- Joined
- Oct 26, 2008
- Messages
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- 63
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[h=3]Viewing cable 09SINGAPORE588, FOLLOWING THE MONEY TRAIL OF SINGAPORE'S SECRETIVE[/h]</pre>
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 SINGAPORE 000588 STATE PASS USTR TREASURY FOR RAND, CBERRY SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: EFIN EINV ECON ECIN ETRD SN SUBJECT: FOLLOWING THE MONEY TRAIL OF SINGAPORE'S SECRETIVE SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS REF: (A) SINGAPORE 355, (B) SINGAPORE 80 </pre>
¶1. (SBU) Summary: Despite a portfolio estimated at more than $300 billion, the funding sources and uses of Singapore's two sovereign wealth funds (SWF) are shrouded in secrecy and not well understood by the Singapore public or most analysts. SWF funds come from three sources: the government's regularly large fiscal surpluses, mandatory individual retirement savings, and -- to a much lesser extent -- excess foreign exchange reserves. The two SWFs, Temasek Holdings and the Government of Singapore Investment Corporation (GIC), invest these funds and return an undisclosed portion of the investment earnings to the general budget to fund ongoing fiscal expenditure. The SWFs retain the majority of their investment earnings, which have earned returns significantly higher than the government has paid out as a return on its population's mandatory savings. End Summary. </pre>
Deliberate lack of transparency ------------------------------- ¶2. (SBU) Comment: Tracking the money of Singapore's SWFs is a long and arduous effort as each institution involved can only describe its small part in the process. Few people in Singapore (and likely no one outside of government) know the full details of how funds are transferred in and out of the SWFs or how decisions are made about how much to transfer. This compartmentalized structure has kept the general public in the dark about how much money the GOS has saved on the public's behalf and how well it has been invested. Details of investments are released only sporadically, but have demonstrated strong returns over the years. The current crisis has raised concerns that GIC and Temasek will not be able to continue earning similarly high returns without taking excessive risks. With limited transparency, it remains impossible for outsiders to assess the SWFs risk- return tradeoffs. Moreover, Singaporeans are privately questioning why the SWFs earn much higher rates than the government pays its citizens as a return on the mandatory retirement savings accounts which fund the SWFs. End comment.</pre>
Information on Singapore's Large Nest Egg Closely Held ------------------------------------------ ¶3. (U) GIC and Temasek Holdings, Singapore's two SWFs, manage an estimated US$300 billion for the GOS, making them among the largest SWFs in the world (see table below). Temasek's portfolio stood at $85 billion at the end of November 2008. GIC does not disclose the size of its fund, but private sector analysts estimate the value of its portfolio at around $220 billion. These estimates include some but not all of the losses incurred since the global financial crisis began last fall. Sovereign Wealth Funds ---------------------- (as at end 2008) Name Assets ($ billion) ---- ------------------ Abu Dhabi Investment Authority 850 Saudi Arabia General Investment Authority 431 China SAFE Investment Company 311 Norway State Fund 305 Kuwait Investment Authority 228 Government of Singapore Investment Corporation (GIC) 220 Russian Reserve Fund 137 Temasek Holdings 85 --------------------- Source: Preqin and SWF Wealth Institute, March 2009 ¶4. (U) Mystery also surrounds the sources of the funds that SINGAPORE 00000588 002 OF 004 the SWFs manage. Temasek received its initial funding through an in-kind injection of S$354 million (roughly $153 million at then prevailing exchange rates) worth of shares in domestic government-owned companies in 1974. Later, Temasek moved beyond being just a holding company for government shares to become a commercial investment house, owning the assets it manages with the Ministry of Finance as its sole shareholder. In contrast, the GIC was established in 1981 to manage Singapore's investments outside the country. GIC manages but does not own its funds and the GOS retains direct ownership and oversight of its assets. ¶5. (SBU) While technically the MoF sets SWF policy for the GOS and the President is the constitutionally-appointed guardian of Singapore's fiscal reserves, it is unclear how they work in practice with the SWFs' high-powered boards. GIC's 16-person board is led by Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew (Chairman), PM Lee Hsien Loong (Deputy Chairman), and former Deputy PM Tony Tan (Deputy Chairman and