AMDK say Deglobalization is making world reset to 1930...tge Good Old Days De woh

[k1976]

OpinionAdrian Wooldridge

Deglobalization Is Not Just for Countries​

Multinational companies are rethinking their corporate structures for a world that looks more like the 1930s than the 1990s.

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That was then.
Photographer: J. Wilds/Hulton Archive/Getty Images
By Adrian Wooldridge
July 20, 2023 at 12:00 AM EDT

Forty years ago, Theodore Levitt, then the most respected marketing thinker at Harvard Business School, wrote a pathbreaking article in the Harvard Business Review (“The Globalization of Markets”) that contained the resounding phrase “the earth is round, but for most practical purposes it’s sensible to treat it as flat.”

As globalization gathered pace, a growing number of companies followed his advice. Ford Motor Co. launched an ambitious plan to build a one-size-fits-all car company under the slogan “Ford 2000.” The carmaker abolished a score of separate national units and replaced them with global product teams. International Business Machines Corp. tried to turn itself into a “globally integrated enterprise,” defined by Sam Palmisano, the company’s CEO from 2003 to 2011, as “a company that fashions its strategy, its management, and its operations in pursuit of a new goal: the integration of production and value delivery

 

[k1976]

https://www.brookings.edu/articles/what-is-the-evidence-for-deglobalization/

What is the evidence for deglobalization?​

Pinelopi K. Goldberg, Tristan Reed, Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti, James Stock​

May 11, 2023

It is widely understood that the global economy has become increasingly interconnected over the last century, with especially rapid globalization trends for 20 years starting in the 1990s. That trend continued even through the COVID-19 pandemic, when countries were forced to close their doors and many supply chains were disrupted. However, new Brookings Papers on Economic Activity research by Pinelopi Goldberg and Tristan Reed uses trade, capital flow, and immigration to show that there has been a slowing in globalization beginning around 2015. In a conversation on the Brookings Podcast on Economic Activity, recorded in March 2022, the authors joined Brookings Senior Fellow Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti for a discussion on their findings and the outlook for globalization going forward.

 

[k1976]

https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2023/01/deglobalisation-what-you-need-to-know-wef23/

Sentiment is turning towards deglobalisation​

The rise of globalisation was never entirely smooth or assured. The reduction of global trade that was bookended by the two world wars was followed by 60 years of increased globalisation.

This included the hyper-globalisation period from 1990 to 2008.
However, the 2008 financial crisis, trade wars, disenfranchised middle classes in developed economies and rising concerns about over-reliance on trade with single partners led to a period of relatively stagnant "slowbalisation".

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GLOBAL COOPERATION

Deglobalisation: what you need to know​

Jan 17, 2023

Deglobalisation may be picking up pace as a result of the war in Ukraine, the COVID-19 pandemic and the needs of the green transition. Image: Getty Images/iStockphoto

Christian Keller​

Managing Director, Head of Economics Research, Barclays

Renate Marold​

Director, Investment Sciences, Barclays
This article is part of:World Economic Forum Annual Meeting
Listen to the article

6 min listen

• Following nearly a century of globalisation, successive global shocks and the movement to confront climate change appear to be turning the tide.
• 'Slowbalisation' following the 2008 financial crisis may be turning into deglobalisation.
• But some regions and sectors are deglobalising faster than others.

In response to COVID-19, Russia’s war with Ukraine and climate change, governments and global companies are seeking security and resilience over the benefits of global value chains.
There are strong signals that the era of globalisation is coming to an end, analysis by research analysts at Barclays Corporate and Investment Bank suggests.

Sentiment is turning towards deglobalisation​

The rise of globalisation was never entirely smooth or assured. The reduction of global trade that was bookended by the two world wars was followed by 60 years of increased globalisation. This included the hyper-globalisation period from 1990 to 2008.
However, the 2008 financial crisis, trade wars, disenfranchised middle classes in developed economies and rising concerns about over-reliance on trade with single partners led to a period of relatively stagnant "slowbalisation".

Since the end of the second world war, globalisation has surged — but that era may be coming to an end. Image: Jorda-Schularick-Taylor Macrohistory Database. Data 1960 onwards for World from IMG and World Bank, Barclays Research
Today, "slowbalisation" appears to be moving towards deglobalisation.

Recent disruptions to global value chains such as the COVID-19 pandemic, the war in Ukraine, growing ideological differences and the green transition have prompted governments and corporations to reconsider external dependencies. They are looking closer to home and to trusted partners for more resilient growth models.
This sentiment is transcending media headlines and political posturing, and is becoming part of general corporate rhetoric. According to Barclays’ Investment Sciences team, a small but notable fraction — 4% — of corporate transcripts mentioned onshoring in 2022. Striking, when this has been under 1% prior to the pandemic.

