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Chitchat Any gong cheebye invest in Noontalk Media?

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https://www.channelnewsasia.com/sin...asmond-koh-financial-performance-sias-5427371

NoonTalk Media defends business strategy after auditor raises concerns about losses​

The media entertainment company, led by former DJ Dasmond Koh, has failed to make a profit since its listing in 2022, with accumulated losses reaching S$9.2 million as of Jun 30.​

NoonTalk Media defends business strategy after auditor raises concerns about losses

Former DJ Dasmond Koh and the logo of the media entertainment company he co-founded, NoonTalk Media. (File photos: Instagram/@dasmondkoh and Facebook/NoonTalk Media)

Read a summary of this article on FAST.
SINGAPORE: Media entertainment company NoonTalk Media on Monday (Oct 27) defended its business strategy after an independent auditor flagged concerns about its financial performance and ability to sustain operations.

NoonTalk Media, led by former DJ Dasmond Koh, incurred a net loss of S$1.8 million (US$1.39 million) and net operating cash outflows of S$0.9 million for its 2025 financial year, which ended on Jun 30.

This is the third consecutive year that NoonTalk Media has failed to make a profit since listing in 2022.

Its accumulated losses had reached S$9.16 million as of Jun 30.

According to the auditor's report on Oct 16, the financial numbers "indicate the existence of a material uncertainty that may cast significant doubt about the group’s ability to continue as a going concern".

This prompted the Securities Investors Association (Singapore), or SIAS, to raise questions about NoonTalk Media's plans to achieve profitability, its cost structure, as well as how the board exercises its oversight duties.

PLANS TO BECOME PROFITABLE​

Addressing the questions from SIAS, NoonTalk Media pointed to projects such as the Golden Singa Awards, an international event in December that recognises outstanding achievements for Chinese-language films.

“The Golden Singa Awards will be an international yearly event that will ensure a steady cash flow for the Group as it develops,” it said in a statement on the Singapore Exchange.

It added that the event is expected to contribute to the company’s financial performance over the medium term rather than immediate profit.

NoonTalk Media also highlighted micro-drama and other collaborative projects as part of its growth strategy.

Micro-drama episodes last around one to two minutes each, and are designed specifically for mobile viewing. It is a form of content that has taken the Chinese market by storm in recent years.

“While the micro-drama ecosystem is more developed in regional markets such as China, with billion-dollar revenues projected for 2025, Singapore’s micro-drama industry remains in its early stages but is showing promising growth since early 2025,” said the company.

“NoonTalk Media’s extensive artiste network and comprehensive in-house production capabilities distinguish itself from smaller independent studios, enabling more cost-effective and scalable development.”

Founded by Mr Koh in 2011, NoonTalk Media specialises in artiste and talent management, multimedia production and events.

The company said it has developed a slate of micro-drama productions in collaboration with strategic partners, with launches planned within the current financial year.

Also read:​

COST CONTROLS​

SIAS noted that NoonTalk Media’s administrative expenses had “significantly” exceeded gross profits, indicating “potential inefficiencies in cost structure and scalability”.

The company’s cost of sales, which includes staff and subcontracting costs, was more than S$5.7 million for FY2025, up from about S$4.3 million in the previous year.

Giving a breakdown of the cost of sales, NoonTalk said staff costs under the costs of sales had decreased. It fell from from S$2.1 million in FY2024 to S$1.7 million in FY2025, as "management continues to carefully streamline manpower".

Subcontracting costs, however, almost doubled, rising from S$2.1 million in FY2024 to S$4 million in FY2025.
According to the company, it has shifted towards contract and project-based roles over the past three years to better manage manpower and resources, with headcount falling from 61 to 40.

“Like any other industry in Singapore, the Group also faced inflationary salary levels over the past few years,” it said. “Management maintains a rigorous screening process and continues to explore opportunities to retain and attract suitable talent.”

NoonTalk Media said it reduced staff costs by 12.7 per cent in total in FY2025, touting it as a significant achievement despite cost pressures, given the increased revenue and gross profit.

The company added that its board and management team have implemented a "structured cost transformation plan with measurable milestones and accountability".

“Significant cost savings are expected to materialise in FY2026, with rental expenses being a major contributor to the reduction,” said NoonTalk Media.

