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[Video] - Persians wrestle away control of Major Cities In Iran From IRGC Islamic terrorists. Free Persians from Islam!

The iraqis too welcome the US army thinking life will be better after sadam. But even today, the oil money Sold by iraq goes to the US first. And balance returned in cash. Causing enormous amount of pilferage.
If the iranians think US is there to liberate, they got it wrong.
 
The iraqis too welcome the US army thinking life will be better after sadam. But even today, the oil money Sold by iraq goes to the US first. And balance returned in cash. Causing enormous amount of pilferage.
If the iranians think US is there to liberate, they got it wrong.

As of March 2026, **Iraqi oil revenues**—which account for around **88-90%** of the country's federal budget—are primarily under the control of the **Iraqi federal government** in Baghdad, with a unique and ongoing U.S. role in managing the dollar proceeds.

### Key Aspects of Control
- **Federal Government (Baghdad)**:
The vast majority of Iraq's oil is produced and exported under the authority of the federal **Ministry of Oil** and its state marketer, **SOMO** (State Oil Marketing Organization). Revenues from these exports (mostly from southern fields) flow into the national budget. This funds federal expenditures, including salaries, pensions, and transfers to regions.
For the **Kurdistan Region** (KRG), a 2025 agreement (extended into 2026) requires the KRG to deliver oil volumes (e.g., around 200,000+ bpd in practice) to SOMO for export. Revenues from those sales go to the federal budget, and Baghdad then distributes funds back (e.g., for KRG public sector salaries, though disputes over full shares and delays persist).

- **U.S. Role in Dollar Custody**:
Since the 2003 U.S.-led invasion, Iraq's oil export proceeds (paid in U.S. dollars) have been deposited into an account held at the **Federal Reserve Bank of New York** (as an account of the Central Bank of Iraq). This arrangement—originally set up via the Development Fund for Iraq and protected by U.S. executive orders renewed annually—gives the United States effective oversight and leverage.
This has continued into 2026, providing Washington influence over Iraq's access to its dollar revenues (e.g., for pressuring Baghdad on issues like alleged dollar flows to sanctioned entities). The Iraqi Central Bank manages distribution from there, but the funds' custody remains in New York. Recent reports note occasional delays in transfers back to Iraq due to external factors (like regional conflicts affecting logistics), exacerbating fiscal pressures.

### Internal Dynamics and Disputes
- Oil revenues overwhelmingly support the federal budget, but tensions remain between Baghdad and the KRG over revenue sharing, export control, and budget allocations. Recent deals have centralized more export authority with federal SOMO, reducing independent KRG sales abroad.
- Iraq's heavy oil dependence (90%+ of revenues) makes the system vulnerable to price fluctuations, with 2025-2026 seeing deficits and calls for diversification.

In summary, while the **Iraqi federal government** (via the Ministry of Oil, SOMO, and Central Bank) ultimately directs and distributes oil revenues, the **U.S.** retains significant practical control through custody of the dollar proceeds at the New York Fed—a post-2003 arrangement that persists today.

There is credible evidence of significant **oil-related pilferage, smuggling, and corruption** in Iraq that deprives the country of substantial revenue, though the scale and exact impact vary by type (crude oil vs. refined products/fuel oil) and region. This has been a persistent issue for years, with reports continuing into 2025–2026.

### Key Forms and Estimates of Losses
- **Fuel oil and refined products smuggling**:
This appears to be one of the largest ongoing drains. Networks (often linked to militias, including Iran-backed groups) smuggle subsidized or allocated fuel oil, blending it or selling it illicitly. Recent U.S. Treasury actions (e.g., 2025 sanctions on networks like those run by Waleed al-Samarra’i and Salim Ahmed Said) targeted schemes generating **hundreds of millions** to **at least $1 billion annually** for Iran and its proxies in Iraq. These involve disguising Iranian oil as Iraqi or diverting Iraqi fuel oil exports. Iraqi officials and analysts have stated that stopping smuggling could save **at least $1 billion per year**. Smuggling of imported/subsidized gasoline and diesel has historically cost billions (e.g., older estimates of $2.5–4 billion in one year), contributing to domestic shortages despite self-sufficiency claims in some fuels.

- **Crude oil smuggling (especially from Kurdistan)**:
After the Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline closure in 2023 (due to disputes), smuggling via trucks surged—estimates around **180,000–200,000 barrels per day** from the Kurdistan Region (KRG) to Iran and Turkey at cut-rate prices. This deprives federal revenues and helps Iran evade sanctions. Baghdad has accused the KRG of responsibility, while the KRG and SOMO have denied ongoing large-scale crude smuggling, claiming all legitimate exports now run through federal channels (SOMO). Disputes over control have led to massive cumulative losses (e.g., $28 billion+ cited for halted legal exports since 2023), but smuggling fills part of that gap illicitly.

