Breaking (25 Mar): SMRT Track Accident: Families of dead Duo planning Joint Prayers

[CoffeeAhSoh]

The ST 25 Mar


Bros, Joint Prayers Is What Ahh ??? Tk U.




SMRT track accident: Families of dead duo planning joint prayers

The funerals of SMRT trainees Muhammad Asyraf and Nasrulhudin at the Muslim cemetery in Lim Chu Kang on Wednesday. The two men were killed on Tuesday when they were hit by an oncoming train.PHOTO: BERITA HARIAN



Meanwhile, SMRT chief calls on his staff to ensure 'such a tragedy never happens again'


Seow Bei Yi
Adrian Lim

The families of the two SMRT trainees hit and killed by an oncoming train on Tuesday are planning to hold joint prayers next week to mourn their loss, said an uncle of one of the dead men.

Relatives said both families are struggling to cope with the sudden deaths of Mr Nasrulhudin Najumudin, 26, and Mr Muhammad Asyraf Ahmad Buhari, 24.


"We'll be having prayers every day... We also invited the other family to join us (next week), for a combined prayer for the deceased," said Mr Bakhtiar Ahmad, 63, an uncle of Mr Muhammad Asyraf.


The two trainees were among 15 technical staff investigating a possible fault with a point machine used for trains to change tracks.

They were struck by an oncoming train near Pasir Ris station while walking towards the machine.

When asked about a statement by SMRT on Wednesday revealing that a key safety procedure had not been followed, Mr Nasrulhudin's older brother Nisham, 32, said: "We have no comments on SMRT's statement. We hope to wait for the complete picture after investigations are over."

Said Mr Bakhtiar: "We don't want to speculate. Let the authorities do what they are supposed to."


In an e-mail message to all staff yesterday obtained by The Straits Times, SMRT chief executive Desmond Kuek said "our efforts must now be to make sure such a tragedy never happens again".

"Clearly there is much more that can and must be done everywhere to make our workplace safer for all our staff," he wrote.

In the wake of the accident, industry observers also weighed in on SMRT's safety protocols. "The investigation should reveal why 15 people needed to go down just to inspect a fault. There may be a valid reason, but it's yet to be known," said Mr Rajan Krishnan, chief executive of engineering firm KTC group.

According to SMRT, the 15 staff comprised six engineers, five technical officers and four trainees.


A rail engineer, who spoke to ST on condition of anonymity, asked if there was a worker assigned to keep a lookout for oncoming trains, or a controller for site safety.

He said that whenever a track excursion is required, one person among the group should be responsible for the safety of everyone else.

"His job is not to hold a shovel or anything like that, but to set up a safe system of work. He has to calculate the speed of the train and the sighting distance that you have, so that you obtain the required warning time to get out of the track and into a place of safety," he added.

 

[CoffeeAhSoh]

Re: Breaking (25 Mar): SMRT Track Accident: Families of dead Duo planning Joint Pray

Christopher Tan
Senior Transport Correspondent




SMRT track accident points to more than one safety lapse


SMRT Corp's latest statement on the tragic accident that claimed two young lives points to a safety lapse on the part of the maintenance crew.

It said the crew must coordinate with the station for oncoming trains to be halted before any track crossing takes place, and that there was no record of this procedure having taken place on the fateful day.

Was this why Mr Nasrulhudin Najumudin, 26, and Mr Muhammad Asyraf Ahmad Buhari, 24, were hit and killed on Tuesday morning by a train that was travelling at 60kmh in auto-drive mode?


It would be most unfortunate - and downright scary - if our rail safety protocol allowed a single lapse to result in a fatal outcome.

Railway tracks are hazardous places to be on foot - with intersecting metal rails, loose gravel, sleepers, bolts, brackets, fasteners and cables to trip over - even when trains are not moving.

It would not be unreasonable to say that there were several safety lapses leading to Tuesday's fatal accident on the tracks near Pasir Ris MRT station, and not just the one that SMRT pointed to in its statement. Because the alternative - to assume the safety protocol was not multi-layered - would simply be unthinkable in a place like Singapore. PHOTO: SMRT


But when trains are plying, they can be as dangerous as a loaded weapon. So any safety protocol governing the deployment of work crew during service hours would have to include a number of fail-safes - so that if there is a lapse (or even two), tragedies can be avoided.