 

[k1976]

Deglobalization Is the New Globalization​

National industrial policies aren’t a move away from a more globalized economy so much as an extension of it.

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An aerial view of industrial energy policy.
Photographer: CFOTO/Future Publishing via Getty Images
By Tyler Cowen
February 3, 2023 at 7:00 AM EST

For better or worse, industrial policy is back. The European Union is placing “green tariffs” on carbon-intensive imports. The US is giving green-energy subsidies to domestic firms. Guaranteed access to high-quality semiconductor chips is a priority for various nations, including China, the US and the UK, for economic and geopolitical reasons. And of course there is now far greater appreciation, after Covid, of the benefits of a domestic vaccine industry.

It would be a mistake, however, to think that these policies represent a move away from globalization. In fact they are an extension of globalization — and they likely will enable yet more globalization to come. That sounds counterintuitive, so let me explain.

 

[k1976]

https://www2.deloitte.com/us/en/ins...ation-fdi-cross-border-investment-trends.html

Article
10 minute read 28 February 2023

Is deglobalization in the cards?​

The February 2023 Economics Spotlight takes a closer look at the trends in cross-border investment to gauge if concerns around deglobalization hold water.​

Patricia Buckley​

United States

Bhavna Tejwani​

India




Dating back to the global financial crisis, many economic observers have worried that a trend of deglobalization has been underway, threatening to reverse decades of gains from trade. However, similar to a recently published Deloitte study that looked at trade flows, we find no evidence of deglobalization when considering trends in cross-border investment.
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In “Globalization is here to stay,1” Deloitte economists Ira Kalish and Michael Wolf analyze one of the major indicators of globalization: trade in goods. For the purpose of this report, we also assessed cross-border investment flows to evaluate changes, if any, in patterns of financial integration between economies. Specifically, we: i) noted the decline in global investment flows but also the increase in foreign direct investment (FDI) stock; ii) acknowledged the vulnerability of foreign investment to economic shocks and policy shifts; iii) noted the evidence on resilience of investment flows; iv) distinguished between conduit and productive investment; v) examined alternative measures of investment to overcome inadequacies in FDI data; and vi) noted future challenges for cross-border investment flows. We concluded that though cross-border investments are vulnerable to shocks in economies and policy shifts, there is evidence of resilience in the levels of foreign investment.
We take a deeper dive into each of these aspects:
FDI flows versus stock: Post the global financial crisis, net global FDI inflows have not been growing as fast as global gross domestic product (GDP), mainly due to declining rates of return and a less favorable policy climate.2 However, the growth in FDI flows has been sufficient enough to increase FDI stock as a percent of GDP. Barring the initial setbacks during shocks to the economy, such as during the global financial crisis and the initial emergences of the COVID-19 pandemic, the share of FDI stock in GDP has been rising.

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Vulnerability of foreign investment to economic shocks and policy shifts: Foreign investment is channeled into the creation of productive assets via greenfield investments, or through the purchase of existing assets via mergers and acquisitions (M&A). The United Nations (UN) also reports data on international project finance, a mechanism to channel investment in infrastructure and other sectors relevant for sustainable development.3 These components of FDI respond differently to uncertainties in the economy and the policy environment.
While greenfield investments appear to be more vulnerable to economic shocks, M&A and international project finance are closely linked to financial markets and are more responsive to policy initiatives and changes. In 2021, FDI flows rebounded from the low levels reached during the pandemic in 2020.4 This recovery was driven by a rebound in M&A markets and international project finance due to a return to accommodative monetary policies and an increase in infrastructure stimulus packages across economies. However, the recovery in greenfield investments remained subdued.

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Resilience of investment flows: Although foreign investment is sensitive to changes in policies, there is evidence of resilience after the initial impact wears off. For instance, in 2018, the United States enacted the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act (FIRRMA), which strengthened the ability of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the US (CFIUS) to review foreign investment for national security consideration, even if it did not result in the control of a US business.5 While not explicitly aimed at China, the number of CFIUS cases involving Chinese investors fell between 2017 and 2020 before rebounding in 2021,6 as Chinese investors appear to have adjusted to the new rules. The data on M&A also suggests that the CFIUS turned cautious post-FIRRMA but is now stabilizing in its reviews.
The growth in inward investment in the United States declined during 2018–2020 but rebounded in 2021. In fact, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) reported that in 2021, the United States was the world’s top destination for FDI, while China also moved up a notch to the third position.7

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Despite a rise in protectionist sentiment and talk of nearshoring amid global supply chain pressures during the pandemic, the Peterson Institute for International Economics notes that inward FDI in China rose by a third, to reach a new all-time high, allaying concerns around deglobalization.8 Further, the Peterson report notes that a majority of the firms in the United States and Europe with investments in China do not plan to pull out of the economy amid an increasingly favorable policy climate.

