The world can know how disgusting our regulators are.
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Regulators Refusing to Act - Hyflux & Noble Group's Decline
- Thread starter JustLikeThis
- Start date
Hyflux was confident of getting extension when hearing started.
I heard from legal that Hyflux thought they just had to go through the motion online and then sure get extended because term sheet looked so sincere and Hyflux management endorsed it.
I guess now the hyflux lawyers only want to make sure that JM will not withhold their outstanding payment hahaha.
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I think Hyflux lawyers fell off their chairs. Even news also reported that Hyflux lawyers wanted to appeal on the spot.
Will Hyflux office catch fire tonight to destroy evidences?
Anyway, i wish to clarify on the position of MTN holders. We support the JM. This article just mentions that we hope to appoint an alternative JM manager.
https://www.channelnewsasia.com/new...anagement-debt-moratorium-ends-court-13566738
" Lawyers representing other stakeholders, such as the medium-term noteholders (MTNs), DBS and the Securities Investors Association Singapore, voiced objections about the judicial managers appointed, citing the “appearance of conflict of interest” and need for a “neutral and independent party”. "
https://www.channelnewsasia.com/new...anagement-debt-moratorium-ends-court-13566738
" Lawyers representing other stakeholders, such as the medium-term noteholders (MTNs), DBS and the Securities Investors Association Singapore, voiced objections about the judicial managers appointed, citing the “appearance of conflict of interest” and need for a “neutral and independent party”. "
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GLC rumour was also true.
https://www.channelnewsasia.com/new...anagement-debt-moratorium-ends-court-13566738
Arguing that a judicial management would yield a “fairer and more transparent restructuring”, Mr Ng told the court that Hyflux has also been passing on “genuine” investors such as OUE and Keppel with “forced explanation”. Both companies were recommended to Hyflux by Borrelli Walsh.
“There’s an agenda in place by the company and they are naturally inclined to dealing with investors who only want to keep the board in place,” he said.
https://www.channelnewsasia.com/new...anagement-debt-moratorium-ends-court-13566738
Arguing that a judicial management would yield a “fairer and more transparent restructuring”, Mr Ng told the court that Hyflux has also been passing on “genuine” investors such as OUE and Keppel with “forced explanation”. Both companies were recommended to Hyflux by Borrelli Walsh.
“There’s an agenda in place by the company and they are naturally inclined to dealing with investors who only want to keep the board in place,” he said.
I lost money in shares. I lost my savings in Hyflux. My family members think that I am a failure. They think that I am a speculator, a gambler. I think people tend to judge you like that, when you lose money. I don't think we should call Hyflux investors as speculators or gamblers.
Whenever we talk about money issues at home, and when they lose any argument with me, they will say that I am their worry, I cannot handle finances. Because of Hyflux, I have no say in the family, no matter what I do. I know they love me but whenever we have any arguments, they will checkmate me with Hyflux and cite my poor financial planning. Seriously, they think I want these to happen? Seriously, if I am a speculator, I will not choose Hyflux.
Whenever we talk about money issues at home, and when they lose any argument with me, they will say that I am their worry, I cannot handle finances. Because of Hyflux, I have no say in the family, no matter what I do. I know they love me but whenever we have any arguments, they will checkmate me with Hyflux and cite my poor financial planning. Seriously, they think I want these to happen? Seriously, if I am a speculator, I will not choose Hyflux.
Duties of the JM, more unbiased than Hyflux directors
https://links.sgx.com/FileOpen/Announcement - 17 Nov 2020.ashx?App=Announcement&FileID=639507
https://links.sgx.com/FileOpen/Announcement - 17 Nov 2020.ashx?App=Announcement&FileID=639507
Our country screwed us and now they tell us this
Time for Hyflux's PnP holders to move on
as firm enters judicial management
https://www.businesstimes.com.sg/co...to-move-on-as-firm-enters-judicial-management
Time for Hyflux's PnP holders to move on
as firm enters judicial management
https://www.businesstimes.com.sg/co...to-move-on-as-firm-enters-judicial-management
This is gutter journalism. Reminds me of shanmugam's ministerial statements to defend Liew Mun Leong
the state apparatus is reeking of desperation. this one goes all the way up to the dowager.
DBS rescued the Indian Bank called LVB
https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/south-asia/dbs-to-rescue-ailing-indian-bank
https://economictimes.indiatimes.co...e-to-wipe-out-equity/articleshow/79294290.cms
I went to read up about it. The media called it a merger, actually LVB ran out of capital. The following article cited "The bank failed to mobilise capital from outside since promoters stonewalled proposals for higher valuations........" It is not a merger, it is a bailout.
https://economictimes.indiatimes.co...f-lakshmi-vilas-bank/articleshow/79285301.cms
LVB waited long enough and got saved by DBS.
How about us? Not only our country don't save us, we got screwed by DBS and PUB.
Third largest shareholder of Oxley is in trouble with OCBC.
LVB’s weakening financials were no secret. The major problem is the bad loans on its books, which have completely wiped out its net worth. The Gross NPA of the bank has been consistently increasing for the past three years. Gross NPAs were 10% in 2018, which increased to 15.3% in 2019 and are now 25.4% in 2020. That means Rs 1 out of every Rs 4 lent by LVB is not coming back. In contrast, strong banks such as HDFC Bank and Kotak Bank have gross NPAs of 1.08% and 2.55% respectively.
https://www.financialexpress.com/mo...is-shift-a-c-at-first-hint-of-trouble/2135681
Best case scenario, assume LVB has 200,000m rupees loan book
https://www.businesstoday.in/curren...der-struggle-with-bad-loans/story/422465.html
This is at least S$3.6 billion
DBS will need to lose at least $800m or more in LVB.
