Changing power equation in the Indo-Pacific

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In the last few decades, India has witnessed a transformational change in its foreign policy-making. Ever since India moved away from bloc politics during the Cold War era and opened a new front of diplomatic engagement with the like-minded newly independent countries of the Global South, many realist and neo-realist scholars such as Leo E Rose and Baldev Raj Nayar termed India a ‘pragmatic State’ for choosing ‘strategic autonomy’ in foreign policy-making. Since India emerged from colonial suppression after several years of struggle against British imperialism, it could not afford to become a victim of another great-power politics; therefore, it decided to stay away from it. The formation of NAM under the leadership of then Prime Minister (PM) Jawaharlal Nehru was purely based on a strategic and political framework; its establishment was mainly oriented towards collectively opposing the prevailing imperialism, colonialism and Cold War politics. Therefore, the then-Indian leadership chose peace over conflict. Since the internal challenges of newly independent India were not that favourable to taking any sides, China, on the other hand, taking its side with the Soviet bloc, remarkably strengthened itself and positioned itself very well in Asia. With China’s exponential rise in Asia in the late 1990s and early 2000s, challenges to American hegemony in the region gradually shifted India more into the category of a swing State, as the US always sought to play the India card to balance China to maintain its hegemonic image in Asia as well as the Indo-Pacific. Therefore, many international scholars, such as John Mearsheimer and Christopher Layne, argue that India’s growing ties with the US in the early 2000s were a well-planned offshore balancing strategy by the US to diplomatically position India against the rising China.

Today, the transformational shift in India’s foreign policy has pushed India towards becoming a leading power or system shaper in Asia. It is argued in several scholarly works that in the early first quarter of the 21st century, India, after years of regional challenges, now somehow managed to become a leading power in Asia. However, scholars such as Ashley J Tellis write in his book “Grasping Greatness: Making India a Leading Power” that India still has a long way to go. Although India has become a leading power in recent times, it still does not belong to the category of great power that it seems destined for. A leading power can best be called a system shaper. It means a leading power cannot write the new rules of the world order; at best, such a power can only change some rules, since it is not a genuine pole of international politics. However, the rapidly changing power dynamic in the Indo-Pacific is an opportunity for India to achieve what it is destined for. Foreign minister S Jaishankar argues that in recent times, the changes in globalisation, rebalancing in the international order and rising multipolarity have left India with no other option but to maintain a transactional relationship with the international community. Since economic diplomacy has become a defining feature of India’s foreign policy in recent times, energy diplomacy is one of the most important aspects of it, where India aggressively follows its strategic autonomy, keeping national interest a top priority of diplomatic engagements.

 

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In the Strait of Gulf, his oil tankers were attacked by the Iran and US, in the Caspian Sea, his tankers were hit by Russia and Ukraine