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Kim Jong Nuke's Hwasong-15 can reach USA for sure Alt 4475km

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https://www.nknews.org/2017/11/north-korea-announces-first-test-of-hwasong-15-icbm/

North Korea announces first test of Hwasong-15 ICBM
DPRK hails successful test of rocket capable of striking the "entire" U.S. mainland
Dagyum Ji and Oliver Hotham

November 29th, 2017
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North Korea announced the successful launch of the Hwasong-15 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) in a broadcast on the state-run Korea Central Television (KCTV) on Wednesday.

In a rare special broadcast at 1200 Pyongyang time, announcer Ri Chun Hee said that North Korean leader Kim Jong Un had ordered the launch of a missile which could strike the “entire” U.S. mainland.

The Hwasong-15 can hit the “entire region of the U.S. mainland,” Ri said, and can be mounted with a “super-large heavy warhead.”

The new rocket has “much greater advantages in its tactical and technical specifications and technical characteristics,” the DPRK’s Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) reported in an accompanying statement by the country’s government.

“It is the most powerful ICBM which meets the goal of the completion of the rocket weaponry system development set by the DPRK,” the statement added.

It was launched in “the suburbs of Pyongyang” and flew for 53-minutes, the statement continued, “soaring to the highest altitude of 4475 km” and flying 950 km.

Kim Jong Un reportedly declared that the DPRK has now “finally realized the great historic cause of completing the state nuclear force, the cause of building a rocket power.”

KCTV announced the launch in a special midday broadcast

The missile test represents Pyongyang’s first launch since September 15, when it successfully fired an Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM) Hwasong-12 missile, and its third of an ICBM.

But it is the first of the Hwasong-15, of which imagery is yet to be released.

The announcement followed reports by South Korea, Japan, and the U.S. of a missile launch by North Korea in the early hours of Wednesday morning.

It appears to be the longest-range missile ever tested by North Korea.

In response to the launch, South Korea conducted what its Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) described as a “precision strike” missile launch near the Northern Limit Line in the East Sea.

Responding to news of the test, U.S. President Donald Trump told reporters Washington would “take care” of North Korea, though did not specify what this response might involve.

South Korean President Moon Jae-in, meanwhile, has warned the U.S. and North Korea against “misjudgment” in the wake of the test.

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) will hold an emergency meeting later in the day.

Featured image: KCTV

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http://www.newsweek.com/north-korea...new-hwasong-15-missile-and-super-large-725331


North Korea Says It Can Destroy the U.S. With Its New Hwasong-15 Missile and 'Super-large Heavy Warhead'
By Cristina Silva On 11/28/17 at 11:00 PM
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U.S.
North Korea announced Tuesday a new it's got a new intercontinental ballistic missile it has named the Hwasong-15. It's "super-large heavy warhead" puts all of the U.S. within range and was launched under orders of North Korea supreme leader Kim Jong Un, according to North Korean media reports.

"Kim Jong Un, Supreme Leader of our Party, state and army, gave an autographic order to test-fire the newly developed inter-continental ballistic rocket Hwasong-15 on Nov. 28, Juche 106," the Korean Central News Agency, the state news agency of North Korea, announced according to a translation of the broadcast from the Wall Street Journal. The missile flew for around 620 miles for about 53 minutes before landing in the Sea of Japan.

rtx3ka7h.jpg
A presenter makes a special announcement on North Korea's state-run television after the country launched a missile, in this still image taken from a video released by KRT, November 29, 2017. Reuters

Keep up with this story and more by subscribing now

The missile is the latest achievement for North Korea's growing nuclear development program. The Hwasong-14 was previously named as North Korea's furthest-reaching intercontinental ballistic missile. It could travel about 10,400km, meaning it was able to strike Latin America, parts of Africa and Antarctica. North Korea last tested a missile in September, when it sent its Hwasong-12 missile about 3,700km over Japan.

North Korea likely has 60 nuclear weapons, enough uranium to make six new nuclear bombs every year and even a hydrogen bomb, which is estimated to be 1,000 times more powerful than the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima, Japan, during World War II by Washington. North Korea saw its first successful nuclear test in 2006.

President Donald Trump has threatened military action against North Korea, but offered few details when asked about the launch on Tuesday. “It is a situation that we will handle. We will take care of it,” he said.

Defense Secretary James Mattis said the launch showed North Korea is a serious threat. “It went higher frankly than any previous shot they’ve taken, a research and development effort on their part to continue building ballistic missiles that can threaten everywhere in the world, basically," he told reporters at the White House.

It's unclear how the U.S. will respond. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson said Tuesday that "diplomatic options remain viable and open, for now," adding, "The United States remains committed to finding a peaceful path to denuclearization and to ending belligerent actions by North Korea."



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http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/201...es-ballistic-missile-reports-may-have-landed/

Live
North Korea hails 'historic' milestone after testing 'new long-range missile' capable of striking anywhere in US


TELEMMGLPICT000147408129_1_trans_NvBQzQNjv4BqaRL1kC4G7DT9ZsZm6Pe3PUPXbRlaI4_qh_dM2Z5d688.jpeg

The launch on Tuesday followed tests of the intercontinental ballistic missile Hwasong-14, pictured earlier this year
29 November 2017 • 6:17am
North Korea has declared itself a "nuclear state" after successfully testing a new intercontinental ballistic missile that it said was capable of striking anywhere in the United States.

The announcement of the new "Hwasong-15" missile, made in a special broadcast at noon local time on Wednesday, came hours after a long-range missile was fired into waters off Japan in what was believed to be its longest-range test yet.

Kim Jong-un’s rogue regime launched the missile, its first for more than two months, in the middle of the night and it flew for around 590 miles, reaching an altitude of 2,781 miles - more than 10 times the height of the international space station - and splashing down 53 minutes later in the Sea of Japan.

The missile ended up within Japan’s exclusive economic zone, which extends 200 nautical miles from its coast.

North Korea had carried out two tests of an intercontinental ballistic missile in July, both of which were Hwasong-14 missiles. The revelation of the new missile came as a surprise to experts.

"The ICBM Hwasong-15 type weaponry system is an intercontinental ballistic rocket tipped with super-large heavy warhead which is capable of striking the whole mainland of the US," KCNA said.

North Korea's leader Kim Jong-un signs what is said to be a document authorizing the missile test Credit: AP
It said the development of the weapon would defend the North against the "US imperialists' nuclear blackmail policy and nuclear threat".

"Kim Jong Un declared with pride that now we have finally realised the great historic cause of completing the state nuclear force," state media KCNA reported.

In response to the test, Donald Trump, the US president, said: “It is a situation that we will handle. We will take care of it.” He offered no further details.

The missile reached a greater altitude than any North Korea has previously tested, James Mattis, the US defence secretary, said.

Pyongyang residents react at the Pyongyang Railway Station after the news of the successful launch of the new intercontinental ballistic missile Credit: AFP
“It went higher frankly than any previous shot they’ve taken, a research and development effort on their part to continue building ballistic missiles that can threaten everywhere in the world, basically," he told reporters at the White House.

Many nuclear experts say the North has yet to prove it has mastered all technical hurdles including the ability deliver a nuclear warhead reliably atop an ICBM, but likely soon will.

"We don't have to like it, but we're going to have to learn to live with North Korea's ability to target the United States with nuclear weapons," said Jeffrey Lewis, head of the East Asia Nonproliferation Programme at the Middlebury Institute of Strategic Studies.


South Korea responded by almost immediately launching three of its own missiles in a show of force. President Moon Jae-in expressed worry that North Korea's growing missile threat could force the United States to attack the North before it masters a nuclear-tipped long-range missile, something experts say may be imminent.

"If North Korea completes a ballistic missile that could reach from one continent to another, the situation can spiral out of control," Mr Moon said at an emergency meeting in Seoul, according to his office. "We must stop a situation where North Korea miscalculates and threatens us with nuclear weapons or where the United States considers a pre-emptive strike."

Mr Trump spoke to Sinzo Abe, the Japanese prime minister, after the test. The two leaders agreed that China needed to play an increased role to tackle the crisis.

A presenter makes a special announcement on North Korea's state-run television after the country launched a missile Credit: Reuters
In a phone call the leaders "agreed to strengthen our deterrence capability against the North Korean threat," said Yasutoshi Nishimura, Japan's deputy chief cabinet secretary.

Mr Abe described the launch as a "violent act" that "can never be tolerated", while Moon Jae-in, the South Korean president, said the test was a "serious threat" to global peace.

UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres urged Pyongyang to "desist taking any further destabilising steps."

Boris Johnson, the Foreign Secretary called on North Korea to "change course".

"This is not the path to security and prosperity for the North Korean people. DPRK regime must change course," Mr Johnson said.

Today's DPRK Missile test, launched out of Pyongsong and according to these numbers: https://t.co/1iTF0qfAnJ

Note: impact location, acceleration, speed, etc. are all notional and for demonstrative purposes only. dat apogee doe pic.twitter.com/2Imcp7BLQm

— Scott LaFoy (@wslafoy) November 28, 2017
The UN Security Council has scheduled an emergency meeting for Wednesday to discuss the provocation.

Japanese Defence Minister Itsunori Onodera said it was judged to be ICBM class given its lofted trajectory.

"If these numbers are correct, then if flown on a standard trajectory rather than this lofted trajectory, this missile would have a range of more than 13,000 km (8,100 miles) ... Such a missile would have more than enough range to reach Washington, D.C., and in fact any part of the continental United States," the US-based Union of Concerned Scientists said.

However, it was unclear how heavy a payload the missile was carrying, and it was uncertain if it could carry a large nuclear warhead that far, the nonprofit science advocacy group added.

The test came just days after Mr Trump added North Korea to America’s list of state sponsors of terror and unveiled new sanctions targeting its shipping, moves Pyongyang had called a “serious provocation and violent infringement”.

It came weeks after Mr Trump returned from a tour of Asia where he sought to rally support for clamping down on North Korea’s economy.

North Korean missile ranges
Hours before the launch, officials in Hawaii said wailing sirens last heard more than 20 years ago would sound for 60 seconds at more than 400 locations on the first working day of each month, starting in December. In the event of a real attack, the sirens would give Hawaiians 12 to 15 minutes of warning before impact. Richard Rapoza, Hawaii’s emergency management spokesman, said: “We stopped using them in the mid-Nineties after the Cold War ended.”

The new siren tests were to be accompanied by public service announcements urging residents to “get inside, stay inside and stay tuned”. Announcing the tests, Mr Rapoza said a single 150-kiloton weapon detonated over Pearl Harbor, on the main island of Oahu, would be expected to kill 18,000 people and injure 120,000.

