Xi & Putin can surely all the more do so when Israeli did it to Lebanese Jordanian and Syrians. Russian Chinese alliance forces should occupy ENTIRE KOREAN PENINSULAR kick out all American forces. And if necessary expand to ENTIRE JAPAN. Call it 1B1R nuke safety zone or Peace Keeping Zone, or Security Assurance Zone, or New Golan Heights, or Eastern West Bank... what so ever.
This is a very Jewish concept, endorsed by UN USA NATO and implemented over the last many decades by Jews. So Russian Chinese alliance can all the more do so, and stick middle finger up any silly idiots who try to object or show unhappiness. Ask Israeli to break up ALL of it's rubbish zones before you start to ask Moscow & Beijing basically.
Sino-Russian forces can do it with reasonably low cost and swift. They can assure Dotard of his ass safe from any Hwasong-XX ICBM. And toast to world peace - LOL!
https://www.infowars.com/israel-announces-security-zone-in-syria/
Israel Announces “Security Zone” in Syria
February 4, 2013 Comments
Kurt Nimmo
Infowars.com,
February 4, 2013
Israel is considering a “buffer zone” stretching ten miles into Syria “to protect itself from fundamentalist rebels on the other side of the border,” the Sunday Times reports.
The proposal, which has been drawn up by the military and presented to Binyamin Netanyahu, the prime minister, is intended to secure the 47-mile border against a growing Islamist threat if President Bashar al-Assad’s embattled regime loses control of the area.
The “Islamist threat” in Syria is funded and armed by the CIA and Saudi Arabia and Qatar. The Obama administration likes to pretend it is actively working to keep arms out of the hands of al-Qaeda in Syria, but the truth is something quite different – al-Qaeda and its affiliates play a key role in undermining the al-Assad regime.
One of the most effective fighting groups inside Syria is Jabhat al-Nusra, a terrorist organization aligned with the Free Syrian Army. The U.S. has designated it as an al-Qaeda affiliate. According to Quilliam Foundation, a counterterrorism policy institute based in London, Jabhat al-Nusra is an offshoot of al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), a terror group allegedly founded by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the mythical terror leader who transformed AQI “from a small elitist vanguard to a mass movement.”
In addition to Israel’s “state sponsored terrorism” (as its bombing inside Syria was characterized by Turkish PM Recep Tayyip Erdogan), Israel has long used the Kurds to undermine not only Syria, but also Iran.
Lebanon Redux
Israel’s decision to carve out a strip on the Syrian side of the Golan Heights – Syrian territory occupied and administered by Israel since 1967 – is hardly a new tactic: Israel did much the same in south Lebanon.
Following the conclusion of the 1982 Lebanon War and Operation Peace in Galilee (the Israeli invasion of Lebanon), the IDF was instructed by the Israeli government to maintain a “security zone” in Lebanon, ostensibly to prevent infiltration by the PLO. Israeli occupation of a 25 kilometer deep area inside the country and the brutality inflicted on civilians by the IDF and its proxy the South Lebanon Army resulted in the formation of Hezbollah.
Around 18,000 people were killed and 30,000 injured and between 500,000-800,000 made homeless in the first three months of the Israeli occupation. The IDF maintained the notorious Khiam prison where many Lebanese were held without trial and tortured.
Resistance by the Lebanese and Hezbollah’s low-intensity guerrilla warfare eventually resulted in Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon. In 2000, Israel completed the withdrawal in compliance with UN Security Council Resolutions 425 and 426 requiring it to withdraw to internationally recognized borders.
Intimidating Syria
Israel’s action against Lebanon was part of a long-standing “effort to secure the balkanization and vassalization of Lebanon, the eradication of Palestinian nationalism, and the intimidation of Syria,” writes Naseer H. Aruri. He cites the writings of Moshe Sharett, the second Prime Minister of Israel, who documented
deliberate Israeli acts of provocation, intended to generate Arab hostility and thus to create pretexts for armed action and territorial expansion. Sharett’s records document this policy of “sacred terrorism” and expose the myths of Israel’s “security needs” and the “Arab threat” that have been treated like self-evident truths from the creation of Israel to the present…
Livia Rokach, in her book on Sharett’s personal dairy, reveals a consistent effort by Israel to provoke Syria, beginning in the early 1950s and culminating in the occupation of the Golan in 1967, a move that resulted in the explusion of 130,000 Syrians.
“The Golan Heights serves as yet another reminder that the conflict on the ground is very different than the story Israel offers up to the world,” writes Mya Guarnieri. “The conflict isn’t about the Western world battling the Muslim world; it’s not a clash of cultures or a clash of values; the occupation isn’t a security measure, meant to protect Israel from ‘terrorists.’”
It is also about balkanizing and splintering the Arab and Muslim world, a plan not exclusive to Israel as a key component of its own territorial ambitions, but also used by the global elite who have employed the time-tested British “divide and conquer” strategy to “prevent collusion and maintain security dependence among the vassals, to keep tributaries pliant and protected, and to keep the barbarians from coming together,” as Zbigniew Brzezinski writes in The Grand Chessboard.
Israel’s Buffer Zone in Syria: Old Habits
“The purpose of the plan [to impose a buffer zone] is to ensure the safety of Israel’s Golan Heights and its northern region after the fall of the Assad regime in Syria,” Israel Defense reports today.
“If the Syrian instability persists, it seems that IDF forces will have to stay in the security zone that will be constructed for years,” said one of those close to those behind the plan that was submitted.
For Israel, the piecemeal conquest of Syria – and Lebanon before it – has little to do with “Syrian instability” manufactured in large part by external players (the CIA, Saudi Arabia and Qatar), but is rather an ongoing effort to dissolve Arab and Muslim states.
A Strategy for Israel in the 1980s, written by Oded Yinon, who was formerly attached to the Israeli Foreign Ministry, and published in Kivunim (Directions), the journal of the Department of Information of the World Zionist Organization, “reflects high-level thinking in the Israeli military and intelligence establishment,” writes Ralph Schoenman. The article “outlines a timetable for Israel to become the imperial regional power based upon the dissolution of the Arab states.”
Yinon described an effort to dissolve Lebanon, fragment Syria, go to war with Iran, target Iraq (mission accomplished), marginalize and weaken Egypt (now in process), undermine Saudi Arabia, and eventually depopulate the Occupied Territories.
