ship ballistic missile umbrella reaching out over 3,000 miles from Chinese shores.

Above all else the H-6N is an indication of China's maturing anti-access/area-denial umbrella and all the infrastructure that goes along with. It will also make China's anti-ship ballistic missile arsenal more survivable, as with the H-6N in inventory, DF-21D missiles can be conveyed from anywhere in the country out over the ocean for launch.

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DF-ZF (formerly WU-14)
WU-14 Dong Feng-21D (DF–21D) /
CSS-5 Mod 5
Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile (ASBM)


China is fielding a limited but growing number of conventionally armed, medium-range ballistic missiles, including the DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM). The DF-21D is based on a variant of the DF-21 (CSS-5) medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) and gives the PLA the capability to attack large ships, including aircraft carriers, in the western Pacific Ocean. The DF-21D has a range exceeding 1,500 km and is armed with a maneuverable warhead.

New Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) systems include the WU-14 DF-21D “Carrier Killer" long range ballistic missile which has the capability to disrupt and/or deny US forward airbases and aircraft carrier capabilities. The Dong Feng-21D (DF–21D) antiship ballistic missile (ASBM) warhead dives towards its target at speeds of up to Mach 10, equivalent to over 12,000 km per hour. The DF–21D, which has a range exceeding 810-900 nm, provides Beijing with the ability to threaten large surface ships, such as US Navy aircraft carriers, throughout the Western Pacific. China is fielding additional DF–21D missiles and may be developing a longer-range variant.

An increase in the number of stealth UCAVs with reduced electronic size (reduced radar cross-section) is likely, possibly to cue long-range, land-based missiles such as the DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile.

The 2004 publication of the PLA Second Artillery book, Science of Second Artillery Campaigns, described the ASBM as an “assassin’s mace" against aircraft carriers. The DF-1D is anticipated to cover a range of 2,000 kilometers and operate at a speed of Mach 10. The threat is also capable of maneuvering both during the midcourse and terminal flight phases for the purposes of guidance, target acquisition, and countermeasures. A 2006 unclassified assessment by ONI stated that “China is equipping theater ballistic missiles with maneuvering reentry vehicles (MaRVs) with radar or IR [infrared] seekers to provide the accuracy necessary to attack a ship at sea."

China's DF-21D ASBM threatens US and allied surface warships in the Western Pacific. While the Missile Defense Agency has exo-atmospheric targets in development, no program currently exists for an endo-atmospheric target. The endo-atmospheric ASBM target is the Navy’s responsibility, but it is not currently budgeted. The Missile Defense Agency estimates the non-recurring expense to develop the exo-atmospheric target was $30 million with each target costing an additional $30 million; the endo-atmospheric target will be more expensive to produce according to missile defense analysts. Numerous Navy acquisition programs will require an ASBM surrogate in the coming years, although a limited number of targets (3-5) may be sufficient to validate analytical models.

A September 2009 report by Mark Stokes on China’s ASBM program estimated that:

  • The initial phase of the program was intended to have a rudimentary 1,500 to 2,000 kilometer range ASBM capability by the end of the 11th Five-Year Plan in 2010.
  • A second phase would seek to extend these capabilities out to a range of 3,000 kilometers and enhance aerodynamic maneuvering capabilities by the conclusion of the 12th Five-Year Plan in 2015.
  • A third phase would focus on extending conventional precision strike capability out to 8,000 kilometers (intercontinental) before the end of the 13th Five-Year Plan in 2020.
  • A final phase would involve global precision strike capability by the conclusion of the 14th Five- Year Plan in 2025.


The Chinese army is researching a new type of conventional missile that is set to be weaponized and entered into active service within five years, military sources revealed to Global Times in February 2011. China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation (CASIC), the nation's largest missile weaponry manufacturer, is set "to complete research, production and delivery of this new generation of missile by 2015," the China NewsService reported.