Auto update


6:17AM
Celebrations in North Korea
Pyongyang residents react at the Pyongyang Railway Station after the news of the successful launch of the new intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) Hwasong-15 in Pyongyang Credit: AFP
Pyongyang residents watch a big screen near the Pyongyang Railway Station showing the news on the successful launch Credit: AFP
Pyongyang residents react at the Pyongyang Railway Station Credit: AFP
5:20AM
Is this the endgame?
Some analysts believe the announcement suggests this will be the last such test for a while.

"Kim Jong Un declared with pride that now we have finally realised the great historic cause of completing the state nuclear force," state media KCNA reported.

Melissa Hanham, Senior Research Associate at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, said the language suggested an endgame.

So perhaps this is an out. A way to say they’ve achieved what they want (as long as we treat them the way they want to be treated). 4/

— Melissa Hanham (@mhanham) November 29, 2017
4:08AM
The announcement in full
Here is video of the announcement - though you may struggle to follow it if you don't understand Korean.

Here's a video recording of North Korea's missile announcement. https://t.co/1H8Me293nt

— Chad O'Carroll (@chadocl) November 29, 2017
3:41AM
Kim Jong Un 'personally authorised today's launch'
Kim Jong Un personally authorized today's launch of the Hwasong-15, which North Korea says can reach all of the United States mainland pic.twitter.com/G0lPIRavfE

— Anna Fifield (@annafifield) November 29, 2017
3:37AM
North Korea announces new missile
North Korea says it has successfully tested a new ICBM - named the Hwasong-15 - which can reach all of the US mainland. It says it was a success.

Hwasong-15? pic.twitter.com/3TtLE9br5Q

— Dave Schmerler (@DaveSchmerler) November 29, 2017


3:34AM
The announcement has begun
North Korea has just started a special announcement about its latest missile test, featuring Ri Chun Hee, the newsreader who appears only when there's big news pic.twitter.com/WEOVmAcZD9

— Anna Fifield (@annafifield) November 29, 2017
Find out more about Ri Chun Hee here.

3:21AM
State TV gearing up for announcement
Nothing like a power ballad before a missile launch announcement pic.twitter.com/WhC4yasKRC

— Oliver Hotham (@OliverHotham) November 29, 2017
3:07AM
What to expect
With the broadcast coming up in about 20 minutes, one North Korea watcher runs down the likely announcements.

2/ Not all launches this year have warranted special news. So this is considered by DPRK to be big achievement. New second stage? All of US in reach? Successful completition of working ICBM? Something like that.

— Martyn Williams (@martyn_williams) November 29, 2017
2:37AM
North Koreans unaware anything happened
While the launch of the long-range missile has made headlines around the world, it seems North Koreans are blissfully unaware.

There has not yet been any official reports in North Korea about the test. At 10am, state radio was reportedly leading its news with the formation of a committee for remembering former leader leader Kim Jong-il in Bangladesh.

State TV had shceduled an announcement for 3pm local time - but that seems to have been brought forward to noon, which is 3.30am UK time.

Korean Central TV looks like it will begin broadcasts at noon local time, 3 hours earlier than scheduled. That means a likely release of news and images at noon on TV and probably radio, KCNA (in about 1 hour). pic.twitter.com/AMzhqTjdPv

— Martyn Williams (@martyn_williams) November 29, 2017
1:51AM
Trump uses missile launch to attack Democrats
After North Korea missile launch, it's more important than ever to fund our gov't & military! Dems shouldn't hold troop funding hostage for amnesty & illegal immigration. I ran on stopping illegal immigration and won big. They can't now threaten a shutdown to get their demands.

— Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump) November 29, 2017
As America's parties fight over a Republican tax plan, a new battle opened on another front as Democratic congressional leaders Chuck Schumer and Nancy Pelosi skipped a White House meeting with Trump to discuss spending, immigration and other issues.

Lawmakers must renew government funding before it expires on December 8 or risk a shutdown. Democrats hope to use their leverage on the budget issue to renew protections for young immigrants who entered the country illegally as children.

1:32AM
Missile presumed to be Hwasong-14
South Korea's Joint Chiefs of Staff said they presume North Korea fired a Hwasong-14 long-range ballistic missile on Wednesday, the South's Yonhap News Agency reported.

A military spokesman told Reuters he could not confirm the report.

If confirmed, the test would be a repeat of the intercontinental ballistic missile launch in July. Here's a handy graphic depicting a Hwasong-14.

Hwasong-14 by JamesMartinCNS on Sketchfab

1:09AM
Comparison of tests
A quick draft chart to compare today's missile test with previous #Hwasong launches this year. Will update when more info becomes available. #NorthKorea pic.twitter.com/mLOCB3ZqpJ

— Andrew Facini (@andrewfacini) November 28, 2017
12:50AM
Missile test 'underscores grave threat .... to entire world'
President Donald Trump has spoken with South Korean President Moon Jae-in to discuss the countries' response to North Korea's latest missile launch.

The White House says both leaders "underscored the grave threat that North Korea's latest provocation poses" not only to U.S. and South Korea, "but to the entire world."

The two presidents also "reaffirmed their strong condemnation of North Korea's reckless campaign to advance its nuclear and ballistic missile programs, noting that these weapons only serve to undermine North Korea's security and deepen its diplomatic and economic isolation."

12:26AM
Washington DC 'in range'
Japanese Defence Minister Itsunori Onodera said it was judged that the missile was ICBM class given its lofted trajectory.

The U.S.-based Union of Concerned Scientists said:

"If these numbers are correct, then if flown on a standard trajectory rather than this lofted trajectory, this missile would have a range of more than 13,000 km (8,100 miles) ... Such a missile would have more than enough range to reach Washington, D.C., and in fact any part of the continental United States,"

However, it was unclear how heavy a payload the missile was carrying, and it was uncertain if it could carry a large nuclear warhead that far, the nonprofit science advocacy group added.

11:53PM
North Korea 'undermining its security'
US President Donald Trump and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe warned North Korea is putting its own security at risk with a provocative new missile test, according to a White House account of a crisis call between the pair.

"The two leaders agreed that the North Korean regime's provocative actions are undermining its security and further isolating it from the international community.

"The leaders reaffirmed their commitment to combat the North Korean threat."

9:37PM
Japan's PM: 'Violent act will not be tolerated'
Japan's Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has called for an emergency UN Security Council meeting. Mr Abe called the test a "violent act that can never be tolerated" and added: "We will never yield to any provocative act. We will maximise our pressure."

9:23PM
Defense Secretary Jim Mattis: North Korea 'endangers world peace'
The Defense Secretary said that the ICBM was shot "higher frankly than any previous shots" NK has taken. He said that North Korea's continued effort to develop weapons "endangers world peace, regional peace and certainly he United States."

8:56PM
Trump: 'We will take care of it'
Discussing the provocation, Mr Trump said: "It is a situation that we will handle. We Will take care of it".

8:19PM
Pentagon: test was an intercontinental missile
The Pentagon said in its initial assessment that the missile was an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launched from Sain Ni in North Korea and travelled about 1,000 km before splashing down in the Sea of Japan. It added that the missile did not pose a threat to the United States its territories or allies.

The US administration has previously said it will not tolerate the North's testing or deployment of an intercontinental ballistic missile capable of carrying a nuclear warhead to US cities.

7:57PM
What does the nuclear test mean?
South Korean and US authorities are working together to analyse the latest missile's trajectory, according to a statement from South Korean military chiefs.

North Korea is thought to be focusing efforts on building long-range missiles with the potential of reaching the mainland continental US.

Officials in Pyonyang said the first of the longer-range missiles it tested in July could hit "any part of the world", but the US military called it an intermediate-range missile instead.

Its last nuclear test reportedly involved a miniaturised hydrogen bomb that could be loaded on to a long-range missile.

7:48PM
Donald Trump briefed on missile launch
US President Donald Trump was briefed on North Korea's ballistic missile test while it was still in the air, the White House said.

Mr Trump was visiting Congress at the time of the launch, according to press secretary Sarah Sanders, but has since returned to the White House.

He is expected to make a statement on the missile test shortly

7:45PM
How will the US react?
Asked whether the US is out of peaceful options with North Korea, senator Lindsey Graham tells MSNBC: “Not yet but we’re getting closer”

7:37PM
Missile flew for 50 minutes
Japan's government estimates the North Korea missile flew for 50 minutes and landed in Japan's Exclusive Economic Zone

Related Topics





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http://edition.cnn.com/2017/11/29/asia/north-korea-missile-test/index.html

North Korea missile launch: The most important things to know
By James Griffiths, CNN

Updated 0613 GMT (1413 HKT) November 29, 2017

171129122212-01-kim-jong-un-nov-29-missile-test-exlarge-169.jpg

171129122212-01-kim-jong-un-nov-29-missile-test-exlarge-169.jpg

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Can anyone stop a Trump nuclear strike?
Fact check: Trump wrong on his nuclear boast
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Trump: Mutual commitment to denuclearize NK
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What exactly is a 'dotard'?

(CNN)North Korea broke a two-month lull in weapons testing with a dramatic launch of its most advanced missile yet, an intercontinental ballistic missile it claims can reach the "whole" US mainland.

The country's state media declared the Hwasong-15 missile was "the most powerful ICBM" which carried a "super-large heavy warhead" to unprecedented heights of almost 4,500 kilometers (2,800 miles).
It was a dramatic show of force and technical capabilities from Pyongyang, which had not conducted any military tests since September 15, raising suggestions that perhaps the rogue country was heeding warnings to halt its provocations and cease its weapons program.
Key points
  • Hwasong-15 is a new type of intercontinental ballistic missile, upgrade of Hwasong-14
  • Fired 3 a.m. local time from mobile launcher in Pyongsong, South Pyongan Province
  • Reached a height of 4,475 kilometers (2,800 miles), higher than ever before
  • Splashed down off the Japanese coast, within the country's Exclusive Economic Zone
  • South Korea responded with a "precision missile strike drill," matching the flight distance

Precursor to nuclear test?
North Korea's last test in September set off a firestorm of condemnation in the region and beyond, with multiple warnings from US President Donald Trump, including one issued during his stop in South Korea where he implored North Korea, "do not try us."
In recent days, US officials told CNN they were puzzled why there hadn't been a test in recent weeks, and on Monday, Russia's deputy foreign minister said Moscow greatly valued the North Korean regime's "silence."
Any hope that Pyongyang's silence could be interpreted as compliance seems to be misplaced.
A North Korean official told CNN following Wednesday's launch Pyongyang was not interested in diplomacy with the US until it had fully demonstrated its nuclear deterrent capabilities.
Reiterating remarks made in the past, the official said one step was to conduct an above-ground nuclear detonation or "large-scale hydrogen bomb" test. The other was the "testing of a long-range ICBM," the implication being this had been achieved with the most recent launch.
In a statement following the test, Pyongyang said the Hwasong-15 "meets the goal of the completion of the rocket weaponry system development."
A South Korean soldier walks past a television news screen showing North Korean leader Kim Jong-Un approving the country's new ICBM test.
Highest ever
Wednesday's missile reached an altitude of up to 4,475 kilometers (2,800 miles), higher than any previous launch, a North Korea reading that was in line with estimates released by Japan and South Korea.
The missile was fired on a lofted trajectory, where the missile flies very high to cover a relatively short horizontal distance. David Wright, an expert with the Union of Concerned scientists said that if it had been fired on a standard trajectory, the ICBM would have been capable of traveling 13,000 kilometers, or 8,100 miles.
"Such a missile would have more than enough range to reach Washington, DC, and in fact any part of the continental United States," Wright said in a statement, though he noted that range probably wouldn't be possible if the missile were fitted with a heavy nuclear warhead.
In a statement, North Korea said the missile was topped with a "super-large heavy warhead."
Michael Elleman, a ballistic missile analyst with 38 North, noted that while the launch demonstrated North Korea had "taken another minor step forward," more tests would be needed to "establish the missile's performance and reliability."