Executive Director), while Minister of Finance Tharman Shanmugaratnam is one of thirteen other directors including several very prominent businessmen and three foreigners. Temasek's nine-person board is led by Suppiah Dhanabalan (Chairman), who has a long career of Cabinet and state-owned enterprise (SOE) appointments, PM Lee's wife Ho Ching (Deputy Chairman and CEO until October 2009), and prominent businessman Kwa Chong Seng (Deputy Chairman), and includes six other directors, including two foreigners. One of them, American Charles "Chip" Goodyear, has been designated publicly as Ho Ching's successor as CEO, effective in October. Fiscal surpluses feed the SWFs ------------------------------ ¶6. (SBU) The SWFs source new funds to invest from Singapore's private and government savings. Singapore has one of the highest savings rates in the world, with a gross savings ratio of 47.6 percent of GDP in 2008. This high savings rate can be attributed both to the conservative fiscal policies of the GOS and the mandatory contributions to Singapore's pension fund scheme. ¶7. (SBU) The GOS has chalked up budget surpluses year after year for close to two decades. According to CIMB-GK Research, the consolidated budget surplus, which includes land and other asset sales, and various vehicle-related revenue, was about S$20 billion in calendar year 2008, while it was S$30 billion and S$21 billion in 2007 and 2006, respectively. Mandatory Retirement Savings End up in SWFs ------------------------------------------- ¶8. (SBU) Singapore's Central Provident Fund (CPF) has also built up national savings by requiring all citizens and permanent residents (about three-fourths of the labor force) to contribute 20 percent of their salaries, and their employers to contribute a further 15 percent of salaries, to retirement individual accounts at the CPF. The CPF pools the individual funds and invests in non-marketable "Special Government Securities" (SGS), issued by the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS), Singapore's central bank, on behalf of the government. These SGSs pay the exact amount that the CPF guarantees on individuals' CPF balances (currently between 2.5 percent to 4.0 percent). MAS transfers the funds raised through the sale of SGSs to the GOS general account where they are mingled with the government's overall fiscal resources. As of the end of 2008, the total amount of SGS held by the GOS was S$141.3 billion (around US$100 billion), according to a UBS report. ¶9. (SBU) Once the GOS determines funds in the government's general account (whether from budget, non-budget or SGS sales) are "excess fiscal reserves," they are transferred to one of the SWFs to invest. GIC is usually the recipient, since in recent years, Temasek has only occasionally received new cash infusions, the last time being S$10 billion in April ¶2007. (Most of the growth in Temasek's asset size has come SINGAPORE 00000588 003 OF 004 from retained earnings and sales of equity stakes in companies in its portfolio.) Before transferring funds to GIC, MAS converts the Singapore dollar-denominated savings into foreign currency, so as to not affect the exchange rate or monetary policy significantly. (Singapore uses exchange rates, rather than interest rates, as its preferred monetary policy instrument. See Reftel A.) The GOS does not disclose how much fiscal surplus is transferred to the SWFs each year. ¶10. (SBU) Ministry of Finance and GIC officials confirmed to Finatt that GIC also manages a small share of Singapore's large foreign exchange reserves (valued at $170 billion in April 2009). However, the vast majority of the funds that GIC manages managed are the product of fiscal surpluses and CPF funds, rather than the result of foreign exchange reserves accumulated due to balance of payments surpluses. Returns from SWFs Fund Budget ----------------------------- ¶11. (U) Under Singapore's Constitution, fiscal reserves accumulated by the end of a government's term in office (typically five years) are automatically locked in as past fiscal reserves and can be used by the government only with the concurrence of the President. To prevent a hypothetical profligate government from needlessly fritting away reserves, incoming governments do not have access to the cash and property managed by Temasek and GIC. This January, Singapore asked for the President's approval to tap the principal of its SWFs for the first time. To support an expansionary budget to battle the recession, the GOS withdrew some S$3.3 billion to help pay for temporary counter-cyclical fiscal programs.