The decision to carve out a new security zone in Syria – despite its abject failure to maintain one in Lebanon – reveals that it remains on a trajectory envisioned prior to the establishment of the Israeli state.
The United States will naturally support this violation of Syria’s national sovereignty – citing al-Qaeda and other manufactured threats – as it has supported nearly all of Israel’s efforts against its Arab and Muslim neighbors.
Birds of a feather, they say, after all fly together.
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/...he-israeli-perspective-on-safe-zones-in-syria
PolicyWatch 2584
The Israeli Perspective on Safe Zones in Syria
Nadav Pollak
Also available in العربية
March 10, 2016
Despite the potential benefits of a safe zone along the Jordan-Syria border, Russia's presence in the war would probably limit Israel's ability to openly support or contribute to such an initiative.
Read more articles from the TWI series on Syrian safe zones.
Since the beginning of Russia's military intervention in Syria, the humanitarian situation has grown worse. In the northwest, Russian airstrikes and ground advances by the Assad regime and its allies have spurred tens of thousands of Syrians to flee into Turkey. And in the south, similar offensives have pushed more Syrians out of Deraa province and toward Jordan, whose border is effectively closed at the moment. In response, policymakers from the Middle East, Europe, and the United States are once again floating the idea of establishing safe zones inside Syria to mitigate the human suffering and relieve some of the pressure on countries that host the most refugees, such as Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan. Yet Israel has not publicly participated in this dialogue despite sharing a border with Syria, and the reasons behind this deliberate absence merit a closer look.
WHY ISN'T ISRAEL PART OF THE DISCUSSION?
Historically, Arab countries have often denied any cooperation with Israel, diplomatically or militarily, in large part to avoid domestic criticism from populations that tend to have deeply hostile feelings about the Palestinian situation. Bringing Israel into the safe zone discussion could taint the legitimacy of any such initiative in Arab public opinion, since the Assad regime and its partners would no doubt depict it as part of an Israeli scheme to gain control in Syria.
Thus, despite the numerous scenarios for implementing a safe zone -- including potential military roles for Turkish, Saudi, Jordanian, and NATO forces -- no policymaker has suggested that Israel contribute military assets. If Israel is not part of the implementation, why would countries want it as part of the planning process? To be sure, Israel could help by sharing intelligence about dynamics on the ground and providing some humanitarian assistance, but it is already doing such things to one degree or another. Moreover, many Israeli decisionmakers believe that a safe zone is not necessarily their business. This line of thought is a direct continuation of Israel's policy toward the civil war thus far -- namely, not taking sides. Supporting a safe zone could entail military action against the Assad regime, which would be perceived as taking sides.
REASONS TO SUPPORT A SAFE ZONE
If outside actors establish a safe zone on their own, how would Israel respond? The answer partly depends on where the zone is located. While Israel would essentially do nothing in response to a northern zone on Turkey's border, it might offer some support for a southern safe zone along the Jordan-Syria border, mostly because of its importance to Amman. The kingdom is having great difficulty coping with the vast number of Syrian refugees already on its territory or waiting outside the border, and another influx would further strain its financial, logistical, and security resources (see PolicyWatch 2581, "A Safe Zone in Southern Syria"). In December, former Israeli national security advisor Yaakov Amidror and former National Security Council deputy Eran Lerman wrote, "Israel has a strategic interest in, and longstanding commitment to, the safety, security, stability, and prosperity of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan...Israeli assistance to Jordan in other forms -- above all, helping Jordan cope in recent years with the immense influx of Syrian refugees -- remains crucial." A southern safe zone could serve all of these interests.
Another reason why Israel might support a zone is that it could have a positive effect on the Syrian opposition. Why would Israel suddenly support a pro-rebel policy when it has studiously avoided taking sides in the war? As Amos Harel noted in a February 21 Haaretz article, Israel is concerned that the ongoing regime and Russian victories will strengthen Hezbollah and Iran, thereby increasing the threat to Israel. According to Harel, Israeli leaders now believe that the West must increase its support to the rebels in order to "stop the regime's progress and the rise in Iran's standing." They may therefore support a safe zone if they think it will strengthen the opposition.
THE RUSSIAN FACTOR
Yet before backing any such plan, even covertly, Israel would need to take Russia's potential reaction into account. Since the beginning of Moscow's military intervention in Syria, Israel and Russia have engaged in tactical coordination that allows both countries to operate there without hindering each other's objectives (see PolicyWatch 2529, "Israeli-Russian Coordination in Syria: So Far So Good?"). Israel's main objectives in Syria are twofold: halting any transfers of advanced weapons to Hezbollah, and preventing Iran and Hezbollah from establishing a fighting front against Israel in the Golan Heights. To enforce these redlines, Israel would prefer to maintain good relations with Moscow, since Russian forces could otherwise decide to defend Hezbollah's assets in Syria or share intelligence with their coalition partners about imminent Israeli strikes.
If a safe zone is established in Syria without a UN Security Council mandate, and if it entails a military component such as a no-fly zone, then Russia would probably perceive it as inimical to its own policy, perhaps even taking countermeasures to interfere with it. Russian forces are less focused on southern Syria at the moment, so they might not oppose a safe zone there so vehemently. Yet if moderate rebels use the zone to launch attacks against the regime, Russia would likely act against it no matter where it is located.
Although supporting a southern safe zone that Russia opposes would be problematic for Israeli leaders, their calculations might change if the United States is leading the operation, since that would signal American commitment to the plan and protection for the parties involved. In that case, Israel would feel more confident about expressing support for the zone and even offering humanitarian assistance and some military coordination as it did in the past (see PolicyWatch 2323, "Tough Dilemma in Southern Syria"). Yet U.S. leadership would not extend to helping Israel enforce its previously described redlines, so Jerusalem would still need to be careful not to aggravate Russia.
