Stupid Ukraine threaten to nuke Putin! BEST LESSON for Kim Jong Nuke to learn about DENUCLEARIZATION = REGRET!

[war is best form of peace]

https://mil.news.sina.com.cn/world/2018-12-11/doc-ihprknvu2800509.shtml

俄专家回应乌政客叫嚣造核武：苏联时期你们都没造过

俄专家回应乌政客叫嚣造核武：苏联时期你们都没造过



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可惜再无机会！乌克兰当年若无美阻挠将售中国图1601/9
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上世纪90年代苏联解体后，乌克兰空军成为欧洲最大的部队，拥有2800架各型飞机；规模上仅次于美国，俄罗斯和中国，拥有超过10个师，49个空军团和11个独立单位。（鼎盛军事）


[环球网军事报道]因刻赤海峡冲突，俄罗斯与乌克兰关系极度紧张，乌克兰已宣布进入战时状态。乌将军日前提出重新制造核武器。但俄罗斯专家对乌克兰制造核武器的能力提出质疑。除了技术与资金问题，包括美国在内的核俱乐部成员也不希望看到乌克兰加入这一队伍。

CNN绘制的乌克兰与俄罗斯军力对比。
“今日俄罗斯”电视台10日以“勒索和蛊惑人心”为题报道称，曾担任乌克兰驻北约代表的彼得·加拉舒克少将9日在乌克兰“观察者”电视台参加直播节目时公开宣称，尽管乌克兰目前没有核武器，但拥有制造核武器的知识储备、组织能力与财政能力。乌克兰拥有生产核武器的权利，只要乌克兰领导人表现出拥有核武器的想法，便可在极短时间内制造出核武器。他强调，基辅不仅可以制造原子弹，还能制造出真正的核弹头。目前在第聂伯罗彼得罗夫斯克，仍保留乌克兰唯一一家可生产洲际弹道导弹的工厂。乌克兰拥有美国、俄罗斯和中国都不能制造的“撒旦”导弹的生产技术。乌克兰不应因为害怕国际制裁而放弃核武器的制造。

苏联解体后，乌克兰继承了境内的原苏联核遗产，后来均被销毁。
对于这一言论，俄罗斯战略研究所信息分析中心副主任叶尔马科夫称，乌克兰甚至都无力为自己的核电站生产核燃料。在乌克兰境内从来没有生产过核弹头，因此，它根本不具备生产核武器的能力。要制造核武器，需要的材料比政治家的想法要多得多，必须要拥有科技基础及工业生产能力。报道指出，乌克兰在苏联解体后曾继承了大量核武器。然而在1994年，乌克兰、俄罗斯、美国和英国签署了《布达佩斯安全保障备忘录》。之后，乌克兰的所有核武器已运往俄罗斯或被销毁。
《俄罗斯报》10日报道称，俄议员克林采维奇认为，乌克兰在苏联时期就没有独立制造核武器的能力，现在更没有。他表示，以加拉舒克将军为代表的乌克兰军方不过是虚张声势。乌克兰其实已经丧失了从苏联继承的制造核武器的能力。在当前条件下，更不用谈论其财力和组织能力了。

值得注意的是，早在2015年德国情报部门曾发出警告，乌克兰寻求恢复核武器研发。
俄政治分析家费利普波夫也称，苏联时期在第聂伯罗彼得罗夫斯克只是生产用于核武器的运载导弹。如果乌克兰没有完善的弹头生产技术，是不可能制造出核弹头的。此外，这需要庞大的财政资源，乌克兰没有钱。专家认为，乌克兰永远也无法再拥有核武器。包括美国在内的核俱乐部国家不会容忍新核大国的出现。



关键字 : 乌克兰核武器俄罗斯

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Russian experts responded to Ukrainian politicians calling for nuclear weapons: you have never made it during the Soviet era.
Russian experts responded to Ukrainian politicians calling for nuclear weapons: you have never made it during the Soviet era.
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Unfortunately, there is no chance! If Ukraine did not obstruct the sale of China in the same year, 1601/9
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After the collapse of the Soviet Union in the 1990s, the Ukrainian Air Force became the largest force in Europe, with 2,800 aircraft of various types; second only to the United States, Russia and China, with more than 10 divisions, 49 air force regiments and 11 independent units. (Dingsheng Military)

[Global Network Military Report] Due to the conflict in the Kerch Strait, Russia-Ukraine relations are extremely tense, and Ukraine has declared a wartime state. Ukrainian generals proposed to re-make nuclear weapons. But Russian experts question Ukraine’s ability to make nuclear weapons. In addition to technical and financial issues, members of the nuclear club, including the United States, do not want to see Ukraine join the team.
The comparison between Ukraine and Russian military forces drawn by CNN. The comparison between Ukraine and Russian military forces drawn by CNN.

On the 10th, "Russia Today" TV station reported on the topic of "blackmailing and confusing people". Major General Peter Garasuk, who served as the Ukrainian representative in NATO, publicly declared on the 9th in the Ukrainian "Observer" TV station, despite Ukraine currently has no nuclear weapons, but it has the intellectual reserve, organizational capacity and financial capacity to make nuclear weapons. Ukraine has the right to produce nuclear weapons, and as long as the Ukrainian leader shows the idea of possessing nuclear weapons, nuclear weapons can be produced in a very short time. He stressed that Kiev can not only create atomic bombs, but also create real nuclear warheads. Currently in Dnepropetrovsk, the only factory in Ukraine that can produce intercontinental ballistic missiles remains. Ukraine has the production technology of "Satan" missiles that the United States, Russia and China cannot manufacture. Ukraine should not give up the manufacture of nuclear weapons for fear of international sanctions.
After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Ukraine inherited the former Soviet Union’s nuclear heritage and was later destroyed. After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Ukraine inherited the former Soviet Union’s nuclear heritage and was later destroyed.

For this remark, Yerkakov, deputy director of the Information Analysis Center of the Russian Strategy Institute, said that Ukraine is even unable to produce nuclear fuel for its nuclear power plant. Nuclear warheads have never been produced in Ukraine, so it does not have the capacity to produce nuclear weapons at all. To make nuclear weapons, the materials needed are much more than those of politicians, and they must have a technological base and industrial production capacity. The report pointed out that Ukraine had inherited a large number of nuclear weapons after the collapse of the Soviet Union. However, in 1994, Ukraine, Russia, the United States and the United Kingdom signed the Budapest Security Guarantee Memorandum. After that, all Ukrainian nuclear weapons have been shipped to Russia or destroyed.

"Russian newspaper" reported on the 10th that Russian parliament Klintsevich believes that Ukraine did not have the ability to independently manufacture nuclear weapons during the Soviet era, and now there is no. He said that the Ukrainian military represented by General Galasuk was merely a bluff. Ukraine has in fact lost the ability to make nuclear weapons inherited from the Soviet Union. Under current conditions, let alone talk about its financial and organizational capabilities.

It is worth noting that as early as 2015, the German intelligence service issued a warning that Ukraine is seeking to resume nuclear weapons research and development.

Russian political analyst Felippof also said that during the Soviet era, Dnepropetrovsk only produced missiles for nuclear weapons. If Ukraine does not have a sound warhead production technology, it is impossible to produce a nuclear warhead. In addition, this requires huge financial resources, and Ukraine has no money. Experts believe that Ukraine can no longer possess nuclear weapons. Nuclear club countries, including the United States, will not tolerate the emergence of new nuclear powers.
Keywords : Ukraine Nuclear Weapon Russia
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[war is best form of peace]

https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2014/03/10/ukraine-nuclear/6250815/

Ukraine may have to go nuclear, says Kiev lawmaker
Oren Dorell, USA TODAY Published 10:51 a.m. ET March 10, 2014 | Updated 8:23 a.m. ET March 11, 2014

Russian supporters of their country's annexation of Crimea rally in Moscow with one saying, "terrorists took over power in Kiev" Nathan Frandino reports. Video provided by Reuters Newslook