Technical advances
Elleman said North Korea's re-entry vehicle capabilities remained unclear. In order for an ICBM to deliver its payload to a target, it must survive the intense heat of re-entering the earth's atmosphere after a brief space flight, not breaking up or going off target in the process.
"A viable ICBM capable of reaching the west coast of the US mainland is still a year away, though North Korea continues to progress," Elleman said.

While North Korea claimed to have a stable re-entry system following an ICBM test in July, South Korea's intelligence service told lawmakers the technology was only "at the beginning stage" and was likely not "capable of re-entry."
At a briefing this week however, lawmakers were told North Korea may be able to pair a nuclear warhead with a long-range ballistic missile sometime next year.
"They have been developing their nuclear capabilities faster than expected," South Korean Unification Minister Cho Myoung-gyon said. "We cannot rule out the possibility of North Korea declaring the completion of their nuclear program next year."
The latest test appeared to be implementing lessons learned from two launches in July, when North Korea fired ICBMs over Japan, said Stratfor analyst Rodger Baker.
This could also be an explanation for the apparent lull in testing, as Pyongyang analyzed the July launches, its first of an ICBM done on a non-lofted trajectory.
"There's a technical component that goes into these delays," Baker said. "This is a functional military program. They take time to analyze the telemetries from previous launches."
Baker and others have also noted a level of seasonality to the launches, with the fourth quarter of every year tending to have fewer North Korean missile tests due to a variety of factors, including soldiers being needed to help with the harvests and winter training schedules.
Night launch
As well as its height, another notable featured of Wednesday's test was that it was fired from a mobile launcher.
"Most of what they've been doing lately is with mobile launchers," Baker said. "It demonstrates a potential strike capability that couldn't be preempted by the US."
Why North Korea wants nukes and missiles
North Korea has long maintained it wants nuclear weapons and long-range missiles to deter the United States from attempting to overthrow the regime of Kim Jong Un.

Pyongyang looks at states such as Iraq -- where Saddam Hussein was overthrown by the United States -- and Libya -- its late leader, Moammar Gadhafi, gave up his nuclear ambitions for sanctions relief and aid, only to be toppled and killed after the United States intervened in his country's civil unrest -- and believes that only being able to threaten the US mainland with a retaliatory nuclear strike can stop American military intervention.

Many experts say they believe North Korea would not use the weapons first. Kim values his regime's survival above all else and knows the use of a nuclear weapon would start a war he could not win, analysts say.

US, Japanese and South Korean intelligence services -- as well as independent observers -- watch North Korea closely at all times for signs of potential groundwork for missile or nuclear tests.
Over the last "few days" there were intelligence indications that preparations were underway for a possible launch and those indications grew steadily until the launch took place, a US official told CNN.
Launching in the dark may have been an attempt to further conceal last-minute preparations, Baker said: "There were reports out of Japan and South Korea before the launch which suggested there was nothing visible yet. Late at night they moved the missile out and launched it."
The use of mobile launchers and quick fueling stymies the ability of the US or South Korea to launch a pre-emptive strike against any planned North Korean attack, and increases their effectiveness as a deterrent.
"By showing they have missiles that can be used very quickly and before the US can get them," Baker said. "Conceptually what they're saying is we can bring out multiple missiles, and (even if some are intercepted) they will still get one or two through."
From the US perspective, he said, "this just adds one more level of potential risk in the calculus of determining whether it wants to carry out a preemptive strike."
[img alt="N. Korea border trench aims to stop defections" class="media__image" src="http://cdn.cnn.com/cnnnext/dam/assets/171122085209-01-north-korea-defector-1122-large-169.jpg">

N. Korea border trench aims to stop defections 02:03
South Korean test
Compared to previous tests, Wednesday's launch received a somewhat muted response from US President Donald Trump, who merely said "we will take care of it."
"The bottom line is, it's a continued effort to build a threat -- a ballistic missile threat that endangers world peace, regional peace and certainly the United States," US Defense Secretary James Mattis said, though Secretary of State Rex Tillerson said diplomatic options "remain viable and open, for now."
Following his visit to Asia earlier this month, Trump had appeared more optimistic about finding a solution to the North Korean crisis, praising China for sending an envoy to the country and promoting the ability of sanctions to reign in Pyongyang's weapons programs.
South Korea on the other hand reacted aggressively to Wednesday's test, with the country's Joint Chiefs of Staff saying it carried out a "precision missile strike drill" just minutes after North Korea's launch.
The precision missile strike matched the flight distance of the North Korean missile and landed in waters off the east coast of South Korea.
Stratfor's Baker said Seoul wanted to "show they are an independent actor and can strike back at North Korea without the US."
That being said, "the South really wants to make sure there is no military action on the peninsula because they're the ones who will hurt the most."
CNN's Will Ripley and Barbara Starr contributed reporting.

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https://www.usatoday.com/story/news...h-korea-launches-ballistic-missile/901963001/


North Korea says it successfully launched a missile that can reach U.S. mainland
Thomas Maresca and Jim Michaels, USA TODAY Published 1:36 p.m. ET Nov. 28, 2017 | Updated 12:52 a.m. ET Nov. 29, 2017


North Korea fired another intercontinental ballistic missile on Wednesday. The missile traveled about 600 miles before splashing down in the Sea of Japan, according to the Pentagon. USA TODAY

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SEOUL — North Korea said Wednesday it successfully launched a new type of intercontinental ballistic missile capable of striking “the whole mainland of the U.S.,” claiming the isolated nation has achieved its goal of becoming a nuclear state.

The ICBM, called the Hwasong-15, appears to be the longest-range missile ever tested by the North. The missile flew about 600 miles in a high trajectory, but would have had a range of 8,100 miles had it flown in a flat trajectory, according to calculations by David Wright, an expert at the Union of Concerned Scientists. That would make it capable of reaching Washington, D.C.

North Korean news agency KCNA issued a report stating that the Hwasong-15 carried a “super-large heavy warhead.” The report said that North Korean leader Kim Jong Un watched the launch and “declared with pride that now we have finally realized the great historic cause of completing the state nuclear force.”

State television also ran a special broadcast on the launch, which showed Kim personally signing the launch order.

The missile was launched from Sain Ni, near the capital of Pyongyang, and splashed down into the Sea of Japan, according to the Pentagon. The missile landed inside Japan's Economic Exclusion Zone.

Following the test, President Trump told reporters that the U.S. "will take care of it. ... It is a situation that we will handle."

In a phone call after the launch, Trump and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe “reaffirmed their commitment to combat the North Korean threat,” the White House said. Trump also spoke with South Korean President Moon Jae-in and "reaffirmed their strong condemnation of North Korea’s reckless campaign to advance its nuclear and ballistic missile programs."

The State Department announced it is launching an international effort to step up pressure on North Korea that could include interdicting ships carrying goods to and from that country.

Spokeswoman Heather Nauert said the joint U.S.-Canada effort will include 16 countries. "We have always been very clear that we would be open to talks with North Korea. But North Korea is not showing it is willing to sit down and talk," she said.

The North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) determined the missile was not a threat to North America or U.S. territories.

More: Trump: North Korea launch will bring Democrats to negotiating table on spending bill

More: Two months without a North Korean missile test is a record for this year

More: Hawaii, eyeing North Korea, readies nuclear war sirens

More: South Korea: North Korea could complete its nuclear program next year

Defense Secretary Jim Mattis said the missile "went higher, frankly, than any previous shots they have taken.”

It is not clear whether North Korea has mastered the technology, however, that would allow it to place a miniaturized nuclear warhead on an intercontinental ballistic missile.

Mattis said the latest test "endangers world peace, regional peace and certainly the United States."

South Korea's military responded by conducting its own shorter-range missile tests to mimic striking the North Korea launch site, the South Korean Yonhap news agency reported.

"We remain prepared to defend ourselves and our allies from any attack or provocation," Col. Robert Manning, the Pentagon spokesman, said in a statement.

The launch came one day after reports surfaced that the Japanese government had intercepted radio signals suggesting another launch appeared imminent.

North Korean soldiers look at the South side near the spot where a North Korean soldier crossed the border on Nov. 13 at the Panmunjom, in the Demilitarized Zone, South Korea, Nov. 27, 2017. South Korea is reportedly broadcasting on loudspeakers into North Korea news of the recent escape of a North Korean soldier who was shot five times by his former colleagues as he dashed across the rivals' border, part of Seoul's psychological warfare against the North. Lee Jin-man, AP
The launch was the first since Sept. 15, when North Korea fired an intermediate ballistic missile.

A lull of more than two months in a missile test prompted some analysts to wonder if the North Korean leader was signaling a desire to negotiate with the United States on the future of his nuclear program.

But analysts also cautioned against reading too much into the lull, noting that North Korea has traditionally fired fewer missiles in the last three months of the year. It is not clear why.

The latest launch would be the 16th test this year, a record for North Korea. It comes amid heightened rhetoric between Trump and Kim, with each threatening to annihilate the other in response to a first strike.

Last week the Trump administration reinstated North Korea on the list of countries that support terrorism.

The September test was an intermediate-range missile that flew over Japan and into the northern Pacific. North Korea also detonated its first hydrogen bomb this year.

On Tuesday, the South Korean government said North Korea could have a nuclear-tipped intercontinental ballistic missile capable of reaching the U.S. mainland as early as next year.

"North Korea has been developing its nuclear weapons at a faster-than-expected pace," Cho Myoung Gyon, South Korea's unification minister, told reporters in Seoul. The unification ministry is an executive department that promotes Korean reunification.

That timetable confirms other intelligence estimates that North Korea could have the capability to fire a nuclear-tippled missile at the U.S. in 2018.

The U.N. Security Council has scheduled an emergency meeting on North Korea’s latest ballistic missile launch.

Contributing: John Bacon, Oren Dorell, Kim Hjelmgaard, David Jackson. Michaels reported from Washington.

