Opposition Politics: Where the Whole is Not Greater than the Sum of its Parts
By Derek da Cunha
With the announcement by the Malaysian Election Commission of the date of Malaysia’s 13th general election, the excitement level has gone up several notches in what is expected to be a very keenly fought contest. It is also expected to be keenly watched south of the Causeway, in Singapore. There has been a view in some Singapore opposition circles that a number of opposition parties should follow the example of their Malaysian counterparts and come together to provide a united front to the governing party. This reflects the concept that “the whole is greater than the sum of its parts.” This sounds good in theory. But is it viable in practice?
In Malaysia, the opposition Pakatan Rakyat (PR) coalition is composed of three component parties each of which are of almost equal strength to the other. The main measurement of this strength is their presence in the lower house of the Federal Parliament, the Dewan Rakyat. The parliamentary strength of the three component PR parties going into the 13th general election is: People’s Justice Party (Parti Keadilan Rakyat) 23 seats, Democratic Action Party (DAP) 29 seats, and the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS) 23 seats. Each of these parties has its own comparative advantages, largely in terms of the geographic areas each contests and the demographics each appeals to. When combined, these comparative advantages provide synergy to a coalition, reinforcing the coalition as a whole. For these reasons, among others, the PR coalition is expected to give the Barisan Nasional coalition government a run for its money.
In Singapore, the opposition parties are of very unequal strength. One opposition party, the Workers’ Party, has a parliamentary presence of nine – seven fully elected MPs and two Non-constituency MPs. The WP has no peer. This is the reason why I had in a FB Note on 2 June 2012 said in reference to the WP, that it is “a first tier opposition party, the other opposition parties are in the third tier, and one or two of them risk sliding into the fourth tier.” It could be argued that that last part has now come to pass for two of the four parties that contested the Punggol East by-election on 26 January 2013.
Even if the other Singapore opposition parties have no parliamentary presence (with the exception of the Singapore People’s Party through NCMP Lina Chiam), it is worthwhile examining what, if anything, they could bring to an opposition coalition. Here, one key measurement is party brand which tends to be heavily associated with personalities. To that extent, as a purely cerebral exercise, let us look hypothetically at a potential three-party coalition among the WP, the Singapore Democratic Party and the National Solidarity Party, and the impact of their individual party brand to such a coalition.
The WP brand is known to increasing numbers of Singaporeans. The politically aware would instantly associate the WP brand with the following names: Low Thia Khiang, Sylvia Lim, Chen Show Mao, and, increasingly, Pritam Singh and Png Eng Huat. Most reasonable people would say that they are perfectly fine with these five personalities; that they have nothing against them.
For the SDP brand, it is synonymous with Chee Soon Juan. Just the mere mention of this name would draw a mixed reaction from politically aware Singaporeans. Dr Chee is liked by some proportion of Singaporeans, but he draws a sharply negative reaction from others – a reaction that is almost visceral in nature.
For the NSP, it too is largely associated with one name, Nicole Seah. She has a following but that following appears to be narrowly based on younger and English-educated segments of the electorate. The broader NSP is unlikely to benefit from the popularity of one member whose support base is in any case fairly narrow. In other words, there will not be any significant coattail effect.
If this analysis is correct then what could SDP and NSP bring to a coalition with the WP? As of now it is not apparent that they could bring anything materially significant to it, although this minor detail is of little interest to those advocating for such a coalition or who have an impressionistic view of it. The fact of the matter is that the biggest loser in such a coalition would be the WP itself. Here, the metaphor that applies is the following: a chain is only as strong as its weakest link. Based on all evidence, including the results of the 2011 general election, the weakest link in a possible WP-SDP-NSP coalition would be the SDP. A segment of middle-ground voters who would vote for the WP because of its moderate credentials would never vote for the SDP because of Dr Chee. That is the visceral reaction of some voters to SDP/Chee Soon Juan. The WP’s brand would be diminished and made amorphous in any opposition coalition and its electoral prospects leveled down to the weakest link in that possible coalition. In other words, in a coalition, the WP’s chances of securing any more parliamentary seats would be seriously jeopardized, and the chances of the other opposition parties gaining seats would improve only marginally.
