Bravo Russia! 1B1R China & Russia unplugged Internet from Western World! Cut! Block! Screen! Ang Moh FUCK OFF!

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https://tw.news.yahoo.com/俄聲稱成功建成-全國路網-與全球網路隔離-075415005.html

俄聲稱成功建成「全國路網」 與全球網路隔離

中廣新聞網

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2019年12月26日 上午7:54

俄聲稱成功建成「全國路網」 與全球網路隔離
俄羅斯宣佈，他們已經成功測試了只有在俄羅斯境內能聯通的國內網際網路，同時，俄羅斯也要向中國大陸學習，由國家來控管網路供應商。（葉柏毅報導）

俄羅斯這次測試的所謂「國內網際網路」，其實就只是把整個俄羅斯，變成一個大型的「內部網路」，也就是「intranet」。俄國電信部聲稱，他們的成功在於成功隔開了外界進入俄國網際網路的路徑，但是一般的俄國網路用戶，卻不會感覺到聯網有任何不同。
全球已經有不少國家，憂心網路對他們政權的衝擊，因此積極發展技術，希望能夠截斷與世界網際網路的連接，他們還稱這種想法叫「發揚網路主權」。有不少專家對這種「網路主權」的趨勢感到憂心，認為這是全球網際網路發展，開始走回頭路。
有英國網路專家就指出，越來越多的威權國家，看到中國大陸與伊朗都能夠成功控制公民，在網路上能看到的內容之後，也都想學習。如果俄羅斯也做成了，這顯示個別國家網路發展，只是變成了一種強化的「網路隔離罩」。


Russia claims successful completion of "National Road Network" and isolation from global networks
[Zhongguang News Network]
China Broadcast News

5.6k followers

December 26, 2019 at 7:54 am


Russia claims successful completion of "National Road Network" and isolation from global networks

Russia announced that they have successfully tested the domestic Internet that can only be connected within Russia. At the same time, Russia has to learn from China and let the country control the network providers. (Reporting by Ye Baiyi)


The so-called "domestic Internet" tested by Russia this time is actually just turning the entire Russia into a large "intranet", also known as "intranet". The Russian Ministry of Telecommunications claims that their success lies in successfully separating the outside world's access to the Russian Internet, but ordinary Russian Internet users will not feel any difference in networking.

Many countries around the world are worried about the impact of the Internet on their regimes, so they actively develop technology and hope to cut off the connection to the Internet in the world. They also call this idea "advancing Internet sovereignty." Many experts are worried about this trend of "Internet sovereignty" and believe that this is the development of the global Internet, and they are beginning to go back.

Some British Internet experts point out that more and more authoritarian countries, after seeing that both China and Iran can successfully control their citizens, want to learn after what they can see on the Internet. If Russia did it, it would indicate that the development of the Internet in individual countries has only become an enhanced "network shield."



https://www.wired.com/story/russia-and-iran-plan-to-fundamentally-isolate-the-internet/

Opinion: Russia and Iran’s decisions to build isolated, domestic internets represent a new form of internet fragmentation—one that is far more physical than what we’ve seen before.

Stefan Volk/Redux

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For years, countries have spoken in vague terms about creating domestic internets that could be isolated from the world at will. Now we’re seeing some begin to execute that vision. Last month Iran announced that its "national information network"—essentially a domestic internet—is 80 percent complete. Earlier this year, Russia launched a major initiative to build a domestic Russian internet, purportedly to defend against cybersecurity threats—though also a likely expansion on the Kremlin’s desire to control the flow of information within its borders.
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With Russia and Iran spearheading a new level of internet fragmentation, they’re not just threatening the global network architecture (cables, servers) or working to allow the government to greatly control information flows and crack down on freedoms; their actions could also inspire others to follow suit and create geopolitical implications extending far beyond those two countries’ borders.