SMRT is not shedding more light on the incident beyond what it has said in its latest statement.

It would, however, not be unreasonable to say that there were several safety lapses - and not just the one that SMRT pointed to in its statement. Because the alternative - to assume the safety protocol was not multi-layered - would simply be unthinkable in a place like Singapore.



According to experts, trains approaching a worksite would have to be driven in manual mode, and moving at a crawling speed.

This makes perfect sense because a train, unlike a road vehicle, cannot steer away to avoid collision. And a fully laden six-car train weighs close to 300 tonnes, and would require well over 100m (about the full length of a football field) to stop if it was moving at 60kmh in dry weather.

If it was moving at a crawling speed, the stopping distance would have been drastically shaved.

It is also imperative for a driver to be in control at all times when workers are on the tracks.

A driver in control would have a clear line of sight, so he can apply the brakes when necessary. Train systems are not designed to look out for people or obstacles - except for another moving train. So, allowing a train to move in auto mode and at 60kmh near a work zone is ill-advised.

A driver at the helm is also supposed to sound the horn as soon as he spots workers from afar. That is because MRT trains, being driven by electric motors, can be relatively quiet on an open track near road traffic.

Mr Muhammad Hatin Kamil, 24, who was with his two unfortunate colleagues when they were mowed down, said: "Our environment up there is different - you wouldn't be able to hear the train coming."

Another layer of safety that is commonly employed pertains to lookouts stationed at least 50m from the work party. This would give workers ample time to get off the tracks and get back into the safe walkway area when a train approaches.

Similarly, a flag-waving signalman must be at the station headwall to warn train drivers of workers ahead.

All these steps would have been on top of a system that requires work teams to seek permission before going onto the tracks. If so, SMRT's operations control centre (OCC) would have been aware of a work team near Pasir Ris station on Tuesday morning.

Which means train drivers moving along that stretch should already have been forewarned. So, even if there were no lookouts or signalmen, drivers would already have been on alert.

Another thing, track-switching when men are on site is a bad idea as it introduces unpredictability into an area where predictability is crucial.

The OCC could also have chosen to remove speed codes along that selected stretch, thereby forcing drivers to drive in what is known as restricted manual mode. In this mode, speed is automatically capped at 18kmh.

That is what is meant by having fail-safes.

The fact that at least one man in that work team on that tragic day had to jump out of the way of the train suggests that he did not expect it to come towards him, or to come towards him at such a high speed.

That may well point to safety lapses other than the one SMRT alluded to.

By the same token, if all the safety measures had been observed religiously, the two deaths might well have been prevented.

The two who died were part of a 15-man team, so we shudder to think how far worse the tragedy could have been if more men were not on the viaduct's walkway when that train hurtled by.

Looking ahead, we can only hope that rail operators and regulators learn from this incident and therefore be in a better position to ensure there is no repeat of it.

We can meanwhile take comfort in the fact that Tuesday's incident was only the second rail accident that resulted in staff sustaining fatal injuries on the tracks in Singapore's 29-year rapid transit history.

Let us hope the relatively clean slate has been the result of strict adherence to a robust safety protocol, and not sheer luck.

 

[scroobal]

Re: Breaking (25 Mar): SMRT Track Accident: Families of dead Duo planning Joint Pray

Excellent article. This correspondent was banned from all press conference and events by the then NTUC Comfort chief and MP Goh Chee Wee as he asked damaging questions about the arsehole's salary.

 

[frenchbriefs]

Re: Breaking (25 Mar): SMRT Track Accident: Families of dead Duo planning Joint Pray

why these muslims are provided with their own graves when our great leader had to be cremated?

 

[tonychat]

Re: Breaking (25 Mar): SMRT Track Accident: Families of dead Duo planning Joint Pray

After the Funeral, it is time to SUE smrt for their death.

 

[enterprise2]

Re: Breaking (25 Mar): SMRT Track Accident: Families of dead Duo planning Joint Pray

Christopher Tan
Senior Transport Correspondent




SMRT track accident points to more than one safety lapse


SMRT Corp's latest statement on the tragic accident that claimed two young lives points to a safety lapse on the part of the maintenance crew.