Supporters and members of the other opposition parties would contend that they could bring a few positive attributes to an opposition coalition. The usual thing they would say is that parties like the SDP and NSP have a significantly stronger online presence than does the WP, and therefore that is their contribution to an opposition coalition. I have a long-held view on this, and that is online chatter has little, if any, bearing on electoral outcomes in Singapore, even if it has such a bearing elsewhere. (It clearly has a bearing on Malaysian elections, which is yet another difference between the Malaysian and Singapore eco-systems.)
The WP has in fact been criticized by some Netizens for ignoring a number of high-trafficked socio-political blogs. Yet, the reality is that, as the Punggol East by-election had once again shown, electoral outcomes in Singapore are determined through a traditional campaign and not via online chatter. In Punggol East the WP deployed several hundred volunteers. Those volunteers, led by the WP’s parliamentarians, campaigned on as many of the doorsteps of the public housing blocks in Punggol East as they possibly could. No other opposition party in Singapore has that level of logistical capability.
Equally, not all opposition boats will rise with the WP tide. In point of fact, because politics is a zero-sum game, the reverse is true. More and more support and resources that gravitate to the party in the ascendant will largely be at the expense of the already weak parties. This will have vast implications for opposition parties attempting to meet the massive logistical challenges posed by a general election campaign. Thus, “success begets success” and “failure begets failure”.
To that extent, it should be mentioned that underpinning an already strong WP brand is the party’s competency in Town Council management. If one believes that, ultimately, all politics is local, then this is no small advantage. The efficient way the WP has run an enlarged Town Council comprising up to 300,000 residents would have a significant demonstration effect in adjacent electoral divisions in which the WP intends to field candidates at the next election. All the other opposition parties are seriously hobbled by not having such an advantage. Most, with the exception of the Singapore People’s Party, do not have a CV that lists Town Council management as a part of their recent experience. In fact, the SDP did not do itself any favours in a proposal it made to the WP leading up to the Punggol East by-election. The SDP statement said: “In the spirit of compromise and cooperation, we would like to propose that our two parties run a joint campaign and field one candidate from the SDP. If victorious, the SDP candidate will enter Parliament and the WP will run the Punggol East Town Council.”
It is understandable that the only people who would keep talking about an opposition coalition in Singapore along the lines of the one in Malaysia, are, on the one hand, those who are unaware of the very different political realities in both countries, and, on the other, members and supporters of the weaker opposition parties who require a leg-up from the WP to improve their parties’ electoral prospects (although publicly they would never portray it that way).
Getting that last 10% of the vote to cross the finishing line cannot be achieved simply on the back of a protest vote against the PAP. That final 10% will only be secured on the strength of one’s own party brand. A large proportion of middle ground voters (whom I have consistently indicated constitute around 35% of the electorate) simply do not subscribe to the view of opposition to the People’s Action Party at any cost, or at any price. This is borne out in an analysis of individual electoral divisions in Breakthrough: Roadmap for Singapore’s Political Future. There is nothing to suggest that this has changed markedly since the 2011 GE. If anything the gap between the WP and the other opposition parties has widened. It may no longer be 8-10%, but now exceeds 10%. If this is in fact the case, then one thing is certain: between now and the next general election (which I believe will be held in 2015 when Singapore celebrates its 50th National Day) any number of individuals will attempt to curry favour with WP leaders in the hope of standing on the WP ticket at that election.
In the meantime, one can describe the Singapore political scene by employing an analogy from the world of business. The ruling PAP is like a supermarket chain with branches throughout the island. It could be argued that at one time this was an upscale supermarket brand. Today, however, it could be said that, in the public perception, the brand has slipped a few notches and is more down market.
On the other hand, the WP is like a mini-mart chain focused on a regional basis, with outlets in the eastern half of the island and with financially viable plans to expand its presence there by potentially doubling, if not tripling, its number of outlets over the medium term. The mini-mart chain, even if growing only regionally, is clearly taking market share away from the national supermarket chain.
The other opposition parties are like mom and pop provision shops. As the supermarket and mini-mart chains have the manpower, financial resources and, significantly, strong branding to compete with each other for market share, the mom and pop shops are squeezed out. They are going out of business even as they insist on incurring financial losses just to maintain an existence.
Dr Derek da Cunha is author of the books: Breakthrough: Roadmap for Singapore’s Political Future (2012); The Price of Victory: The 1997 Singapore General Election and Beyond (1997); and, Singapore Places its Bets: Casinos, Foreign Talent and Remaking a City-State (2010).
