https://theconversation.com/sudans-...o-make-a-return-to-historic-stronghold-228954
“Sudan’s moment has come; chaos is our chance to sow the seeds of jihad,” warned Abu Hudhaifa al-Sudani, a high-ranking al-Qaida leader, in an October 2022 manifesto.
His words may have seemed premature at the time, but a year of brutal civil war has now plunged Sudan into the kind of chaos in which terrorist groups thrive. The risk of al-Qaida gaining ground in Sudan is now very real and imperils, I believe, not only the country itself but also regional – and potentially global – security.
In April 2023, fighting broke out in Sudan between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces, creating a power vacuum that extremists are eager to fill.
At the same time, the Rapid Support Forces – a group that developed under and was once allied to Sudan’s al-Qaida-harboring former president Omar al-Bashir – has been solidifying its grip in strategic areas such as Darfur and southern Khartoum.
Indeed, both the paramilitary group and the armed forces have been accused of recruiting Islamist fighters, fueling fears that the civil war will – regardless of the victor – prove a toehold for extremist groups.
As a defense policy researcher and counterterrorism expert, I’m concerned that Sudan risks becoming an al-Qaida stronghold – and a potential base for orchestrating attacks on the U.S. and its allies. A potential Rapid Support Forces takeover in Sudan could mirror pre-9/11 Afghanistan, where Taliban control facilitated al-Qaida’s rise.
Al-Qaida members, seeking opportunities to achieve what they couldn’t in the Middle East, are already heeding calls to head to Sudan.
Facing international sanctions over its support of terrorism, Sudan expelled bin Laden in 1996.
But al-Bashir’s sponsorship of the Janjaweed militia group, the architects of the 2003 Darfur genocide, further solidified his alignment with Islamist extremists. Under scrutiny, al-Bashir rebranded the Janjaweed as the Rapid Support Forces in 2013, appointing ex-Janjaweed member Mohammed Hamdan “Hemeti” Dagalo as its leader and retaining their brutal tactics.
The 2021 coup, orchestrated by Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Burhan of the Sudanese Armed Forces and Hemeti of the Rapid Support Forces, soon devolved into a power struggle between the two men, igniting Sudan’s current conflict.
Today, with Hemeti at the helm, the paramilitary group continues its oppressive campaign in West Darfur, engaging in alleged ethnic cleansing against the Indigenous Masalit people.
Meanwhile, a prison attack in April 2023, which the Sudanese army blamed on Rapid Support Forces rebels, facilitated the escape of al-Bashir’s allies, though the former president remains hospitalized under guard.
Despite his expulsion, bin Laden continued to emphasize Sudan’s importance in his plans for global jihad. This was evident in his 2006 audiotape and diary entries in which he referred to Sudan as a pivotal operational base.
A 2023 publication by key al-Qaida figure Ibrahim al-Qussi titled “Fragments from al-Qaida’s History” revealed that bin Laden directed an investment of US$12 million solely for jihad in Sudan, highlighting the region’s ongoing relevance to al-Qaida’s objectives.
Sudan’s appeal to extremists extends beyond its connections to bin Laden. Strategically bridging North and sub-Saharan Africa, Sudan is a key location for Islamist extremists aiming to expand their influence across the region.
After the 2021 U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan and the Taliban’s return to power, al-Qaida reestablished a presence in the country, reopening training camps and madrassas.
Well before that, however, al-Qaida had long since evolved from a centralized organization in Afghanistan into a decentralized network with global affiliates – from the Arabian Peninsula to the Indian subcontinent all the way to sub-Saharan Africa and the Sahel.
“Sudan’s moment has come; chaos is our chance to sow the seeds of jihad,” warned Abu Hudhaifa al-Sudani, a high-ranking al-Qaida leader, in an October 2022 manifesto.
His words may have seemed premature at the time, but a year of brutal civil war has now plunged Sudan into the kind of chaos in which terrorist groups thrive. The risk of al-Qaida gaining ground in Sudan is now very real and imperils, I believe, not only the country itself but also regional – and potentially global – security.
In April 2023, fighting broke out in Sudan between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces, creating a power vacuum that extremists are eager to fill.
At the same time, the Rapid Support Forces – a group that developed under and was once allied to Sudan’s al-Qaida-harboring former president Omar al-Bashir – has been solidifying its grip in strategic areas such as Darfur and southern Khartoum.
Indeed, both the paramilitary group and the armed forces have been accused of recruiting Islamist fighters, fueling fears that the civil war will – regardless of the victor – prove a toehold for extremist groups.
As a defense policy researcher and counterterrorism expert, I’m concerned that Sudan risks becoming an al-Qaida stronghold – and a potential base for orchestrating attacks on the U.S. and its allies. A potential Rapid Support Forces takeover in Sudan could mirror pre-9/11 Afghanistan, where Taliban control facilitated al-Qaida’s rise.
Al-Qaida members, seeking opportunities to achieve what they couldn’t in the Middle East, are already heeding calls to head to Sudan.
Decades of turmoil and extremism
Sudan’s civil strife predates the current fighting by decades. It ignited in 1989 when al-Bashir seized power, aligning the nation with radical Islamist ideologies. He imposed Sharia law and in 1991 sheltered al-Qaida leader Osama bin Laden. Under al-Bashir’s regime, bin Laden established training camps and expanded al-Qaida’s financial network, laying the groundwork for the 9/11 terrorist attacks.Facing international sanctions over its support of terrorism, Sudan expelled bin Laden in 1996.
But al-Bashir’s sponsorship of the Janjaweed militia group, the architects of the 2003 Darfur genocide, further solidified his alignment with Islamist extremists. Under scrutiny, al-Bashir rebranded the Janjaweed as the Rapid Support Forces in 2013, appointing ex-Janjaweed member Mohammed Hamdan “Hemeti” Dagalo as its leader and retaining their brutal tactics.
The 2021 coup, orchestrated by Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Burhan of the Sudanese Armed Forces and Hemeti of the Rapid Support Forces, soon devolved into a power struggle between the two men, igniting Sudan’s current conflict.
Today, with Hemeti at the helm, the paramilitary group continues its oppressive campaign in West Darfur, engaging in alleged ethnic cleansing against the Indigenous Masalit people.
Meanwhile, a prison attack in April 2023, which the Sudanese army blamed on Rapid Support Forces rebels, facilitated the escape of al-Bashir’s allies, though the former president remains hospitalized under guard.
Sudan at the heart of jihad
With conflicts in the Middle East and Eastern Europe, the West might be overlooking the crisis in Sudan and the potential it holds for al-Qaida, a group that has long harbored ambitions of returning to Sudan.Despite his expulsion, bin Laden continued to emphasize Sudan’s importance in his plans for global jihad. This was evident in his 2006 audiotape and diary entries in which he referred to Sudan as a pivotal operational base.
A 2023 publication by key al-Qaida figure Ibrahim al-Qussi titled “Fragments from al-Qaida’s History” revealed that bin Laden directed an investment of US$12 million solely for jihad in Sudan, highlighting the region’s ongoing relevance to al-Qaida’s objectives.
Sudan’s appeal to extremists extends beyond its connections to bin Laden. Strategically bridging North and sub-Saharan Africa, Sudan is a key location for Islamist extremists aiming to expand their influence across the region.
After the 2021 U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan and the Taliban’s return to power, al-Qaida reestablished a presence in the country, reopening training camps and madrassas.
Well before that, however, al-Qaida had long since evolved from a centralized organization in Afghanistan into a decentralized network with global affiliates – from the Arabian Peninsula to the Indian subcontinent all the way to sub-Saharan Africa and the Sahel.