BOARD’S OVERSIGHT DUTIES​

Noting the company’s financial performance for the past three years, SIAS questioned how NoonTalk Media's board had exercised its oversight duties and evaluated its own effectiveness.

In response, Noontalk Media said its board was operating amid a challenging environment that has evolved post-pandemic, especially with the advancement of new technology in the edutainment and media industry.

The board had “actively engaged with key management" over the past three years to implement cost optimisation initiatives, leading to reduced losses and improved revenue, said the company

“These efforts have resulted in improved revenues from S$4.4 million to S$6.3 million and reduced losses for FY2024 and FY2025, respectively,” it said.

NoonTalk added that the board continuously monitors NoonTalk Media’s long-term value creation and sustainability, conducting regular self-assessments.

“The board remains committed to making the necessary structural and strategic adjustments beyond business as usual to strengthen stakeholder confidence and ensure long-term resilience,” it said.
 
can become a SG educational documentary film maker?

Can save the Sinki from extinction
 

NoonTalk Media — CSI-Style Forensic Brief​

Executive summary​


NoonTalk Media Ltd (SGX: SEJ) is a small, founder-led Chinese-language media firm (artist management, production, events). Since its 2022 Catalist IPO it has recorded cumulative losses ≈ S$9.16M (to 30 Jun 2025), a FY2025 net loss of ~S$1.8M and operating cash outflows of ~S$0.9M. Staff & subcontracting costs ballooned (subcontracting ≈ S$4M in FY2025) and staff costs (~S$2.86M) materially exceed gross profit, producing recurring negative cash flow. Auditors issued a material uncertainty related to going concern (net liabilities ≈ S$396,881). Survival to date has relied heavily on founder (Dasmond Koh) funding — an unsecured, interest-free committed loan of up to S$2.0M (S$550k drawn in FY2025; further S$800k post-year end) — plus cost cuts and episodic production revenues. The company is event/project driven, lumpy, and lacks a stable recurring revenue engine.

Snapshot facts (key numbers)​

  • FY2025 revenue ≈ S$6.26M (production ≈ S$4.54M).
  • FY2025 net loss ≈ S$1.795M.
  • Cumulative losses (since IPO) ≈ S$9.16M.
  • Cash & cash equivalents fell from S$1.61M (2024) → S$0.69M (2025).
  • Operating cash used ≈ S$0.9M in FY2025.
  • Staff costs ≈ S$2.86M (cost of sales S$1.79M + admin S$1.07M).
  • Subcontracting increased to ~S$4.0M (FY2025).
  • Director loan committed by founder up to S$2.0M; S$550k drawn in FY2025; S$800k advanced after year-end; unsecured and interest-free, repayable on/after 1 Jul 2026.
  • Founder/CEO disclosed FY2025 cash remuneration ≈ S$300,891.
  • Auditor: going-concern material uncertainty.

Business model — how NoonTalk earns money​

  1. Management & Events (majority of revenue)
    • Artist/talent management commissions (10–20% of fees).
    • Event production & management (corporate events, charity concerts, national events). Revenue is lumpy and project-based.
  2. Production (TV/film/multimedia)
    • Co-productions, commissioned videos, short dramas, livestreams. High upfront costs and variable margins.
  3. Other
    • Studio rental, IP/licensing (limited), grants/other income (modest).
Operational pattern: bid for a project → assemble internal crew + subcontractors → deliver → invoice/collect. High fixed labour cost + high variable subcontract cost makes margin management difficult. Post-COVID shift to livestream/short-form seeks growth but is not yet recurring revenue.

How NoonTalk has been surviving (mechanics)​

  • Founder funding: the single largest stabiliser — an unsecured S$2M loan promise; tranches drawn to bridge working capital gaps.
  • Project wins: episodic higher-margin production/events helped revenues in FY2025 (e.g., Golden Singa/IMDA ties cited).
  • Cost control: headcount cuts (61 → ~40), rent reductions, lower corporate overheads.
  • Working-capital timing: stretching payables and timing receipts to smooth cash flows.
  • Government grants / other income: small, but helpful.