Let’s look at another country that has tightened control over its internet. China has long been the gold standard for internet censorship. Its Golden Shield Project, originally conceived as a surveillance database to strengthen police control, now manifests in the sophisticated Great Firewall. The government filters what information flows into the country as well as what requests are sent out using techniques like deep packet inspection and IP blacklisting.
Many thought this kind of internet splintering, with different kinds of content served to different countries, was the worst it could get. The New York Times editorial board has written about contrasting internet spheres in Europe, China, and the United States. Google’s Eric Schmidt has spoken about a bifurcation between a Chinese and non-Chinese internet (the latter led by the US). Indeed, the scale, technological sophistication, and economic influence of Chinese internet censorship is unprecedented. And it goes beyond China’s borders; Beijing wants to rewrite the rules of the global internet as well.
Yet for all of this noise, the internet “fragmentation” here is quite superficial—there are alterations to information flows on top of internet architecture, yes, but not alterations to the architecture itself. China still relies upon the likes of the global domain name system to manage web traffic. Its government has yet to permanently cut or unplug major internet routing points. The fragmentation is occurring on the surface level of the net, rather than on the lowest levels. In fact, filtering information rather than halting its flow is what enables Beijing’s delicate balancing act of content control with the economic benefits of internet openness.
Russia and Iran, however, are pursuing something different—a much deeper kind of internet fragmentation, one that may be less reversible and more attractive to countries who want rigid control over information.
When Vladimir Putin signed a bill in early May to create a domestic Russian internet, the law encompassed not just increased government authority over internet exchange points (IXPs) that route global traffic in and out of Russian borders, but policies like the build-out of a national domain name system, which is overseen by Roskomnadzor, Russia’s internet regulator. It’s aiming at a whole new level of Russian cyber sovereignty. Further, because the RUnet is meant to operate independently from the global net, this and other measures will likely involve physically cutting or moving cables and/or altering internet routing protocols to limit the traffic that comes into or out of the country.
Iran, meanwhile, has reached 80 percent completion of its so-called national information network. Tehran, like Moscow, hopes to reduce its country’s reliance on the global network through one that can be domestically operated. Censorship pervasive on the Iranian internet is already coupled with measures that double the cost of accessing foreign news sites, to incentivize citizens to use the domestic network—incentives that will only grow stronger should more domestic isolation take hold. As with Russia, claims about better defending Iran from foreign cyber threats have also been cited here as justification. Others argue that sanctions have played a role as well.



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These two countries’ decisions to build isolated domestic internets represent a new form of internet fragmentation—one poised to be far more physical than what we’ve seen before. While today citizens in net-censored countries can often use virtual private networks and other tools to circumvent filters, that could become impossible if their domestic internets are disconnected from the global one. In turn, this will only accelerate global crackdowns on internet freedom and allow authoritarian regimes to consolidate power. But there are also significant geopolitical implications far beyond the borders of Russia or Iran.
For one, this may influence other countries wanting to assert control over the internet within their borders. Our research at New America on the state of global internet governance shows that 50 countries—which we call the Digital Deciders—have yet to clearly align themselves with a "global and open" or a "sovereign and controlled" internet model. As internet governance decisions are increasingly shaped at the national level rather than in international bodies, these countries’ decisions may influence the future of the global internet as we know it.
Governments looking to exert even greater control over their citizens online—for instance, by limiting the effectiveness of censorship bypass tools—may want to pursue this deeper form of internet fragmentation. Altering the architecture of the internet itself (while a heavier lift) could provide much deeper internet control than just leveraging content filtering tools. Governments looking to better protect their countries from cybersecurity threats, meanwhile, may also find reason to pursue the kind of deep internet fragmentation that Russia and Iran are spearheading; limiting the connection of your country to the globe, under the guise of stopping foreign cyberattacks, is arguably an attractive option for many policymakers around the world.
This may also hasten the extent to which countries are willing to manipulate global internet protocols, such as the Border Gateway Protocol that routes global internet traffic. If a country is largely or entirely disconnected from the global network, that could arguably diminish reservations about collateral effects of traffic manipulation. It may also limit the extent to which an internet protocol manipulation could be directed back at the perpetrator, although the centralization of internet controls could produce vulnerabilities in other ways for these countries.
If Russia and Iran are any indication, the internet fragmentation we see today is nothing compared to what’s coming. There are great technical challenges ahead that may hamper such efforts, yes, but these pursuits will still have wide ramifications. For nations seeking to balance the economic benefits of the internet with regulation of online information flows, the Chinese model of filtering on top of the net is still perhaps a better approach. But for those looking to really suppress information or protect themselves from foreign cyber threats, these deeper, less reversible forms of internet fragmentation are a more powerful solution.
WIRED Opinion publishes articles written by outside contributors, representing a wide range of viewpoints. Read more opinions here. Got something to say? Submit an op-ed at [email protected]