CONCLUSION
Israel's position will not be the deciding factor in the safe zone debate -- the United States, Turkey, Jordan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and others will have a much bigger influence because they are more invested in the war. Some of them have already stated their readiness to contribute military assets for such a policy. At the moment, Israel seems committed to staying impartial toward the war and will likely avoid making public statements about any safe zone plan -- some Arab countries would certainly prefer that it keep out of the matter. If Moscow does not oppose the plan, then Israel might change its mind and support it, but any Russian criticism or threats aimed at the zone would likely convince Israel to remain silent. The current leadership believes that as long as they are able to act on Israel's redlines in Syria, then no drastic policy changes are warranted. Although some analysts and former officials have suggested that Israel strengthen its relations with moderate rebels in the south and consider a no-fly zone, most of these recommendations were made before Russia's military intervention, which has deterred many actors from increasing their own involvement in the war. In short, if Russia opposes a safe zone in the south, then Israel is unlikely to assist the effort militarily.
Nadav Pollak is the Diane and Guilford Glazer Foundation Fellow at The Washington Institute.
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Nadav Pollak is a former Diane and Guilford Glazer Foundation fellow at The Washington Institute.
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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Israeli_occupation_of_Southern_Lebanon
Israeli occupation of Southern Lebanon
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
This article needs additional citations for verification. Please help improve this article by adding citations to reliable sources. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed. (August 2013) (Learn how and when to remove this template message)
South Lebanon security belt
South Lebanon security zone
1985[1]–2000
Capital Marjayoun
Languages Arabic · French
Religion Islam · Christianity · Druze faith
Government Provisional administration
President
• 1985–2000 Antoine Lahad
Historical era Lebanese Civil War and South Lebanon conflict (1985–2000)
• declaration 1985[1]
• Israeli withdrawal from Southern Lebanon May 2000
Population
• est. 150,000
Currency Lebanese Pound, Old Israeli Shekel
Preceded by Succeeded by
Free Lebanon State
Lebanon
Today part of
Lebanon
The Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon took place after Israel invaded Lebanon during the 1982 Lebanon War and subsequently retained its forces to support the Christian South Lebanon Army in Southern Lebanon. In 1982, the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) and allied Free Lebanon Army Christian militias seized large sections of Lebanon, including the capital of Beirut, amid the hostilities of the wider Lebanese Civil War. Later, Israel withdrew from parts of the occupied area between 1983 and 1985, but remained in partial control of the border region known as the South Lebanon Security Belt, initially in coordination with the self-proclaimed Free Lebanon State, which executed a limited authority over portions of southern Lebanon until 1984, and later with the South Lebanon Army (transformed from Free Lebanon Army), until the year 2000. Israel's stated purpose for the Security Belt was to create a space separating its northern border towns from terrorists residing in Lebanon.[citation needed]
During the stay in the security belt, the IDF held many positions and supported the SLA. The SLA took over daily life in the security zone, initially as the official force of the Free Lebanon State and later as an allied militia. Notably, the South Lebanon Army controlled the prison in Khiam. In addition, United Nations (UN) forces and the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) were deployed to the security belt (from the end of Operation Litani in 1978).
The strip was a few miles wide, and consisted of about 10% of the total territory of Lebanon, which housed about 150,000 people who lived in 67 villages and towns made up of Shiites, Maronites and Druze (most of whom lived in the town of Hasbaya). In the central zone of the Strip was the Maronite town Marjayoun, which was the capital of the security belt. Residents remaining in the security zone had many contacts with Israel, many of whom have worked there and received various services from Israel.
Contents
Map of southern Lebanon, featuring the Blue Line, UNIFIL zone, and Litani River (2006)
Main article: Free Lebanon State
Although the strip was officially formed in 1985, following degradation of the Free Lebanon State and the IDF withdrawal from most of South Lebanon, it has its roots in the early Lebanese civil war. From 1968, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) controlled southern Lebanon. In 1975, the PLO's control became a severe nuisance to Christians and local residents. The Christians asked Israel for its assistance. From mid-1976, Israel began to assist the Christian residents across the border by opening the border, or Good Fence, in Metola, and through military cooperation with the Christian militia, the Free Lebanon Army and later Free Lebanon State, which was established under the Christian officer Major Saad Haddad.
History
1985-2000
Main article: South Lebanon conflict (1985–2000)
During the evacuation in the first Lebanon war, the command of the SLA was delivered into the hands of Antoine Lahad, who demanded and received Israeli permission to hold the Jezzine zone north of the strip. In the first years after the IDF withdrawal from the north part of Lebanon, the strip was relatively quiet. Over the years, the Lebanese militant groups, led by Sh'ite Hezbollah, increased on the Israeli side in the security belt. Driving on the roads became dangerous, and IDF forces stayed more in the military camps than on the roads. Hezbollah made many efforts to attack the IDF's military camps. On 16 February 1992, the then-leader of Hezbollah, Abbas Musawi, was assassinated by IDF's helicopter missiles. The IDF assumed that the Hezbollah leadership would curb their activities for fear of their lives and the lives of their families. Hezbollah was headed by Sheikh Nasrallah.
Israeli soldiers serving in Southern Lebanon received no ribbon for wartime military service, because Israel considered the maintaining of the security belt as a low-intensity conflict rather than a war.[2] In early 2000, Chief-of-Staff Shaul Mofaz said that 1999 was "the IDF's most successful year in Lebanon" with 11 soldiers killed by hostiles in Southern Lebanon, the lowest casualty rate during the entire conflict.[3] A total number of 256 Israeli soldiers died in combat in South Lebanon from 1985 to 2000.[4]
Withdrawal from the security belt (1999-2000)
Before the Israeli election in May 1999 the prime minister of Israel, Ehud Barak, promised that within a year all Israeli forces would withdraw from Southern Lebanon, effectively dropping the support for the South Lebanon Army. When negotiation efforts between Israel and Syria, the goal of which was to bring a peace agreement between Israel and Lebanon as well, failed due to Syrian control of Lebanon (until 2005), Barak led to the decision of withdrawal of the IDF to the Israeli border. With the amounting pressure on South Lebanon Army and the South Lebanon security belt administration, the system began to fall apart, with many members of the army and administration requesting political asylum in Israel and other countries. With mounting attacks of Hezbollah, the ranks of the South Lebanese Army deteriorated, with reduced conscription and high rates of desertion at lower ranks. In April 2000, when it was clear the Israeli withdrawal was about to happen within weeks or months, some SLA officials began moving their families to northern Israel.