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https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/north-korea-missile-launch_us_5a1ddc4fe4b0dc52b029ea97

Threat From North Korea No Longer Hypothetical, Arms Experts Warn
“It’s the next logical step that we were expecting."
By Nick Visser and Jesselyn Cook

Global arms experts say North Korea’s latest test of a ballistic missile was an expected but troubling development that further solidifies Kim Jong Un’s role as a nuclear-backed strongman.

A defiant North Korea launched what appeared to be another intercontinental ballistic missile on Tuesday, and initial reports put the weapon’s range at more than 8,100 miles. As tested, such a weapon would be able to travel more than enough distance to reach Washington, D.C., or New York City.

Experts say it’s unlikely the missile would be able to deliver a nuclear bomb that far just yet, as it appeared likely that Tuesday’s launch carried a lighter mock warhead. But many say such a reality is one step closer, and the test advances North Korea’s weapon program despite efforts by U.S. President Donald Trump to quash Kim’s ambitions.

“It’s the next logical step that we were expecting,” said David Wright, a physicist and the co-director of the global security program at the Union of Concerned Scientists. “North Korea knows what they’re doing. They have an engineering team that knows what they’re doing. It’s hard to say if it’s six months or two years before they can deliver a nuclear warhead, but it’s heading in that direction.”

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JUNG YEON-JE via Getty Images
“We can’t claim that we were surprised by this," global arms experts say.
Tuesday’s launch was the first for North Korea in more than two months, and it came amid some reports that the country may have been scaling back its weaponry tests for the winter or been signaling it was ready to open diplomatic negotiations.

Experts say those reports now appear misguided.

“We now have to assume the entire continental U.S. is within range of the North Korean Hwasong-14,” Vipin Narang, an associate professor specializing in nuclear proliferation at MIT, told HuffPost in an email. “It’s one hell of a way to break the testing pause.”

Van Jackson, a senior lecturer at Victoria University of Wellington in New Zealand, said the test confirmed that Pyongyang was preparing to launch missiles under real-world conditions. Jones noted bluntly: “The threat from North Korean missiles is no longer hypothetical.”

“We can’t claim that we were surprised by this because people like me have been warning of it for weeks,” Jackson said. “The larger response that’s needed ― askew of any tit-for-tat with this particular test ― is to stabilize the situation and avert inadvertent nuclear war.”

Many analysts appeared to place the burden of handling the situation on a White House that has so far displayed little tact in handling the North Korean threat.

Trump told reporters at the White House on Tuesday that he was aware of the launch, saying curtly, “We will take care of it.”

“It is a situation that we will handle,” he added.

But it remained unclear how exactly the Trump administration envisioned doing so.

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Jonathan Ernst / Reuters
President Donald Trump spoke at the South Korean National Assembly in Seoul earlier this month to call for international cooperation to rein in Pyongyang. Meanwhile, he continued to mock North Korean leader Kim Jong Un on social media.
Trump has repeatedly mocked Kim, calling him a “Rocket Man,” and he’s undermined efforts by Secretary of State Rex Tillerson and Defense Secretary Jim Mattis to pursue diplomatic paths.

George A. Lopez, a professor emeritus at Notre Dame University and a former member of a U.N. panel of experts created to monitor North Korea sanctions, said the launch was another call for the Trump administration to take “bold diplomatic action” to bring North Korea to the negotiating table. He noted, however, that such efforts “appear leaderless.”

“I worry that, despite the designation of North Korea as a terrorist state and the administration touting the way the recent trip to Asia has tightened the screws on North Korea, we do not have an all-out diplomatic strategy for direct ― or even indirect ― discussions that might lead to either a freeze on both sides of military escalation, or other non-military options for engagement,” he wrote in an email.

Lopez cautioned that calls for a preemptive attack on North Korea ― or a surgical strike to destroy missile launch pads that some have called for ― would only provoke Kim rather than send a message.

“Those people are naïve as such action would be considered by the North as the beginning of the war they have long anticipated.”



Nick Visser

Reporter, HuffPost

Jesselyn Cook

World News Reporter, HuffPost
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Threat From North Korea No Longer Hypothetical, Arms Experts Warn
 

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Kim Jong Nuke now say he also have rocket army.

North Korea: Latest missile launch was new type of ICBM capable of reaching entire US
Published time: 29 Nov, 2017 03:41 Edited time: 29 Nov, 2017 04:40
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North Korean leader Kim Jong-un watches the launch of a ballistic missile on September 16, 2017 © KCNA / Reuters
North Korea has claimed its latest launch was a new type of intercontinental ballistic missile, the Hwasong 15, which can hit all the US mainland.
The announcement was made on North Korean state TV on Wednesday, following the launch on Tuesday (earlier Wednesday Pyongyang time). The missile flew some 1,000 kilometers eastward, according to the Pentagon, before falling in the Sea of Japan without causing any damage.

Pyongyang's statement also declared that the North now has a full-fledged nuclear force. "North Korean leader Kim Jong-un announced that the country has realized the great historic cause of completing a state nuclear force," it said, as cited by Yonhap.

Read more
North Korea fires ballistic missile, Pentagon claims it’s an ICBM
The missile launch prompted an immediate response from South Korea, which launched its own missile-firing test minutes later.

The US, Japan and South Korea have called for an emergency UN Security Council meeting in response to the launch. The meeting is set to convene in New York later Wednesday.

The Hwasong-15 type missile, which Pyongyang boasts it has launched, would be a new development, with the other launches in 2017 being either the older Hwasong-14 ICBM, or the intermediate range (IRBM) Hwasong-12.

North Korean leader Kim Jong-un has declared that his country's nuclear weapons development is aimed solely at "defending the sovereignty of the nation from the US nuclear threat and protecting the peaceful life of the people." He reiterated his assertion that no other country is under threat from Pyongyang's nukes.

US President Donald Trump has called North Korea's latest launch “a situation that we will handle,” saying that it won't change his approach to the crisis on the Korean peninsula.

The head of the Russian Senate's Foreign Affairs Committee said the launch, coming after a two-month break, was an act of desperation, provoked by incessant US and South Korean saber-rattling on the North's doorstep. “Pyongyang, most likely, expected the same restraint in response on the part of the West, both in judgments and actions,” which Washington and Seoul failed to demonstrate, Konstantin Kosachev said.

READ MORE: North Korea’s missile launch result of US & allies' saber-rattling – Russian senator

The deputy chief of the Committee for Defense and Security believes Pyongyang could be probing Washington for reaction: “I don’t rule out that in this case it was a kind of a ‘trial balloon,“ Frants Klintsevich said, adding that he hoped Washington “will have enough wisdom to refrain from any retaliatory actions.”
 

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https://www.reuters.com/article/us-...reas-latest-icbm-test-stacks-up-idUSKBN1DT0IF

How North Korea's latest ICBM test stacks up
Josh Smith
4 Min Read


SEOUL (Reuters) - North Korea said on Wednesday it had successfully tested a new type of intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), called Hwasong-15, that could reach all of the U.S. mainland. [L1N1NY1RR]

A man walks past a street monitor showing a news report about North Korea's missile launch, in Tokyo, Japan, November 29, 2017. REUTERS/Toru Hanai
In a broadcast on state TV, North Korea said the newly developed Hwasong-15 has “much greater advantages in its tactical and technological specifications and technical characteristics” than its Hwasong-14 ICBM, tested twice in July.

Analysts and officials are awaiting the release of photos and video from the launch to identify what differences there may be between the Hwasong-15 and previous North Korean missiles.

HEIGHT, DISTANCE
The missile, the first test in 75 days, was fired on a steep trajectory and flew for 53 minutes, North Korea said. It reached an altitude of 4,475 km (2,780 miles) and flew 950 km (590 miles), according to the North.

“If (today‘s) numbers are correct, then if flown on a standard trajectory rather than this lofted trajectory, this missile would have a range of more than 13,000 km (8,100 miles),” the U.S.-based Union of Concerned Scientists said in a statement.

That would suggest that all of the continental United States including Washington D.C. and New York could be theoretically within range of a North Korean missile.


On July 4, North Korea launched its first ICBM, Hwasong-14, which reached an altitude of 2,802 km (1,741 miles) and a range of 933 km (580 miles) during a flight of 39 minutes, North Korea’s state media reported.

A second test of the Hwasong-14 on July 28 exhibited improved performance, with the missile flying for about 47 minutes to an altitude of 3,724 km (2,313 miles) and a range of 998 km (620 miles), according to state media.

The second flight showed the missile has a range of more than 10,000 km (6,213 miles), potentially putting the U.S. West Coast within range, analysts have said.

After Wednesday’s test, Kim declared that with the Hwasong-15 North Korea had “finally realized the great historic cause of completing the state nuclear force.”

International observers, however, said it remains unclear how heavy a payload the missile was carrying, and if it could carry a large nuclear warhead far enough to strike the United States.

It also remains unclear whether the North Koreans have perfected a re-entry vehicle capable of protecting a nuclear warhead during its descent.

LOCATION, TIME
North Korea launched the missile from Pyongsong, South Pyongan Province, about 30 km (18 miles) north of its capital, Pyongyang, the first time a missile was fired from this location.

Unlike many other tests that historically occur in the early mornings, Wednesday’s launch occurred in the middle of the night in Korea, at around 2:28 a.m. North Korea’s local time (6:17 p.m. GMT).

The location and timing are likely a reflection of Pyongyang’s continuing efforts to test weapons from anywhere and at any time, providing more realistic tests and making it more difficult for other countries to predict and possibly intercept a launch.

“The test is unusual in that it was conducted in the dead of night, perhaps reflecting North Korean concerns about avoiding a U.S. ballistic missile defence intercept,” the U.S.-based Centre for Strategic and International Studies said.

The previous two ICBM tests in July were launched from Panghyon airfield in North Pyongan Province, and in Mupyong-ni, Chagang Province, respectively.

Other, shorter range missiles have been launched from a variety of locations as well, including at least two intermediate-range ballistic missiles that flew over Japanese airspace in August and September.

The last of those missiles was launched at Sunan, just north of Pyongyang, from a “transporter erector launcher,” a road-mobile vehicle that can make it more difficult to track and target missiles before they are launched.

Reporting by Josh Smith in Seoul, Editing by Soyoung Kim and Michael Perry

Our Standards:The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.
 

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Guam's peasants are now celebrating their own relief and safety because they are now no longer the target pont. Huat Ah!
 

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https://qz.com/1140566/north-koreas...x-height-of-iss-and-suggests-it-could-hit-us/

North Korea’s latest missile test traveled 10 times higher than the ISS
north-korea-missile-test.jpg

Yet another. (AP Photo/Shizuo Kambayashi)
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Written by

Alice Truong
5 hours ago
After a two-month break in missile tests, North Korea was back at it today (Nov. 29).