 

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https://www.newamerica.org/cybersec...2b-log/russias-plans-for-a-national-internet/


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Analysis: Russia’s Plans for a National Internet
Blog Post

Photo: kremlin.ru // labeled for reuse

By Robert Morgus
and Justin Sherman
Feb. 19, 2019
Much has been made of the Russian initiative to wall off its internet (the RUnet) from the global internet. Last week the Russian lower house of parliament debated the first round of a bill designed to turn this hope into a reality. In this Internet Realities Analysis, we unpack what the draft law really says, how it fits with accompanying policies—like the national Domain Name System (DNS) proposal—and what all this means for western policymakers and the global internet realities. We also include a direct translation of the explanatory note submitted by the bill’s proposers, which explains their purported motive for pushing the bill.
Russia has previously discussed building a domestic internet with the capacity to separate from the global one, but via a draft law, the Russian parliament is now apparently moving to make this notion of a domestic Russian internet a reality. According to Meduza, all political parties in Russia’s state Duma opposed the legislation “except for United Russia [President Putin’s party], which has a super-majority in parliament.” The bill is currently in the process of being amended before a second reading in the parliament. If it’s passed, it will then proceed to the upper house of the legislature—the Federation Council—before being sent to President Vladimir Putin’s desk for a signature. To test the practicality of some of the stipulations in the law, Russia plans to disconnect briefly from the global internet on April 1. This all comes amidst Russian governmental plans to route up to 95% of Russian internet traffic domestically by 2020 (article in Russian) and to spin up a national Domain Name System.
Putting aside, for a moment, the possibility that this could all just be a very elaborate April Fools’ Day prank (the test is scheduled for April 1), the Russian scheme is not without precedent. In China, the Golden Shield Project—also known as the Great Firewall—similarly allots legal powers to the government to not only shut the internet down, but also to alter the way packets are routed, as well as what types of information can legally flow over the internet.
Below, we overview what is and is not in the Russian law itself. Then, we analyze the explicit and ulterior motives for its passage, and the extent to which the U.S. and our partners should care. We also include, at the bottom, a full unofficial translation of the law’s explanatory note.
What’s in the Law?
The law, which is actually (another) amendment to the 2003 Federal Law on Communications, technically serves two primary purposes.
First, it pulls “traffic exchange points” under the jurisdiction of the law. This year’s proposed amendments define traffic exchange points as the “communications facilities” that “connect… and pass traffic between communication networks of telecommunications operators”—essentially what we refer to as Internet Exchange Points, or IXPs. The amendments set out that traffic exchange points must comply with orders from and share information with the Federal Service for the Supervision of Communications, Information Technology, and Mass Media—better known as Roskomnadzor, or Roskom. Traffic exchange point operators must also comply with requests from Roskomnadzor that they adjust their routing and develop the capacity to resolve domain names using the—as of yet incomplete—Russian national domain name system (DNS).
The second function of the law is to provide Roskomnadzor with authorities to centralize management over the Russian internet in cases where the “integrity, stability, and security” of the Russian internet is threatened. The law sets out that Roskomnadzor will establish the “procedure, terms and technical conditions for the instillation of technical means” for “countering threats,” as well as the requirements for the use of this technology. Roskomnadzor can then carry out the “centralized management” of the internet by managing these “technical means” of “countering threats” or by sending “binding instructions to telecom operators, network operators, and other persons having an autonomous system number.” In addition, Roskomnadzor will be given authorities to block illegal information resources using this same technology, even when not acting as the centralized manager of the internet. Currently, Roskomnadzor issues orders to telecoms to block undesirable information. The new authority and accompanying technology could allow Roskomnadzor to institute a national firewall similar to the Golden Shield in China.