(Photo: Oren Dorell, USA TODAY)
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KIEV, Ukraine — Ukraine may have to arm itself with nuclear weapons if the United States and other world powers refuse to enforce a security pact that obligates them to reverse the Moscow-backed takeover of Crimea, a member of the Ukraine parliament told USA TODAY.
The United States, Great Britain and Russia agreed in a pact "to assure Ukraine's territorial integrity" in return for Ukraine giving up a nuclear arsenal it inherited from the Soviet Union after declaring independence in 1991, said Pavlo Rizanenko, a member of the Ukrainian parliament.
"We gave up nuclear weapons because of this agreement," said Rizanenko, a member of the Udar Party headed by Vitali Klitschko, a candidate for president. "Now there's a strong sentiment in Ukraine that we made a big mistake."
His statements come as Russia raised the possibility it may send its troops beyond the Crimean peninsula on the Black Sea into the eastern half of Ukraine.
The Russian Foreign Ministry said lawlessness "now rules in eastern regions of Ukraine as a result of the actions of fighters of the so-called 'right sector' with the full connivance" of Ukraine's authorities.
Rizanenko and others in Ukraine say the pact it made with the United States under President Bill Clinton was supposed to prevent such Russian invasions.
The pact was made after the Soviet Union dissolved in 1991 and became Russia, leaving the newly independent nation of Ukraine as the world's third largest nuclear weapons power.
The communist dictatorship that was the Soviet Union had based nuclear missiles in republics it held captive along its border with Europe, and Ukraine had thousands. World powers urged Ukraine to give up the arsenal but its leaders balked, expressing fear they needed the weapons to deter Russia from trying to reverse Ukraine's independence.
To reassure the Ukrainians, the United States and leaders of the United Kingdom and Russia signed in 1994 the "Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances" in which the signatories promised that none of them would threaten or use force to alter the territorial integrity or political independence of Ukraine.

A worker cuts a Soviet-made aviation cruise missile KH-22, able to carry a nuclear charge, on the military base Ozerne in Zhytomyr Nov. 6, 2002. (Photo: Dima Gavrish, AFP)

They specifically pledged not to militarily occupy Ukraine. Although the pact was made binding according to international law, it said nothing that requires a nation to act against another that invades Ukraine.
The memorandum requires only that the signatories would "consult in the event a situation arises which raises a question concerning these commitments." Ukraine gave up thousands of nuclear warheads in return for the promise.
There is little doubt that Russia has in fact placed its military forces in Ukraine's province of Crimea. Russia's foreign minister has said its troops are there to protect Russian lives and interests.
And Russian President Vladimir Putin said that the commitments in the agreement are not relevant to Crimea because a "coup" in Kiev has created "a new state with which we have signed no binding agreements."

The U.S. and U.K. have said that the agreement remains binding and that they expect it to be treated "with utmost seriousness, and expect Russia to, as well."
President Obama has talked to Putin over the phone and said there is no danger to Russians in Ukraine and that they should agree to let international forces enter Crimea so differences can be resolved peacefully, according to the White House.
But Putin insisted to Obama that ethnic Russians in Crimea needed protection and reiterated that the government in Kiev is illegal because the parliament ousted pro-Moscow President Viktor Yanukovych.
"Everyone had this sentiment that for good or bad the United States would be the world police" and make sure that international order is maintained, Rizanenko said of the Budapest pact.
"Now that function is being abandoned by President Obama and because of that Russia invaded Crimea," he said.
"In the future, no matter how the situation is resolved in Crimea, we need a much stronger Ukraine," he said. "If you have nuclear weapons people don't invade you."
The White House and U.S. State Department did not respond to e-mails requesting comment.
Rizanenko spoke a day after returning from a visit to the Crimea, where armed Crimeans under orders from Russian commanders blocked him from visiting a Ukrainian border post, he said.
Russian military units have ringed Crimea's borders to block the Ukrainian military from exerting control on the territory, and Ukraine's army cannot defeat Russia's, he said.
Obama had warned Putin of "costs" should he persist in Crimea but the main action against Moscow so far has been a ban on travel to the United States of unnamed persons. Europe and the United States said they are considering economic sanctions against Russia but none have been imposed.
Meanwhile, "all the time Russia is moving more and more troops into Crimea," Rizanenko said. "Only force will influence (Putin's) decision."
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[war is best form of peace]

https://warontherocks.com/2018/04/denuclearization-again-lessons-from-ukraines-decision-to-disarm/