The new missile would be part of a network forming a solid defense system allowing for total coverage in both defense and attack, and capable of dealing with various threats from land, sea, air, space as well as cybernetic attacks, according to the report. The report, however, did not provide any further details of the new missile.

A military source close to the development, speaking on condition of anonymity, confirmed to the Global Times that "The subject under development is a medium- and long-range conventional missile with a traveling distance of as far as 4,000 kilometers." "The research is going smoothly, and the missile will be produced and ready for service in five years," he said, noting that the project would also entail a three-year evaluation period. "It extends the range of China's missiles and will therefore greatly enhance the national defense capabilities," the source said.



A Game Changer
Peter M. Bilodeau noted in 2011 that "The DF-21D, if fully operational, could reach all current forward bases in the region with the exception of perhaps Guam. Therefore, the US must consider all current forward bases vulnerable to attack.... the US is forced to operate from longer distances. Increased distances, such as missions from Guam, will drive increased sortie durations thus resulting in reduced available sorties over a given period of time. A nominal daily sortie rate for a 500nm combat radius is 3.94 sorties per aircraft per day. If the combat radius increases to 2250nm, the rate drops to 1.79 sorties per aircraft per day."

Gregory R. Bamford noted in 2012 that "The loss of a Nuclear Powered Carrier (CVN) and its associated airwing or an Amphibious Assault Ship (multi-purpose) LHD with its Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) components due to PRC use of the DF-21 ASBM would be a significant strategic defeat for US naval forces in the region. The use of the DF-21, combined with the use of intra-theater ballistic missiles against aircraft, surface units and their associated logistical support bases, could close the South China Sea that would allow the PRC to control a major portion of the SLOCs in East Asia."

"The WU-14 will become China's global strike weapon that would cause a great threat and challenges to the US," said Professor Arthur Shu-fan Ding, the secretary general of the Taipei-based Chinese Council of Advanced Policy Studies. A successful model of the vehicle would boost China’s defense, and possibly render existing US missile-defense systems obsolete, according to the professor. China currently has approximately 100 teams of experts working on the project, a hypersonic expert told the South China Morning Post.



Maybe Not a Game Changer
A March 2013 report by Ronald O'Rourke, the US Congressional Research Service (CRS) specialist in naval affairs, suggests China's anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) can be countered, and is not, necessarily, the "game-changer" many defense analysts predict. O'Rourke argues that the DF-21D ASBM can be defeated by "employing a combination of active and passive measures"along the ASBM's "kill chain."

In "China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities," O'Rourke noted there are several areas in the sequence of events (the "kill chain") where active and passive measures can be taken to stop the missile. These include when the target ship is detected and identified, when that data is transmitted to the ASBM launcher, firing the ASBM, and when the ASBM re-entry vehicle finds the target ship. The Navy could acquire systems for disabling or jamming China's long-range maritime surveillance and targeting systems, destroy ASBMs in various stages of flight, and decoy and confuse ASBMs as they approach their intended targets.

  1. The U.S. Navy could do more to control electromagnetic emissions or using deception emitters.
  2. Options for destroying ASBMs in flight include developing versions of the SM-3 Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) interceptor missile, including the planned SM-3 Block IIA.
  3. The U.S. Navy could accelerate the procurement of the Sea-Based Terminal interceptor, which is the planned successor of the SM-2 Block IV terminal-phase BMD interceptor.
  4. ASBMs could be defeated as they approach their intended targets by equipping ships with electronic warfare systems or systems for generating radar-opaque smoke clouds that confuse an ASBM's terminal-guidance radar.


More could be done to develop an ASBM endo-atmospheric target, which currently appears dead in the Pentagon. Despite dire warnings by a variety of defense analysts that the U.S. risks losing an aircraft carrier to a Chinese ASBM, O'Rourke concluded that the U.S. Air Force had already "taken [China's] kill chains apart to the ‘nth' degree."