A big part of this new suite of technology—the “technical means” referred to in the law—will be the national DNS, which the law notes is not yet fully functional but is undergoing creation by Roskomnadzor. Roskomnadzor will also serve as the registrar for the DNS. Any entity that resolves domain names in Russia will have to function in accordance with orders from Roskomnadzor. Although not explicit in the law, the legal requirements for those who route internet traffic to possess the capacity to route traffic domestically allow Russia to viably test—as it will on April 1—completely disconnecting from the outside internet.
What’s not in the Law?
Quite a bit.
First, how will (or can) Roskomnadzor do this technically? In order to carry out the scheme to disconnect the RUnet from the global internet with minimal disruption, Russia will need to duplicate critical elements of the global internet within Russia. Since 2016, the Russian government has been working on designing a system that keeps 95% of Russian internet traffic within Russian borders. The national Domain Name System could play an important role in enabling this shift.
In theory, a comprehensive national DNS would be a step towards keeping routing local, as the DNS queries sent when typing URLs into a browser wouldn’t need to leave the country. However, the DNS server then needs to send a request to a server hosting the website content the user is trying to retrieve. Chances are this will mean pinging a server outside of Russia, unless all web content the Russian state deems legal is also stored on servers within the country. Localizing all prospective content—that is to say storing all the content that someone in Russia would potentially like to access while in Russia on servers in Russia—is a steep challenge, but may be more feasible in Russia than elsewhere, where the content the government wants people to access is relatively narrow, largely Russian language already, and produced by people in Russia.
If (and it’s a big if) Russia is able to create a national DNS and localize content, creating an autonomous internet—that is to say, one that is capable of fully functioning when disconnected from the global network—becomes a matter of either (a) physically cutting off access to the outside internet (literally cutting wires) or (b) cutting off access to the outside internet by manipulating routing protocols. IXPs are the physical buildings that house interconnection infrastructure and facilitate traffic flowing to the right places. Thus, Roskomnadzor’s ability to dictate the actions of IXPs is crucial in the latter scenario, as it will be in a position to order them to alter routing (e.g., through changes to their Border Gateway Protocol configuration), null traffic coming in and out, and reroute requests that would’ve left the country to local servers.
Second, what is the procedure through which Roskomnadzor would exercise the authorities, and when are they activated? While this consideration is perhaps less relevant in a country like Russia where the executive branch of government holds a great deal of power, it’s nonetheless an interesting consideration. According to comments from an individual with knowledge of the drafting process, a new “monitoring center” will be created, which, according to the bill, will be the entity that triggers centralized management. Where this center will be housed and the circumstances under which it will activate the authorities are undefined, leaving the question of when Roskomnadzor can act under these new authorities largely opaque.
Finally, what, exactly, constitutes a threat to the Russian internet? According to Russian cybersecurity and information security doctrines, cyber threats are not limited to just attacks on computer networks, as the U.S. and our partners might define them, but also include things like online content that pose a threat to the stability of the state. There is realistically little reason to assume that the threats referenced herein would be any different, though according to RBC.ru (article in Russian), someone familiar with the drafting of the law claims that a list of threats to the Russian internet exists, even though the list is “closed.”