Denuclearization Again? Lessons from Ukraine’s Decision to Disarm

Mariana Budjeryn and Polina Sinovets

April 19, 2018

Commentary

On Dec. 25, 1991, Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev announced his resignation and handed off his nuclear strike authorization unit, the so-called Cheget briefcase, to Russian President Boris Yeltsin. With this final act, the Soviet Union was no more. What remained, however, was Soviet Union’s gargantuan nuclear arsenal and the military-industrial complex that produced it. The problem was that now it was situated not in one, but in four sovereign states: Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine. This unprecedented development spurred fears that the biggest wave of nuclear proliferation in history was in the offing, fears that fortunately failed to materialize.
Amid proliferation gloom about North Korea, Iran, and possibly Saudi Arabia, it seems fitting to recall past nonproliferation successes. Ukraine’s case is the most instructive of the Soviet nuclear inheritors. The United States and its allies formulated an expectation that only one nuclear state should emerge from the Soviet collapse, and everyone understood that state to be Russia. While Belarus and, after a short hesitation, Kazakhstan complied with this expectation, Ukraine followed a more convoluted and difficult path.
Ukraine’s initial intention to become a nuclear-free state, recorded in its 1990 Declaration of Sovereignty, gave way to a more nuanced stance soon after the country became independent the following year. As a successor state of the Soviet Union, Ukraine claimed, it was the rightful owner of what amounted to the world’s third-largest nuclear arsenal deployed on its territory: 176 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) armed with 1,240 nuclear warheads and 44 strategic bombers armed with hundreds of nuclear-tipped cruise missiles.
Heated internal deliberations and intense international negotiations ensued. In mid-1993 it seemed far from certain that Ukraine would agree to denuclearize. Yet by 1994, Ukraine joined the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as a non-nuclear-weapons state, proceeding to transfer all nuclear warheads to Russia and dismantle, with U.S. technical assistance, ICBMs, silos, bombers, and cruise missiles. In exchange, the young country received compensation for fissile material contained in warheads and security assurances from recognized nuclear states.
What can we learn from Ukraine’s path to denuclearization? Bearing in mind that all historical parallels are necessarily tenuous, we offer three insights that may help deal with today’s proliferation challenges.
Insight 1. Supply-Side Abundance? So What?
While Soviet weapons were less useful than supposed, Ukraine nonetheless inherited the foundation to build its own. But it wasn’t interested.
Scholars of nuclear proliferation tentatively sort drivers of nuclear acquisition into two buckets: supply-side, or technological capacity to develop nuclear weapons, and demand-side, or political motivations to do so. In enforcing the nonproliferation regime, the United States and its allies have focused on controlling the supply-side of nuclear proliferation: buttressing the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards regime, discouraging states from pursuit of indigenous enrichment capacity, instituting and enforcing export controls for sensitive technology, and going after illicit trade networks. This is good and necessary work. Yet curbing nuclear proliferation is not reducible to choking a potential proliferator’s technology supply lines.
The case of Ukraine underscores that, when it comes to nuclear proliferation, the availability of technology is far from determinative. Counterintuitively, it was not the inheritance of a cache of strategic weaponry that was the biggest proliferation opportunity, since at the moment of Soviet dissolution, Ukraine’s strategic armaments were looped into a centralized command and control system, the keys to which remained in Moscow. Rather, Ukraine’s most important asset was the extent of scientific know-how and military-industrial capacity that contributed to the Soviet nuclear enterprise. This technological capacity would have allowed Ukraine to establish direct control over parts of its arsenal and complete the missing elements of the nuclear fuel cycle, had it chosen to do so.
Ukraine’s city of Dnipropetrovsk (now Dnipro) was home to the Yuzhnoie design bureau and the Yuzhmash missile plant, the largest producer of ICBMs for the Soviet arsenal. Yuzhmash produced 46 of the 176 missiles deployed in Ukraine, the SS-24s, and could continue to maintain and modernize them. Kharkiv, an important node in Soviet military-industrial complex, was home to Khartron, the designer of guidance and targeting systems for SS-19 ICBMs, 130 of which were deployed in Ukraine. Bruce Blair, writing in 1995, estimated that, despite technological challenges, “the initial direct costs [for Ukraine] of cobbling together a deterrent force out of inherited or seizable assets would be relatively small.”
Although Ukraine lacked uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing facilities, fuel fabrication, and warhead production, it mined and missile uranium ore and operated two research and 15 civilian nuclear power reactors. This included one RBMK reactor at Chernobyl, in operation until 2000, which produced irradiated fuel rich in weapons-grade plutonium. Ukraine had the metallurgical and chemical expertise, precision electronics, two prominent physics institutes in Kyiv and Kharkiv, and a heavy water plant in Driprodzerzhinsk. Ukrainians might also have had access to a Soviet nuclear warhead design, shared with Yuzhmash as part of a missile development program before the Soviet collapse. A feasibility study conducted by Ukrainian scientists in 1993 concluded that Ukraine had sufficient technological capacity to establish centrifuge production and uranium enrichment in five to seven years.
In short, beyond weaponry, Ukraine inherited considerable scientific, technological, and industrial capacity that would have made an enviable starter package for any aspiring proliferator. Ukraine is not a nuclear weapons state today, not because it lacked technology or scientific expertise, but because it lacked political motivation for a nuclear deterrent.
Insight 2: Nuclear Weapons Are Nice; A Good Reputation is Better.
Ukraine wanted international recognition, not the isolation that would come with nuclear weapons.
Political motivations that drive nuclear acquisition are notoriously difficult to ascertain. We know that adverse security environments, status considerations, and domestic lobby groups that benefit from a nuclear program are all conducive to nuclear proliferation. Ukraine’s story suggests that motivations for a nuclear program are also shaped by how the country defines itself in relation to the Western-led international order.
After the Soviet collapse, Ukraine found itself in a perilous security environment as Ukrainian-Russian relations became increasingly acrimonious. As we found through archival research and chronicled in a recent paper, Ukraine aspired to be recognized as an equal successor state to the Soviet Union, on par with Russia, and thought this equality should obtain also in the nuclear realm. As such it demanded, successfully, to be included as a party to the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), signed by the United States and the Soviet Union just weeks before the latter collapsed. Finally, Ukraine had a prominent missile lobby, which, given that procurements from Moscow dried up following the Soviet collapse, supported the retention of the 46 SS-24 ICBMs produced in Ukraine and development of replacement systems after their service life expired in early 2000s.
Yet this dangerous combination of an adverse security environment, desire for status, and domestic interests nonetheless failed to produce a Ukrainian nuclear deterrent, because there were equally powerful political motivations that inhibited the acquisition of nuclear weapons. Had Ukraine pursued a nuclear program, it surely would have been subject to international isolation and sanctions that would have prevented the country’s integration into the world economy and affect Russian supply of nuclear fuel to Ukraine’s power stations. Acceding to the NPT, on the other hand, meant Ukraine could maintain its peaceful nuclear energy under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards. Moreover, Ukraine, a fledgling sovereign emerging from a communist empire, aspired to become a European liberal democracy and an international citizen in good standing. It did not only relinquish nuclear weapons because of what it wanted to get or avoid, but also because it wanted to become a certain kind of state.
Threats of sanctions and isolation will not have the same effect on those regimes that define themselves in opposition to the Western-led international order. In North Korea, for instance, sanctions have done little to thwart the autarchic regime’s determination to get a nuclear deterrent. The penalties may even have backfired by supporting the narrative of besiegement by the West and making illicit trade networks more sophisticated. This is not to say that sanctions should be lifted but rather that we shouldn’t expect a change of heart in Pyongyang solely because of them. On the other hand, in Iran, the lesson from Ukraine may be that the faction of leadership that seeks engagement with the West should be encouraged and supported — it was, after all, instrumental to making a nuclear deal possible.
Insight 3: A Deterrent? Or Just a Fair Deal?
Western and Russian officials projected their own abstract deterrence thinking. Ukrainians thought of nuclear warfare in concrete terms and recoiled.
Statesmen and analysts often become prisoners of the concepts and modes of thinking that are most familiar to them. Western understandings of nuclear weapons, dominated by theories of deterrence, had difficulty explaining why countries would renounce a nuclear option. Indeed, it was partly through the West’s disproportionate attention to the nuclear issue in Ukraine, to the exclusion of all other areas of engagement, that Ukrainians learned the value of their nuclear inheritance. Combined with an increasing perception of the Russian threat, this led Ukraine to qualify its initial renunciation with a more nuanced stance that demanded recognition of Ukraine a legitimate “owner” of nuclear weapons as an equal successor of the Soviet Union.
Russia construed these claims as a Ukrainian bid for a nuclear deterrent. Received wisdom in the West corroborated this suspicion — what state bereft of allies and facing a conventionally superior nuclear-armed adversary wouldn’t want a deterrent? In summer 1993, The Economist made this argument in an article entitled “Ukraine: a nuclear state” and prominent international relations scholar John Mearsheimer argued in Foreign Affairs that Ukraine would — and should — keep a nuclear deterrent, otherwise a war with Russia would be imminent.
As it turns out, Mearsheimer was eventually proven right about the war with Russia. It seems, however, that more Westerners were thinking about a Ukrainian nuclear deterrent than Ukrainians. Indeed, hardly anyone in Ukraine ever talked about nuclear weapons in terms of deterrence. Ukraine’s intense contestation of the nuclear issue in mid-1993 was about the political, not military, value of nuclear weapons. For Ukraine’s president Leonid Kravchuk and the country’s diplomats, nuclear ownership simply meant entitlement to a fair compensation, both in terms of reimbursement for fissile material contained in warheads and in terms of security guarantees by United States and Russia. A faction in the Ukrainian parliament took a more assertive stance and attempted to delay denuclearization. Yet even they viewed Ukraine’s nuclear inheritance not in military terms but rather as a political hedge: The continued presence of nuclear arms in Ukraine meant the West would continue to pay attention and mitigate a potential conflict with Russia.
The only outspoken Ukrainian advocate for a nuclear deterrent, was Gen.-Maj. Volodymyr Tolubko, a parliamentarian and former commander of a strategic missile division. He openly stated, according to archival sources, that Ukraine’s unilateral renunciation was “romantic and premature” and that the country should keep the SS-24s, which would be sufficient to “deter any aggressor.” Tolubko, however, was less specific on the subject of deterrence and on occasion referred to a joint Ukrainian-Russian operation of nuclear forces in Ukraine, a position the rest of the leadership found untenable.
Why was deterrence thinking so conspicuously marginal in Ukraine? As our paper describes, Ukraine’s political leadership had little experience with the intricacies of nuclear strategy. Soviet defense intellectuals who could educate them remained in Moscow. Ukraine’s own military, Tolubko notwithstanding, was preoccupied with multiple challenges associated with forging conventional national armed forces out of the large number of underpaid Soviet troops left in Ukraine.
Ukraine’s powerful missile lobby focused on keeping productions lines busy, rather on nuclear deterrence. When it saw that chances of retaining the 46 SS-24 ICBMs in Ukraine were dwindling, it threw its weight behind joining the NPT and the Missile Technology Control Regime that would allow Ukraine to enter international civilian space markets.
Finally, Kravchuk often came off as personally antipathetic toward all things nuclear. His rare comments on the military utility of nuclear weapons betray that he couldn’t help but imagine them in war-fighting terms and, as the commander-in-chief who would be responsible for giving a launch order, immediately balked at such a proposition. That is, Kravchuk doubted his own credibility in carrying out a deterrent threat — he struggled to think the unthinkable. This attitude was, it seems, more sincere than naïve.
This reminds us that nuclear deterrence, as a set of concepts and practices, does not come automatically attached to nuclear weaponry. In fact, actors may struggle to grasp the military utility of nuclear weapons. This should alert Western analysts to be more attentive to the ways others conceive of nuclear capability. By projecting Western concepts and modes of thinking where they might not belong, we risk misreading our interlocutors’ meanings and motivations, making diplomatic solutions that much more difficult.
Ukraine’s denuclearization deal was forged in a relatively short time and at a rather low cost for the West. For Ukraine, the deal legitimized its claims to the Soviet nuclear inheritance as well as recognized its security concerns. Despite all the ingredients conducive to proliferation, Ukraine emerged as a great nonproliferation success story just at the time the NPT was going into its 1995 Review and Extension conference.
Today, Ukrainians are not so sure they did the right thing. Following Russia’s annexation of Crimea and involvement in the war in Ukraine’s east, in violation of its security commitments pledged to Ukraine exchange for denuclearization, public support for the renewal of Ukraine’s nuclear status rose to almost 50 percent from the previous high of 33 percent in 1994. The final lesson of Ukraine’s denuclearization might be that future such deals will come at a much higher cost and will require more robust security commitments on the part of nuclear states.