Copyright © Derek da Cunha
11 April 2013
http://www.facebook.com/notes/derek...r-than-the-sum-of-its-parts/10152283451918797
By Derek da Cunha
With the announcement by the Malaysian Election Commission of the date of Malaysia’s 13th general election, the excitement level has gone up several notches in what is expected to be a very keenly fought contest. It is also expected to be keenly watched south of the Causeway, in Singapore. There has been a view in some Singapore opposition circles that a number of opposition parties should follow the example of their Malaysian counterparts and come together to provide a united front to the governing party. This reflects the concept that “the whole is greater than the sum of its parts.” This sounds good in theory. But is it viable in practice?
In Malaysia, the opposition Pakatan Rakyat (PR) coalition is composed of three component parties each of which are of almost equal strength to the other. The main measurement of this strength is their presence in the lower house of the Federal Parliament, the Dewan Rakyat. The parliamentary strength of the three component PR parties going into the 13th general election is: People’s Justice Party (Parti Keadilan Rakyat) 23 seats, Democratic Action Party (DAP) 29 seats, and the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS) 23 seats. Each of these parties has its own comparative advantages, largely in terms of the geographic areas each contests and the demographics each appeals to. When combined, these comparative advantages provide synergy to a coalition, reinforcing the coalition as a whole. For these reasons, among others, the PR coalition is expected to give the Barisan Nasional coalition government a run for its money.
In Singapore, the opposition parties are of very unequal strength. One opposition party, the Workers’ Party, has a parliamentary presence of nine – seven fully elected MPs and two Non-constituency MPs. The WP has no peer. This is the reason why I had in a FB Note on 2 June 2012 said in reference to the WP, that it is “a first tier opposition party, the other opposition parties are in the third tier, and one or two of them risk sliding into the fourth tier.” It could be argued that that last part has now come to pass for two of the four parties that contested the Punggol East by-election on 26 January 2013.
Even if the other Singapore opposition parties have no parliamentary presence (with the exception of the Singapore People’s Party through NCMP Lina Chiam), it is worthwhile examining what, if anything, they could bring to an opposition coalition. Here, one key measurement is party brand which tends to be heavily associated with personalities. To that extent, as a purely cerebral exercise, let us look hypothetically at a potential three-party coalition among the WP, the Singapore Democratic Party and the National Solidarity Party, and the impact of their individual party brand to such a coalition.
The WP brand is known to increasing numbers of Singaporeans. The politically aware would instantly associate the WP brand with the following names: Low Thia Khiang, Sylvia Lim, Chen Show Mao, and, increasingly, Pritam Singh and Png Eng Huat. Most reasonable people would say that they are perfectly fine with these five personalities; that they have nothing against them.
For the SDP brand, it is synonymous with Chee Soon Juan. Just the mere mention of this name would draw a mixed reaction from politically aware Singaporeans. Dr Chee is liked by some proportion of Singaporeans, but he draws a sharply negative reaction from others – a reaction that is almost visceral in nature.
For the NSP, it too is largely associated with one name, Nicole Seah. She has a following but that following appears to be narrowly based on younger and English-educated segments of the electorate. The broader NSP is unlikely to benefit from the popularity of one member whose support base is in any case fairly narrow. In other words, there will not be any significant coattail effect.
If this analysis is correct then what could SDP and NSP bring to a coalition with the WP? As of now it is not apparent that they could bring anything materially significant to it, although this minor detail is of little interest to those advocating for such a coalition or who have an impressionistic view of it. The fact of the matter is that the biggest loser in such a coalition would be the WP itself. Here, the metaphor that applies is the following: a chain is only as strong as its weakest link. Based on all evidence, including the results of the 2011 general election, the weakest link in a possible WP-SDP-NSP coalition would be the SDP. A segment of middle-ground voters who would vote for the WP because of its moderate credentials would never vote for the SDP because of Dr Chee. That is the visceral reaction of some voters to SDP/Chee Soon Juan. The WP’s brand would be diminished and made amorphous in any opposition coalition and its electoral prospects leveled down to the weakest link in that possible coalition. In other words, in a coalition, the WP’s chances of securing any more parliamentary seats would be seriously jeopardized, and the chances of the other opposition parties gaining seats would improve only marginally.
Supporters and members of the other opposition parties would contend that they could bring a few positive attributes to an opposition coalition. The usual thing they would say is that parties like the SDP and NSP have a significantly stronger online presence than does the WP, and therefore that is their contribution to an opposition coalition. I have a long-held view on this, and that is online chatter has little, if any, bearing on electoral outcomes in Singapore, even if it has such a bearing elsewhere. (It clearly has a bearing on Malaysian elections, which is yet another difference between the Malaysian and Singapore eco-systems.)