Why this law? Why now?
According to the an explanatory note that accompanied the draft law, the law—and by association, the internet isolation test—are necessary responses to the United States’ “aggressive” 2018 cybersecurity strategy. The fact that the U.S. has “unprovenly” accused Russia of hacking operations against the United States “frankly” declares the need for “punishment.”
The reasoning for the law offered in the explanatory note—an “aggressive” American cybersecurity strategy that threatens to bring down Russia’s entire domestic internet—is not likely the only motive. Under President Putin, the Russian state has repeatedly used “cybersecurity” as top cover for passing restrictive internet laws at home and pushing authoritarian internet norms in the international arena. Censorship, pervasive surveillance, and traffic throttling—slowing access to or spiking access costs for certain sites—are all characteristic of this approach.
Cyber insecurity does, of course, provide a compelling reason to continually reassess trust in the internet. In addition to the malicious code flowing across the global net, justifications for such reassessment also include the vulnerability of some internet protocols, like the Border Gateway Protocol that routes global internet traffic, to manipulation. Large-scale Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks are also a growing threat, as millions of insecure Internet of Things devices can be easily hijacked at scale and used to flood internet traffic to a particular web service.
Indeed, according to the same RBC.ru source as cited above, a potential, massive DDoS attack is one “real threat from the outside” that would trigger Roskomnadzor’s new authorities. As Justin previously wrote, the Russian state views the internet with suspicion. It enables access to undesirable information, coalition building, and anti-regime speech. Vladimir Putin has referred to it as a CIA project. It follows, therefore, that the internet must be tightly controlled, and by the Russian state. However, as the primary champion of a global and open internet—at least rhetorically—it is hard to see the U.S. moving to shut out an entire people from the internet, even as we move into an era of great power competition.
Nonetheless, the claim that the state must do more to “secure” the internet isn’t unique to Russia, either. More countries are temporarily isolating (“blacking out”) the internet within their borders due to unrest and other political events. China has, for the better part of two decades, exercised strict control over content domestically. Iran has a relatively isolated Halal net, when it needs to. North Korea has just one physical entry point to the global network and controls that access strictly.
Even in more liberal countries, governments have sought to preserve an in extremis legal authority to exercise control over the internet. To compare these policies would represent a grasp for false equivalence and ignore the broader context—like the respect for rule of law, norms and laws about freedom of speech and basic human rights, and limits on executive power. The broader legal context in which these new internet changes sit matters.
Nonetheless, concerns over cyber attacks and influence campaigns have led governments to reconsider what free and open means in the context of governance of the internet, leading to the construction of national-level programs to identify and filter out malicious traffic as it enters the country. For example, a 2012 Executive Order in the U.S. further codified the legal powers of the Office of the President of the United States to order a shutdown of the internet in the U.S. in extremis—colloquially referred to as the internet kill switch. The U.K. government has also implemented programs aimed at filtering data rather than content, in an effort to strengthen its ability to protect its citizens from cyber attacks. The key distinction between these programs and the new Russian program or the Chinese great firewall lies in the former’s narrow definition of maliciousness or threat and restrictions on the arbitrary exercises of power through adequate rule of law.
Furthermore, it is unclear the extent to which the proposed legal changes will actually allow the Russian state to ensure greater cybersecurity. And the weak foundation of cybersecurity motivations for the law have not escaped the few Russian policymakers opposing the bill. According to Sergei Ivanov, of the opposition Liberal Democratic Party (via Bloomberg):

