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Islam, Jihad, and Terrorism in Post-9/11 Arabic Discussion Boards

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https://watermark.silverchair.com/jjcmcom1063.pdf


Rasha A. Abdulla
Journalism and Mass Communication Department The American University in Cairo

This study analyzed the contents of three of the most popular Arabic-language online message boards regarding the attacks of September 11, 2001 on the United States. Although terrorists claimed that the attacks were committed in the name of Islam, those who posted messages on all three forums rejected this claim. More than 43% of the messages condemned the attacks as a criminal act of terrorism that contradicts the core teachings of Islam. Some 30% saw some justification behind the attacks, even if they felt sorry for the victims and their families. However, those participants viewed the attacks as a political, rather than a religious, issue.

Introduction Islam is the youngest, fastest growing, and perhaps most controversial of the three monotheistic religions. Following the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States (henceforth, 9/11), Islam and Muslims started to come to the forefront of the Western media, albeit not for very positive reasons. Because Osama Bin Laden cited religious motives for his criminal attacks, a debate started brewing in the Western media over the true nature of Islam and whether or not it justified or even encouraged violence, particularly against non-Muslims. Many media outlets referred to the 9/11 terrorists simply as ‘‘Muslims,’’ which fueled stereotyping of Islam and did nothing to help stop the verbal and physical attacks taking place against Muslims in the U.S. at the time. In an attempt to study how Muslims viewed the attacks from a religious point of view, this article examines the online message exchange on three major discussion boards in the Arab and Muslim world. Through a descriptive content analysis of these messages, the different viewpoints reiterated through Internet conversations are examined. This is an important medium in this part of the world (the Middle East), since most of the media are government-owned and controlled. The Internet, however, provides a relatively free expression forum for Middle Eastern audiences.

It therefore has the potential to reveal Muslim points of view without governmental slanting of ideas in any particular political or religious manner. Arabs and Muslims in the Western Media At the outset, there is a need to differentiate between the terms ‘‘Arab’’ and ‘‘Muslim,’’ which tend to be used interchangeably in the Western media. Arabs are members of an ethnic group of people who reside in North Africa and the Arabian Peninsula. Muslims are those who choose Islam as their religion. Most Arabs (more than 90%) are Muslims. However, the majority of Muslims are not Arabs. The majority of Muslims come from India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, all of which are non-Arab countries (Abdulla, 2007). Long before the attacks of 9/11, Arabs had voiced their concerns about their image in the Western media. In 1980, journalist Djelloul Marbrouk noted that the Arab in American television stands for ‘‘terrorism, hijack, intractability, sullenous, perverseness, cruelty, oil, sand, embargo, boycott, greed, bungling, comedic disunity, primitive torture, family feuds, and white slavery’’ (Shaheen, 1980, n.p.). Shaheen quotes Newsweek regarding the image of an Arab on television, ‘‘He is swarthy and bearded, rich and filthy, dabbling in dope smuggling and white slavery; swaddled in white robes, he carries a curved knife, rides a camel and abuses young boys. He knows a thousand vile curses such as ‘May the fleas of a diseased camel infect the hair of your first born’’’ (n.p.). Shaheen provides examples of many programs that portrayed Arabs in a negative light in the late 1970s, from Hollywood pictures and productions such as Vegas, Fantasy Island, and Charlie’s Angels to comic strips such as Brenda Starr and Dennis the Menace. He also provides examples of antiArab and anti-Muslim coverage from reputed news shows such as 60 Minutes and 20/20, in addition to regular news bulletins that associated Arabs and Muslims with terrorism. A few years later, Shaheen (1984) noted that ‘‘the stereotype [of Arabs] remains omnipresent, appearing in new programs and dated reruns’’ (p. 113). Shaheen reports on an interview with a CBS Vice President who confirmed the notion, saying he ‘‘had never seen a ‘good Arab’ on TV,’’ and that Arabs are rather usually portrayed as ‘‘warmongers and/or covetous desert rulers’’ (p. 114). Indeed, Slade (1981) analyzed a poll of American attitudes and perceptions towards Arabs and found that Americans have little knowledge of Arab culture, history, or contributions to the world. She reported that Americans commonly think of Arabs as ‘‘anti-American,’’ ‘‘anti-Christian,’’ ‘‘unfriendly,’’ and ‘‘warlike.’’ Christensen (2006a, b) argues that the spread of Islamophobia in the West is at least in part the responsibility of distorted and imbalanced media coverage. He argues that news programs are perceived usually as ‘‘serious’’ and ‘‘truthful’’ because journalism is associated in the public mind with objectivity and fairness. Western news stories, he says, tend to show a mosque, a minaret, or a veiled woman regardless of the nature of the story, even when the story is about terrorism. ‘‘The combination