The Israeli complete withdrawal took place on 24 May 2000. No Israeli soldiers were killed or wounded during the redeployment to the internationally recognized border.[citation needed] The South Lebanon Army however shortly collapsed, with most officers and administration officials fleeing to Israel with their families, as Hezbollah amounted pressure on the remaining units. When Israel allowed the pouring refugees in, some 7,000 refugees, including South Lebanon Army soldiers, Security Zone officials and their families arrived in Galilee.
Provisional Administration
Main article: South Lebanon security belt administration
The South Lebanon security belt administration was a local provisional governance body in South Lebanon, in the South Lebanon security belt areas. It replaced the Free Lebanon State institutions and operated from 1985 until 2000 with full Israeli logistic and military support. It controlled 328 square miles of territory in southern Lebanon.[5] During its functioning years, the administration was headed by Antoine Lahad, a Maronite Christian claiming the rank of general.[5]
Military forces
Main article: South Lebanon Army
The South Lebanon Army or South Lebanese Army (SLA) was a Lebanese Christian militia during the Lebanese Civil War and its aftermath, until disbanded in the year 2000. It was originally named the Free Lebanon Army, which split from the Army of Free Lebanon. After 1979, the militia operated in southern Lebanon under the authority of Saad Haddad's Government of Free Lebanon. It was supported by Israel, and became its primary ally in Lebanon during the South Lebanon conflict (1985–2000) to fight against Hezbollah.
Demographics
The strip was a few miles wide, and consisted of about 10% of the total territory of Lebanon, which housed about 150,000 people who lived in 67 villages and towns made up of Shiites, Maronites and Druze (most of whom lived in the town of Hasbaya). In the central zone of the Strip was the Maronite town Marjayoun, which was the capital of the security belt. Residents remaining in the security zone had many contacts with Israel, many of whom have worked there and received various services from Israel.
Economy
Main article: Good Fence
The beginning of the Good Fence coincides with the beginning of the civil war in Lebanon in 1976 and Israelן support of the predominantly-Maronite militias in southern Lebanon in their battle with the PLO. From 1977, Israel allowed the Maronites and their allies to find employment in Israel and provided assistance in exporting goods through the Israeli port city of Haifa. The main border crossing through which goods and workers crossed was the Fatima Gate crossing near Metula. This provided essential economic stability to the administration of Free Lebanon State and the South Lebanon security belt administration.
Israel states that, before 2000, approximately one-third of the patients in the ophthalmology department of the Western Galilee Hospital were Lebanese citizens who crossed the border through the Good Fence and received treatment free of charge.[6] The Good Fence ceased to exist with Israel's withdrawal from southern Lebanon in 2000 and disintegration of the South Lebanon security belt administration.
See also
http://www.inss.org.il/publication/is-the-jordan-valley-truly-a-security-zone-for-israel/
Is the Jordan Valley Truly a Security Zone for Israel?
עברית
Share
Shlomo Brom
Strategic Assessment, Volume 3, No. 4, January 2001
On July 26, 1967, Defense Minister Yigal Alon presented a plan to then-Prime Minister Levi Eshkol for a settlement with the Palestinians, which came to be known as the Alon Plan. Since its inception, the importance of the Jordan Valley to Israeli security has been deeply imprinted on the collective consciousness of the Israeli polity. Today, as Israel discusses a permanent settlement with the Palestinians, the effects of this logic remains discernible within the popular discourse: it is generally believed that the Jordan Valley remains crucial to Israeli security, and that a permanent settlement must include both Israeli control over the Jordan Valley and the positioning of substantial security forces there. Indeed, there are those who go even further, maintaining Israel must annex the area outright.
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-14724842
Golan Heights profile
Israel seized the Golan Heights from Syria in the closing stages of the 1967 Six-Day War. Most of the Syrian Arab inhabitants fled the area during the conflict.
An armistice line was established and the region came under Israeli military control. Almost immediately Israel began to settle the Golan.
Israel unilaterally annexed the Golan Heights in 1981. The move was not recognised internationally.
There are more than 30 Jewish settlements on the heights, with an estimated 20,000 settlers. There are some 20,000 Syrians in the area, most of them members of the Druze sect.
Strategic importance
Southern Syria and the capital Damascus, about 60 km (40 miles) north, are clearly visible from the top of the Heights while Syrian artillery regularly shelled the whole of northern Israel from 1948 to 1967 when Syria controlled the Heights.
The heights give Israel an excellent vantage point for monitoring Syrian movements. The topography provides a natural buffer against any military thrust from Syria.
The area is also a key source of water for an arid region. Rainwater from the Golan's catchment feeds into the Jordan River. The area provides a third of Israel's water supply.
The land is fertile, with the volcanic soil being used to cultivate vineyards and orchards and to raise cattle. The Golan is also home to Israel's only ski resort.
Stumbling blocks
Syria wants to secure the return of the Golan Heights as part of any peace deal. In late 2003, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad said he was ready to revive peace talks with Israel.
In Israel, the principle of returning the territory in return for peace is already established. During US-brokered peace talks in 1999-2000, then Israeli prime minister Ehud Barak had offered to return most of the Golan to Syria.
But the main sticking point during the 1999 talks is also likely to bedevil any future discussions. Syria wants a full Israeli withdrawal to the pre-1967 border. This would give Damascus control of the eastern shore of the Sea of Galilee - Israel's main source of fresh water.
Israel wishes to retain control of Galilee and says the border is located a few hundred metres to the east of the shore.
A deal with Syria would also involve the dismantling of Jewish settlements in the territory.
Public opinion in Israel appears not to favour withdrawal. Opponents say the heights are too strategically important to be returned.
On-off talks
Indirect talks between Israel and Syria resumed in 2008, through Turkish government intermediaries, but were suspended following the resignation of Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert over a corruption inquiry.
The Israeli government under Binyamin Netanyahu elected in February 2009 indicated that it was determined to take a tougher line over the Golan, and in June 2009, the Syrian leader said there was no partner for talks on the Israeli side.
Syrian civil war
The US administration of President Barack Obama - who took up office in January 2009 - declared the restarting of talks between Israel and Syria to be one of its main foreign policy goals, but the advent of civil war in Syria in 2011 put paid to any progress.
Syrian fighting reached the Golan ceasefire lines in 2013, when Israel returned fire after rebel shells landed in Golan. Israeli and Syrian Army troops exchanged fire across their lines in May.