It has nothing to do with protecting the Russian internet from being shut off from abroad. You know how the Chinese internet works—there is a list of banned websites that you can’t access from China and a list of key words you can’t search for. This is what you want?

Ivanov’s statement is probably not far from the truth. For years, Russia has looked enviously upon its southeastern neighbor’s ability to monitor and control information flows domestically. Now, it has the legal authority—and is working on the technology—to do so itself.
Should the U.S. and our partners be concerned?
Yes and no. A global and open internet is strongly in the interest of the people who use it. It’s a major economic booster, allows checks on governments through practices like microblogging and confidential whistleblowing, and heightens global information-sharing. It’s also, as we’ve argued in the past, strongly in the interest of democracies to maintain the openness (at least as far as content is concerned) of the internet. And the United States and its democratic allies have long done so, promoting a global and open internet through government strategies and international agreements.
The challenge here is that “global internet” and “open internet” aren’t necessarily the best descriptors for what exists now. Rather, what we’d like to think of as the global and open internet is instead a series of connected networks, over which states—and sometimes companies—exert varying degrees of control.
What should primarily concern the United States, therefore, is how this law, and this disconnection test, could push the global network further away from an open information environment, especially in places where it’s not already relatively closed off. The likes of China, Iran, Russia, Turkey, the UAE, and many other authoritarian countries have taken a clear stance on the internet: they want to tightly restrict it, exercising technical and physical controls that consolidate power and prevent politically undesirable speech and assembly. Others—U.S., U.K., the E.U. bloc, Israel, and Japan, to name several—have clearly opposed this model of the internet, pushing, as discussed, a global and open approach. Many countries still have not decided.
It’s in the countries of this third group where the global competition over internet governance truly takes place, and viable models for configuring and governing the internet—like Russia’s model for internet control—are powerfully persuasive tools in that context. What should worry the U.S. and our partners is that the model for sovereign control over the internet seems to be pulling ahead in the global push-pull for the internet. This is in part because of the strong marketing campaign by the likes of Russia and China that paints the internet as a source of insecurity and instability, rather than a source of greater freedom and prosperity. But it’s also in part due to our inability to counter that narrative with models that manage instability and insecurity, while maintaining an open content environment.

Full translation of the explanatory note accompanying the law
The draft federal law "On Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation" was prepared taking into account the aggressive nature of the US National Cybersecurity Strategy adopted in 2018. The document, signed by the President of the USA, proclaims the principle of "maintaining peace by force". Russia is directly and unprovenly accused of hacker attacks, and the strategy frankly states the punishment: "Russia, Iran, and North Korea conducted reckless cyber attacks that harmed American and international businesses and our allies and partners without paying costs likely to deter future cyber aggression."
Under these conditions, protective measures are necessary for ensuring the long term and stable functioning of the Internet in Russia, increasing the reliability of Russian internet resources.
The bill provides the following provisions:
The necessary rules for routing traffic are determined and control over compliance with them is organized. This creates an opportunity to minimize the need to transfer data exchanged between Russian users abroad.
Cross-border communication lines and IXPs are defined. Their owners [and] telecom operators are required to ensure the possibility of centralized control over traffic, in the event of a threat.
It is possible to install technical equipment on telecom networks that determine the [original] source of traffic. Technical tools will have to be able to limit access to [internet] resources with prohibited information not only by [blocking] network addresses, but also by prohibiting the passage of passing traffic.
The infrastructure to ensure the operability of the Russian Internet in the case of Russian telecom operators’ failure to connect to foreign root servers is being created.
It [the law] introduces the need for regular exercises of government authorities, telecom operators, and owners of technological networks to identify threats and develop measures to restore the Russian Internet segment.
The Government of the Russian Federation determines the centralized response to threats to the operability of the Internet and public communications networks through the Center for Monitoring and Management. Response measures will be determined over the course of the monitoring and operation of the technical elements of the public communication network, among other things.




https://www.dailymail.co.uk/science...nternet-services-check-operate-isolation.html


Russia tests whether its internal internet would still work if it was cut off from the worldwide web – but critics accuse Putin’s regime of mass censorship