"It's necessary for China to boost its missile capabilities, because the PLA's [People’s Liberation Army] weapons are weaker than the US' shields, which are deployed everywhere in the world," Xudong Wang, a satellite adviser to China’s central government, was quoted as saying by the South China Morning Post. "All missiles launched by the PLA, if there was a military conflict, would be intercepted by the US' defense systems before entering the atmosphere," Wang added.

In written testimony to the US China Commission, Dennis Gormley, senior lecturer at the University of Pittsburgh, raised additional technical questions regarding China’s deployment of the DF–21D such as "whether or not China has truly mastered the terminal guidance and maneuvering capability needed to successfully attack a moving aircraft carrier. Particularly demanding is the development of sensors and warheads that can survive the rigors of atmosphere reentry, including high speeds and temperatures, without adversely affecting required seeker and warhead performance.:" The ability of the Second Artillery to strike its intended target is significant because PLA doctrine appears to consider the possibility of using the DF–21D for precision strikes as well as warning shots. In a tense wartime situation an error in DF–21D targeting, therefore, could mean the difference between deescalation and escalation.



Flight Tests
In December 2010, the commander of the U.S. Pacific Command, Admiral Robert Willard, announced that China’s Dongfeng-21D (DF-21D/CSS-5) ASBM had reached initial operational capacity, suggesting a rapid advancement in China’s command of missile and guidance technology over the past decade. Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Gary Roughead stated in a January 14, 2011, interview that “t would not surprise me that in the next couple of years that the capability will be in play."

Amy Chang wrote in April 2012 that "China has tested the DF-21D missile system over land but not over water against maneuvering targets. Nevertheless, China has extensively researched terminal guidance technologies, possibly to include the guidance employed by the U.S. Pershing II theater ballistic missile with a maneuverable reentry vehicle."

The first test carried out by China’s People’s Liberation Army on 05 January 2014, was successful according to the National Defense Ministry. The United States is the only other nation developing a similar technology.

A Chinese hypersonic vehicle designed to deliver weapons at high speeds failed in its second test launch, the South China Morning Post reported. The vehicle, dubbed the WU-14 by the Pentagon, was launched in Shanxi province on 07 August 2014, breaking apart soon afterwards.

China reportedly conducted a third flight test for its new ultra-high speed strike vehicle in December 2014. The test flight, monitored by US intelligence services this week, was the third in a series of tests of the Wu-14 hypersonic glide vehicle—a high-accuracy, high speed projectile, reports the Washington Free Beacon. A Pentagon representative confirmed the test to the WFB, but declined to provide further comment. “We are aware of reports regarding this test and we routinely monitor foreign defense activities," Marine Corps Lt. Col. Jeff Pool said. “However, we don’t comment on our intelligence or assessments of foreign weapon systems."

On 07 June 2015 China conducted the fourth successful test of a new hypersonic vehicle. The test of the Wu-14 hypersonic strike vehicle was launched atop a ballistic missile fired from a test facility in western China. The vehicle executed "extreme maneuvers" that intelligence officials say are meant to test the ability to dodge US anti-missile defense systems. This marked the fourth test in 18 months, after previous flights in January, August and December, 2014.

China successfully carried out a flight test of its state-of-the-art high-speed maneuvering warhead on 122 April 2016, sources in the Pentagon said. The trial took place just days after a hypersonic glider was reportedly tested by Russia. The DF-ZF hypersonic glide vehicle was launch by a ballistic missile fired from the Wuzhai site in central China, unnamed US military officials told the Washington Free Beacon website.

The maneuvering glider was tracked by American satellites as it was traveling at the speed of several thousand kilometers per hour along the edge of the atmosphere towards an impact area in the west of the country, the sources said. It was the seventh flight test of the Chinese glide vehicle, with six previous tests conducted in 2014 and 2015 also having been successful.

According to the Washington Free Beacon, US intelligence believes that Beijing may use DF-ZF (formerly codenamed WU-14 by the Pentagon), capable of reaching speeds of over 11,000 kilometers per hour, to deliver nuclear weapons bypassing even the most complex of missile defense systems. The glider could also become a part of a conventional strategic strike weapon that would enable China to hit targets anywhere in the world within just an hour.