The 20th missile test of the year, today’s was especially noteworthy because it (literally) reached new heights. The latest missile—which North Korea announced was a new Hwasong-15 intercontinental ballistic missile—flew to an altitude of up to 4,500 km (2,800 miles) and traveled 960 km, spending nearly an hour in the air.

At that height, the missile traveled more than 10 times above the International Space Station, which orbits 408 km above Earth.

The US-based Union of Concerned Scientists said that if the missile were flown on a standard trajectory rather than a lofted trajectory, it would’ve been able to travel more than 13,000 km. “Such a missile would have more than enough range to reach Washington, D.C., and in fact any part of the continental United States,” wrote David Wright, co-director of the advocacy group, in a blog post.

In comparison, North Korea’s first ICBM test in July flew to a maximum altitude of 2,802 km, and was estimated to be able to travel 6,700 km, putting Alaska within its reach.

Wright does note that it’s unclear how heavy a payload the latest missile was carrying, and the trajectory suggests it was a “very light mock warhead.” If that is the case, it’s unlikely the missile could travel such a long distance with a heavier nuclear warhead, he added.

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What achievement has pyongpyore boasted of?


Pioneer PLA Field Marshal 陈毅 @Oct 1963 told reporters of Japan that China is Resolute To Complete it's Nuclear Weapon Program, despite extreme pressure from Washington and Moscow.

His words in exact were that Even if we had to send our pants to pawn shops for the money, we will still have to complete our Atomic Bomb program.

The next year Oct 16 1964. China blasted off it's very 1st nuke.

Now Xi got the face to tell Kim Jong Nuke to stop nuke weapons program? Kim should tell Xi that, the history had been repeated and I am in the role of 毛泽东 of 1960s, and you are in the role of Joseph Stalin who tried to stop me from pursuing nuke. Xi would not have any words to reply. 老子现在就是60年代的毛主席, 你就是当年阻止中国造核子弹要翻脸的斯大林!

http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_b793f5540102wgnq.html


陈毅元帅不要裤子也要搞出原子弹, 金庸的批判对不对
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(2016-07-21 02:27:22)
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据说中国的陈毅元帅说不穿裤子也要搞出原子弹的话传到香港, 金庸发表了这样一份社评:

“中央一位负责首长居然说到‘即使中国人民全部无裤,也要自拥核子武器’,这句话在我们听来,实在是不胜愤慨。一个政府把军事力量放在第一位,将人民的生活放在第二位,老实说,那绝不是好政府。我们只希望,这只是陈毅一时愤激之言,未必是中共的政策”。

“不知陈毅是否了解,一个人民没有裤子穿的国家即使勉强制造了一两枚原子弹出来,这个国家也是决计不会强盛的,而这个政府是一定不会稳固的。中共制造原子弹,不知是什么用处?能去轰炸美国吗?能去轰炸苏联吗?当这些光屁股的人民造起反的时候,能用原子弹将他们一一炸死吗?”
“当英法联军攻打苏伊士运河时(英法想继续控制埃及的苏伊士运河也展开的一次军事行动),英国早已拥有核子武器,但苏联一声恫吓,说要以飞弹轰炸伦敦,英国只好乖乖地收兵。中国再努力十年,也决计赶不上英国在攻打苏伊士运河时的核子成就,请问几枚袖珍原子弹,有何用处?还是让人民多做几条裤子穿吧!”
据说陈毅元帅道歉了, 说自己说的不对, 政府应当关心民生, 不能只关心军事。 也许陈毅确实说错了吧。 曾经卖石油的富国伊拉克现在战火纷飞, 四分五裂,生灵涂炭, 据说那个抡大锤砸萨达姆雕像的老兄后悔了。 曾经事非洲收入最高,的北非明珠如今血雨腥风, 愁云惨惨。 如果萨达姆或者卡扎菲今天再站出来说宁可不穿裤子也要搞出原子弹, 你说伊拉克和利比亚的百姓是支持还是反对?
回到中国, 满清政府战争接连失败, 甲午战争,鸦片战争,

强迫中国人接受鸦片而用鸦片骗走的白银是多少,被炸沉的军舰, 被割去的土地到底值多少钱, 中国人命不值钱, 被强奸屠杀残骸的百姓都不算钱了。 光赔款与利息合集接近10亿两白银,一直到抗日战争进行了5年, 国民党政府还在支付给日本的赔款, 10亿两白银能买多少条裤子?。


即便是到了民国革命, 就一个日本鬼子就烧毁了上千座城市, 毁灭上万村庄, 抓了上百万的奴隶工人, 杀了数千万中国人。 抗日战争之前,如果蒋介石说宁可不要裤子,也要搞出原子弹, 金庸先生, 你怎么评价。
当然了, 萨达姆卡扎菲上校不是中国人, 慈禧和蒋介石也不是陈毅元帅, 他们也没有说:宁可不穿裤子也要原子弹的话。 并且, 他们即便瘦驴放出硬屁,丢了裤子也搞不出原子来。

这张照片是英国殖民印度时期, 残酷镇压印度反抗的照片。 当然, 普通印度百姓杀掉不埋,也绝对留不下照片的。 这张照片是处决印度的精英上层的场面。


西藏农奴烧掉卖身契的庆祝场面

50年代, 8万座水库就是这么修起来的, 他们虽然穿裤子了,但是, 日子过的辛苦。


人心散了, 有裤子又有原子弹也是没用。 寡头窃取了国家财产之后的乌克兰, 你相信那是造出世界最大飞机的国家吗?





 

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http://www.aboluowang.com/2017/0220/885117.html

陈毅豪言当了裤子也要造原子弹遭金庸怒斥
——陈毅说当了裤子也要造原子弹金庸亲自撰文批评陈毅怎么回应?

1963年10月,陈毅在北京接见日本记者团时,发表了这样一番讲话:“帝修反有原子弹、核子弹,了不起吗?他们如此欺侮我们。他们笑我们穷,造不起。我当了裤子也要造原子弹!”金庸听闻后,对此予以痛斥。

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中华人民共和国开国元帅陈毅(图源:VCG)

陈毅和金庸,他们一个是开国元帅,一个是著名小说家。两个看似八竿子打不到一块儿的人,却曾有过一段交集,发生过一个故事……

那是在1963年。

陈毅时任国务院副总理兼外交部部长。我们知道,中国的核计划在1958年全面展开,到了1963年,由于国民经济遇到的困难,经过了是否下马的讨论。陈毅等几位老帅坚决支持中国研制原子弹。在一次会议上,他说了一句个性鲜明的话:“中国人就是把裤子当了,也要把原子弹搞出来。”

这年10月,陈毅在北京接见日本记者团时,发表了一段非常有名的讲话:“帝修反有原子弹、核子弹,了不起吗?他们如此欺侮我们。他们笑我们穷,造不起。我当了裤子也要造原子弹!”

“当了裤子也要造原子弹!”陈毅这段个性鲜明的讲话就被传开去,被世人所知晓。

很快,这话传到香港。著名小说家金庸听了后,亲自撰写了一篇措辞严厉的社论,发表在其自办的《明报》上。

金庸在这篇题目为《要裤子不要核子》中,针对陈毅“当了裤子也要造原子弹”的观点,进行评论:“中央一位负责首长居然说到‘即使中国人民全部无裤,也要自拥核子武器’,这句话在我们听来,实在是不胜愤慨。”

金庸继而提出:“一个人民没有裤子穿的国家即使勉强制造了一两枚原子弹出来,这个国家也是决计不会强盛的,而这个政府是一定不会稳固的。一个政府把军事力量放在第一位,将人民的生活放在第二位,老实说,那绝不是好政府。我们只希望,这只是陈毅一时愤激之言,未必是中共的政策。”

金庸这篇社论见报后,在舆论界引发了巨大的争议。香港五大报纸《文汇报》、《大公报》、《新晚报》、《商报》、《晶报》纷纷撰文,对《要裤子不要核子》一文进行批驳。

金庸当时还不到40岁,正是血气方刚的年纪。对于香港五大报纸的批驳,他自然表示不服,组织了反击。双方你来我往,开展了一场激烈的笔墨之战。为了反击香港五大报纸,金庸甚至拿出一天的所有版面,来进行论战。

这段论战期间,金庸正在撰写《天龙八部》。他有意将这场现实中的论战写入小说中,于是,就有了大侠乔峰成为众矢之的,面对各方围攻的故事情节。

论战始于1963年10月,持续一年多时间,到1964年底才结束。

阿波罗网责任编辑:东方白 来源:微信 转载请注明作者、出处並保持完整。
 

war is best form of peace

Alfrescian
Loyal
https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/nukevault/ebb488/

China's First Nuclear Test 1964 -- 50th Anniversary
China's Advance toward Nuclear Status in Early 1960s Held Surprises for U.S. Analysts, Generated Conflicting Opinions about the Potential Dangers

Early RAND and INR Views Proved More Accurate than DOD's Office of International Security Affairs' Overwrought Scenario

The United States and the Chinese Nuclear Program, 1960-1964 Part II

National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 488

Posted - October 16, 2014

Edited by William Burr

For more information contact:
William Burr - 202/994-7000 or [email protected]



The first Chinese nuclear test, 16 October 1964, had an explosive yield of 22 kilotons (Photo from Web site of Comprehensive Test Ban Organization)


The Chinese test site at Lop Nur (or Lop Nor) as photographed on October 8, 1964 by a KH4-A satellite. (Photo courtesy of Tim Brown with Talent-Keyhole.com)


The Chinese test site at Lop Nur as photographed on October 20, 1964 by a KH-4 satellite four days after the test. (Photo courtesy of Tim Brown, with Talent-Keyhole.com)


The Lanzhou Gaseous Diffusion Plant, as photographed in 1963 by a CIA U-2 aircraft flown by a Taiwanese pilot. U.S. intelligence analyses significantly underestimated Lanzhou's ability to produce the highly enriched uranium needed for China's first bomb. This photo was reproduced in a July 1963 study by the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.


The Lanzhou Gaseous Diffusion Plant, as photographed on May 10, 1966 by a KH-7/GAMBIT satellite (Mission 4028). For more satellite imagery, see "Eyes on the Bomb: U-2, CORONA, and KH-7 Imagery of Foreign Nuclear Installations."


The Lop Nur nuclear test site in northwestern China, photographed on December 8, 1966, during a KH-7/GAMBIT satellite reconnaissance mission. A test occurred on December 28, 1966. (Click for larger view).


This image, reproduced from document 33, shows the typical flight paths taken by AFTAC aircraft to collect samples from the clouds of radioactive debris emanating from overseas atmospheric nuclear tests. One of the mushroom clouds in the image appears to be at, or very close to, the Lop Nur test site in Northwestern China. The aircraft used in the collection mission flew from bases in the Pacific, North Africa, and the United Kingdom.