• The tests of the so-called RuNet were completed over the course of several days
• The move follows from Russia's so-called 'sovereign internet' bill of November
• Federal officials are allegedly concerned by the US's 'aggressive' cyber strategy
• Yet critics fear that Putin's administration is looking to isolate their citizens

By Ian Randall and Ryan Fahey For Mailonline
Published: 09:58 GMT, 24 December 2019 | Updated: 12:17 GMT, 24 December 2019

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Russia completed tests of its internal internet services yesterday to assess if they could continue to run if the country was cut off from the worldwide web.
The review of the so-called RuNet was conducted over the course of several days on specially designated networks within the federation.
This move follows from the 'sovereign internet' bill that came into effect in November in response to what Russia calls the US's 'aggressive' cyber security strategy.
The new legislation mandated that all state-run institutions and security services as well as communications operators, messengers and email providers took part.
Russia aims to route its web traffic and data through state-controlled access points and build a national Domain Name System to end dependence on foreign systems.
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Russia completed tests of its internal internet services yesterday to assess if they could continue to run if the country was cut off from the worldwide web (stock image)
WHAT IS ROSKOMNADZOR?
Roskomnadzor — the Federal Service for Supervision of Communications, Information Technology and Mass Media — is the Russian federal body most known for its responsibility for censorship in the media.
It also acts to oversee the confidential handling of personal data in Russia and the organisation of the radio-frequency service.
It has in the past blocked notable websites including Wikipedia, Pornhub and parts of Amazon.




'Our goal was to provide an uninterrupted internet service on Russian territory under any circumstances,' Deputy Communications Minister Aleksei Sokolov said.
'The outcomes of the review showed that government agencies and communications operators are ready to respond effectively to threats and to ensure the internet and communications operate effectively.'
Federal communications ministry Roskomnadzor will produce a report on the outcomes of the internet isolation test for review by Russian President Vladimir Putin, he added.
According to D-Russia, similar tests will be repeated on an annual basis.
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Critics have claimed that the tests are part of a wider attempt to isolate its citizens from the surrounding world and its influences.
During a press conference on December 19, 2019, however, Mr Putin claimed that a free internet and a sovereign internet were not contradictions.
'The law is aimed at just one thing - preventing negative consequences of being disconnected from the global network, the management of which is mostly abroad,' he said.
'We are not moving towards closing the internet and do not intend to do so.'

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Federal communications ministry Roskomnadzor will produce a report on the outcomes of the internet isolation test for review by Russian President Vladimir Putin, he added
The Russian Government is believed to consider its present reliance on Western IT as a strategic vulnerability that could be exploited by other nations.
'The larger context is Russia’s dependence as a nation on imported/foreign hi-tech and the perceived vulnerabilities that Russia sees in such technology use,' Russian expert at the American Foreign Policy Council Samuel Bendett told Defense One.
'With so many government, public, and private-sector nodes using such foreign tech, the Russian government is seeking to impose a measure of control over how Internet communication over this technology is conducted.'
'In the event of what the government sees as outside influence affecting RuNet, the state can act — hence the annual exercise.'

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Critics claim that the tests are part of a wider attempt to isolate its citizens from the surrounding world. Pictured, protesters campaign for internet freedom in Russia
'The Russian government, particularly since seeing the role social media played in the Arab Spring, has wanted [...] to exert tight control over the online information space within Russia’s borders,' said New America net expert Justin Sherman.
'Free information flows are a threat to regime stability, and they need to be controlled, the narrative goes.'
The move to isolate Russia's internet infrastructure — oft dubbed 'RuNet' — has been accompanied by legislation to limit its citizens' access to certain sites.
A 2006 Russian law, for example, restricted access to services like LinkedIn, encrypted texting app Telegram and 'radio' app Zello by mandating companies to open up their software to the nation's security forces and law enforcement agencies.
Furthermore, the passage of the federation's sovereign internet law in April called upon Russian communications agency Roskomnadzor to create an internet monitoring and management centre.