of stereotypical images adds up to a whole that is, in many ways, greater than the sum of its parts’’ (Christensen, 2006b, p. 30). Said (1997) argues that the image of Islam in the U.S. media has always been influenced by a framework of politics and hidden interests and is therefore laden with ‘‘not only patent inaccuracy but also expressions of unrestrained ethnocentrism, cultural and even racial hatred, deep yet paradoxically free-floating hostility’’ (p. ii). He characterizes the image as involving ‘‘highly exaggerated stereotyping and belligerent hostility’’ (p. xi). Said, himself an American Christian scholar, states, ‘‘Malicious generalizations about Islam have become the last acceptable form of denigration of foreign culture in the West; what is said about the Muslim mind, or character, or religion, or culture as a whole cannot now be said in mainstream discussion about Africans, Jews, other Orientals, or Asians’’ (p. xii). If this was the image before 9/11, things took a turn for the worse after the criminal attacks. Despite the fact that all Arab countries condemned the attacks, for the most part, voices communicated through the mass media still failed to differentiate between Arabs and Muslims, on one hand, and terrorists, on the other. Pintak (2006) reports on Eric Rouleau of Le Monde, who criticized the tendency to portray images of ‘‘Muslims praying, mosques or women in chadors to illustrate stories about extremism and terror’’ (p. 33-34). Pintak adds that after the events of 9/11, ‘‘the U.S. media immediately fell back on the prevailing—and stereotyped—narrative about Arabs and Muslims and reverted to its historic tendency to present the world, in Henry Kissinger’s words, as ‘a morality play between good and evil’’’ (p. 39). Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting (FAIR, 2001) noted that ‘‘many media pundits focused on one theme: retaliation. For some, it did not matter who bears the brunt of an American attack’’ (n.p.). For example, on September 12, 2001, Steve Dunleavy wrote in the New York Post: ‘‘The response to this unimaginable 21stcentury Pearl Harbor should be as simple as it is swift—kill the bastards. A gunshot between the eyes, blow them to smithereens, poison them if you have to. As for cities or countries that host these worms, bomb them into basketball courts.’’ On September 11, former U.S. Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger commented on CNN, ‘‘There is only one way to begin to deal with people like this, and that is you have to kill some of them even if they are not immediately directly involved in this thing’’ (FAIR, 2001, n.p.). On September 13, Bill O’Reilly, on his popular The O’Reilly Factor show on the Fox News Channel, said it ‘‘doesn’t make any difference’’ who you kill in the process of retaliation against the attacks (FAIR, 2001, n.p.). On the same day, syndicated columnist Ann Coulter wrote: This is no time to be precious about locating the exact individuals directly involved in this particular terrorist attack.. We should invade their countries, kill their leaders and convert them to Christianity. We weren’t punctilious about locating and punishing only Hitler and his top officers. We carpet-bombed German cities; we killed civilians. That’s war. And this is war. (FAIR, 2001, n.p.)
 