Washington, D.C., October 16, 2014 – Fifty years ago today, on 16 October 1964, the People's Republic of China (PRC) joined the nuclear club when it tested a nuclear device at its Lop Nur test site in Inner Mongolia. For several years, U.S. intelligence had been monitoring Chinese developments, often with anxiety, hampered by the lack of adequate sources. Early on, opinions within the U.S. government varied widely -- from the views of RAND Corporation and State Department INR [Intelligence and Research] analysts who estimated that a nuclear-armed China would be "cautious" to the Institute for Defense Analyses, which saw "increase[d] risks for the United States and its allies that China will escalate hostilities to the point of initiating nuclear operations." As the Chinese nuclear test approached, the Defense Department's Office of International Security Affairs was alone in taking an alarmist view, projecting 100 million dead Americans in the event of conflict with China in 1980.

To mark the anniversary of the Chinese test, the National Security Archive and the Nuclear Proliferation International History Project are publishing, mostly for the first time, a wide range of declassified U.S. government documents from the early 1960s on the Chinese nuclear program and its implications. Documents include intelligence estimates and analyses reflecting efforts by U.S. intelligence to forecast when Beijing could and would test a weapon and what its diplomatic and military implications could be. During the summer of 1964, the discovery through satellite photography of a test site led to speculation that Beijing would soon stage a nuclear test. Other documents provide information on the State Department's decision to announce the Chinese test in advance — which it did on 29 September 1964 — in order to minimize its impact on world opinion.

Today's publication sheds light on the internal U.S. debate over the significance and implications of an initial Chinese nuclear capability. For example, the Institute for Defense Analyses saw increased risks that "China will escalate hostilities to the point of initiating nuclear operations, " while RAND Corporation analysts argued that "Chinese policy is likely to continue to be cautious and rational and to seek gains by exploiting those opportunities that represent acceptable levels of' risk." Similarly, the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) believed that China would avoid "rash military action" because of its "relative weakness," and the risks of nuclear retaliation.

While President Kennedy had been worried enough about the prospects of a nuclear China to support contingency planning for preventive military action, by the time of the test the U.S. government had decided against such action. The arguments of an April 1964 top secret State Department study may have been influential: "the significance of [a Chinese nuclear] capability is not such as to justify the undertaking of actions which would involve great political costs or high military risks." Indeed, the author of that study noted that a preventive strike could miss important facilities and Beijing would continue to build the bomb. As views about Chinese caution became more typical, a report from the Defense Department's Office of International Security Affairs, prepared in early October 1964, was an outlier: based on the assumption of rapid growth of Chinese nuclear forces, it saw "very important and potentially dangerous consequences," including the need by 1980 to "think in terms of a possible 100 million U.S. deaths whenever a serious conflict with China threatens."

Nonproliferation concerns shaped U.S. thinking about the significance of a nuclear China.[1] The possibility that a Chinese nuclear capability would encourage decisions for national nuclear programs among China's neighbors raised some anxiety, especially with respect to India. Whatever the exact risks were, Secretary of State Dean Rusk observed in late 1963, "Our interest in a formal agreement on non-proliferation is 95% percent because of Communist China." A study produced in 1964 by theArms Control and Disarmament Agency shows how apprehension about a Chinese nuclear capability deepened interest in a global nonproliferation agreement as way to make "more difficult any national decision by non-nuclear powers … to acquire a nuclear capability."

Before China conducted its test, Washington had expected that it, like nuclear powers before it, would test a plutonium-fueled device; the evidence at hand was thought to corroborate that. U.S. government officials and intelligence experts were startled when technical information collected by the Air Force showed that the device was fueled by highly-enriched uranium from a then-unknown source. An INR report prepared a few weeks after the test demonstrated how perplexed the U.S. intelligence community was over how Bejing had acquired the U-235. While a gaseous diffusion plant in Lanzhou had in fact produced the U-235,[2] U.S. intelligence did not believe that it had been in operation long enough to produce enough fissile material, but could not identify another possible source in China; moreover, it was "difficult to imagine that the Soviets would supply weapons-grade U-235."

Other highlights of today's publication:

  • Newly available Keyhole [KH]-4A satellite reconnaissance photographs of the Lop Nur test site, before and after the 16 October detonation, provided by Tim Brown of Talent-Keyhole.com.
  • A State Department INR memo from July 1963 recounting the CIA's insistence that a Special National Intelligence Estimate include language about the possible impact of nuclear weapons on Chinese foreign policy that in effect meant: "we don't believe that something will happen, but if it does, we want you to remember we warned that it might."
  • Joint Chiefs of Staff reports on the military and security implications of a nuclear China and proposals for military programs to counteract them.
  • A hitherto unknown draft of a Special National Intelligence Estimate from late 1962 on the Chinese nuclear program that was abandoned for lack of new evidence.
  • A major study prepared in 1963 by State Department official Robert H. Johnson on the potential consequences of a nuclear-armed China. Johnson did not believe this event would "alter the real relations of power among the major states," but the U.S. would have to find ways to reassure U.S. allies, in part to forestall "the possibility of development of independent nuclear capabilities by Asian countries (especially India)."
  • An unofficial and unusual analysis prepared by INR analyst Helmut Sonnenfeldt. Taking a classic balance of power approach to the Sino-Soviet dispute, he argued that "our efforts should be to weaken the stronger and strengthen the weaker side in order to prolong a dispute which is to some extent debilitating to both." Accordingly, Sonnenfeldt suggested that it might be in the U.S. interest if China had "modest" nuclear forces which could threaten the Soviet Union, but not the United States.
The Chinese leadership sought nuclear weapons because of their experience in confrontations with the United States during the 1950s. In this respect, the 1955 Taiwan Straits crisis had central importance to Mao's decisions.[3] As he explained to the Communist Party Politburo in April 1956: "Not only are we going to have more airplanes and artillery, but also the atomic bomb. In today's world, if we don't want to be bullied, we have to have this thing." By then, the Chinese leadership had already made major decisions to launch a nuclear program. Moreover, they reached out to Moscow for scientific and technical assistance in launching a nuclear program. That Beijing wanted nuclear weapons, at least for basic security purposes, was well understood in Washington. According to a major State Department study from October 1963, a nuclear capability had "direct military value" to China as a deterrent against attack on its territory.

Today's posting follows up, and includes a few items from, an Electronic Briefing Book on "The United States and the Chinese Nuclear Program, 1960-1964," that the present editor and Archive senior fellow Jeffrey T. Richelson compiled in early 2001. That collection of estimates and studies coincided with an essay that International Security had recently published in its Winter 2000/2001 issue: "Whether to 'Strangle the Baby in the Cradle': The United States and the Chinese Nuclear Program, 1960-64." That article reviewed early U.S. government intelligence and policyanalysis of the Chinese nuclear program and the internal debate during 1963-1964 over the significance of a Chinese nuclear capability and whether it was necessary to initiate preventive action to forestall a Chinese nuclear capability.



I. Early Assessments, 1960-62
Documents 1A-C: The Intelligence Picture, 1960

A: Central Intelligence Agency, Article on "Chinese Communist Nuclear Weapons Program," Scientific Intelligence Digest, January 25, 1960, Secret, excised copy

B: Central Intelligence Agency, Article on "The Chinese Communist AE [Atomic Energy Program]," Scientific Intelligence Digest, May 31, 1960, Secret, excised copy

C: Charles C. Flowerree, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, to John A. Armitage, "W arsaw Report on Chicom Nuclear Weapons Activities," Secret

Sources: Documents A and B: FOIA Releases; Document C: National Archives, Record Group 59, Department of State Records [hereinafter RG 59, Bureau of European Affairs, Office of Soviet Union Affairs Subject Files, 1957-1963, box 2, 1.3.4 Communist China

The U.S. intelligence establishment closely monitored Beijing's nuclear progress, although much remained unknown, including the scope of assistance that the Soviet Union had provided.[4] While the Chinese had three research reactors, maintained in part with Soviet aid, they could not produce sufficient quantities of fissile material for weapons and they would need to construct "special facilities to do so." By late 1960, U.S. government intelligence officials were well aware that Sino-Soviet tensions had led Moscow to cut off technical assistance. All the same, one State Department intelligence officer wrote that "there is little doubt … that the Chinese have attained a competence in atomic energy which would enable them eventually to produce a weapon of their own, even with no further Soviet assistance."



Document 2: Memorandum from General Lyman Lemnitzer, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, to the Secretary of Defense, "Strategic Analysis of the Impact of the Acquisition by Communist China of a Nuclear Capability," 26 June 1961, Secret

Source: John F. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Robert W. Komer Files, box 410, China (CPR) Nuclear Explosion (folder 2 of 2)

The Joint Chiefs of Staff believed that a major world reaction to a nuclear China would be "fear that the chances of war had increased;" moreover, "there would be stronger pressure for the full acceptance of Communist China as a member of the world community" and greater pressures for "accommodation" with Beijing, with negative consequences for U.S. influence. Moreover, a nuclear-armed China would be more "truculent and militant." To counter this, the memo concludes, Washington should begin working with Allies on a program of "coordinated political, psychological, economic, and military actions."



Document 3: Central Intelligence Bulletin, article on "Communist China Nuclear Weapons Capability," October 14, 1961, Top Secret, excised copy

Source: FOIA release

The CIA's top secret daily publication ran a short article indicating Beijing's determination to get the bomb. It quoted Chief of the Peoples Liberation Army General Staff General Luo Ruiqing--Lo Jui Ching in Wade-Giles transliteration-as saying that China would not allow a nuclear test ban to "cheat" it from having a nuclear arsenal. Noting Sino-Soviet tensions over China's nuclear ambitions, the article contrasted Soviet concern about nuclear proliferation to a statement by Chinese foreign minister (presumably Chen Yi) that nuclear proliferation was not a concern because the chances of war would be reduced if more countries had nuclear weapons.



Documents 4A-D: "Study PACIFICA" Reports by the Institute for Defense Analyses, International Studies Division

A: "The Communist Chinese Nuclear Threat: Warheads and Delivery Vehicles," Study Memorandum No. 17 by Donald Keesing, May 9, 1962, Secret, excised copy, under appeal

B: "Military Implications of a Communist Chinese Nuclear Capability,"

Study Memorandum No. 14 by General John B. Cary, August 31, 1962, Secret

C: "Reactions to a Nuclear-Armed Communist China: Europe and the United Kingdom," Study Memorandum No. 12 by General "X" and Roderick MacFarquhar, September 15, 1962, Unclassified

D: Study Report No. Two, "The Emergence of Communist China as a Nuclear Power (Study PACIFICA, Final Report)," September 30, 1962, Secret, Excised copy, under appeal

In 1961, the Pentagon made arrangements for the non-profit think tank, the Institute of Defense Analyses, to prepare a contract study, "Study PACIFICA," on the emergence of China as a nuclear power. The study produced a number of reports listed in appendix B of the "Final Report" [Document 5D, PDF pages 126-127]; many remain classified and the final report has been heavily excised. Nevertheless, the "Military Implications" study by Air Force General John Cary was declassified in full and his conclusions may have influenced the PACIFICA final report. Citing estimates that Beijing would stage its first test sometime in the next two years, Cary saw dangers from a Chinese nuclear capability: it will " increase risks for the United States and its allies that China will escalate hostilities to the point of initiating nuclear operations; for China, that it may misread relative strengths and thus overplay its hand, and that the vulnerability of its nuclear forces may invite US counterforce operations." Moreover, a nuclear China, especially after the first test, "will create political and psychological influences that could materially weaken the military position of the United States and its allies in Asia."