In June, the Russian government threatened to block nine major VPN providers who had decline to enforce state censorship polices.
Virtual Private Network (VPN) services let users make secure internet connections across public networks and can be used to access blocked websites.
'When Russia passed its domestic internet bill into law, it wasn’t clear how much the government would actually work to make it happen,' Sherman added.
'Now it’s clear they do intend to modify systems so the internet within Russian borders can be cut off from the global net at will.'
'These disconnection tests which Russia has planned for the near future — as well as, according to documents, annually going forward — are steps in the direction of making this so-called "RuNet" work.'
'They also line up with a series of international pushes by authoritarian governments to make "cyber sovereignty" of this kind more palatable to the global community.'

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Russia completes tests of its internal internet services to check they could operate in isolation

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  https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-47198426
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• Russia considers 'unplugging' from internet
  
  • 11 February 2019
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  Image copyright Reuters Image caption The net independence plan is seen as a way for Russia's government to get more control over online life
  Russia is considering whether to disconnect from the global internet briefly, as part of a test of its cyber-defences.
  The test will mean data passing between Russian citizens and organisations stays inside the nation rather than being routed internationally.
  A draft law mandating technical changes needed to operate independently was introduced to its parliament last year.
  The test is expected to happen before 1 April but no exact date has been set.
  Major disruption
  The draft law, called the Digital Economy National Program, requires Russia's ISPs to ensure that it can operate in the event of foreign powers acting to isolate the country online.
  Nato and its allies have threatened to sanction Russia over the cyber-attacks and other online interference which it is regularly accused of instigating.
  The measures outlined in the law include Russia building its own version of the net's address system, known as DNS, so it can operate if links to these internationally-located servers are cut.
  Currently, 12 organisations oversee the root servers for DNS and none of them are in Russia. However many copies of the net's core address book do already exist inside Russia suggesting its net systems could keep working even if punitive action was taken to cut it off.
  The test is also expected to involve ISPs demonstrating that they can direct data to government-controlled routing points. These will filter traffic so that data sent between Russians reaches its destination, but any destined for foreign computers is discarded.
  Eventually the Russian government wants all domestic traffic to pass through these routing points. This is believed to be part of an effort to set up a mass censorship system akin to that seen in China, which tries to scrub out prohibited traffic.
  Russian news organisations reported that the nation's ISPs are broadly backing the aims of the draft law but are divided on how to do it. They believe the test will cause "major disruption" to Russian internet traffic, reports tech news website ZDNet.
  The Russian government is providing cash for ISPs to modify their infrastructure so the redirection effort can be properly tested.
  Analysis: Zoe Kleinman, BBC technology reporter
  How does an entire country "unplug" itself from the internet?
  It's important to understand a little about how the internet works. It is essentially a series of thousands of digital networks along which information travels. These networks are connected by router points - and they are notoriously the weakest link in the chain.
  What Russia wants to do is to bring those router points that handle data entering or exiting the country within its borders and under its control- so that it can then pull up the drawbridge, as it were, to external traffic if it's under threat - or if it decides to censor what outside information people can access.
  China's firewall is probably the world's best known censorship tool and it has become a sophisticated operation. It also polices its router points, using filters and blocks on keywords and certain websites and redirecting web traffic so that computers cannot connect to sites the state does not wish Chinese citizens to see.
  It is possible to get around some firewalls using virtual private networks (VPNs) - which disguise the location of a computer so the filters do not kick in - but some regimes are more tolerant of them than others. China cracks down on them from time to time and the punishment for providing or using illegal VPNs can be a prison sentence.
  Occasionally countries disconnect themselves by accident - Mauritania was left offline for two days in 2018 after the undersea fibre cable that supplied its internet was cut, possibly by a trawler.

 

[eatshitndie]

so stupid. how to watch netflix if isolated from world wide web?

 

[tanwahtiu]

Man made man destory...