(See Reftel B). ¶12. (U) Although the principal amount has been virtually untouched over the years, the SWF investment returns can be partially transferred to the budget. Since 2001, the government allowed transfers of SWF returns of up to 50 percent of all interest and dividends, termed net investment income (NII). This gives the government flexibility in case of any sudden strengthening or deterioration in government revenue to manage how much in SWF earnings can be used for budget purposes. However, the government does not have to disclose exactly what percentage of the NII is brought on budget, so it is not possible to determine the SWFs overall returns in any given year. In October 2008, to free up additional resources to fund increases in fiscal expenditure, the GOS expanded the definition of investment returns to include estimated capital gains based on long term expected real returns for the next 20 years, termed net investment returns (NIR). The GOS did not disclose the technique for determining the expected capital gain return. The NIR definition will apply to GIC while Temasek will continue to use the NII arrangement which does not include capital gains. The up to 50 percent cap will continue to apply to both entities. Citigroup estimates that this change could add S$5-6 billion annually for the budget, a sum as it would nearly equal the entire budget surplus for FY2007. Good returns not flowing to Singaporean savers --------------------------------------------- - ¶13. (SBU) The final source of funds for the SWFs is retained investment earnings. Over the 20 years to March 2008, GIC earned an overall 5.8 percent nominal annualized return, according to its first ever annual report issued last year. Temasek earned an 18 percent nominal annualized return from its inception in 1974 to March 2008, according to its 2008 annual report. SWFs channel less than half of returns back to the budget, retaining and reinvesting the majority of their earnings. Many Singaporeans privately complain that the individual savers in the CPF earn substantially less return on their mandatory savings account (currently between 2.5 and 4 percent) than the SWFs make managing that money. In essence, the GOS keeps the difference between what the SWFs earn and what the GOS owes on the SGS held by the CPF. The government argues that it pays less on the CPF because it is "government guaranteed" and "risk free", while the SWFs SINGAPORE 00000588 004 OF 004 undertake higher risk in their portfolio. Any claim about risk levels at the SWFs is difficult to verify, however, due to limited transparency on the SWF portfolios and leverage ratios. SHIELDS</pre>[/TD]
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[h=3]Viewing cable 09SINGAPORE588, FOLLOWING THE MONEY TRAIL OF SINGAPORE'S SECRETIVE[/h]</pre>
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 SINGAPORE 000588 STATE PASS USTR TREASURY FOR RAND, CBERRY SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: EFIN EINV ECON ECIN ETRD SN SUBJECT: FOLLOWING THE MONEY TRAIL OF SINGAPORE'S SECRETIVE SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS REF: (A) SINGAPORE 355, (B) SINGAPORE 80 </pre>
¶1. (SBU) Summary: Despite a portfolio estimated at more than $300 billion, the funding sources and uses of Singapore's two sovereign wealth funds (SWF) are shrouded in secrecy and not well understood by the Singapore public or most analysts. SWF funds come from three sources: the government's regularly large fiscal surpluses, mandatory individual retirement savings, and -- to a much lesser extent -- excess foreign exchange reserves. The two SWFs, Temasek Holdings and the Government of Singapore Investment Corporation (GIC), invest these funds and return an undisclosed portion of the investment earnings to the general budget to fund ongoing fiscal expenditure. The SWFs retain the majority of their investment earnings, which have earned returns significantly higher than the government has paid out as a return on its population's mandatory savings. End Summary. </pre>
Deliberate lack of transparency ------------------------------- ¶2. (SBU) Comment: Tracking the money of Singapore's SWFs is a long and arduous effort as each institution involved can only describe its small part in the process. Few people in Singapore (and likely no one outside of government) know the full details of how funds are transferred in and out of the SWFs or how decisions are made about how much to transfer. This compartmentalized structure has kept the general public in the dark about how much money the GOS has saved on the public's behalf and how well it has been invested. Details of investments are released only sporadically, but have demonstrated strong returns over the years. The current crisis has raised concerns that GIC and Temasek will not be able to continue earning similarly high returns without taking excessive risks. With limited transparency, it remains impossible for outsiders to assess the SWFs risk- return tradeoffs. Moreover, Singaporeans are privately questioning why the SWFs earn much higher rates than the government pays its citizens as a return on the mandatory retirement savings accounts which fund the SWFs. End comment.</pre>
