Re: [Breaking News] PM Lee wants to sue Alex Au over blog posts about AIM!
The case below span over 39 pages and I've posted only part of the start and end of the text.
Full case can be downloaded from here:
http://www.mediafire.com/view/?c48ljta241ocdc9
Happy reading.
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Wong Hwee Im Clare Nee Lim v Yeo Chor Cher (also known as Mrs Winnie Wang) [2006] SGDC 78
| Suit No: | DC Suit 3435/2002, DA 6/2006 |
| Decision Date: | 21 Apr 2006 |
| Court: | District Court |
| Coram: | Tan Boon Khai |
| Counsel: | Oommen Mathew (Haq & Selvam) for plaintiff, N. Srinivasan (Heng, Leong & Srinivasan) for defendant |
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| Subject Area / Catchwords |
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Civil Procedure - Trial - Application for liability and quantum of damages to be tried separately - Plaintiff applying at commencement of trial for split trial -Application to be made early in proceedings - Whether defendant suffering prejudice if application granted - Whether application should be granted
Damages - Assessment - Plaintiff failing to explain losses and quantify them in monetary terms - Burden on plaintiff to do so - Assuming malicious prosecution claim made out, whether possible to determine what loss resulting to plaintiff - Whether plaintiff entitled to damages
Tort - Malicious Prosecution - Elements - Whether defendant prosecuting plaintiff maliciously in bringing private summons against her - Whether absence of reasonable and probable cause in private summons proceedings - If reasonable and probable cause proven, lack of malice no matter - Malice and want of reasonable and probable cause dependent on circumstances of case
| 21 April 2006 | Judgment reserved |
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District Judge Tan Boon Khai
Introduction
1 In these proceedings, the Plaintiff claimed against the Defendant for damages under the tort of malicious prosecution. In a nutshell, the Plaintiff complained that the Defendant had maliciously prosecuted her in Private Summons No. 1195 of 1999 (“PSS1195/99”), which summons was withdrawn by the Defendant mid-way through the trial proceedings. The summons had accused the Plaintiff of,
inter alia, criminal defamation under sections 499 and 500 of the Penal Code (Cap 224), after various obscene and vulgar faxes were received by the Defendant sometime in October 1997.
2 Following the Defendant’s withdrawal of PSS1195/99, the court in that case granted the Plaintiff a discharge amounting to an acquittal. The court also dismissed the Plaintiff’s application for the Defendant to reimburse her the costs of those proceedings, on the basis that the proceedings instituted by the Defendant were not frivolous or vexatious.
3 As a result of the Defendant’s actions in pursuing, and discontinuing, PSS1195/99, the Plaintiff claimed that she was “injured in her reputation and was put to considerable trouble, inconvenience, anxiety and expense”. Insofar as she had suffered any loss and damage, she averred as follows: (i) legal expenses in defending PSS1195/99; (ii) loss of reputation; (iii) moral stigma; and (iv) other losses to be assessed and/or quantified (see paragraph 7 of the Statement of Claim).
4 At the end of the proceedings, having taken time to consider parties’ respective evidence as well as closing submissions, I dismissed the Plaintiff’s claim. The Plaintiff, being dissatisfied with my judgment, has appealed against my decision. I now give my written reasons.
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121 It should be mentioned that from the commencement of these proceedings, from pleadings to the filing of AEICs to set down, and even till the pre-trial conference stage, the Plaintiff never once indicated that she was taking the approach of a spilt trial on both liability and quantum. The Plaintiff only took this position after it was apparent when this trial began that there was no evidence to prove her loss. The Plaintiff’s application therefore appeared more of a tactical decision to try to salvage her claim.
122 The law governing whether to grant a spilt trial on liability and quantum was clear. The normal procedure, especially in the absence of any parties’ early indication before the hearing commenced, was for the issue of liability and damages to be tried together, unless it was just and convenient to order a spilt trial: see
Coenen v Payne and Anor [1974] 2 All ER 1109, [1974] 1 WLR 984. Considering the factual scenario in this case, it was clearly not just for there to be a spilt trial at this late stagebecause parties had, right till the first day of trial, and when filing AEICs, proceeded on the assumption that this trial would be on both liability and quantum. It was not right for the Plaintiff, well knowing that she borne the burden of proving her loss in her AEIC, to come now and say that a spilt trial ought to be ordered so that she could adduce further evidence of the loss and damage she suffered. Why did she not put this evidence in her AEIC in the first place then?
123 The Plaintiff argued that there would be no prejudice caused to the Defendant if a spilt trial was ordered, but in my view, that argument was untenable. Assuming a spilt trial was ordered, these proceedings may be further prolonged, and more AEICs filed. All this would incur cost and expense, and was neither convenient nor just to the Defendant, who had all this while proceeded on the basis that the issues of liability and quantum in these proceedings would be determined fully and finally at one go. Crucially, as I stated earlier, this would afford the Plaintiff two bites at the cherry. The Plaintiff should have put in evidence of her loss right from the beginning, after directions were given by the court. She chose not to do so, and must be responsible for the consequences.
124 Procedures are in place for proceedings to be conducted fairly and efficiently. They were not there for parties to abuse in order to remedy holes in their evidence, or gaps in their case. By allowing the Plaintiff in this case a fresh opportunity to conduct her case through a spilt trial, it would effectively prolong these proceedings, and result a delay that was undesirable for everyone.
125 Of course, the issue of a spilt trial was academic in view of my decision that the Plaintiff’s case for malicious prosecution was not made out. Having said that, I considered it in order to fully address the Plaintiff’s application.
Conclusion
126 For all the abovestated reasons, I dismissed the Plaintiff’s claim. Costs were awarded to the Defendant, to be agreed or taxed.