This is a very Jewish concept, endorsed by UN USA NATO and implemented over the last many decades by Jews. So Russian Chinese alliance can all the more do so, and stick middle finger up any silly idiots who try to object or show unhappiness. Ask Israeli to break up ALL of it's rubbish zones before you start to ask Moscow & Beijing basically.
Sino-Russian forces can do it with reasonably low cost and swift. They can assure Dotard of his ass safe from any Hwasong-XX ICBM. And toast to world peace - LOL!
https://www.infowars.com/israel-announces-security-zone-in-syria/
Israel Announces “Security Zone” in Syria
February 4, 2013 Comments
Kurt Nimmo
Infowars.com,
February 4, 2013
Israel is considering a “buffer zone” stretching ten miles into Syria “to protect itself from fundamentalist rebels on the other side of the border,” the Sunday Times reports.
The proposal, which has been drawn up by the military and presented to Binyamin Netanyahu, the prime minister, is intended to secure the 47-mile border against a growing Islamist threat if President Bashar al-Assad’s embattled regime loses control of the area.
One of the most effective fighting groups inside Syria is Jabhat al-Nusra, a terrorist organization aligned with the Free Syrian Army. The U.S. has designated it as an al-Qaeda affiliate. According to Quilliam Foundation, a counterterrorism policy institute based in London, Jabhat al-Nusra is an offshoot of al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), a terror group allegedly founded by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the mythical terror leader who transformed AQI “from a small elitist vanguard to a mass movement.”
In addition to Israel’s “state sponsored terrorism” (as its bombing inside Syria was characterized by Turkish PM Recep Tayyip Erdogan), Israel has long used the Kurds to undermine not only Syria, but also Iran.
Lebanon Redux
Israel’s decision to carve out a strip on the Syrian side of the Golan Heights – Syrian territory occupied and administered by Israel since 1967 – is hardly a new tactic: Israel did much the same in south Lebanon.
Following the conclusion of the 1982 Lebanon War and Operation Peace in Galilee (the Israeli invasion of Lebanon), the IDF was instructed by the Israeli government to maintain a “security zone” in Lebanon, ostensibly to prevent infiltration by the PLO. Israeli occupation of a 25 kilometer deep area inside the country and the brutality inflicted on civilians by the IDF and its proxy the South Lebanon Army resulted in the formation of Hezbollah.
Around 18,000 people were killed and 30,000 injured and between 500,000-800,000 made homeless in the first three months of the Israeli occupation. The IDF maintained the notorious Khiam prison where many Lebanese were held without trial and tortured.
Intimidating Syria
Israel’s action against Lebanon was part of a long-standing “effort to secure the balkanization and vassalization of Lebanon, the eradication of Palestinian nationalism, and the intimidation of Syria,” writes Naseer H. Aruri. He cites the writings of Moshe Sharett, the second Prime Minister of Israel, who documented
deliberate Israeli acts of provocation, intended to generate Arab hostility and thus to create pretexts for armed action and territorial expansion. Sharett’s records document this policy of “sacred terrorism” and expose the myths of Israel’s “security needs” and the “Arab threat” that have been treated like self-evident truths from the creation of Israel to the present…
Livia Rokach, in her book on Sharett’s personal dairy, reveals a consistent effort by Israel to provoke Syria, beginning in the early 1950s and culminating in the occupation of the Golan in 1967, a move that resulted in the explusion of 130,000 Syrians.
“The Golan Heights serves as yet another reminder that the conflict on the ground is very different than the story Israel offers up to the world,” writes Mya Guarnieri. “The conflict isn’t about the Western world battling the Muslim world; it’s not a clash of cultures or a clash of values; the occupation isn’t a security measure, meant to protect Israel from ‘terrorists.’”
It is also about balkanizing and splintering the Arab and Muslim world, a plan not exclusive to Israel as a key component of its own territorial ambitions, but also used by the global elite who have employed the time-tested British “divide and conquer” strategy to “prevent collusion and maintain security dependence among the vassals, to keep tributaries pliant and protected, and to keep the barbarians from coming together,” as Zbigniew Brzezinski writes in The Grand Chessboard.
Israel’s Buffer Zone in Syria: Old Habits
“The purpose of the plan [to impose a buffer zone] is to ensure the safety of Israel’s Golan Heights and its northern region after the fall of the Assad regime in Syria,” Israel Defense reports today.
“If the Syrian instability persists, it seems that IDF forces will have to stay in the security zone that will be constructed for years,” said one of those close to those behind the plan that was submitted.
For Israel, the piecemeal conquest of Syria – and Lebanon before it – has little to do with “Syrian instability” manufactured in large part by external players (the CIA, Saudi Arabia and Qatar), but is rather an ongoing effort to dissolve Arab and Muslim states.
A Strategy for Israel in the 1980s, written by Oded Yinon, who was formerly attached to the Israeli Foreign Ministry, and published in Kivunim (Directions), the journal of the Department of Information of the World Zionist Organization, “reflects high-level thinking in the Israeli military and intelligence establishment,” writes Ralph Schoenman. The article “outlines a timetable for Israel to become the imperial regional power based upon the dissolution of the Arab states.”
Yinon described an effort to dissolve Lebanon, fragment Syria, go to war with Iran, target Iraq (mission accomplished), marginalize and weaken Egypt (now in process), undermine Saudi Arabia, and eventually depopulate the Occupied Territories.
The decision to carve out a new security zone in Syria – despite its abject failure to maintain one in Lebanon – reveals that it remains on a trajectory envisioned prior to the establishment of the Israeli state.
The United States will naturally support this violation of Syria’s national sovereignty – citing al-Qaeda and other manufactured threats – as it has supported nearly all of Israel’s efforts against its Arab and Muslim neighbors.
Birds of a feather, they say, after all fly together.
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/...he-israeli-perspective-on-safe-zones-in-syria
PolicyWatch 2584
The Israeli Perspective on Safe Zones in Syria
Nadav Pollak
Also available in العربية
March 10, 2016
Despite the potential benefits of a safe zone along the Jordan-Syria border, Russia's presence in the war would probably limit Israel's ability to openly support or contribute to such an initiative.
Read more articles from the TWI series on Syrian safe zones.