To counter an emerging threat, Cary proposed a regional deterrent force that would be "plainly capable of devastating" China, without threatening the Soviet Union (which he assumed would continue to have strained alliance relations with Beijing). Such a force could "deter overt aggression …, permit the United States to impose ground rules, within limits, if aggression occurs; and minimize the risk of escalation uncontrolled by the United States." Among other recommendation was a capability for a "rapid US local response" that could control Chinese escalation and "minimize pressures for active Soviet support of Chinese military operations."



II. Estimates and Their Implications 1962-1963
Document 5A-B: The SNIE That Never Was

A: [ Name Excised] Deputy Assistant Director of National Estimates, Central Intelligence Agency, to Allan Evans (INR) et al., "SNIE 13-6-62: Implications of Communist China's Acquisition of a Nuclear Weapons Capability," October 9, 1962, Secret, Excised copy

B: Acting Deputy Assistant Director National Estimates, Central Intelligence Agency, to U.S. Intelligence Board, Special National Intelligence Estimate 13-6-62 Central Intelligence Agency, "Communist China's Nuclear Weapons Program," December 14, 1962, Top Secret, Draft, excised copy, under appeal

Sources:A: FOIA release; B: RG 59, Records of the Policy Planning Staff for 1962, box 232, China

By late 1962, the intelligence community had published several estimates of China's nuclear weapons potential. A National Intelligence Estimate completed earlier in the year suggested that Beijing could test a plutonium device by early 1963, but found it "unlikely that the Chinese will meet such a schedule." It was more likely that the first Chinese test would be "delayed beyond 1963, perhaps by as much as several years." Later in the year, at the specific request of the State Department, the CIA's Board of National Estimates drafted Special National Intelligence Estimate 13-6-62, which found that the "evidence is not now adequate to make a confident judgment about the likely date of a first nuclear test in China." It could "occur as early as 1963," but "we believe that it is more likely to occur some years later." The Air Force strongly dissented, arguing that China was "likely to conduct [its] first nuclear test in 1963-1964." This estimate remained in draft form, never finalized by the U.S. Intelligence Board, in order "to await further evidence" [See document 10 below].



Documents 6A-C: U.S. Air Force Project RAND Reports:

A: R.L. Blachly et al., Briefing, "Implications of a Communist Chinese Nuclear Capability: A Briefing," August 1962, RM 3264-PR, Confidential

B: R.L. Blachly et al., "A Study of the Implications of a Communist Chinese Nuclear Capability," December 1962, R-411-PR, Confidential

C: B. F. Jaeger and M. Weiner, "Military Aspects of A Study of the Implications of a Communist Chinese Nuclear Capability," March 1963, RM-3418-PR, Confidential, excised copy

Source: FOIA requests

Created by the U.S. Air Force in the late 1940s, the RAND [for Research and Development] Corporation produced studies on a wide variety of topics for that service.[5] In a briefing at Air Force headquarters, and a follow-on report, RAND analysts drew a nuanced picture of a nuclear-armed China: "Chinese policy is likely to continue to be cautious and rational and to seek gains by exploiting those opportunities that represent acceptable levels of risk." Nevertheless, a nuclear China "will adversely affect U.S. alliances and military posture in Asia and … generate pressures on U.S. freedom of action in the area." To compensate, the analysts proposed "the designation and maintenance in Pacific area of U.S. nuclear forces explicitly targeted for China and capable of flexible and selective employment against a wide range of Chinese aggressive actions."

A follow-up report from March 1963 analyzed three hypothetical military conflicts with China, two involving Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait, a third involving a Chinese nuclear attack on U.S. bases in East Asia. One conclusion was that Chinese "nuclear or high-level nonnuclear campaigns would involve very high risks on their part." For example, in the instance of a Chinese nuclear campaign against Taiwan, a U.S. counter-attack by augmented theater nuclear forces could "reduce the Chinese offensive capabilities to a very low level."



Document 7: Central Intelligence Bulletin, article on "Communist China-USSR- Nuclear Capability," March 2, 1963, Top Secret, excised copy

Source: FOIA release

This internal CIA article reports on a statement by what appears to have been a Soviet official that included an estimate that China would have a "plutonium weapon" in a few years, and that Chinese leaders believed that nuclear war would destroy capitalism, enabling "Chinese survivors to build a new world." The Soviet Union had taken "extraordinary measures" to convince the Chinese otherwise and had cut off nuclear assistance, the statement added, which did not information on how to build a gaseous diffusion plant for the enrichment of uranium.



Document 8: Executive Secretariat, U.S. Department of State, "The Secretary's Staff Meeting, 9:15 a.m. (Wednesday)," May 1, 1963, Secret

Source: RG 59, Executive Secretariat Briefing Books, Reports, and Minutes, box 1, Secretary's Large Staff Meetings 1963

During Dean Rusk's daily staff meeting, INR official George Denney reported that U-2 photographs (probably taken by Taiwanese pilots[6]), had "confirmed the existence of an atomic reactor in North China, capable of producing sufficient radioactive material for a few nuclear weapons annually." This was a reference to the Baotou (Pao-t'ou) site, which included a small power reactor. According to Denney, this finding "confirms existing intelligence estimates that the Chinese would be capable of detonating a small nuclear explosion by the end of 1963." It was this discovery that encouraged intelligence analysts to assume that the Chinese were likely to test a plutonium device.



Document 9 : Memorandum from George C. Denney, Jr., Bureau of Intelligence and Research, to Secretary of State, "Probable Consequences of a Chinese Communist Nuclear Detonation," INR Research Memorandum R-17, May 6, 1963, Secret

Source: RG 59, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs Subject, Personnel, and Country Files, 1960-1963, box 21, CSM-Communism.

This report assessed the implications of a Chinese nuclear capability for Beijing's diplomatic and military posture, and for China's East and South Asian neighbors. Like the RAND analysts, INR maintained that China would avoid "rash military action" because of its "relative weakness," the risks of nuclear retaliation, and the "uncertainty" of Soviet support in a confrontation with Washington. To avoid losing support in the Third World, China "will attempt to pose as a peaceful, benevolent and powerful supporter of Afro-Asian aspirations for independence and peace." Nevertheless, China could make "political-military probes when and where it believes there are soft spots in the local situation" and in U.S. resolve.

Analysis of country reactions varied. For example, in Taiwan, a Chinese nuclear test "would probably produce a sense of shock and setback in Taiwan even though the leadership had discounted the event in advance and taken steps to offset its impact." In Japan, a "detonation will not come as a complete shock" but the reaction "is certain to be one of apprehension, disapproval and disquiet." While Beijing would like to move Japan toward neutralism, the Japanese were unlikely to "revise … defense policy or the relationship with the United States."



Document 10: Richard T. Ewing to George C. Denney, Jr., "SNIE 13-2-63: Communist China's Advanced Weapons Program," July 23, 1963, Top Secret

Source: FOIA release

With the evidence about Baotou (see Document 8), the intelligence community moved ahead in finalizing a new Special National Intelligence Estimate on the Chinese nuclear program — SNIE 13-2-63 — which it approved on July 24, 1964. But the day before, all the i's had not been dotted and INR staffer Richard Ewing provided some background and an overview of issues that the U.S. Intelligence Board would settle the next day. Ewing noted that the estimate was "the most optimistic plausible view" because in private most of the intelligence representatives were "more conservative about the timing and scheduling of [Beijing's] programs."

Whatever the analysts actually believed, their estimate forecast that a plutonium device could be tested by early 1964. This was based on an estimate that the recently discovered Baotou reactor could not have reached criticality before late 1962 and that it would take nearly two years to produce spent fuel and process it into plutonium. While U.S. intelligence recognized that China was building a gaseous diffusion facility at Lanzhou, the analysts did not believe that it would be large enough to produce U-235 for a nuclear test device.

Ewing recommended that the State Department press for the removal of paragraph 27, which held that "on balance," the intelligence board believed that the Chinese leadership would "react rationally" to their nuclear achievements, but "we do not exclude the possibility" that it could "embark on radical new external courses." This was a "saving" paragraph, Ewing observed, so that the intelligence community could say "we don't believe that something will happen, but if it does, we want you to remember we warned that it might." Ewing believed that CIA Director John McCone would resist removing the paragraph and it, or some version of it, survived.



Documents 11A-C: Working with Moscow

A: National Security Council Staff, "Briefing Book on US-Soviet Non-Diffusion Agreement for Discussion at the Moscow Meeting," circa June 12, 1963, Top Secret, Excerpts

B: Entry for 21 June 1963, Journals of Glenn Seaborg, Confidential

C: Memorandum from Thomas L. Hughes, INR, to Secretary of State, "Soviet Attitude toward Chinese Communist Acquisition of a Nuclear-Weapons Capability," September 11, 1963, Secret

Sources: A. John F. Kennedy Library, National Security File, Carl Kaysen Files, box 276, Nuclear Energy Matters, Nuclear Diffusion Briefing Book, Volume I on US-Soviet Non-Diffusion Agreement 6/1963; B: Declassification request to Department of Energy; C: RG 59, Policy Planning Council Records, 1963-1964, box 250, China

Moscow's thinking about a Chinese nuclear capability was of great interest to the Kennedy administration, in part because of the hope that the developing Sino-Soviet split could lead Moscow and Washington to reach a nuclear nonproliferation agreement and possibly team up to take joint action against the Chinese project. Toward that end, a briefing book prepared for the use of U.S. negotiators in talks with Soviet leaders on the test ban and nuclear proliferation issues included a paper, "Aborting the ChiCom Nuclear Capability," which directly raised possibilities for joint action, although Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev refused to single China out.[7]

The interest in joint action with the Soviets surfaced in a White House meeting recounted in the journals of Atomic Energy Commissioner Glen Seaborg. The meeting focused on the test ban negotiations with the Soviet Union and forthcoming talks in Moscow to be led by Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs W. Averell Harriman. According to Seaborg's account the discussion turned to China-which had refused to support a test ban treaty-when President Kennedy asked how the United States might handle that subject in the Moscow discussions. Reflecting ongoing discussions of the possibility of working with Moscow against the Chinese nuclear program, William C. Foster, the director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, confidently observed that "if we could get together with the USSR, the Chinese could be handled even if it required an accidental drop on their facilities."