Red flags & governance concerns​

  1. Going-concern: auditor’s qualifier is a serious investor warning.
  2. Founder dependence: unsecured, interest-free related-party loan is principal lifeline → conflict and sustainability risk.
  3. Negative equity / cumulative losses: repeated losses reduce financing options and market confidence.
  4. Cost structure mismatch: staff & subcontracting > gross profit; implies business not scalable without model change.
  5. Revenue concentration & receivables: large receivables share of assets and few big customers create liquidity vulnerability.
  6. Remuneration and related-party optics: founder pay (~S$300k) is disclosed; not obviously excessive alone, but combined with founder lending and lack of robust clawback/protections raises governance questions.
  7. Lumpy, non-recurring revenue base: events/production are not guaranteed future cashflow.

Additional forensic observations / analysis (my additions)​

  • Hidden leverage risk: unsecured loan repayable on demand post-July 2026 is a ticking maturity risk. If founder cannot/will not extend, company must find alternative financing quickly or face insolvency risk.
  • Working capital mismatch: production companies often front cash for talent/crew; unless contractual advance rules or client deposit policies are tightened, cash burn will persist.
  • Value of IP & artists: artiste rosters and content IP could be monetised (licensing, recurring digital distribution) — but current disclosures indicate limited scale here. Monetisation strategy seems underdeveloped.
  • Potential audit focus areas: revenue recognition on production contracts, recoverability of contract assets/receivables, related-party disclosure completeness, and going-concern stress assumptions.
  • Strategic path dependence: success appears pinned to a small number of medium-term bets (micro-dramas, Golden Singa). Failure to deliver commercial traction by FY2026 will materially increase default probability.
  • Founder incentives: while cash salary is modest, equity/control concentration means founder incentives might not be fully aligned with minority shareholders — especially if founder lending terms are preferential.

Plausible scenarios (next 12–24 months)​

  1. Best case (30%) — Micro-drama/award projects scale, recurring clients sign retainer deals, operational margins improve, founder loan provides bridge until self-sufficiency. Auditor removes going-concern next report.
  2. Stressed case (50%) — Lumpy wins continue but not recurring; founder extends/forgives loan; company trims further but remains subscale; eventual rights issue or strategic tie-up required.
  3. Downside (20%) — Client payments falter or founder can’t/ won’t extend funding; liquidity squeeze → restructuring, asset sales, or delisting.

Practical recommendations (for investors / watchdogs / AGM questions)​

Immediate document requests / disclosure checks
  1. Provide executed loan agreement(s) with Mr Dasmond Koh (terms, security, board resolution approving the loan).
  2. Provide monthly cashflow and bank statements for latest 12 months; show runway with/without further founder funding.
  3. Supply aged receivables ledger and status of top 5 customers (contracts, retention terms, security).
  4. Show revenue recognition policies for production contracts and any significant one-off adjustments.
  5. Provide board minutes approving remuneration and related-party transactions.
  6. Auditor: provide management-letter highlights and going-concern mitigation evidence.
Good governance fixes the company should adopt
  • Formalise an independent repayment/extension plan for founder loan (convertible facility, market-rate interest or equity conversion) with independent director sign-off.
  • Tighten client contracts to secure upfront deposits for large productions.
  • Move toward recurring revenue (retainers, subscription channels, platform monetisation) to reduce lumpy project exposure.
  • Strengthen independent board oversight (audit committee transparency, clawback policy).

Suggested investor / SIAS-style questions (copy-paste)​

  1. Please upload the executed loan agreement(s) between NoonTalk and Mr Dasmond Koh, including board minutes approving the loan.
  2. Provide the company’s cash runway as at the latest date (monthly burn, committed funding, and break-even date under management plan).
  3. Provide the aged receivables schedule and confirm collections from the top 3 customers since 30 Jun 2025.
  4. State the company’s plan to convert one-off event revenues into recurring income (timelines and KPIs).
  5. Confirm whether any director or related parties have received non-disclosed benefits or unsecured advances in the last 36 months.
  6. Provide a summary of the auditor’s key management letter points and management’s remediation plan.

Conclusion — forensic verdict​


NoonTalk is surviving by founder capital + short-term operational fixes, not by a healthy, scalable business model. Founder salary alone does not prove overpayment, but the combination of founder lending, repeated losses, thin cash reserves, and a going-concern is a governance and solvency red flag. Unless the company converts its event/production capability into predictable, recurring cashflows and/or secures longer-term external financing, the downside (restructuring/delist) risk is material within 12–24 months.