Mariana Budjeryn is a research fellow at Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center. Polina Sinovets is an Associate Professor at Odessa National University. Their working paper “Interpreting the Bomb: Ownership and Deterrence in Ukraine’s Nuclear Discourse” was recently published by the Wilson Center Nuclear Proliferation International History Project.
Image: Polina Sinovets


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[war is best form of peace]

https://www.dailystar.co.uk/news/wo...-nuclear-weapons-nato-peter-garashchuk-russia


World War 3 THREAT: Ukraine could 'create its own NUKES' – NATO envoy makes SHOCK claims

UKRAINE can create its own nuclear weapons, according to shocking claims made by former Ukrainian envoy to NATO Peter Garashchuk.

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By Matt Drake / Published 9th December 2018

NUKES: The former NATO envoy claims Ukraine could develop its own nukes (Pic: GETTY)
Kiev has the intellectual, organisational and money to develop its own nuclear arsenal, Peter Garashchuk claims Kiev has the intellectual, organisation and money to develop its own nuclear arsenal.
Speaking to Ukraine's Obozrevatel TV, he claimed Kiev is also capable of developing full-fledged nuclear warheads for missiles.
The former NATO envoy argued that to date the only plant for the production of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) is located in the Ukrainian city of Dnepropetrovsk and that the US nor Russia nor China can create an ICBM
He said: “In the world today there is no other such plant for the production of intercontinental ballistic missiles, which was in the USSR, and then in independent Ukraine, in Dnieper.

MARTIAL LAW: The claims comes as tensions between Ukraine and Russia are at breaking point (Pic: GETTY)
“Neither the USA, nor China, nor Russia could produce an analogue for the Satan class rocket.”
Ukraine, Russia, Kazakhstan, Belarus, the US and the UK signed the Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances in 1994.
This obliged Kiev to give up its nuclear weapons.
It was was then followed by Ukraine entering the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).
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But Mr Garashchuk claimed that Kiev should not be afraid of international sanctions in creating the weapons for the “benefit” of Ukrainian troops.
It comes amid escalating tensions between Ukraine and Russia which has led to Kiev issuing martial law.
He added: "We are not afraid of anything. Our soldier at the front is not afraid of anything.
“And the whole system - political, economic and security policy - of our state, must work for our soldier.

ICBM: Mr Garashchuk said Ukraine is the only country capable of making ICBMS (Pic: GETTY)

SANCTIONS: The former envoy said Ukraine shouldn't worry about sanctions (Pic: GETTY)
“Not only the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff. This is the whole state is at war!"
Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko signalled his readiness to make amendments to the Memorandum.
This is so it could legalise his country’s push to join EU and NATO.
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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_weapons_and_Ukraine
Nuclear weapons and Ukraine


From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia




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Prior to 1991, Ukraine was part of the Soviet Union and had Soviet nuclear weapons in its territory.
On December 1, 1991, Ukraine, the second most powerful republic in the Soviet Union (USSR), voted overwhelmingly for independence, which ended any realistic chance of the Soviet Union staying together even on a limited scale.[1] More than 90% of the electorate expressed their support for Ukraine's declaration of independence, and they elected the chairman of the parliament, Leonid Kravchuk as the first president of the country. At the meetings in Brest, Belarus on December 8, and in Alma Ata on December 21, the leaders of Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine formally dissolved the Soviet Union and formed the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).
After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Ukraine held about one third of the Soviet nuclear arsenal, the third largest in the world at the time, as well as significant means of its design and production.[2] 130 UR-100N intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) with six warheads each, 46 RT-23 Molodets ICBMs with ten warheads apiece, as well as 33 heavy bombers, totalling approximately 1,700 warheads remained on Ukrainian territory.[3] Formally, these weapons were controlled by the Commonwealth of Independent States.[4] While Ukraine had physical control of the weapons, it did not have operational control, as they were dependent on Russian-controlled electronic Permissive Action Links and the Russian command and control system. In 1994 Ukraine agreed to destroy the weapons, and to join the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).[5][6]
Contents

• 1 Former military units
• 2 Denuclearization
• 3 Budapest Memorandum
• 4 France and China's commitments
• 5 2014 annexation of Crimea
• 6 See also
• 7 Reference list
  • 7.1 External links

Former military units
See also: Strategic missile forces museum in Ukraine

As a republic in the Soviet Union, Ukraine was the base for the following nuclear forces:

• 43rd Rocket Army
  • 19th Rocket Division (Rakovo, Khmelnytskyi Oblast) (see uk:19-та ракетна дивізія (СРСР))
  • 37th Guards Rocket Division (Lutsk, Volyn Oblast)
  • 43rd Guards Rocket Division (Romny, Sumy Oblast)
  • 46th Rocket Division (Pervomaisk, Nikolayev Oblast)[7]
  • 50th Rocket Division (Bilokorovychi, Zhitomir Oblast)

• 
  
  
  Nuclear complex SS-20 Saber in Vinnytsia
  
  
• 
  
  
  Nuclear missile SS-18 Satan fully design and manufactured in Ukraine at Yuzhmash
  
  
• 
  
  
  Missile silo in the Central Ukraine for a SS-24 missile
  
  
• 
  
  
  Tupolev Tu-95 strategic bombers
  
  

Denuclearization
International relations theorist John Mearsheimer predicted a Ukraine without any nuclear deterrent was likely to be subjected to aggression by Russia, but this was very much a minority view at the time.[8]
A 2016 study argues that the denuclearization of Ukraine was not a "stupid mistake" and that it is unclear that Ukraine would be better off as a nuclear state.[9] The study argues that the push for Ukrainian independence was with a view to make it a nonnuclear state.[9] The United States would also not have made Ukraine an exception when it came to the denuclearization of other post-Soviet states such as Belarus and Kazakhstan.[9] The deterrent value of the nuclear weapons in Ukraine was also questionable, as Ukraine would have had to spend 12 to 18 months to establish full operational control over the nuclear arsenal left by the Russians.[9] The ICBMs also had a range of 5.000-10.000 km (initially targeting the United States), which meant that they could only have been re-targeted to hit Russia's far east.[9] The air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) left by the Russians had been disabled by the Russians during the collapse of the Soviet Union, but even if they had been reconfigured and made to work by the Ukrainians, it is unlikely that they would have had a deterrent effect.[9] Had Ukraine decided to establish full operational control of the nuclear weapons, it would have faced sanctions by the West and perhaps even a withdrawal of diplomatic recognition by the United States and other NATO allies.[9] Ukraine would also likely have faced retaliatory action by Russia.[9] Ukraine would also have struggled with replacing the nuclear weapons once their service life expired, as Ukraine did not have a nuclear weapons program.[9] In exchange for giving up its nuclear weapons, Ukraine received financial compensation, as well as the security guarantees of the Budapest Memorandum.[9]
Budapest Memorandum
Main article: Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances

On December 5, 1994 the leaders of Ukraine, Russia, Britain and the United States signed a memorandum to provide Ukraine with security assurances in connection with its accession to the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state. The four parties signed the memorandum, containing a preamble and six paragraphs. The memorandum reads as follows:[10]