The WP has in fact been criticized by some Netizens for ignoring a number of high-trafficked socio-political blogs. Yet, the reality is that, as the Punggol East by-election had once again shown, electoral outcomes in Singapore are determined through a traditional campaign and not via online chatter. In Punggol East the WP deployed several hundred volunteers. Those volunteers, led by the WP’s parliamentarians, campaigned on as many of the doorsteps of the public housing blocks in Punggol East as they possibly could. No other opposition party in Singapore has that level of logistical capability.
Equally, not all opposition boats will rise with the WP tide. In point of fact, because politics is a zero-sum game, the reverse is true. More and more support and resources that gravitate to the party in the ascendant will largely be at the expense of the already weak parties. This will have vast implications for opposition parties attempting to meet the massive logistical challenges posed by a general election campaign. Thus, “success begets success” and “failure begets failure”.
To that extent, it should be mentioned that underpinning an already strong WP brand is the party’s competency in Town Council management. If one believes that, ultimately, all politics is local, then this is no small advantage. The efficient way the WP has run an enlarged Town Council comprising up to 300,000 residents would have a significant demonstration effect in adjacent electoral divisions in which the WP intends to field candidates at the next election. All the other opposition parties are seriously hobbled by not having such an advantage. Most, with the exception of the Singapore People’s Party, do not have a CV that lists Town Council management as a part of their recent experience. In fact, the SDP did not do itself any favours in a proposal it made to the WP leading up to the Punggol East by-election. The SDP statement said: “In the spirit of compromise and cooperation, we would like to propose that our two parties run a joint campaign and field one candidate from the SDP. If victorious, the SDP candidate will enter Parliament and the WP will run the Punggol East Town Council.”
It is understandable that the only people who would keep talking about an opposition coalition in Singapore along the lines of the one in Malaysia, are, on the one hand, those who are unaware of the very different political realities in both countries, and, on the other, members and supporters of the weaker opposition parties who require a leg-up from the WP to improve their parties’ electoral prospects (although publicly they would never portray it that way).
Getting that last 10% of the vote to cross the finishing line cannot be achieved simply on the back of a protest vote against the PAP. That final 10% will only be secured on the strength of one’s own party brand. A large proportion of middle ground voters (whom I have consistently indicated constitute around 35% of the electorate) simply do not subscribe to the view of opposition to the People’s Action Party at any cost, or at any price. This is borne out in an analysis of individual electoral divisions in Breakthrough: Roadmap for Singapore’s Political Future. There is nothing to suggest that this has changed markedly since the 2011 GE. If anything the gap between the WP and the other opposition parties has widened. It may no longer be 8-10%, but now exceeds 10%. If this is in fact the case, then one thing is certain: between now and the next general election (which I believe will be held in 2015 when Singapore celebrates its 50th National Day) any number of individuals will attempt to curry favour with WP leaders in the hope of standing on the WP ticket at that election.
In the meantime, one can describe the Singapore political scene by employing an analogy from the world of business. The ruling PAP is like a supermarket chain with branches throughout the island. It could be argued that at one time this was an upscale supermarket brand. Today, however, it could be said that, in the public perception, the brand has slipped a few notches and is more down market.
On the other hand, the WP is like a mini-mart chain focused on a regional basis, with outlets in the eastern half of the island and with financially viable plans to expand its presence there by potentially doubling, if not tripling, its number of outlets over the medium term. The mini-mart chain, even if growing only regionally, is clearly taking market share away from the national supermarket chain.
The other opposition parties are like mom and pop provision shops. As the supermarket and mini-mart chains have the manpower, financial resources and, significantly, strong branding to compete with each other for market share, the mom and pop shops are squeezed out. They are going out of business even as they insist on incurring financial losses just to maintain an existence.
Dr Derek da Cunha is author of the books: Breakthrough: Roadmap for Singapore’s Political Future (2012); The Price of Victory: The 1997 Singapore General Election and Beyond (1997); and, Singapore Places its Bets: Casinos, Foreign Talent and Remaking a City-State (2010).
Copyright © Derek da Cunha
11 April 2013
http://www.facebook.com/notes/derek...r-than-the-sum-of-its-parts/10152283451918797