So anymore talk cock about
Then take out China little by little. First thing first, the SCS... island chain around it. Enforce a no fly zone for ship and aeroplane.
Plot the downfall of Yuan.


:biggrin::biggrin::biggrin:

Kong langjeow wei

:biggrin::biggrin::biggrin:
 

pakchewcheng

Alfrescian
Loyal
Quantum Communications and Chinese SSBN Strategy
China’s quantum lead may have important implications for its SSBN force.

By Raymond Wang
November 04, 2017


China has been making significant advances in quantum technology, and it is important to understand the strategic implications of these developments as they enter military use. One area that merits close analysis is how quantum communications technology may influence the sea-based leg of China’s nuclear deterrent, the People’s Liberation Army Navy’s (PLAN) ballistic missile nuclear submarine (SSBN) force. Quantum technology has important implications for SSBN launch pre-delegation and patrol strategy. These implications are not alien to Chinese strategists and shipbuilders, who have already started interacting with top quantum physicists in China.

In short, quantum communication uses photons to transmit information. As such, its underwater performance is affected by water quality. By comparing the relative clarity of the bodies of water surrounding China, certain areas appear to be significantly clearer than others, meaning that signals can penetrate deeper. This will influence ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) patrol strategy if quantum communication technology is deployed with the SSBN force. Furthermore, because of the nature of quantum mechanics, these communications are “unhackable,” which will decrease technical pressures for launch authority pre-delegation, and increase crisis stability.

Quantum Communications and Water Quality

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Quantum communications use the quantum states of photons to transmit information. Photons are bundles of electromagnetic energy that make up light. The only principle required for this discussion is that photons are light of a particular wavelength, which affects their penetrative ability in different types of water.

The PLAN has long sought to improve its ability to securely communicate with SSBNs on patrols. It was reported in 2013 that the PLAN’s Extremely Low Frequency (ELF, 30-300 Hz) communication systems went online, which represents the adoption of a “classical” submarine communications network using radio waves. ELF systems can communicate to around 100 meters in depth. Note that China defines 30-300Hz as Super Low Frequency (极低频/SLF), whereas the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) defines it as ELF.

The next step toward more secure communications could be quantum communications. On August 30, 2017, the CEO of China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation, which produces China’s SSBNs, met with Pan Jianwei. Pan Jianwei is one of the leading quantum physicists in China. During the meeting, they reaffirmed cooperation on “quantum communication, quantum navigation and quantum sensing (radar).”

Recently, a team of Chinese scientists successfully maintained the entangled state of a pair of photons through seawater by developing a method of “filtering out” depolarized photons at the receiving end. This represents a significant step toward developing a quantum communication capability for Chinese SSBNs.

The scientists from the study chose water samples from six points spanning 36 km in the Yellow Sea, which happens to be one of the areas identified by Chinese analysts as a probable site for Chinese SSBN patrols. There are also technical reasons for choosing the Yellow Sea. The authors remark that the water there was Jerlov type I, which is the clearest category under the Jerlov water classification scheme.

This shows that the adoption of quantum technology would introduce water quality as a new factor that will affect the capabilities of a submarine communications network. To be sure, any quantum underwater communication will experience attenuation — signal loss due to travel in water — and it is reasonable to assume there will be measures to compensate for such problems. However, it is also reasonable to assume that even with such measures, there will still be an attenuation threshold at which quantum communications become unfeasible. Certain quantum communication protocols can tolerate up to 70db of loss, but there is currently no available open-source information to determine the kind of protocol that will be used in such an SSBN communication system.

The Jerlov scheme classifies seawater into different types, each with its distinct attenuation coefficient (Kd) curve. Kd is inversely proportional to the Z90 value (Kd = 1/Z90), which represents the depth at which 90 percent of a signal is lost. In a nutshell, the lower the Kd value, the clearer’the water, and the deeper a quantum signal can penetrate. Another property of water types is that its clarity for light at different wavelengths is transferable – that is, if water type A is clearer than water type B at a given wavelength, then it is clearer than type B at all wavelengths.