The United States of America, the Russian Federation, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,
Welcoming the accession of Ukraine to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as non-nuclear-weapon State,
Taking into account the commitment of Ukraine to eliminate all nuclear weapons from its territory within a specified period of time,
Noting the changes in the world-wide security situation, including the end of the Cold War, which have brought about conditions for deep reductions in nuclear forces.
Confirm the following:
1. The Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America reaffirm their commitment to Ukraine, in accordance with the principles of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, to respect the independence and sovereignty and the existing borders of Ukraine.
2. The Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America reaffirm their obligation to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of Ukraine, and that none of their weapons will ever be used against Ukraine except in self-defence or otherwise in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.
3. The Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America reaffirm their commitment to Ukraine, in accordance with the principles of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, to refrain from economic coercion designed to subordinate to their own interest the exercise by Ukraine of the rights inherent in its sovereignty and thus to secure advantages of any kind.
4. The Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America reaffirm their commitment to seek immediate United Nations Security Council action to provide assistance to Ukraine, as a non-nuclear-weapon State party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, if Ukraine should become a victim of an act of aggression or an object of a threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used.
5. The Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America reaffirm, in the case of Ukraine, their commitment not to use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon State party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, except in the case of an attack on themselves, their territories or dependent territories, their armed forces, or their allies, by such a State in association or alliance with a nuclear-weapon State.
6. Ukraine, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America will consult in the event a situation arises that raises a question concerning these commitments.
— Memorandum on Security Assurances in Connection with Ukraine’s Accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons[10]​

France and China's commitments
France and China also provided Ukraine with assurances similar to the Budapest Memorandum, but with some significant differences. For instance, France's pledge does not contain the promises laid out in paragraphs 4 and 6 above, to refer any aggression to the UN Security Council, nor to consult in the event of a question regarding the commitments.[11]
China's pledge takes a different form entirely, dating from 4 December, and reading as follows:[12]

• The Chinese Government welcomes the decision of Ukraine to destroy all nuclear weapons on its territory, and commends the approval by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on 16 November of Ukraine’s accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as a non-nuclear-weapon State. China fully understands the desire of Ukraine for security assurance. The Chinese Government has always maintained that under no circumstances will China use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States or nuclear-weapon-free zones. This principled position also applies to Ukraine. The Chinese Government urges all other nuclear-weapon States to undertake the same commitment, so as to enhance the security of all non-nuclear-weapon States, including Ukraine.
• The Chinese Government has constantly opposed the practice of exerting political, economic or other pressure in international relations. It maintains that disputes and differences should be settled peacefully through consultations on an equal footing. Abiding by the spirit of the Sino-Ukrainian joint communiqué of 4 January 1992 on the establishment of diplomatic relations, the Sino-Ukrainian joint communiqué of 31 October 1992 and the Sino-Ukrainian joint statement of 6 September 1994, China recognizes and respects the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine, and stands ready to further develop friendly and cooperative Sino-Ukraine relations on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence.

Thus, China's pledge, similar to France's, does not pledge to involve UN or consultative mechanisms in case of crisis. However, it does pledge to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine.
2014 annexation of Crimea
Despite Russia's claimed annexation of Crimea, which the UN General Assembly rejected as invalid,[13] the Government of Ukraine in 2014 reaffirmed its 1994 decision to accede to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear-weapon state.[14]
After the Ukrainian Parliament voted to remove President Viktor Yanukovych from office, a power vacuum formed, and Russia annexed Crimea.[15] The Russian pretext used nationalist and cultural rhetoric, claiming that the Russian military was protecting ethnic Russians from attack in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine. Russia's military actions violated the Budapest Memorandum.[16]
Pavlo Rizanenko, a member of the Ukrainian parliament told USA Today that Ukraine may have to arm themselves with their own nuclear weapons if the United States and other world leaders do not hold up their end of the agreement. He said "We gave up nuclear weapons because of this agreement. Now, there's a strong sentiment in Ukraine that we made a big mistake."[15] He also said that, "In the future, no matter how the situation is resolved in Crimea, we need a much stronger Ukraine. If you have nuclear weapons, people don't invade you."[17]
On 13 December 2014 Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko stated that he did not want Ukraine to become a nuclear power again.[18]
See also

 

[war is best form of peace]

NO NUKE = I REGRET LIKE FUCK!

Stupid Retard Ukraine accepted US $aid$ and defunct much of their Soviet inheritance nukes and weapons. They are so chicken shit about nuke because of the cancer in their ass from Soviet's Chernobyl. So they let USA fucking HELP them to DENUCLEARIZED = self-castration disarm! Now they fucking regret that they have no nuke to nuke Putin!

LOL!

Fucking Jokers!

IDIOTS!

And Kim Jong Nuke must fucking learn from Ukrainian idiots don't listen to Xijinping! Make tons of nukes as much as you can! Nuke USA! Nothing to lose! Everything to GAIN!

If NK did not make nuke you think cousin Moon will Lan-Lan go cry for peace and brotherhood with Pyongyang? No way! He will be 10x more arrogant than Kim Jong Nuke if Pyongyang did not have any nuke! So wake up!

Denuclearization MY ASS!

 

[war is best form of peace]

https://www.sammyboy.com/threads/st...o-learn-about-denuclearization-regret.262282/ 笨蛋乌克兰现在对当年"去核武化"的大错非常懊悔! 想要从新开发核武器来对付普京! 这个是进胖子最需要借鉴的惨痛教训! 当然还有一个教训例子, 就是当年凄凉被吊死的伊拉克撒旦胡申! 就是守规矩的笨蛋,接受联合国100多次的核武器检查! 洋人偏偏诬赖伊拉克说有核子武器! 攻打伊拉克家破人亡! 处死总统! 结果就是证明没有任何核子武器! 听话守规矩不造核武就是这下场! 造核武喊打喊杀的金胖子却免费风光八面的来新加坡满街保镖跑步护驾的, 傻屄川普客气赞扬金胖子! 如果放弃核武?当然死得比撒旦胡申难看!⚰⚰☠

 

[war is best form of peace]

金胖子如果敢放弃核武川普必把他烤成烧饼!

 

[war is best form of peace]

https://mil.news.sina.com.cn/jssd/2018-12-11/doc-ihmutuec8118363.shtml

乌克兰是否真有能力造核武？看看中国辽宁舰就知道

乌克兰是否真有能力造核武？看看中国辽宁舰就知道



595

俄乌冲突后，乌克兰国内草木皆兵，社会各界都在想着怎么加强乌克兰的军事实力，在与俄罗斯这个庞然大物的对抗中获胜。甚至有些人设想重新研制核武器，并恢复苏联解体时乌克兰的第三核大国地位。

乌克兰接受一批新武器 能和俄罗斯一较高下？1/11
查看原图图集模式
乌克兰国有的“国防工业集团”在12月1日正式将乌克兰武装部队交付了一批战斗机、无人机和直升机。这批新武器中包含了最新升级的米格-29战斗机，新升级的苏-27战斗机和L-39训练机、米-17运输直升机以及“观鸟”无人机。


前乌克兰驻北约特使、佩德罗夫·格拉什楚克少将就是其中之一，他在12月8日接受乌克兰Obozrevatel电视采访时斩钉截铁地表示：我会再说一次，乌克兰有能力开发和生产属于自己的核武器。他表示，乌克兰不但有能力制造核弹，而且还能制造用于洲际导弹的各种小型化核弹头。

图片：乌克兰最新曝光的“雷霆”2型战役战术弹道导弹，是乌克兰南方设计局的杰作。
核武器是一项复杂的系统工程，虽然说乌克兰曾经拥有世界上独一无二的洲际导弹生产设施，比如曾经设计出世界上威力最大的洲际导弹SS-18“撒旦”洲际导弹的第聂伯罗市南方设计局。
但是曾经必然是曾经，在苏联解体后，美国忽悠下，该设计局的洲际导弹研发设备已经销毁，科技人员流失较大，已经不具有研制洲际导弹的能力。所以说，在美国人监督下销毁了全部中远程导弹的乌克兰已经不再拥有战略导弹的研发能力。

图片：地井发射的SS-18同样是南方设计局的杰作，但现在的南方设计局却不可能设计出这种末日武器。
地井发射的SS-18同样是南方设计局的杰作，但现在的南方设计局却不可能设计出这种末日武器，核弹头的研制也是如此！
为什么会说这句话呢？
我们可以看看我们的“辽宁”号航母的前身——苏联留给乌克兰的遗产“瓦良格”号航母。
1993年，当时还关系不错的俄乌两国领导人专门到黑海沿岸的尼古拉耶夫造船厂，讨论“瓦良格”航母的建造问题，当时航母已经建造了70%。