Since the beginning of Russia's military intervention in Syria, the humanitarian situation has grown worse. In the northwest, Russian airstrikes and ground advances by the Assad regime and its allies have spurred tens of thousands of Syrians to flee into Turkey. And in the south, similar offensives have pushed more Syrians out of Deraa province and toward Jordan, whose border is effectively closed at the moment. In response, policymakers from the Middle East, Europe, and the United States are once again floating the idea of establishing safe zones inside Syria to mitigate the human suffering and relieve some of the pressure on countries that host the most refugees, such as Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan. Yet Israel has not publicly participated in this dialogue despite sharing a border with Syria, and the reasons behind this deliberate absence merit a closer look.
WHY ISN'T ISRAEL PART OF THE DISCUSSION?
Historically, Arab countries have often denied any cooperation with Israel, diplomatically or militarily, in large part to avoid domestic criticism from populations that tend to have deeply hostile feelings about the Palestinian situation. Bringing Israel into the safe zone discussion could taint the legitimacy of any such initiative in Arab public opinion, since the Assad regime and its partners would no doubt depict it as part of an Israeli scheme to gain control in Syria.
Thus, despite the numerous scenarios for implementing a safe zone -- including potential military roles for Turkish, Saudi, Jordanian, and NATO forces -- no policymaker has suggested that Israel contribute military assets. If Israel is not part of the implementation, why would countries want it as part of the planning process? To be sure, Israel could help by sharing intelligence about dynamics on the ground and providing some humanitarian assistance, but it is already doing such things to one degree or another. Moreover, many Israeli decisionmakers believe that a safe zone is not necessarily their business. This line of thought is a direct continuation of Israel's policy toward the civil war thus far -- namely, not taking sides. Supporting a safe zone could entail military action against the Assad regime, which would be perceived as taking sides.
REASONS TO SUPPORT A SAFE ZONE
If outside actors establish a safe zone on their own, how would Israel respond? The answer partly depends on where the zone is located. While Israel would essentially do nothing in response to a northern zone on Turkey's border, it might offer some support for a southern safe zone along the Jordan-Syria border, mostly because of its importance to Amman. The kingdom is having great difficulty coping with the vast number of Syrian refugees already on its territory or waiting outside the border, and another influx would further strain its financial, logistical, and security resources (see PolicyWatch 2581, "A Safe Zone in Southern Syria"). In December, former Israeli national security advisor Yaakov Amidror and former National Security Council deputy Eran Lerman wrote, "Israel has a strategic interest in, and longstanding commitment to, the safety, security, stability, and prosperity of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan...Israeli assistance to Jordan in other forms -- above all, helping Jordan cope in recent years with the immense influx of Syrian refugees -- remains crucial." A southern safe zone could serve all of these interests.
Another reason why Israel might support a zone is that it could have a positive effect on the Syrian opposition. Why would Israel suddenly support a pro-rebel policy when it has studiously avoided taking sides in the war? As Amos Harel noted in a February 21 Haaretz article, Israel is concerned that the ongoing regime and Russian victories will strengthen Hezbollah and Iran, thereby increasing the threat to Israel. According to Harel, Israeli leaders now believe that the West must increase its support to the rebels in order to "stop the regime's progress and the rise in Iran's standing." They may therefore support a safe zone if they think it will strengthen the opposition.
THE RUSSIAN FACTOR
Yet before backing any such plan, even covertly, Israel would need to take Russia's potential reaction into account. Since the beginning of Moscow's military intervention in Syria, Israel and Russia have engaged in tactical coordination that allows both countries to operate there without hindering each other's objectives (see PolicyWatch 2529, "Israeli-Russian Coordination in Syria: So Far So Good?"). Israel's main objectives in Syria are twofold: halting any transfers of advanced weapons to Hezbollah, and preventing Iran and Hezbollah from establishing a fighting front against Israel in the Golan Heights. To enforce these redlines, Israel would prefer to maintain good relations with Moscow, since Russian forces could otherwise decide to defend Hezbollah's assets in Syria or share intelligence with their coalition partners about imminent Israeli strikes.
If a safe zone is established in Syria without a UN Security Council mandate, and if it entails a military component such as a no-fly zone, then Russia would probably perceive it as inimical to its own policy, perhaps even taking countermeasures to interfere with it. Russian forces are less focused on southern Syria at the moment, so they might not oppose a safe zone there so vehemently. Yet if moderate rebels use the zone to launch attacks against the regime, Russia would likely act against it no matter where it is located.
Although supporting a southern safe zone that Russia opposes would be problematic for Israeli leaders, their calculations might change if the United States is leading the operation, since that would signal American commitment to the plan and protection for the parties involved. In that case, Israel would feel more confident about expressing support for the zone and even offering humanitarian assistance and some military coordination as it did in the past (see PolicyWatch 2323, "Tough Dilemma in Southern Syria"). Yet U.S. leadership would not extend to helping Israel enforce its previously described redlines, so Jerusalem would still need to be careful not to aggravate Russia.
CONCLUSION
Israel's position will not be the deciding factor in the safe zone debate -- the United States, Turkey, Jordan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and others will have a much bigger influence because they are more invested in the war. Some of them have already stated their readiness to contribute military assets for such a policy. At the moment, Israel seems committed to staying impartial toward the war and will likely avoid making public statements about any safe zone plan -- some Arab countries would certainly prefer that it keep out of the matter. If Moscow does not oppose the plan, then Israel might change its mind and support it, but any Russian criticism or threats aimed at the zone would likely convince Israel to remain silent. The current leadership believes that as long as they are able to act on Israel's redlines in Syria, then no drastic policy changes are warranted. Although some analysts and former officials have suggested that Israel strengthen its relations with moderate rebels in the south and consider a no-fly zone, most of these recommendations were made before Russia's military intervention, which has deterred many actors from increasing their own involvement in the war. In short, if Russia opposes a safe zone in the south, then Israel is unlikely to assist the effort militarily.
Nadav Pollak is the Diane and Guilford Glazer Foundation Fellow at The Washington Institute.