Figure 1 Variation of Z90 with wavelength, taken from Liu Ying & Li Guosheng, Study of attenuation depths for MODIS bands in the Bohai Sea in China, Acta Oceanologica Sinica 2009, Vol. 28, No. 5, p. 44.


Figure 2 Variation of Kd with wavelength, taken from Northam, Donna et al, High repetition rate frequency-doubled Nd: YAG laser for airborne bathymetry, Applied Optics, Vol. 20, No. 6, 1981, p. 969.

SSBNs can patrol in “murky” areas and go to “clear” areas to receive signals. Alternatively, they can use buoyant antennas similar to the ones used to receive VLF signals — this would allow the SSBN to remain submerged at its operating depth, while trailing an antenna that floats to a depth with stronger signal. However, the Chinese ELF report observes that this will “limit the SSBN’s speed to 4 knots, and there is still a chance that the antenna could be detected.” This suggests that, doctrinally, the PLAN hopes to move away from using buoyant antennas. However, very clear water with around 0.01Xm-1 Kd is very rare, especially in coastal regions. Indeed, even at the clearest points identified in the analysis below, the average clarity would only translate to a Z90 of around 40 meters, which means only 10 percent of the quantum signal would remain at 40 m. As such, despite its doctrinal reluctance, the PLAN may have to occasionally deploy buoyant antennae. This will face the same issues of water quality, unless the antenna goes above the surface; something the PLAN would hope to avoid.

It is beyond the scope of this article to take into account the effect of the air-water interface, an important factor for which I am indebted to Dr. Richard Garwin. Suffice it to say that makes sending signals accurately difficult due to the refractive properties of seawater, especially when taking surface ripples into account. One interesting consequence is that it will be much harder for the SSBN to send signals accurately back to the satellite than vice versa, as the signal has to travel farther to reach the satellite than the SSBN, therefore magnifying any deviations resulting from the refractive effect.

Analysis of the Four Bodies of Water

Figure 3 is taken from a study that used remote sensing data to calculate the Kd values at a signal wavelength of 490 nm. It is common practice to denote the Kd value at a particular wavelength as Kd(wavelength). The study encompasses the Bohai Gulf, the Yellow Sea, and the East China Sea. These results were compared with otherstudies that collected in situ data from the Bohai Gulf and the Yellow Sea, and proved to be consistent. Note that the Chinese scientists in the quantum study used photons at a wavelength of 405 nm, and Kd values in the 400-500 nm range increase as the wavelength decreases. As such, Kd(405) values would be slightly higher than the ones discussed below, which are measured at Kd(490).

Bohai Gulf and Yellow Sea

Figure 3 shows that the Bohai Gulf is not a favorable area for quantum communications, with Kd(490) values mostly at around 1.00 m-1, meaning 90 percent of the signal will be lost at 1 m. The Yellow Sea is clearer, with lower Kd(490) values between 0.01 – 0.1 m-1. China would probably prefer to conduct patrols in the northern part of the Yellow Sea, defined as the area above the 38th parallel, despite it being slightly murkier than the area below. This is because the northern part is bounded by the Chinese and North Korean border, whereas the latter would put Chinese SSBNs close to areas that likely contain South Korean and U.S. anti-submarine assets.

East China Sea

The East China Sea is significantly affected by the discharge of the Yangtze River, which carries a lot of sediment. The coastal areas surrounding the outlet have extremely high Kd values going up to 6.00m-1, meaning 90 percent signal loss at 0.17 m. The “plume” effect of this discharge affects a large part of the coastal area of the East China Sea, and in order to get to comparable water qualities (light blue/deep blue), SSBNs would have to go to areas close to the South Korean Jeju Island, or away from the coast in the southeastern part, where Japan and the United States “most likely deploy a variety of anti-submarine assets.”