Information on Singapore's Large Nest Egg Closely Held ------------------------------------------ ¶3. (U) GIC and Temasek Holdings, Singapore's two SWFs, manage an estimated US$300 billion for the GOS, making them among the largest SWFs in the world (see table below). Temasek's portfolio stood at $85 billion at the end of November 2008. GIC does not disclose the size of its fund, but private sector analysts estimate the value of its portfolio at around $220 billion. These estimates include some but not all of the losses incurred since the global financial crisis began last fall. Sovereign Wealth Funds ---------------------- (as at end 2008) Name Assets ($ billion) ---- ------------------ Abu Dhabi Investment Authority 850 Saudi Arabia General Investment Authority 431 China SAFE Investment Company 311 Norway State Fund 305 Kuwait Investment Authority 228 Government of Singapore Investment Corporation (GIC) 220 Russian Reserve Fund 137 Temasek Holdings 85 --------------------- Source: Preqin and SWF Wealth Institute, March 2009 ¶4. (U) Mystery also surrounds the sources of the funds that SINGAPORE 00000588 002 OF 004 the SWFs manage. Temasek received its initial funding through an in-kind injection of S$354 million (roughly $153 million at then prevailing exchange rates) worth of shares in domestic government-owned companies in 1974. Later, Temasek moved beyond being just a holding company for government shares to become a commercial investment house, owning the assets it manages with the Ministry of Finance as its sole shareholder. In contrast, the GIC was established in 1981 to manage Singapore's investments outside the country. GIC manages but does not own its funds and the GOS retains direct ownership and oversight of its assets. ¶5. (SBU) While technically the MoF sets SWF policy for the GOS and the President is the constitutionally-appointed guardian of Singapore's fiscal reserves, it is unclear how they work in practice with the SWFs' high-powered boards. GIC's 16-person board is led by Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew (Chairman), PM Lee Hsien Loong (Deputy Chairman), and former Deputy PM Tony Tan (Deputy Chairman and Executive Director), while Minister of Finance Tharman Shanmugaratnam is one of thirteen other directors including several very prominent businessmen and three foreigners. Temasek's nine-person board is led by Suppiah Dhanabalan (Chairman), who has a long career of Cabinet and state-owned enterprise (SOE) appointments, PM Lee's wife Ho Ching (Deputy Chairman and CEO until October 2009), and prominent businessman Kwa Chong Seng (Deputy Chairman), and includes six other directors, including two foreigners. One of them, American Charles "Chip" Goodyear, has been designated publicly as Ho Ching's successor as CEO, effective in October. Fiscal surpluses feed the SWFs ------------------------------ ¶6. (SBU) The SWFs source new funds to invest from Singapore's private and government savings. Singapore has one of the highest savings rates in the world, with a gross savings ratio of 47.6 percent of GDP in 2008. This high savings rate can be attributed both to the conservative fiscal policies of the GOS and the mandatory contributions to Singapore's pension fund scheme. ¶7. (SBU) The GOS has chalked up budget surpluses year after year for close to two decades. According to CIMB-GK Research, the consolidated budget surplus, which includes land and other asset sales, and various vehicle-related revenue, was about S$20 billion in calendar year 2008, while it was S$30 billion and S$21 billion in 2007 and 2006, respectively. Mandatory Retirement Savings End up in SWFs ------------------------------------------- ¶8. (SBU) Singapore's Central Provident Fund (CPF) has also built up national savings by requiring all citizens and permanent residents (about three-fourths of the labor force) to contribute 20 percent of their salaries, and their employers to contribute a further 15 percent of salaries, to retirement individual accounts at the CPF. The CPF pools the individual funds and invests in non-marketable "Special Government Securities" (SGS), issued by the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS), Singapore's central bank, on behalf of the government. These SGSs pay the exact amount that the CPF guarantees on individuals' CPF balances (currently between 2.5 percent to 4.0 percent). MAS transfers the funds raised through the sale of SGSs to the GOS general account where they are mingled with the government's overall fiscal resources. As of the end of 2008, the total amount of SGS held by the GOS was S$141.3 billion (around US$100 billion), according to a UBS