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At a meeting of the Global Policy Forum, Hans Giessmann of the University of Hamburg’s Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy criticized the Western media for how it ‘‘fully attributed blame for the September attacks on ‘Muslim terrorists’ and stopped there’’ (Inbaraj, 2002, n.p.). He added that ‘‘the media accepted the side effects of a stigmatization of religion, cultures, states, people and minorities and this paved the way for prejudices’’ (n.p.). Journalists at the meeting agreed that the media failed to provide context for their pictures and stories. That, they said, would have ‘‘allowed readers, viewers and listeners to gain a clear understanding of the background issues and of the clash on interpretations in a war where the lines were blurred between reporting and propaganda in a controlled atmosphere’’ (Inbaraj, 2002, n.p.). Perhaps most offensive to Muslims was Reverend Jerry Falwell’s statement on 60 Minutes: ‘‘I think Mohammed was a terrorist. I read enough of the history of his life written by both Muslims and non-Muslims, that he was a violent man, a man of war’’ (CBS news, 2002, n.p.). Statements like this coincided with and may have contributed to an increasing anti-Muslim sentiment. CNN reported that the anti-Islamic sentiment following 9/11 was spreading around the world. Several mosques in Europe and Australia were petrol-bombed by individuals who believed they were ‘‘doing the U.S. a favor.’’ In South Shields, Northern England, graffiti on a wall near a mosque read in red paint, ‘‘Avenge U.S.A. Kill a Muslim now’’ (Jones, 2001, n.p.). Such trends in the American media coverage of the post 9/11 attacks were documented in several studies. Pintak (2006) reports on a content analysis of CBS newscasts carried out by the Center for Media and Public Affairs. The study found that in covering the war on Iraq, the network was ‘‘most supportive’’ of U.S. government policies (p. 44). Those who displayed an anti-war message or attitude were found to constitute fewer than 10% of interviewees on CBS Evening News with Dan Rather. The study concluded that CBS coverage was even more conservative than Fox News, which is seen as ‘‘the headquarters for patriotic fervor’’ (p. 44). Pintak further reports on another study by the U.S. Department of Defense, which analyzed U.S., European, and Middle Eastern newspapers. The study concluded that the American media ‘‘primed its audience to support the war,’’ while silencing opposition voices (p. 43). Fadel (2002) conducted a content analysis of an Egyptian daily newspaper (Al Ahram) and an American daily newspaper (USA Today) in the three months following 9/11. The study showed that the top two subjects mentioned in relation to Arab countries in both newspapers were terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism. However, while Al Ahram stressed the Arab world’s condemnation of the attacks and of fundamentalism, USA Today linked Arabs to Islamic fundamentalism, terrorism, and extremism all over the world. The study also reported that the American newspaper ‘‘adopted a clear line of linking violence and terrorism with resisting Israeli occupation in parts of Lebanon and the Palestinian territories’’ (p. 451). Gomaa (2002) conducted a content analysis of the image of Islam and Muslims in the American, French, and German press. She analyzed the International Herald Tribune, Le Monde, and Frankfurter Allgemeine during the 50 days following 9/11. She reported that although the Herald focused on Osama Bin Laden as the party responsible for the attacks (even before any evidence had surfaced), the newspaper tackled the issue in light of Huntington’s (1993) ‘‘clash of civilizations’’ thesis and portrayed it as a start for a Crusade between Islam and the West. The Herald claimed that the Arab and Muslim countries have become a safe haven for terrorism and are breeding a ‘‘culture of violence’’ (p. 239). The study contrasted this with Le Monde’s coverage, which stressed the dangers of terrorism as a global issue that is not restricted to the Muslim world, and clarified the nature of Islam as a religion of tolerance and peace. The French newspaper focused its analysis on the importance of understanding the other and acquainting oneself with foreign civilizations. It stressed that the issue is not one of a clash of civilizations, but rather a clash between extremists and moderates within each civilization and across ethnicities and religions worldwide. In this light, the newspaper argued, France should support the U.S. not in a war against Islam but in a war against the terrorists who carried out these attacks on humanity. Still, the study reported that Le Monde reported negatively on the Arab and Muslim worlds in about 65% of its total coverage. This figure was up to 78% in the Herald, and 86.5% in Frankfurter Allgemeine. In its coverage of the sources of terrorism worldwide, the Herald linked terrorism with the Arab and Muslim world 96% of the time. Chomsky (2001) asserted that the mainstream media in the U.S. constituted ‘‘well-run propaganda systems’’ whose capacity ‘‘to drive people to irrational, murderous, and suicidal behavior’’ should not be underestimated. He urged citizens to resist the notion of responding to terrorist crimes with more terror directed against civilian Muslims abroad but said the ‘‘hysterical’’ attitude of the media in such circumstances was not surprising (p. 69). Pintak (2006) contended that the bias in American media after 9/11 constituted what could be called ‘‘jihad journalism’’ (pp. 42-44). He added that such slanted coverage was ‘‘the hallmark of the post-9/11 era’’ (p. 44). Fruit (2001) called it ‘‘a result of racist jingoism,’’ adding, ‘‘This is shocking but not surprising in the face of the Anti-Islamic, xenophobic hysteria in the media and from our ‘world-leaders’’’ (n.p.). In light of the above literature, this study examines discussions about Islam in the Arabic-language postings of Arabs and Muslims after 9/11. It discusses whether those who posted messages thought Islamic teachings were the reason behind the attacks, and whether the attacks are considered acts of terrorism or acts of Islamic jihad.
 

duluxe

Alfrescian
Loyal
Islam, Jihad, and Terrorism in Post-9/11 Arabic Discussion Boards
Rasha A. Abdulla
Journalism and Mass Communication Department The American University in Cairo
 

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