图片：大家都知道，“瓦良格”号的凤凰涅槃是在中国，而非乌克兰。
当大家问这样才能将航母造完工时，马卡洛夫厂长说了著名的一段论述：
“（需要）苏联、党中央、国家计划委员会、军事工业委员会和九个国防工业部、600个相关专业、8000家配套厂家，总之需要一个伟大的国家才能完成他。”
原来对于航母、核武器、洲际导弹这种“国”字级别的复杂工程，只有伟大的强国才能建造，但那个强国已不复存在了。

图片：变身“辽宁”号的“瓦良格”号，记载着那个红色帝国最后的辉煌。
航母如此，洲际导弹和核武器也是这样，并不是乌克兰有个南方设计局就能够包打天下了，在苏联全国一盘棋的大协作体制下，南方设计局本身也只是其中的一个螺丝钉，就连当时在设计局工作的科学家，也都不全是乌克兰人！
根据苏联核武器研制史记载，苏联核武器研制，是在第一总局积极参与下，从斯维尔德洛夫斯克、车里雅宾斯克、莫斯科、列宁格勒、古比雪夫等州的化工、冶金、机械制造行业抽调的大量科学家、技术工人等，一起汇聚而来，在大家集体合作的状态下才有序推进了苏联核武器研制的工作。

图片：苏联核武器项目是一个复杂的系统工程，不是现在乌克兰能够恢复的。
目前，南方设计局仍然拥有一定的弹道导弹设计能力，最近推出的“雷霆”2战役战术弹道导弹就是一个很好的例子，这种被称为“乌克兰的伊斯坎德尔”的导弹射程500公里，具有一定的威慑能力。
但是在现在这个第三世界国家都能够造导弹的年代，这种新导弹并不能证明乌克兰就能够恢复核打击能力。

图片：乌克兰南方设计局新设计的“雷霆”2战役战术弹道导弹。
苏联解体后，乌克兰在美国的忽悠下，将自身的战略、战术核武器全部销毁殆尽，将图-160战略轰炸机切割成废铁，以换回所谓的经济援助。
破坏容易建设难，现在乌克兰说要恢复世界第三核大国身份，那只能是痴心妄想。（作者署名：虹摄库尔斯克）

图片：乌克兰将图-160战略轰炸机和空射核巡航导弹拆解。


Is Ukraine really capable of building nuclear weapons? Look at the Chinese ship in Liaoning, you know
Is Ukraine really capable of building nuclear weapons? Look at the Chinese ship in Liaoning, you know
595

After the Russian-Uzbek conflict, Ukrainian domestic grass and trees, all sectors of society are thinking about how to strengthen Ukraine's military strength, winning in the confrontation with Russia's behemoth. Some even imagined re-developing nuclear weapons and restoring Ukraine’s status as a third nuclear power when the Soviet Union collapsed.
Ukraine accepts a new batch of weapons to compete with Russia? 1/11
View the original map mode

The Ukrainian state-owned "Defense Industry Group" officially delivered a batch of fighters, drones and helicopters to the Ukrainian armed forces on December 1. The new weapons include the newly upgraded MiG-29 fighters, the newly upgraded Su-27 and L-39 trainers, the Mi-17 transport helicopter and the "bird watching" drone.

Former Ukrainian special envoy to NATO and Major General Pedrof Graszuk was one of them. In an interview with Ubozrevatel in Ukraine on December 8, he said categorically: I will say once again that Ukraine has the ability to develop and produce itself. Nuclear weapon. He said that Ukraine not only has the ability to manufacture nuclear bombs, but also can manufacture various small-scale nuclear warheads for intercontinental missiles.

Photo: Ukrainian latest exposure of the "Thunder" type 2 battle tactical ballistic missile, is a masterpiece of the Southern Design Bureau of Ukraine.

Nuclear weapons are a complex system engineering, although Ukraine once had the world's unique intercontinental missile production facilities, such as the Southern Design Bureau of Dnipropetrovsk, which designed the world's most powerful intercontinental missile SS-18 "Satan" intercontinental missile.

But once it was once, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States flickered, the Bureau of Intercontinental missile research and development equipment has been destroyed, the loss of scientific and technological personnel is large, and there is no ability to develop intercontinental missiles. Therefore, Ukraine, which has destroyed all medium- and long-range missiles under the supervision of the United States, no longer has the research and development capabilities of strategic missiles.

Photo: The SS-18 launched by the well is also a masterpiece of the Southern Design Bureau, but it is impossible for the Southern Design Bureau to design such a doomsday weapon.

The SS-18 launched by the well is also a masterpiece of the Southern Design Bureau, but it is impossible for the Southern Design Bureau to design such a doomsday weapon. The development of the nuclear warhead is also true!

Why do you say this?

We can look at the predecessor of our "Liaoning" aircraft carrier - the aircraft carrier "Varyag" that the Soviet Union left for Ukraine.

In 1993, the leaders of Russia and Ukraine, who had good relations at the time, went to the Nikolaev Shipyard on the Black Sea coast to discuss the construction of the "Varyag" aircraft carrier, when the aircraft carrier had been built 70%.

Photo: Everyone knows that the phoenix nirvana of the "Varyag" is in China, not Ukraine.

When everyone asked about this to complete the construction of the aircraft carrier, the director of Makarov said a famous passage:

"(Need) the Soviet Union, the Party Central Committee, the State Planning Commission, the Military Industry Commission, and the nine Defense Industry Departments, 600 related majors, and 8,000 supporting manufacturers. In short, a great country is needed to complete him."

It turned out that for the complex project of the "national" level of aircraft carriers, nuclear weapons and intercontinental missiles, only a great power can be built, but that powerful country no longer exists.

Photo: The "Varyag" of the "Liaoning" is recorded, which records the final glory of the Red Empire.

The same is true for aircraft carriers, intercontinental missiles and nuclear weapons. It is not that Ukraine has a Southern Design Bureau that can beat the world. Under the great cooperation system of the national chess game in the Soviet Union, the Southern Design Bureau itself is only one of the screws, even at the design bureau. The scientists who work are not all Ukrainians!

According to the history of the development of Soviet nuclear weapons, the development of Soviet nuclear weapons was carried out under the active participation of the First General Administration, from the chemical and metallurgical industries of Sverdlovsk, Chelyabinsk, Moscow, Leningrad, Kubyshev and other states. A large number of scientists and skilled workers in the machinery manufacturing industry gathered together to promote the development of Soviet nuclear weapons in an orderly manner.

Photo: The Soviet nuclear weapons program is a complex system engineering that is not now recoverable in Ukraine.

At present, the Southern Design Bureau still has a certain ballistic missile design capability. The recently launched "Thunder" 2 battle tactical ballistic missile is a good example. The missile called "Iskander of Ukraine" has a range of 500 kilometers. , has a certain deterrent ability.

But in the era when the third world countries are capable of building missiles, this new missile does not prove that Ukraine can restore its nuclear strike capability.

Photo: The newly designed "Thunder" 2 tactical ballistic missile of the Ukrainian Southern Design Bureau.

After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Ukraine under the US flicker, destroyed all its strategic and tactical nuclear weapons, and cut the Tu-160 strategic bomber into scrap iron in exchange for the so-called economic assistance.

Destruction is difficult to build. Now that Ukraine says it wants to restore the status of the world’s third nuclear power, it can only be delusional. (Author's signature: Rainbow Photo Kursk)

Photo: Ukraine dismantled the Tu-160 strategic bomber and air-launched nuclear cruise missile.

 

[tun_dr_m]

If Fucking Pee Sai SG53 got nuke than Tun Dr M will not fuck around with borders and Jee Seow here and there. Simple? Can Ass Loong go beg Kim Jong Nuke to sell a warhead and blast near Johore Bahru?