Figure 3 Adapted from Son and Wang using the annotation tool szoter.com, The Diffuse Attenuation Coefficient Model in the Yellow Sea for the Korean Geostationary Ocean Colour Imager, Proceedings of SPIR, Vol. 7861, p. 5.

South China Sea

The northern South China Sea encompasses Hainan Island, where the South Sea Fleet is based at Yulin Naval Base. Figures 4 and 5 are taken from a study comparing the coastal waters of Guangdong and the northern South China Sea (NSCS), and demonstrate that the waters south of Hainan Island have low Kd values while being close to the Chinese coast, and is also the deepest among the four bodies of waters. The Kd values in northern South China Sea remain close to 0.01 from l=400-500 nm, as shown in Figure 5.

More specifically, it determines that Kd(490) at the NSCS range from 0.034-0.193 m-1, with an average of 0.073 m-1, with most samples less than 0.092 m-1. This is reflected in the one outlier data line for the NSCS in Figure 5. Using an empirically derived formula provided in the study, Kd(412) can be estimated to be 0.018m-1 at the clearest point in the NSCS, representing 90 percent signal loss at around 55 m. We can expect Kd(405) to be around this number. This gives a sense of the relative clarity of the NSCS.

As such, should the PLAN adopt quantum technology and a coastal patrol strategy, the northern South China Sea and the northern Yellow Sea are the most favorable areas. The PLAN will likely adopt a coastal patrol strategy for the near future, given the noisy nature of its Type 094 SSBN. At the time of writing, the PLAN has four active Type 094 SSBNs in service, all based at the Yulin base in Hainan.


Figure 4 Sampling stations in the northern South China Sea in 2004(•) and 2005(Δ), taken from Wang et al,. Variation in downwelling diffuse attenuation coefficient in the northern South China Sea p. 3.


Figure 5 Kd values of NSCS cruises, taken from Wang et al., Variation in downwelling diffuse attenuation coefficient in the northern South China Sea p. 4.

This analysis leads to one more observation: since oceanic waters generally have lower Kd values than coastal waters, adopting quantum communications channels implies a trade-off – in order to get to clearer waters, submarines have to move farther away from the coast, i.e., farther away from the protection coverage of friendly land-based assets.

Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) or Pure Quantum Channel

There are two methods of deploying quantum communication channels. QKD is a hybrid model in which the message is transmitted via a classical channel but is encrypted with a key, which is then transmitted via a quantum channel. There are various QKD protocols, but the photon signal will be affected by water quality regardless of which is used.

A QKD model for land-to-submarine communications could be: the message would be transmitted via the Extremely Low Frequency (ELF) classical channel, and the key would be transmitted via a quantum channel, such as through a satellite. Attaining the shared key will require a “public” discussion on the classical channel. China has already successfully used the Micius satellite to entangle photons and transmit each twin to two receiving stations on land. More recently, it was used to make the first intercontinental quantum phone call from China to Austria, proving the feasibility of the world’s first space-to-ground integrated quantum network.

Under this model, China would still face some challenges associated with using ELF, such as low bandwidth and the need to use large antennas, which would make such sites vulnerable targets. However, due to quantum encryption, the channel would be secure in the sense that the message, that is the key, in the quantum channel cannot be read, making SIGINT collection by adversaries impossible. Due to the very nature of quantum mechanics, any attempt at eavesdropping on the channel would introduce “disturbances into the system… and cause the quantum state of the key to change, and the information being intercepted will self-destruct.” This clarifies a popular misconception as to the reason quantum channels are “unhackable.” It is impossible to read an intercepted message, as the very act of intercepting will change the state of the message. However, it is still possible to interrupt a quantum channel and thereby block a message, although the interruption will be detected.