It said the crew must coordinate with the station for oncoming trains to be halted before any track crossing takes place, and that there was no record of this procedure having taken place on the fateful day.

Was this why Mr Nasrulhudin Najumudin, 26, and Mr Muhammad Asyraf Ahmad Buhari, 24, were hit and killed on Tuesday morning by a train that was travelling at 60kmh in auto-drive mode?


It would be most unfortunate - and downright scary - if our rail safety protocol allowed a single lapse to result in a fatal outcome.

Railway tracks are hazardous places to be on foot - with intersecting metal rails, loose gravel, sleepers, bolts, brackets, fasteners and cables to trip over - even when trains are not moving.

It would not be unreasonable to say that there were several safety lapses leading to Tuesday's fatal accident on the tracks near Pasir Ris MRT station, and not just the one that SMRT pointed to in its statement. Because the alternative - to assume the safety protocol was not multi-layered - would simply be unthinkable in a place like Singapore. PHOTO: SMRT


But when trains are plying, they can be as dangerous as a loaded weapon. So any safety protocol governing the deployment of work crew during service hours would have to include a number of fail-safes - so that if there is a lapse (or even two), tragedies can be avoided.

SMRT is not shedding more light on the incident beyond what it has said in its latest statement.

It would, however, not be unreasonable to say that there were several safety lapses - and not just the one that SMRT pointed to in its statement. Because the alternative - to assume the safety protocol was not multi-layered - would simply be unthinkable in a place like Singapore.



According to experts, trains approaching a worksite would have to be driven in manual mode, and moving at a crawling speed.

This makes perfect sense because a train, unlike a road vehicle, cannot steer away to avoid collision. And a fully laden six-car train weighs close to 300 tonnes, and would require well over 100m (about the full length of a football field) to stop if it was moving at 60kmh in dry weather.

If it was moving at a crawling speed, the stopping distance would have been drastically shaved.

It is also imperative for a driver to be in control at all times when workers are on the tracks.

A driver in control would have a clear line of sight, so he can apply the brakes when necessary. Train systems are not designed to look out for people or obstacles - except for another moving train. So, allowing a train to move in auto mode and at 60kmh near a work zone is ill-advised.

A driver at the helm is also supposed to sound the horn as soon as he spots workers from afar. That is because MRT trains, being driven by electric motors, can be relatively quiet on an open track near road traffic.

Mr Muhammad Hatin Kamil, 24, who was with his two unfortunate colleagues when they were mowed down, said: "Our environment up there is different - you wouldn't be able to hear the train coming."

Another layer of safety that is commonly employed pertains to lookouts stationed at least 50m from the work party. This would give workers ample time to get off the tracks and get back into the safe walkway area when a train approaches.

Similarly, a flag-waving signalman must be at the station headwall to warn train drivers of workers ahead.

All these steps would have been on top of a system that requires work teams to seek permission before going onto the tracks. If so, SMRT's operations control centre (OCC) would have been aware of a work team near Pasir Ris station on Tuesday morning.

Which means train drivers moving along that stretch should already have been forewarned. So, even if there were no lookouts or signalmen, drivers would already have been on alert.

Another thing, track-switching when men are on site is a bad idea as it introduces unpredictability into an area where predictability is crucial.

The OCC could also have chosen to remove speed codes along that selected stretch, thereby forcing drivers to drive in what is known as restricted manual mode. In this mode, speed is automatically capped at 18kmh.

That is what is meant by having fail-safes.

The fact that at least one man in that work team on that tragic day had to jump out of the way of the train suggests that he did not expect it to come towards him, or to come towards him at such a high speed.

That may well point to safety lapses other than the one SMRT alluded to.

By the same token, if all the safety measures had been observed religiously, the two deaths might well have been prevented.

The two who died were part of a 15-man team, so we shudder to think how far worse the tragedy could have been if more men were not on the viaduct's walkway when that train hurtled by.

Looking ahead, we can only hope that rail operators and regulators learn from this incident and therefore be in a better position to ensure there is no repeat of it.

We can meanwhile take comfort in the fact that Tuesday's incident was only the second rail accident that resulted in staff sustaining fatal injuries on the tracks in Singapore's 29-year rapid transit history.