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TWI Series on Syrian Safe Havens/Zones
- A Safe Zone in Southern Syria
- How to Prevent al-Qaeda from Seizing a Safe Zone in Northwestern Syria
- Intervention to Assist Fleeing Syrians: Who, What, Where, Why, and How
- Two Potential Safe Zones in Northern Syria
- The First Step Should Be to Create Buffer Zones in Syria
- Safety First in Syria
- A Turkish 'Secure Strip' in Syria: Domestic Concerns and Foreign Limitations
- Legal Justifications for a Safe Zone in Syria
- Kerry Neither Rules Out nor Supports Safe Zone Concept
- Countering Russian and Assad Regime Responses to Safe Zones
- The Diplomatic Case for America to Create a Safe Zone in Syria
- TWI Series on Syrian Safe Havens/Zones
Nadav Pollak
Nadav Pollak is a former Diane and Guilford Glazer Foundation fellow at The Washington Institute.
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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Israeli_occupation_of_Southern_Lebanon
Israeli occupation of Southern Lebanon
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
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South Lebanon security belt
South Lebanon security zone
1985[1]–2000
Capital Marjayoun
Languages Arabic · French
Religion Islam · Christianity · Druze faith
Government Provisional administration
President
• 1985–2000 Antoine Lahad
Historical era Lebanese Civil War and South Lebanon conflict (1985–2000)
• declaration 1985[1]
• Israeli withdrawal from Southern Lebanon May 2000
Population
• est. 150,000
Currency Lebanese Pound, Old Israeli Shekel
Preceded by Succeeded by
Lebanon
Today part of
The Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon took place after Israel invaded Lebanon during the 1982 Lebanon War and subsequently retained its forces to support the Christian South Lebanon Army in Southern Lebanon. In 1982, the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) and allied Free Lebanon Army Christian militias seized large sections of Lebanon, including the capital of Beirut, amid the hostilities of the wider Lebanese Civil War. Later, Israel withdrew from parts of the occupied area between 1983 and 1985, but remained in partial control of the border region known as the South Lebanon Security Belt, initially in coordination with the self-proclaimed Free Lebanon State, which executed a limited authority over portions of southern Lebanon until 1984, and later with the South Lebanon Army (transformed from Free Lebanon Army), until the year 2000. Israel's stated purpose for the Security Belt was to create a space separating its northern border towns from terrorists residing in Lebanon.[citation needed]
During the stay in the security belt, the IDF held many positions and supported the SLA. The SLA took over daily life in the security zone, initially as the official force of the Free Lebanon State and later as an allied militia. Notably, the South Lebanon Army controlled the prison in Khiam. In addition, United Nations (UN) forces and the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) were deployed to the security belt (from the end of Operation Litani in 1978).
The strip was a few miles wide, and consisted of about 10% of the total territory of Lebanon, which housed about 150,000 people who lived in 67 villages and towns made up of Shiites, Maronites and Druze (most of whom lived in the town of Hasbaya). In the central zone of the Strip was the Maronite town Marjayoun, which was the capital of the security belt. Residents remaining in the security zone had many contacts with Israel, many of whom have worked there and received various services from Israel.
Contents
- 1 Background
- 2 History
- 3 Provisional Administration
- 4 Military forces
- 5 Demographics
- 6 Economy
- 7 See also
- 8 References
Map of southern Lebanon, featuring the Blue Line, UNIFIL zone, and Litani River (2006)
Main article: Free Lebanon State
Although the strip was officially formed in 1985, following degradation of the Free Lebanon State and the IDF withdrawal from most of South Lebanon, it has its roots in the early Lebanese civil war. From 1968, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) controlled southern Lebanon. In 1975, the PLO's control became a severe nuisance to Christians and local residents. The Christians asked Israel for its assistance. From mid-1976, Israel began to assist the Christian residents across the border by opening the border, or Good Fence, in Metola, and through military cooperation with the Christian militia, the Free Lebanon Army and later Free Lebanon State, which was established under the Christian officer Major Saad Haddad.
History
1985-2000
Main article: South Lebanon conflict (1985–2000)
During the evacuation in the first Lebanon war, the command of the SLA was delivered into the hands of Antoine Lahad, who demanded and received Israeli permission to hold the Jezzine zone north of the strip. In the first years after the IDF withdrawal from the north part of Lebanon, the strip was relatively quiet. Over the years, the Lebanese militant groups, led by Sh'ite Hezbollah, increased on the Israeli side in the security belt. Driving on the roads became dangerous, and IDF forces stayed more in the military camps than on the roads. Hezbollah made many efforts to attack the IDF's military camps. On 16 February 1992, the then-leader of Hezbollah, Abbas Musawi, was assassinated by IDF's helicopter missiles. The IDF assumed that the Hezbollah leadership would curb their activities for fear of their lives and the lives of their families. Hezbollah was headed by Sheikh Nasrallah.
Israeli soldiers serving in Southern Lebanon received no ribbon for wartime military service, because Israel considered the maintaining of the security belt as a low-intensity conflict rather than a war.[2] In early 2000, Chief-of-Staff Shaul Mofaz said that 1999 was "the IDF's most successful year in Lebanon" with 11 soldiers killed by hostiles in Southern Lebanon, the lowest casualty rate during the entire conflict.[3] A total number of 256 Israeli soldiers died in combat in South Lebanon from 1985 to 2000.[4]
Withdrawal from the security belt (1999-2000)
Before the Israeli election in May 1999 the prime minister of Israel, Ehud Barak, promised that within a year all Israeli forces would withdraw from Southern Lebanon, effectively dropping the support for the South Lebanon Army. When negotiation efforts between Israel and Syria, the goal of which was to bring a peace agreement between Israel and Lebanon as well, failed due to Syrian control of Lebanon (until 2005), Barak led to the decision of withdrawal of the IDF to the Israeli border. With the amounting pressure on South Lebanon Army and the South Lebanon security belt administration, the system began to fall apart, with many members of the army and administration requesting political asylum in Israel and other countries. With mounting attacks of Hezbollah, the ranks of the South Lebanese Army deteriorated, with reduced conscription and high rates of desertion at lower ranks. In April 2000, when it was clear the Israeli withdrawal was about to happen within weeks or months, some SLA officials began moving their families to northern Israel.
The Israeli complete withdrawal took place on 24 May 2000. No Israeli soldiers were killed or wounded during the redeployment to the internationally recognized border.[citation needed] The South Lebanon Army however shortly collapsed, with most officers and administration officials fleeing to Israel with their families, as Hezbollah amounted pressure on the remaining units. When Israel allowed the pouring refugees in, some 7,000 refugees, including South Lebanon Army soldiers, Security Zone officials and their families arrived in Galilee.