Proves that SEC is 100 times better than SGX and MAS
https://links.sgx.com/FileOpen/FINA... Dec 2020.ashx?App=Announcement&FileID=642142
https://links.sgx.com/FileOpen/FINA... Dec 2020.ashx?App=Announcement&FileID=642142
NIKKEI ASIA REVIEW: Singapore's Hyflux saga shows folly of court-supervised restructuring
Company's directors have finally lost their liability shield
https://asia.nikkei.com/Opinion/Sin...shows-folly-of-court-supervised-restructuring
When Singapore water treatment company Hyflux announced in May 2018 that it had asked the Singapore High Court to commence a court-supervised restructuring, investors were left reeling.
Coming just two months after KPMG had issued a clean audit opinion, Hyflux -- a market darling -- not only once counted Singapore sovereign wealth fund Temasek Holdings as an investor, it had won a number of major projects from the Singapore government. Olivia Lum, the company's charismatic founder, was the first woman to win the Ernst & Young World Entrepreneur Award back in 2011.
At its peak, Hyflux had a market capitalization of nearly 2.1 billion Singapore dollars ($1.6 billion). By the time it collapsed, it owed banks S$1.84 billion, noteholders S$265 million, and 34,000 preference and perpetual security holders S$900 million.
Last month, after granting 10 extensions, the High Court finally put an end to the supervised restructuring, approving an application by a group of unsecured bank creditors to place the company under interim judicial management. Suspicious that details of another potential investor surfaced every time the company came to ask the court for an extension, the ruling judge suspected some sort of gamesmanship was at work.
A successful restructuring is difficult to execute, as it requires the support of various stakeholders with competing interests. Those who have lost much of their investment under the existing board may not want the same board to oversee the company's rehabilitation, especially if there are clear signs of poor corporate governance or mismanagement.
And because a third party such as a judicial manager may uncover wrongdoing and take action against the board, the board's preference for a court-supervised restructuring may be driven by its desire to control the process and shield itself from potential liability. Thus the board's own interests may affect its judgment when it comes to potential saviors.
In Hyflux's case, certain potential saviors appeared less than bona fide. Some included conditions that the current directors be retained and released from potential liability -- despite the directors being under investigation. Others said that any offer that released the directors would not be accepted.
But with judicial managers now in place, there is the possibility of action being taken against the directors if there has been wrongdoing. This could result in personal liability, which was never a possibility when the board was overseeing the restructuring. While it is too early to tell if the directors breached their duties, there were plenty of signs of poor corporate governance and questionable decision-making.
As its debt grew, Hyflux resorted to preference shares and perpetual securities which were accounted for as equity. Yet this did not stem its high reliance on debt. In 2011, it issued preference shares, or prefs, and in 2014, it issued its first two tranches of perpetual securities, or perps. Those perps were only available to institutional and accredited investors.
In May 2016, it issued another tranche of perps that was so successful that it raised S$500 million, rather than the initially proposed S$300 million. Much of the amount raised from the 2016 perps came from retail investors, and the institutional and accredited investors who subscribed to the earlier perps were bailed out.
Company's directors have finally lost their liability shield
https://asia.nikkei.com/Opinion/Sin...shows-folly-of-court-supervised-restructuring
When Singapore water treatment company Hyflux announced in May 2018 that it had asked the Singapore High Court to commence a court-supervised restructuring, investors were left reeling.
Coming just two months after KPMG had issued a clean audit opinion, Hyflux -- a market darling -- not only once counted Singapore sovereign wealth fund Temasek Holdings as an investor, it had won a number of major projects from the Singapore government. Olivia Lum, the company's charismatic founder, was the first woman to win the Ernst & Young World Entrepreneur Award back in 2011.
At its peak, Hyflux had a market capitalization of nearly 2.1 billion Singapore dollars ($1.6 billion). By the time it collapsed, it owed banks S$1.84 billion, noteholders S$265 million, and 34,000 preference and perpetual security holders S$900 million.
Last month, after granting 10 extensions, the High Court finally put an end to the supervised restructuring, approving an application by a group of unsecured bank creditors to place the company under interim judicial management. Suspicious that details of another potential investor surfaced every time the company came to ask the court for an extension, the ruling judge suspected some sort of gamesmanship was at work.
A successful restructuring is difficult to execute, as it requires the support of various stakeholders with competing interests. Those who have lost much of their investment under the existing board may not want the same board to oversee the company's rehabilitation, especially if there are clear signs of poor corporate governance or mismanagement.
And because a third party such as a judicial manager may uncover wrongdoing and take action against the board, the board's preference for a court-supervised restructuring may be driven by its desire to control the process and shield itself from potential liability. Thus the board's own interests may affect its judgment when it comes to potential saviors.
In Hyflux's case, certain potential saviors appeared less than bona fide. Some included conditions that the current directors be retained and released from potential liability -- despite the directors being under investigation. Others said that any offer that released the directors would not be accepted.
But with judicial managers now in place, there is the possibility of action being taken against the directors if there has been wrongdoing. This could result in personal liability, which was never a possibility when the board was overseeing the restructuring. While it is too early to tell if the directors breached their duties, there were plenty of signs of poor corporate governance and questionable decision-making.
As its debt grew, Hyflux resorted to preference shares and perpetual securities which were accounted for as equity. Yet this did not stem its high reliance on debt. In 2011, it issued preference shares, or prefs, and in 2014, it issued its first two tranches of perpetual securities, or perps. Those perps were only available to institutional and accredited investors.
In May 2016, it issued another tranche of perps that was so successful that it raised S$500 million, rather than the initially proposed S$300 million. Much of the amount raised from the 2016 perps came from retail investors, and the institutional and accredited investors who subscribed to the earlier perps were bailed out.
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