 

[Ang4MohTrump]

http://slide.mil.news.sina.com.cn/l/slide_8_62085_69262.html#p=1


覆水一去难再回：乌克兰能否重新拥有核武器挑战俄罗斯

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自乌克兰舰艇强闯刻赤海峡，遭到俄军射击并被扣留以来，俄乌关系持续紧张，双方行动与表态也受到国际社会的广泛关注。8日，乌克兰驻北约前特使彼得·加拉什查克在接受乌克兰Obozrevatel电视台采访时表示，乌克兰拥有发展和生产核武器的知识、组织和财力，有能力制造自己的核武器，基辅方面不应该害怕国际制裁。作为前苏联加盟国之一，乌克兰曾部署有相当规模的战略核力量。那么乌克兰是否真的有能力“铤而走险”，重新走上依靠核武器提升国际话语权，并回击外部威胁的道路，本期《出鞘》带您简要解读。



覆水一去难再回：乌克兰能否重新拥有核武器挑战俄罗斯

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2 / 17
俄乌刻赤海峡冲突引发危机后，乌克兰总统波罗申科多次向北约国家求援，北约也第一时间宣布支持乌克兰。但当乌克兰总统呼吁北约派遣舰艇前往黑海时，却应者寥寥。我们当然不知道这次冲突中，西方国家暗地里扮演了一个什么样的角色，但从实际结果来看，大抵与十年前发生在格鲁吉亚那一幕类似，乌克兰政府惹了麻烦之后却发现“刷卡时为零”。乌克兰驻北约前特使这次表态，某种意义上也是由于对北约隔岸观火的态度感到失望而进行的赌气式发言。


覆水一去难再回：乌克兰能否重新拥有核武器挑战俄罗斯

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2018.12.13 22:34:06

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事实上，这并不是乌克兰国内第一次传出类似恢复拥有战略核武器的言论。2014年，克里米亚并入俄罗斯导致俄乌关系危机，乌克兰民族主义政党——自由党，便向乌克兰议会提交了发展导弹核武器、恢复乌克兰“有核国家”地位的提案，并交由乌克兰议会外交委员会、国家安全和国防委员会、预算委员会进行研究。但最终此案不了了之。



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冷战时期，前苏联曾在乌克兰境内部署有大量战略核武器，至上世纪80年代末期，乌克兰境内共有SS-19洲际弹道导弹发射井130个，SS-24洲际弹道导弹导弹发射井46个。这一数字还不包括在第一阶段《美苏削减和限制战略进攻性武器条约》中销毁的130余枚SS-24导弹。除此之外，乌克兰还部署有25架图-95MS和19架图-160战略轰炸机（俄罗斯在苏联解体时仅保有6架图160），可发射携带核弹头的Kh-55空射巡航导弹。苏联解体后，乌克兰曾在短暂时间内成为世界“第三”核大国，仅次于美国和俄罗斯。


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乌克兰在独立后的弃核之路并非如同一些网络传言所叙述那样一帆风顺，原因很简单，没有政治家会轻易放弃手中的底牌。包括白俄罗斯、哈萨克斯坦在内，三国并未心甘情愿将战略核武器无偿移交俄罗斯，而是将手中的战略核武器作为筹码，与美俄谈判争取最大利益。经过反复谈判，1994年1月14日，美俄同乌克兰在莫斯科签署了《关于销毁乌克兰境内全部核武器的三方协议》。此后，在取得美、俄、中、英、法不对乌克兰本土使用核武器的联合承诺后，乌克兰于1996年开始将核弹头分批运往俄罗斯，而销毁导弹及摧毁发射井的工程更是到了2001年才全部完成。



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乌克兰在销毁核武器的过程中获得的潜在利益也非常可观，绝不仅仅是卖了个“白菜价”。如俄罗斯给乌克兰采购的石油和天然气提供优惠价格，美国提供1.75亿美元的经济补偿，后追加1.55亿美元的经济援助。乌克兰弃核后，得到国际货币基金组织15亿美元的贷款和世界银行7亿美元的贷款等。同时，乌克兰用8架图160轰炸机抵押了欠俄罗斯的巨额外债。对于解体后经济濒临破产边缘的乌克兰来说，上述举措一定程度扭转了经济衰败的颓势。


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对于乌克兰来说，长期扣留其手中的战略武器实际上无法带来任何既得利益，只能成为烫手的山芋。对于有核国家来说，核武器存在的意义更多是一种威慑，但彼时的乌克兰，却并没有任何需要用核武才能解决的假想敌存在。而随着冷战的结束，大规模核战争的风险也史无前例地降到最低。同时，乌克兰的“弃核”还节省了每年数亿美元核武器维护费用。这笔维护费用在当时没法也没人敢节省——发生在乌克兰本土的切尔诺贝利核泄露事故刚刚过去数年，全世界都还对核事故心有余悸。

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乌克兰驻北约前特使加拉什查克此番言论，虽然处在敏感的时间点，却未必是直接发出威胁挑衅俄罗斯。且不说俄罗斯吃不吃这一套，自人类发展核武器以来，只存在过有核国家向无核国家进行核讹诈，还从来没有过无核国家或地区向一个核大国进行核讹诈——这本身就是个笑话。当然，与海峡对岸叫嚣“台湾可以三个月造出原子弹对抗大陆”的绿媒“名嘴”胡忠信相比，乌克兰这位特使还算靠谱，毕竟乌克兰也是“祖上曾经阔过”。


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然而，尽管前苏联曾在乌克兰部署有大量的战略核武器，却没有一枚核弹头产自乌克兰。换言之，从前苏联1949年第一枚原子弹爆炸成功直至1991年苏联解体，乌克兰本地从来不具备自主生产核武器的能力。前苏联的武器级核原料的生产及弹头的组装，大多位于俄罗斯腹地，亚欧交界的乌拉尔山脉地区，其中位于车里雅宾斯克地区的玛雅克生产协会则是其中规模最大的核设施。该设施由于管理不善，导致了该地区严重的核污染，靠近哈萨克斯坦边境的卡拉恰伊湖也因此成为了全世界核污染最严重的地区。

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那么乌克兰是否有能力单独进行核武器研发呢？答案也是不容乐观的。乌克兰国内的铀矿储量并不低，根据地质学家的判断，乌克兰铀矿资源潜力占世界探明铀储备的3%，占全球产铀国第十位，但乌克兰的核原料加工技术甚至还不如亚洲及中东地区某些国家。目前乌克兰国内除已封闭的切尔诺贝利核电站外，总共有四个核电厂共15个反应堆处于运行中的状态，总发电能力达到13.835兆瓦，位列欧洲第四，仅次于法国、俄罗斯和德国，但其使用的核燃料却严重依赖进口。


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根据中国驻乌克兰大使馆经济商务参赞处发布信息显示，今年前8个月，乌克兰为维持核电站的正常运行，已进口核燃料超3亿美元，其中近7成来自俄罗斯。而这仅仅是民用级别的核原料，武器级核原料甚至根本无法从任何一个国家获得。可以说，虽然乌克兰曾短暂成为世界第三核大国，但如今若想自行研制核武器，某种意义上却不得不从零开始。而其所面临的局面，甚至要比上世纪60年代的中国更加严峻。


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乌克兰在前苏联的工业体系中，更多是扮演一个核武器载体生产者的角色，而非生产核弹头本身。乌克兰拥有前苏联著名的导弹设计机构——南方设计局，该设计局撑起了前苏联弹道导弹的半壁江山，冷战时令西方震撼的SS-18“撒旦”洲际弹道导弹便出自该设计局。这种导弹可以携带10枚500千吨当量分弹头，或一枚当量达2500万吨的热核弹头。南方设计局甚至直至2014年俄乌关系全面恶化之前还向俄罗斯出售“撒旦”弹道导弹的零部件，并提供相关技术服务。

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如今的南方设计局境况实际上已大不如前，甚至面临倒闭的危险。2014年俄乌关系恶化，南方设计局与俄方围绕运载火箭方面的合作全面终止，失去了来自俄罗斯的全部订单，而这竟占到该公司近80%的业务，损失年营业额高达18亿美元。乌克兰现任总统波罗申科视察南方设计局的时候，该公司能展示给总统的产品仅剩一款竞标乌军制式装备失败的RG-1 30mm榴弹机枪，除此之外便是民用汽车和地铁车厢了。

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据乌克兰南方机械制造厂副总经理介绍，工厂目前由于缺乏订单无法向工人支付全额工资，导致人才正大量流失，甚至每天有接近40人离开。为了拓展海外业务，该公司正日渐深化同中国的合作。在今年举行的第12届珠海航展上，南方设计局也携带多款火箭模型参展。并展示了一款1:1的RD843二轴矢量喷口火箭发动机。据展方人员介绍，乌克兰南方设计局正同中国多个研究所在多个领域展开合作，尤其是火箭和液体火箭发动机等领域。