Provisional Administration
Main article: South Lebanon security belt administration
The South Lebanon security belt administration was a local provisional governance body in South Lebanon, in the South Lebanon security belt areas. It replaced the Free Lebanon State institutions and operated from 1985 until 2000 with full Israeli logistic and military support. It controlled 328 square miles of territory in southern Lebanon.[5] During its functioning years, the administration was headed by Antoine Lahad, a Maronite Christian claiming the rank of general.[5]
Military forces
Main article: South Lebanon Army
The South Lebanon Army or South Lebanese Army (SLA) was a Lebanese Christian militia during the Lebanese Civil War and its aftermath, until disbanded in the year 2000. It was originally named the Free Lebanon Army, which split from the Army of Free Lebanon. After 1979, the militia operated in southern Lebanon under the authority of Saad Haddad's Government of Free Lebanon. It was supported by Israel, and became its primary ally in Lebanon during the South Lebanon conflict (1985–2000) to fight against Hezbollah.
Demographics
The strip was a few miles wide, and consisted of about 10% of the total territory of Lebanon, which housed about 150,000 people who lived in 67 villages and towns made up of Shiites, Maronites and Druze (most of whom lived in the town of Hasbaya). In the central zone of the Strip was the Maronite town Marjayoun, which was the capital of the security belt. Residents remaining in the security zone had many contacts with Israel, many of whom have worked there and received various services from Israel.
Economy
Main article: Good Fence
The beginning of the Good Fence coincides with the beginning of the civil war in Lebanon in 1976 and Israelן support of the predominantly-Maronite militias in southern Lebanon in their battle with the PLO. From 1977, Israel allowed the Maronites and their allies to find employment in Israel and provided assistance in exporting goods through the Israeli port city of Haifa. The main border crossing through which goods and workers crossed was the Fatima Gate crossing near Metula. This provided essential economic stability to the administration of Free Lebanon State and the South Lebanon security belt administration.
Israel states that, before 2000, approximately one-third of the patients in the ophthalmology department of the Western Galilee Hospital were Lebanese citizens who crossed the border through the Good Fence and received treatment free of charge.[6] The Good Fence ceased to exist with Israel's withdrawal from southern Lebanon in 2000 and disintegration of the South Lebanon security belt administration.
See also
http://www.inss.org.il/publication/is-the-jordan-valley-truly-a-security-zone-for-israel/
Is the Jordan Valley Truly a Security Zone for Israel?
עברית
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Shlomo Brom
Strategic Assessment, Volume 3, No. 4, January 2001
On July 26, 1967, Defense Minister Yigal Alon presented a plan to then-Prime Minister Levi Eshkol for a settlement with the Palestinians, which came to be known as the Alon Plan. Since its inception, the importance of the Jordan Valley to Israeli security has been deeply imprinted on the collective consciousness of the Israeli polity. Today, as Israel discusses a permanent settlement with the Palestinians, the effects of this logic remains discernible within the popular discourse: it is generally believed that the Jordan Valley remains crucial to Israeli security, and that a permanent settlement must include both Israeli control over the Jordan Valley and the positioning of substantial security forces there. Indeed, there are those who go even further, maintaining Israel must annex the area outright.
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-14724842
Golan Heights profile
- 27 November 2015
- From the section Middle East
Israel seized the Golan Heights from Syria in the closing stages of the 1967 Six-Day War. Most of the Syrian Arab inhabitants fled the area during the conflict.
An armistice line was established and the region came under Israeli military control. Almost immediately Israel began to settle the Golan.
- Read more country profiles - Profiles by BBC Monitoring
Israel unilaterally annexed the Golan Heights in 1981. The move was not recognised internationally.
There are more than 30 Jewish settlements on the heights, with an estimated 20,000 settlers. There are some 20,000 Syrians in the area, most of them members of the Druze sect.
Strategic importance
Southern Syria and the capital Damascus, about 60 km (40 miles) north, are clearly visible from the top of the Heights while Syrian artillery regularly shelled the whole of northern Israel from 1948 to 1967 when Syria controlled the Heights.
The heights give Israel an excellent vantage point for monitoring Syrian movements. The topography provides a natural buffer against any military thrust from Syria.
The area is also a key source of water for an arid region. Rainwater from the Golan's catchment feeds into the Jordan River. The area provides a third of Israel's water supply.
The land is fertile, with the volcanic soil being used to cultivate vineyards and orchards and to raise cattle. The Golan is also home to Israel's only ski resort.
Stumbling blocks
Syria wants to secure the return of the Golan Heights as part of any peace deal. In late 2003, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad said he was ready to revive peace talks with Israel.
In Israel, the principle of returning the territory in return for peace is already established. During US-brokered peace talks in 1999-2000, then Israeli prime minister Ehud Barak had offered to return most of the Golan to Syria.
But the main sticking point during the 1999 talks is also likely to bedevil any future discussions. Syria wants a full Israeli withdrawal to the pre-1967 border. This would give Damascus control of the eastern shore of the Sea of Galilee - Israel's main source of fresh water.
Israel wishes to retain control of Galilee and says the border is located a few hundred metres to the east of the shore.
A deal with Syria would also involve the dismantling of Jewish settlements in the territory.
Public opinion in Israel appears not to favour withdrawal. Opponents say the heights are too strategically important to be returned.
On-off talks
Indirect talks between Israel and Syria resumed in 2008, through Turkish government intermediaries, but were suspended following the resignation of Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert over a corruption inquiry.
The Israeli government under Binyamin Netanyahu elected in February 2009 indicated that it was determined to take a tougher line over the Golan, and in June 2009, the Syrian leader said there was no partner for talks on the Israeli side.
Syrian civil war
The US administration of President Barack Obama - who took up office in January 2009 - declared the restarting of talks between Israel and Syria to be one of its main foreign policy goals, but the advent of civil war in Syria in 2011 put paid to any progress.
Syrian fighting reached the Golan ceasefire lines in 2013, when Israel returned fire after rebel shells landed in Golan. Israeli and Syrian Army troops exchanged fire across their lines in May.
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