A pure quantum channel solves problems related to a classical ELF channel, and has the same level of quantum security. It is possible that China can eventually produce such a channel, given a recent experimental successusing direct counterfactual communication, which transmits a quantum state without any particles being physically sent between the two parties. However, the set-up from the experiment cannot utilize “a strong coherent state (classical) light,” and there is not enough available information to assess how this could be operationalized. In contrast, the aforementioned space-to-ground model is an existing operationalized QKD system. Therefore, a QKD system is a likely next step.

Both models will offer China increased confidence in the security of their SSBN communications. This would decrease technical pressure to pre-delegate launch authority, and increase crisis stability.

Crisis stability in part depends on both sides believing that there are no significant advantages to be gained by initiating nuclear war. Without QKD, the Chinese leadership might worry that at some point in a crisis, its commands can be spoofed or altered to cancel or interfere with SSBN launches, creating a “use it or lose it” scenario where there may be incentives to launch early. With QKD, they can be assured that messages will not be spoofed, altered, or read, thereby removing this pressure. This security will also reduce pressures to pre-delegate launch authority. That said, since QKD still requires ELF facilities, Chinese perceptions of their vulnerability to counterforce strikes — strikes by an adversary to destroy ELF facilities — will still affect crisis stability.

Policy Implications and Conclusions

This analysis shows that water quality will become a new factor in underwater communications. A technical and strategic analysis of the waters surrounding China show that the northern Yellow Sea and the northern South China Sea are more favourable toward quantum communication. This leads to a few policy implications.

First, water quality is by no means the only factor influencing the area of deterrence patrols. Other factors such as depth and salinity, which affect the detectability of SSBNs, will also play a role. SSBNs could patrol in murky areas and regularly go to clear areas to receive signals. That said, knowing certain areas are overall more favorable toward quantum communications would create “watering holes,”, whereby monitoring clear areas will give a good probability of locating an SSBN. It is also important to remember that water quality is affected by seasonal changes and other variables.

Second, the fact that oceanic waters generally have lower Kd values increase incentives to achieve open water patrols. This partially depends on when China will develop a quieter SSBN.

Third, as mentioned in the previous section, the adoption of quantum communications will increase confidence in the security of submarine communications, which will decrease technical pressures to pre-delegate launch authority, and increase crisis stability.

In the final analysis, developments in underwater quantum communications are a significant technological breakthrough. Further research in this area is needed to determine its full strategic implications.
 

pakchewcheng

Alfrescian
Loyal
Checking out the 2nd island chain (scientifically)


US spy planes kept eye on Chinese scientists during research expedition near Guam

The Kexue oceanographic ship had regular low flyovers from US Navy P3-Orion surveillance aircraft while investigating a seamount southeast of Guam


PUBLISHED : Wednesday, 04 October, 2017, 2:32pm
UPDATED : Thursday, 05 October, 2017, 7:18am


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The Kexue oceanographic ship had regular low flyovers from US Navy P3-Orion surveillance aircraft while investigating a seamount southeast of Guam between August 5 and September 5, the researcher told the South China Morning Post

Guam is home port to the US’s fast-attack nuclear submarines that operate in the South China Sea and from the US naval base that is combined with Andersen Air Force Base. From this outpost, B-2 stealth bombers can quickly reach potential conflict areas such as the Korean Peninsula.

Xu Kuidong, a lead researcher with the mission who is affiliated with the Institute of Oceanology, Chinese Academy of Sciences in Qingdao, Shandong, said the scientists on board were “well aware” of the area’s sensitivity.

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“It is all about the Second Island Chain,” he said, referring to a series of archipelagos that stretches from the eastern coast of Japan to the Bonin islands, to the Mariana islands, to Guam and the island country of Palau.

The US-controlled islands initially served as a second line of defence against communist countries in East Asia during the cold war. Today they are regarded as a major constraint on China’s rapidly expanding marine power and influence in the Pacific Ocean.

Chinese and US spy planes have close encounter over South China Sea

Caroline seamount is a large table-top mountain rising more than 3,000 metres from the sea floor, with its highest peaks fewer than 30 metres below the surface. Caroline has irregular landscapes such as sheer cliffs and holes which generate powerful, unexpected turbulence that can threaten submarines.