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乌克兰南方设计局的命运不由得让人联想到已于今年7月裁定破产的前苏联唯一航母建造地——乌克兰尼古拉耶夫造船厂。同样作为前苏联的“国”字号工程的代表，同样因红色巨人的轰然倒塌而命途多舛。尼古拉耶夫造船厂前厂长马卡洛夫在回答如何将中国辽宁号航空母舰的前身——瓦良格号完工时曾说：我需要苏联、苏共、国家计划委员会、军事工业委员会和九个国防工业部，总之，一个伟大的国家才能完成它。事实上，核武器和洲际导弹又何尝不是如此，但很显然，乌克兰并不可能成为这样一个强国。


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很多人认为，乌克兰废除战略武器的行为是“自废武功”。但今时今日重新回顾那段历史，乌克兰在彼时的选择已经是在时局所迫下，为自己争取到了最好的结果。乌克兰如今的国运黯然，与其说是实力不济，不如说是国家道路的选择出现了偏差。如果乌克兰保持政局的相对稳定，如果乌克兰不主动令自己沦为大国博弈的棋子，如果乌克兰能坚持多元化的外交，独立自主的发展道路，或许如今便是另一番景象。而不必面临国家分裂的危机，不必应对强敌虎视眈眈的威胁，更不必靠“抱大腿”为自己壮胆。那么本期《出鞘》就到这里，我们下期再见。



Http://slide.mil.news.sina.com.cn/l/slide_8_62085_69262.html#p=1



It’s hard to return to the water: Ukraine can regain nuclear weapons and challenge Russia


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Since the Ukrainian ship was forced to smash the Strait of Strait and was shot and detained by the Russian army, Russia-Ukraine relations have continued to be tense. The actions and attitudes of both sides have also received wide attention from the international community. On the 8th, Ukrainian special envoy to NATO, Peter Garashchak, said in an interview with Ukrainian Obozrevatel that Ukraine has the knowledge, organization and financial resources to develop and produce nuclear weapons and has the ability to manufacture its own nuclear weapons. Kiev should not be afraid of international Sanctions. As one of the former Soviet Union countries, Ukraine has deployed a considerable strategic nuclear force. Then, whether Ukraine really has the ability to "take the risk" and re-enter the road of relying on nuclear weapons to enhance the international voice and counterattack external threats. This issue of "Sheathing" will give you a brief explanation.




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After the crisis in the Ukrainian Strait conflict, Ukrainian President Poroshenko repeatedly asked NATO countries for help. NATO also announced its support for Ukraine for the first time. But when the Ukrainian president called on NATO to send ships to the Black Sea, it should be embarrassing. Of course, we don’t know what role the Western countries played secretly in this conflict, but from the actual results, it’s similar to what happened in Georgia a decade ago. The Ukrainian government got into trouble and found that “when swiping the card, Zero". The former Ukrainian special envoy of NATO expressed his position in this sense, and in a sense, he was also disappointed by the attitude of NATO to watch the fire across the bank.



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3 / 17
In fact, this is not the first time in Ukraine that there has been a remark about the restoration of strategic nuclear weapons. In 2014, the integration of Crimea into Russia led to a crisis in Russia-Ukraine relations. The Ukrainian nationalist party, the Liberal Party, submitted a proposal to the Ukrainian parliament to develop missile nuclear weapons and restore the status of Ukraine’s “nuclear state” and submit it to the Ukrainian parliament. The Foreign Affairs Committee, the National Security and National Defense Commission, and the Budget Committee conduct research. But in the end the case is gone.




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4 / 17
During the Cold War, the former Soviet Union deployed a large number of strategic nuclear weapons in Ukraine. By the end of the 1980s, there were 130 SS-19 intercontinental ballistic missile silos and 46 SS-24 intercontinental ballistic missile launchers. This figure does not include more than 130 SS-24 missiles destroyed in the first phase of the US-Soviet Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. In addition, Ukraine has deployed 25 Tu-95MS and 19 Tu-160 strategic bombers (Russia only retained 6 maps 160 when the Soviet Union disintegrated), and can launch Kh-55 air-launched cruise missiles carrying nuclear warheads. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Ukraine became the world's "third" nuclear power in a short period of time, second only to the United States and Russia.



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5 / 17
Ukraine’s road to nuclear abandonment after independence is not as smooth as some network rumors have stated. The reason is simple. No politician will easily give up his cards. Including Belarus and Kazakhstan, the three countries are not willing to hand over strategic nuclear weapons to Russia without compensation. Instead, they will use their strategic nuclear weapons as a bargaining chip to negotiate the best interests with the United States and Russia. After repeated negotiations, on January 14, 1994, the United States and Russia signed a "Tripartite Agreement on the Destruction of All Nuclear Weapons in Ukraine" with Ukraine in Moscow. Since then, after obtaining the joint commitment of the United States, Russia, China, Britain and France to use nuclear weapons on the Ukrainian mainland, Ukraine began to transport nuclear warheads to Russia in 1996, and the project to destroy missiles and destroy silos was only in 2001. Completed.




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Ukraine’s potential benefits in the process of destroying nuclear weapons are also very impressive, and it’s more than just selling a “cabbage price”. For example, Russia offers preferential prices for oil and natural gas purchased by Ukraine. The United States provides $175 million in economic compensation and an additional $155 million in economic assistance. After Ukraine’s nuclear abandonment, it received a $1.5 billion loan from the International Monetary Fund and a $700 million loan from the World Bank. At the same time, Ukraine used eight map 160 bombers to mortgage the huge foreign debt owed to Russia. For Ukraine, which is on the verge of bankruptcy after the disintegration, the above measures have reversed the decline of the economy to a certain extent.



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For Ukraine, the long-term detention of strategic weapons in its hands does not actually bring any vested interests, but can only become a hot potato. For nuclear-weapon states, the significance of the existence of nuclear weapons is more of a deterrent, but Ukraine at that time does not have any imaginary enemy existence that needs to be solved by nuclear weapons. With the end of the Cold War, the risk of large-scale nuclear wars has never been reduced to an unprecedented level. At the same time, Ukraine’s “nucleus” has saved hundreds of millions of dollars in nuclear weapons maintenance costs each year. This maintenance cost was not available at the time and no one dared to save it. The Chernobyl nuclear leak in the Ukrainian country has just been in the past few years, and the world is still worried about the nuclear accident.







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The Ukrainian special envoy to NATO, Garashchak’s remarks, although at a sensitive point in time, may not be directly threatening to provoke Russia. Not to mention that Russia does not eat this set. Since the development of nuclear weapons by human beings, there have only been nuclear swindles by nuclear states to non-nuclear states, and there have never been nuclear swindles by non-nuclear states or regions to a nuclear power. This is itself a joke. Of course, compared with Hu Zhongxin, the green media "named mouth" that Taiwan can make an atomic bomb against the mainland in three months, the Ukrainian special envoy is still reliable. After all, Ukraine is also "the ancestors once was wide."



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9 / 17
However, although the former Soviet Union had deployed a large number of strategic nuclear weapons in Ukraine, none of the nuclear warheads were produced in Ukraine. In other words, from the success of the first atomic bomb explosion in the Soviet Union in 1949 until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Ukrainian locality never had the ability to produce nuclear weapons on its own. The production of weapons-grade nuclear materials and the assembly of warheads in the former Soviet Union are mostly located in the hinterland of Russia and the Ural Mountains in the Asia-Europe border. The Mayak Production Association in the Chelyabinsk region is the largest nuclear facility. Due to poor management, the facility has caused serious nuclear pollution in the area, and Lake Karachay near the border with Kazakhstan has become the most polluted area in the world.


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10 / 17
So is Ukraine capable of conducting nuclear weapons research and development alone? The answer is also not optimistic. Ukrainian uranium reserves are not low. According to geologists, Ukrainian uranium resources account for 3% of the world's proven uranium reserves, accounting for tenth of the global uranium production, but Ukraine's nuclear material processing technology even Not as good as some countries in Asia and the Middle East. At present, in addition to the closed Chernobyl nuclear power plant in Ukraine, a total of 15 nuclear power plants have a total of 15 reactors in operation, with a total generating capacity of 13.835 megawatts, ranking fourth in Europe, after France, Russia and Germany, but the nuclear fuel they use is heavily dependent on imports.



It’s hard to return to the water: Ukraine can regain nuclear weapons and challenge Russia