- **Overall impact on revenue**:
Iraq's oil revenues fund ~88–91% of the federal budget (e.g., ~$83 billion from oil in 2025 out of ~$94 billion total). While major losses stem from price volatility, OPEC cuts, pipeline issues, and regional conflicts (causing production drops and export halts), smuggling and theft add a notable layer—potentially in the low billions annually across categories. Corruption in allocation, forged documentation, and militia involvement exacerbates this. Efforts include enhanced security to curb theft/vandalism (noted in some export improvements) and government pushes to maximize legal exports (e.g., plans for >1 million bpd of "black oil" in 2026 to boost income).

In short, **yes—pilferage and smuggling are real and deprive Iraq of significant revenue** (likely $1+ billion/year in key areas), fueling fiscal pressures, domestic fuel shortages, and geopolitical tensions (especially with Iran/U.S.). However, the federal government (via SOMO/Ministry of Oil) has tightened some controls, and not all reported figures are undisputed—political accusations between Baghdad and Erbil play a role. Diversification remains urged to reduce vulnerability.

It is not primarily the USA's fault** that significant pilferage, smuggling, and corruption deprive Iraq of oil revenues today. The main culprits are **internal Iraqi factors**—deep-rooted corruption, weak governance, political patronage networks, and the influence of **Iran-backed militias** and other armed groups—combined with structural issues like porous borders, subsidized fuel prices that incentivize smuggling, and ongoing Baghdad-KRG disputes over export control.

### Primary Causes and Responsible Parties
- **Iran-backed militias and networks**: These groups (e.g., Kata’ib Hizballah, Asaib Ahl al-Haq, and others) play a central role in large-scale smuggling, particularly of fuel oil and by blending/smuggling Iranian oil disguised as Iraqi to evade U.S. sanctions. This generates hundreds of millions to billions annually for Iran and its proxies, while undermining Iraq's economy through graft, monopolizing resources, and diverting funds. Recent U.S. Treasury sanctions (2025) targeted these networks explicitly for corruption, weapons smuggling, and oil-related evasion in Iraq.
- **Domestic corruption and mismanagement**: Iraq's oil sector has long suffered from systemic graft since 2003, with estimates of massive cumulative losses (e.g., $150 billion+ in smuggled/stolen revenues post-invasion). This includes overpricing, kickbacks, forged documentation, and diversion at ports/checkpoints. The federal government (Baghdad) has launched probes (e.g., after 2025 U.S. sanctions revelations), but enforcement remains inconsistent due to political interference and militia penetration of institutions.
- **Baghdad vs. KRG tensions**: Disputes over who controls exports (especially post-2023 pipeline closure) have fueled accusations of smuggling (e.g., trucked crude to Iran/Turkey), though both sides deny large-scale illicit crude flows now that more is centralized via SOMO.

### The U.S. Role: Influence, Not Direct Causation
The U.S. maintains significant leverage through custody of Iraq's dollar oil proceeds at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (a post-2003 arrangement). This gives Washington tools to pressure Baghdad on issues like Iranian influence, militia inclusion in government, or dollar flows to sanctioned entities—sometimes threatening delays or restrictions on access (e.g., warnings in 2026 over potential pro-Iran PM choices or militia roles). Critics (including some Iraqi voices) blame the U.S. for enabling post-invasion chaos that fostered corruption, or for indirectly facilitating Iran's infiltration by "handing over" power structures.

However, the U.S. actively combats smuggling that benefits Iran (via repeated 2025 sanctions on networks disguising Iranian oil as Iraqi, targeting militia corruption, and maximum pressure policies). The U.S. does not orchestrate or profit from Iraq's pilferage; instead, it uses financial oversight to curb flows to adversaries. Broader losses stem more from Iraq's internal failures (e.g., lack of diversification, weak rule of law) than direct U.S. actions.

In essence, while the 2003 invasion created conditions for corruption to flourish and U.S. influence persists, **current oil revenue losses from pilferage are overwhelmingly driven by Iraqi actors and Iran-linked networks**, not U.S. orchestration or deliberate fault. Baghdad's efforts to tighten controls and international pressure (including U.S. sanctions) aim to mitigate this, but deep reforms are needed to address root causes.
 
The iraqis too welcome the US army thinking life will be better after sadam. But even today, the oil money Sold by iraq goes to the US first. And balance returned in cash. Causing enormous amount of pilferage. If the iranians think US is there to liberate, they got it wrong.
To the Iranians, any govt is far better than life under the Ayatollahs. Iran has the fastest growing church in the world; the people are disillusioned with Islam.
 
Nice reading all the delusional comments here.
Luckily PAP rule you guys with an iron fist worse than 10 Ayatollahs put together
Now don't scream helpa helpa helpa


lol


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Nice reading all the delusional comments here.
Luckily PAP rule you guys with an iron fist worse than 10 Ayatollahs put together
Now don't scream helpa helpa helpa
LKY was a greedy politician who saw the opportunity to enrich his family through overpaying himself and his cronies.
 
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