The Kexue, laden with cutting-edge equipment, made a large number of “exciting discoveries”, Xu said.

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The researchers found that the seamount used to be an island with a high point 1,700 metres above sea level. The cliffs and holes were created by tidal wave erosion.

The team’s findings would be shared with the Chinese military and other interest groups in government, Xu said.

Chinese scientists discover new family of barnacles during expedition to Okinawa

“There are many efforts going on to breach the Second Island Chain, this is part of them,” he said.

On a steep mountain slope more than 1,200 metres below the surface, one of Kexue’s underwater drones discovered what is likely the planet’s longest living organism.

It was a black coral about 1.6 metres tall – the height of an average Chinese woman – with “arms” extending nearly three metres across.

Another similar-sized black coral found by US scientists in warmer and shallower waters near Hawaii has been shown to be 4,265 years old.


The Caroline specimen was likely even older. Although it was about the same size as the Hawaiian sample, it lived at a greater depth and had a relatively poor food supply, so it would have taken longer to grow, Xu said.

Since the coral was dead when it was discovered, scientists used carbon dating to age the sample, he said.

This and other discoveries, including the observation of many creatures with features previously unseen, will be published in a series of papers in international journals, Xu said.

If Beijing can claim South China Sea, US can call Pacific ‘American Sea’, says Clinton in leaked speech

Besides their scientific value, the papers will tell the international community that China meant to “come and play” in this strategic location, he said.

The Caroline seamount is located in the midway between Guam and the Federated States of Micronesia, an island country on the other side of the Second Island Chain.

According to Tom Matelski, a US Army War College Fellow at the Daniel K. Inouye Asia Pacific Centre for Security Studies in Hawaii, China was seeking to build a military base in Micronesia.

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Micronesia, with a population of about 110,000, has received a large amount of aid and investment from China since 2003. The money helped build some of the nation’s largest farms, schools, bridges and power plants, as well as the residence for the president and other senior government officials.

Since Micronesia lacked its own military, it had “outsourced” its defence to the US since the end of the second world war. But in 2015 Micronesian lawmakers introduced a resolution to end the exclusive partnership with the US as early as 2018.

Why the US policy on South China Sea only helps China

If the Chinese military got a foothold on a Micronesian island, “the US could potentially lose their access to the strategic lines of communication that connect the Pacific Ocean to the vital traffic of the East and South China Seas”, Matelski wrote in an article published on the website of The Diplomat magazine in February last year.

Possession of portions of the Second Island Chain would give China a “springboard against foreign force projection,” he said.

Xu said the US’s concerns were “expected” but unlikely to affect the increase in Chinese activity in this remote corner of the Pacific Ocean.

“The P-3s flew low and made some noises, but the Americans knew not to cross the line,” he said. “This is international water. They have no right to interfere in our work.

“They should get used to the presence of China. This water does not belong to the United States of America, but to the world,” Xu said.

Securing power in the South China Sea: Beijing’s plans for floating nuclear reactors get US$150 million boost

However, there is little indication that China will build a military base in the area any time soon, he said.

In June, Kexue called at the tiny Micronesian island of Pohnpei to resupply, mostly with fresh vegetables from Chinese farms on the main island.

Xu said he and his colleagues had not heard of a plan for a Chinese naval base while visiting the island and exchanging information with locals.
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Maintaining a military outpost would be a difficult and costly task due to the remoteness of the location from China, he said.

“But who knows, maybe we will have one in 20 years,” Xu said.

Why most have read North Korea’s threats against Guam all wrong

When President Xi Jinping and Micronesian President Peter Christian met in Beijing in March, Xi said China and Micronesia share “similar viewpoints on many international and regional issues”. He urged the two sides to explore the potential for cooperating, particularly in tourism, agriculture, fishing and infrastructure construction, Xinhua reported.

Christian said Micronesia would like to coordinate closely with China while dealing with global challenges.
 
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