report. ¶9. (SBU) Once the GOS determines funds in the government's general account (whether from budget, non-budget or SGS sales) are "excess fiscal reserves," they are transferred to one of the SWFs to invest. GIC is usually the recipient, since in recent years, Temasek has only occasionally received new cash infusions, the last time being S$10 billion in April ¶2007. (Most of the growth in Temasek's asset size has come SINGAPORE 00000588 003 OF 004 from retained earnings and sales of equity stakes in companies in its portfolio.) Before transferring funds to GIC, MAS converts the Singapore dollar-denominated savings into foreign currency, so as to not affect the exchange rate or monetary policy significantly. (Singapore uses exchange rates, rather than interest rates, as its preferred monetary policy instrument. See Reftel A.) The GOS does not disclose how much fiscal surplus is transferred to the SWFs each year. ¶10. (SBU) Ministry of Finance and GIC officials confirmed to Finatt that GIC also manages a small share of Singapore's large foreign exchange reserves (valued at $170 billion in April 2009). However, the vast majority of the funds that GIC manages managed are the product of fiscal surpluses and CPF funds, rather than the result of foreign exchange reserves accumulated due to balance of payments surpluses. Returns from SWFs Fund Budget ----------------------------- ¶11. (U) Under Singapore's Constitution, fiscal reserves accumulated by the end of a government's term in office (typically five years) are automatically locked in as past fiscal reserves and can be used by the government only with the concurrence of the President. To prevent a hypothetical profligate government from needlessly fritting away reserves, incoming governments do not have access to the cash and property managed by Temasek and GIC. This January, Singapore asked for the President's approval to tap the principal of its SWFs for the first time. To support an expansionary budget to battle the recession, the GOS withdrew some S$3.3 billion to help pay for temporary counter-cyclical fiscal programs.(See Reftel B). ¶12. (U) Although the principal amount has been virtually untouched over the years, the SWF investment returns can be partially transferred to the budget. Since 2001, the government allowed transfers of SWF returns of up to 50 percent of all interest and dividends, termed net investment income (NII). This gives the government flexibility in case of any sudden strengthening or deterioration in government revenue to manage how much in SWF earnings can be used for budget purposes. However, the government does not have to disclose exactly what percentage of the NII is brought on budget, so it is not possible to determine the SWFs overall returns in any given year. In October 2008, to free up additional resources to fund increases in fiscal expenditure, the GOS expanded the definition of investment returns to include estimated capital gains based on long term expected real returns for the next 20 years, termed net investment returns (NIR). The GOS did not disclose the technique for determining the expected capital gain return. The NIR definition will apply to GIC while Temasek will continue to use the NII arrangement which does not include capital gains. The up to 50 percent cap will continue to apply to both entities. Citigroup estimates that this change could add S$5-6 billion annually for the budget, a sum as it would nearly equal the entire budget surplus for FY2007. Good returns not flowing to Singaporean savers --------------------------------------------- - ¶13. (SBU) The final source of funds for the SWFs is retained investment earnings. Over the 20 years to March 2008, GIC earned an overall 5.8 percent nominal annualized return, according to its first ever annual report issued last year. Temasek earned an 18 percent nominal annualized return from its inception in 1974 to March 2008, according to its 2008 annual report. SWFs channel less than half of returns back to the budget, retaining and reinvesting the majority of their earnings. Many Singaporeans privately complain that the individual savers in the CPF earn substantially less return on their mandatory savings account (currently between 2.5 and 4 percent) than the SWFs make managing that money. In essence, the GOS keeps the difference between what the SWFs earn and what the GOS owes on the SGS held by the CPF. The government argues that it pays less on the CPF because it is "government guaranteed" and "risk free", while the SWFs SINGAPORE 00000588 004 OF 004 undertake higher risk in their portfolio. Any claim about risk levels at the SWFs is difficult to verify, however, due to limited transparency on the SWF portfolios and leverage ratios. SHIELDS</pre>[/TD]
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