-------------Source: ChatGPT

CSI Investigation: How Is NoonTalk Media (SGX: SEJ) Still Alive in 2025?​

As requested, here is a full, no-stone-unturned breakdown in classic ChatGPT-style format – clean, structured, and easy to read.

Quick TL;DR​

  • Cumulative losses since 2022 IPO: S$9.16 million
  • FY2025 net loss: S$1.8 million (improved from S$3.8 million)
  • Staff + subcontracting costs consistently higher than gross profit
  • Auditors issued “material uncertainty related to going concern” in Oct 2025
  • The only thing keeping the lights on: personal loans from founder Dasmond Koh (S$2 million interest-free)
  • Business model: High-risk, project-based Chinese-language media & events
  • Verdict: Classic founder-funded “zombie” Catalist stock surviving on passion + personal cash

Company Background​

NoonTalk Media Limited (SGX: SEJ) was founded in 2011 by former radio DJ/actor Dasmond Koh. It listed on SGX Catalist in November 2022, raising S$4.84 million at S$0.22 per share (market cap ~S$43.6 million at IPO). Core focus: Chinese-language artiste management, event organising, TV/drama production, and now micro-dramas.

The Ugly Financial Reality (2022–2025)​

YearRevenueNet LossKey Notes
FY2022S$6.37 milS$3.24 milIPO year, heavy expansion
FY2023S$4.18 milS$3.24 milPost-COVID event drought
FY2024S$4.44 milS$3.81 milWorst year
FY2025S$6.30 milS$1.80 milRevenue up 42%, losses narrowed via headcount cut
As of 30 June 2025 → net liabilities of S$396,881 and auditors flagged going-concern risk.

Why Staff Costs Are Killing the Company​

  • Headcount reduced from 61 → ~40 staff, yet staff + subcontracting expenses still exceed gross profit
  • FY2025 subcontracting costs alone: S$4 million (+82% YoY)
  • Many projects require heavy outsourcing (camera crew, editors, venues, etc.)

Where Does the Money Actually Come From?​

  1. Artiste Management & Event Organisation (60–70% of revenue) → 10–20% commission on bookings + full event fees (ChildAid, Chingay, corporate dinners)
  2. Multimedia Production (30–40%) → Co-productions with Mediacorp, One31 Thailand, regional film distribution
  3. New Bets (still tiny revenue) → Micro-dramas (1–2 min vertical episodes) → Golden Singa Awards (Dec 2025, with IMDA support)
Revenue is lumpy and unpredictable – big paydays when a project lands, long dry spells otherwise.

Survival Lifeline: Dasmond Koh’s Personal Loans​

  • Oct 2024: Announced S$2 million interest-free shareholder loan from Dasmond Koh
  • As of latest filings: S$550k + S$800k already drawn down
  • Unsecured, repayable only after 1 July 2026
  • Purpose: Working capital + expansion → Basically the founder is personally bankrolling the company.

Was Dasmond Koh Overpaid?​

Exact CEO salary is lumped under “key management personnel” in filings, but:
  • Estimated range for Dasmond Koh: S$250,000 – S$500,000 per year (typical for founder-CEOs of similar-sized listed media firms)
  • For a company bleeding millions? Yes, it looks high.
  • However, he owns 62.6% of the company, so he’s effectively paying himself with his own future dividends (that don’t exist yet).

Final Verdict – What’s Really Going On?​

NoonTalk is a textbook example of a founder passion project turned listed zombie company:
  • Aggressive expansion post-IPO burned all the IPO cash
  • Business model is high-overhead and heavily dependent on winning the next big tender
  • No recurring revenue stream
  • Only surviving because the founder keeps injecting personal money
  • If the micro-drama pivot or Golden Singa Awards flop → very real risk of insolvency or forced takeover/delisting
Bottom line: It’s still breathing purely because Dasmond Koh refuses to let his baby die – not because the underlying business is healthy. Shareholders are along for the ride on pure hope and founder cash.
Case closed. Watch the next AGM (likely late Oct/early Nov 2025) – fireworks expected.
-----------------Source: Grok AI
 
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He’s obviously made a nice big chunk from the IPO. And he’s still paying himself well judging from the remuneration section. So it’s basically like left pocket out, go into right pocket.
 
NoonTalk Media will avoid being placed on a financial watch list despite three consecutive years of losses, as the Singapore Exchange (SGX) has abolished the financial watch list criteria effective late October 2025. Well done SGX
 
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