 

[k1976]

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deg... the,and investment between countries decline.

 

[k1976]

Periods of deglobalization have mainly been seen as interesting comparators to other periods, such as 1850–1914 and 1950–2007, in which globalization had been the norm, given that globalization is the norm for most people and because the interpretation of the global economy has mainly been framed as inevitably increasing integration.[6]

Therefore, even periods of stagnant international interaction are often wrongly seen as periods of deglobalization. Recently, scientists have started to also compare the major periods of deglobalization in order to better understand drivers and consequences of this phenomenon.[7][8]

The two major phases of deglobalisation are not identical twins. The two phases of deglobalisation were equally triggered by a demand shock in the wake of a financial crisis. Both in the 1930s and in the 2000s the composition of trade was a second key determinant: manufacturing trade bore the brunt of the contraction.

One important finding is that country experiences both during the Great Depression and Great Recession are very heterogeneous so that one-size-fits-all policies to counter negative impacts of deglobalization are inappropriate.[9] In the 1930s, democracies supported free trade, and deglobalisation was driven by autocratic decisions to strengthen self-sufficiency. In the 2010s, political institutions are just as significant, but now democratic decisions such as the election of President Trump with an America First agenda[10] and Brexit drive the deglobalisation process worldwide. Indeed, while the industrialised countries in the 2010s avoided the pitfalls of protectionism and deflation, they have experienced different political dynamics.

 

[k1976]

Deglobalization has also been used as a political agenda item or a term in framing the debate on a new World economic order, for example by Walden Bello in his 2005 book Deglobalization.[15]

One of the prominent examples of deglobalization movement could be found in the United States of America, where the Bush and Obama administration instituted Buy American Act clause as party of massive stimulus package, which was designed to favor American-made goods over traded goods.

Likewise, the EU has imposed new subsidies to protect their agricultural sectors for their own protection.

These movements of deglobalization can be seen as the example of how developed nations react to the Financial crisis of 2007–08 through deglobalization movements.[16]

Recently a change in the pattern of anti-globalism has been observed: anti-globalism now has a strong foothold in the Global North and among right-wing (conservative) politicians,[17] with much different attitudes in the Global South, particular among the BRICS countries.

 

[k1976]

https://www.cfr.org/event/coping-deglobalization-conversation-council-councils

 

[k1976]

 

[laksaboy]

Only globalist vermins support globalism.

This is the true essence of globalism:

 

[k1976]

https://online.ucpress.edu/currenthistory/article/122/840/3/195020/The-Specter-of-Deglobalization

 

[k1976]

https://www.enterprisesg.gov.sg/gro..._nqqZt70_EbAf8fZ5auAriWnw4gl7fohoCJLEQAvD_BwE

All ish no lost... Singapore has many many FTA De woh

 

[k1976]

Singapore will be a strong beacon to lead the globalization revival again

 

[k1976]

Heng Ong Huat lah...

 

[k1976]

https://www.google.com.sg/amp/s/www...the-worlds-free-trade-champion/1302785?espv=1

 

[k1976]

and Cambodia and even destinations further afield in South Asia, Central Asia and Africa.

This might seem counter intuitive, as with growth slowing globally the temptation is to keep the money at home and to use our cash piles and wealth funds domestically to keep people happy ― Singapore first. But for us this isn’t an option: if we retreat behind our reserves, we won’t have an economic future.

For its own good, Singapore needs to lead the charge for free trade if no other leaders are forth-coming. Our Island is a trading post so it is time for us to fight for trade.

 

[k1976]

wealth around the world.

The bottom line is that Singapore companies and its government need to start investing ― and sharing our wealth with the region ― not for charity but for viable profit-driven projects.

To date Singapore's investments in the region have been modest. According to government statistics over the past decade, over US$600 billion of investments have flowed from Singapore to China but just US$50 billion has flowed from Singapore to Malaysia.

Our other regional partners have seen even less Singaporean (or Singapore-based) money. The situation needs to be rebalanced and more of the money flowing through Singapore must go to places like Myanmar and Cambodia and even destinations further afield in South Asia, Central Asia and Africa.

This might seem counter intuitive, as with growth slowing globally the temptation is to keep the money at home and to use our cash piles and wealth funds domestically to keep people happy ― Singapore first. But for us this isn’t an option: if we retreat behind our reserves, we won’t have an economic future.

For its own good, Singapore needs to lead the charge for free trade if no other leaders are forth-coming. Our Island is a trading post so it is time for us to fight for trade.

 

[k1976]

 

[k1976]