The reference to an "accidental drop on their facilities" was excised when the diary entry was first published in the Foreign Relations of the United States but the Department of Energy declassified it in response to a request for a new review of the document. An "accidental drop"-presumably a bombing- is an unusual form of arms control and just how the United States or even the Soviet Union could have staged such an event in the interior of China, where the nuclear facilities were located, is an extraordinary problem. The Kennedy Presidential Library indicates that a rough transcript of the meeting based on the original tape recording exists but is not yet declassified (whether the tape recording survives somewhere is unclear and rather mysterious). Therefore, it remains to be learned whether the transcript includes any discussion of the concept of "accidental drop." In any event, Foster's statement is one more piece of evidence that the Kennedy administration was interested in the possibility of taking military action against the Chinese nuclear program.



Document 12: U.S. Department of State Policy Planning Council, "Policy Planning Statement on A Chinese Communist Nuclear Detonation and Nuclear Capability," October 15, 1963, Secret

Sources: RG 59, Policy Planning Council Records, 1963-1964, box 275, S/P Papers Chicom Nuclear Detonation and Nuclear Capability Policy Planning Statement. 10/15/1963

During 1963, Robert Johnson, the State Department's leading expert on the policy issues raised by a Chinese nuclear program, prepared a major study on the impact and importance of China developing a nuclear capability. He started out with a several hundred page report; this version, about half the length, was widely circulated in the national security bureaucracy (Johnson prepared a shorter version for senior officials). Like INR and RAND analysts, Johnson assumed that a nuclear-armed China would act prudently and that a "regional" nuclear capability had "direct military value" to China as a deterrent against attack on its territory. While U.S. nuclear power would continue to deter China, Beijing could "be expected to continue to test from time to time through limited military pressures, the level of the U.S. commitment and response in Asia."

Johnson did not believe that the emergence of a nuclear China would in the near term "alter the real relations of power among the major states or the balance of military power in Asia," but he had concerns about the diplomatic and nuclear proliferation consequences. He recommended that the U.S. find ways to reassure allies in the region "to reduce the effectiveness of Chinese politico-military pressures" and to forestall "the possibility of development of independent nuclear capabilities by Asian countries (especially India)." In general, he recommended that the U.S. official reaction to a Chinese nuclear detonation "be sufficiently low key as not to suggest by sheer volume of activity and comment that the event is more important than is in fact the case."



Documents 13A-C: Planning for Preventive Action:

A: JCS Chairman Maxwell Taylor to Director, Joint Staff, "Operational Air Plan (China)," November 4, 1963, Top Secret

B: Assistant Secretary of Defense William P. Bundy to Deputy Secretary of Defense Gilpatric, "JCS Proposal Concerning Communist China," 13 December 1963, Top Secret

C: Deputy Secretary Gilpatric to Director, Central Intelligence, "JCS Proposal Concerning Communist China," 13 December 1963, Top Secret

Sources: A: RG 218, Maxwell Taylor Chairman Files, box 1, CMs; B and C: FOIA releases

President Kennedy's apprehension that a nuclear-armed China would become a dangerous threat produced a request by Assistant Secretary of Defense William Bundy for operational planning for preventive military action by the Joint Staff.[8] While contingency plans and proposals have not yet surfaced, it is clear that a JCS "Operational Air Plan" was not satisfactory to JCS Chairman Maxwell Taylor. Whatever happened to that plan remains obscure and the next month Taylor recommended that an interagency group explore counter-measures. While Bundy was not sure if anything was "really feasible," he suggested that the National Security Council "Special Group" on CIA covert actions look further into the matter. Accordingly, Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric asked DCI John McCone to consider the problem.



Document 14: Helmut Sonnenfeldt note to Tom Hughes, April 4, 1964, enclosing paper, "The U.S. Interest in Communist China," October 14, 1963, Confidential

Source: RG 59, Office of the Counselor, 1955-77, box 2, HS Chron File July thru Dec 1963

Helmut Sonnenfeldt shared this unusual paper, written some months earlier, with INR colleague Thomas Hughes. Adopting a classic balance of power perspective toward the Sino-Soviet dispute, Sonnnenfeldt argued that "our efforts should be to weaken the stronger and strengthen the weaker side in order to prolong a dispute which is to some extent debilitating to both." Accordingly, it might be in the U.S. interest if China had "modest" nuclear forces which could threaten the Soviet Union, but not the United States. It was decidedly in the U.S. interest that Beijing and Moscow remain divided and also to aid the Chinese "at least to the point of assuring that they cannot be brought to heel by Soviet pressure." Moreover, Washington had an "interest in maintaining quiet direct channels of communication" with Beijing to convey important messages and as a basis for an eventual movement to "more normal relations." This kind of thinking would provide the basis for Nixon-Kissinger triangular diplomacy in the early 1970s when Sonnenfeldt was working on Kissinger's staff.



Document 15: State Department memorandum of conversation, "Proliferation of Nuclear Capability," December 4, 1963, Confidential

Source: RG 59, Records of Executive Secretariat. The Secretary's and Undersecretary's Memoranda of Conversations, 1953-1964, box , Sec Memcons. December 1963

During a conversation with Canadian Foreign Minister Paul Martin, Secretary of State Rusk declared that "Our interest in a formal agreement on non-proliferation is 95% percent because of Communist China." Unless China was party to such an agreement, it could "probably" not be ratified in the United States. Rusk would later change his thinking about China and a nonproliferation agreement, but concern about the proliferation impact of China's nuclear capability would persist for years.



III. 1964: A Test Looms
Document 16: Walt Rostow, Policy Planning Staff, U.S. Department of State, to McGeorge Bundy, "The Bases for Direct Action Against Chinese Communist Nuclear Facilities," April 22, 1964, enclosing report with same title, April 14, 1964, Top Secret

Source: LBJ Library, National Security File, Countries, box 237, China Memos Vol. I 12/63-9/64 [2 of 2]

This April 1964 report prepared by Robert Johnson may have had the effect of nipping in the bud, or at least forestalling, further serious consideration of unilateral U.S. or joint U.S.-Taiwanese preventive action, although interest in working with the Soviets would persist. The assumptions that underlay Johnson's earlier study of a Chinese nuclear program informed this evaluation of preventive action, which was closely coordinated with officials at the CIA and the Pentagon. According to Johnson, "the significance of [a Chinese nuclear] capability is not such as to justify the undertaking of actions which would involve great political costs or high military risks." For example, unless Beijing undertook blatantly aggressive military action, a U.S. attack on China's nuclear facilities "is likely to be viewed as provocative and dangerous and will play into the hands of efforts by [Beijing] to picture U. S. hostility to Communist China as the source of tensions and the principal threat to the peace in Asia." Moreover, Chinese propaganda could effectively portray a U.S. attack as "a racialist effort by the U.S. to keep non-white countries in a state of permanent military inferiority."

Another problem was deficient intelligence on Beijing's nuclear program. Thus, "even 'successful' action may not necessarily prevent the ChiComs from detonating a nuclear device in the next few years." If an attack missed some installations and "Communist China subsequently demonstrates that it is continuing to produce nuclear weapons, what is likely to be the reaction to the half-finished U.S. effort?" For Johnson, the only legitimate way for Washington to act against the Chinese nuclear program was if Beijing attacked a U.S. ally in East Asia.



Document 17: Director of Central Intelligence to U.S. Intelligence Board, Special National Intelligence Estimate 13-4-64, "The Chances of an Imminent Communist Chinese Nuclear Explosion,"26 August 1964, Top Secret, Excised copy

Source: CIA Web site, "The China Collection"

Photographs taken by the Keyhole satellite indicated that Beijing had prepared a site at Lop Nur in Mongolia for testing a nuclear device. This new evidence necessitated a re-evaluation of the estimates for the timing of a Chinese test. The uncertainty about China's sources of fissile material persisted, for example, whether Baotao or possibly other reactors had produced plutonium in sufficient quantities. The analysts allowed the incongruity of bringing a "test site to a state of readiness … without having a device ready for testing," Yet, Lop Nur was "extremely remote" and "we might expect to see the Chinese take a long time in preparing this installation." Thus, the resulting estimate was hedged, with plenty of "saving" language: a test could occur within a few months, but "on balance, we believe that it will not occur until sometime after the end of 1964."



Documents 18A-C: The Soviet Estimate

A: Memorandum of Conversation by Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson, "Miscellaneous Matters," 11 September 1964, Secret

B: Memorandum for the Record by DCI John McCone, "Discussion with Rusk in his office Saturday, September l2th - 10:00 to 1l:30 a.m.," September 13, 1964, Secret, excised copy

C: Central Intelligence Bulletin, item on "Communist China: Soviets believe Chinese Communists could detonate nuclear device at any time," September 19, 1964, Top Secret, excerpts, excised copy

Source: A: RG 59, Records of Ambassador-at-Large Llewellyn E. Thompson, 1961-1970, box 21, Chron - July 1964; B. and C: FOIA releases

At the beginning of a conversation with Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin, Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson asked about Moscow's estimate for the timing of a Chinese nuclear test. Dobrynin "replied without hesitation that the Soviets thought the Chinese could conduct a test at almost any time now." During a conversation with DCI John McCone the next day, Secretary of State Dean Rusk passed on Dobrynin's statement, noting that it represented a "departure" from remarks that Foreign Minister Gromyko had made some time earlier. Dobrynin's statement was cited in an article for the Central Intelligence Bulletin, although the source information was excised, for reasons that are not easy to understand. In their analysis of the Soviet comment, CIA analysts argued that the "weight" of U.S. evidence suggested otherwise — a test "after 1964" — unless Beijing had "an undiscovered reactor" that could supply plutonium.
 

kryonlight

Alfrescian (Inf)
Asset
War on North Korea is inevitable. The time will be ripe in August 2020 just after the collapse of the Chinese Yuan. Donald Trump will not be impeached in 2018 and will get a 2nd term for dissolving Kim Jong-un.
 

tun_dr_m

Alfrescian
Loyal
War on North Korea is inevitable. The time will be ripe in August 2020 just after the collapse of the Chinese Yuan. Donald Trump will not be impeached in 2018 and will get a 2nd term for dissolving Kim Jong-un.


World had waited 70 years to see USA nuked. This wait began since Hiroshima. The time is near. Real near. Feng Shui takes it's turns.
 

tun_dr_m

Alfrescian
Loyal
The time is near for the demise of Kim Jong-un.


Kim is just doing a job for this world.

World is about to see how USA became different from it's good old days. Became weak, poor, frightened, hunt, regretful, and lost. And towards perish.

World is to learn how this phase of an empire reflects. Taste of defeat. To swallow down pride and own blood in own bleeding face and mouth, teeth punched off, bones broken, eyeball popped out.

Huat Ah!
 
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