Let us hope the relatively clean slate has been the result of strict adherence to a robust safety protocol, and not sheer luck.

Of course there will be primary causes as well as secondary ones.

 

[songsongjurong]

Re: Breaking (25 Mar): SMRT Track Accident: Families of dead Duo planning Joint Pray

PAP moles be present, will this event a political crisis ? Khaw be forced tonoffer resignation by deceased parents and entire malay community for inaction of malu minister,mr, yakault

 

[frenchbriefs]

Re: Breaking (25 Mar): SMRT Track Accident: Families of dead Duo planning Joint Pray

i blame it all on sinkies who expect their train servies to run smoothly and uninterruptedly at all times,trains moving at 18 km/h is a blasphemy.

 

[Semaj2357]

Re: Breaking (25 Mar): SMRT Track Accident: Families of dead Duo planning Joint Pray

why these muslims are provided with their own graves when our great leader had to be cremated?

must have space to accommodate 72 virgins when they cum-a-calling, albeit very few at a time.
great leader is a one woman man, and geckoes don't need much space

 

[Papsmearer]

Re: Breaking (25 Mar): SMRT Track Accident: Families of dead Duo planning Joint Pray

why these muslims are provided with their own graves when our great leader had to be cremated?

because his rotting corpse would have stunk up singapore for 2 years.

 

[GoldenDragon]

Re: Breaking (25 Mar): SMRT Track Accident: Families of dead Duo planning Joint Pray

because his rotting corpse would have stunk up singapore for 2 years.

wei ling needed something in the house so no burial but cremation. gurkhas now guard his ashes.

 

[eatshitndie]

Re: Breaking (25 Mar): SMRT Track Accident: Families of dead Duo planning Joint Pray

Of course there will be primary causes as well as secondary ones.

this chap who portrays himself as a transport expert is using motherhood statements without the intimate knowledge of working on the tracks and safety protocols used in various transit systems. he blah blah a lot of bovine scatology and the conspicuous omission of the 3rd rail staring right at us in the pic indicates a novice attempting to bullshit his way around. the freaking covered 3rd rail between the walkway and tracks is key to solving this mystery. it either acts as a barrier if a technician treads carefully along the walkway knowing full well it's running at very high voltage or acts as a potential obstacle for a worker to trip over if eyes are not focused on the walkway. the loose gravel acts as a buffer zone between walkway and 3rd rail, and stepping on gravel should alarm the worker into toeing the line. there is adequate buffer between walkway and 3rd rail and between 3rd rail and tracks. there's no reason for a train, albeit an auto-driven and fast-moving one, to mysteriously "snatch" a worker on the walkway unless the worker on his own volition and through a mistake cross over the 3rd rail onto the tracks. who in the right mind after a couple of months of basic safety training about the dangers of the 3rd rail will wish to cross it willy nilly at any juncture, with oncoming train or not? if they walk single file and toe the line without tripping over the 3rd rail onto tracks (a considerable act of foolishness and or playfulness with disregard to life and limbs) we won't have this discussion today.

 

[ginfreely]

Re: Breaking (25 Mar): SMRT Track Accident: Families of dead Duo planning Joint Pray

must have space to accommodate 72 virgins when they cum-a-calling, albeit very few at a time.
great leader is a one woman man, and geckoes don't need much space

Your mother wife daughters twat can put your bastard head inside. Tried and tested by you dirty fucker. Happy with my promotion of them? Come leylong leylong mudlander trash prostitutes family of semaj2357! Cheap cheap fucks!

 

[tonychat]

Re: Breaking (25 Mar): SMRT Track Accident: Families of dead Duo planning Joint Pray

Praying will not solve the root cause of the problem... too religious is not good. blur the mind.

 

[halsey02]

Re: Breaking (25 Mar): SMRT Track Accident: Families of dead Duo planning Joint Pray

i blame it all on sinkies who expect their train servies to run smoothly and uninterruptedly at all times,trains moving at 18 km/h is a blasphemy.

You blame the commuters..wtf!...we are paying fares to travel...we expect fair services...we pay for an expensive government....what do we expect?..QUALITY, RELIABILITY, INTEGRITY....

as for train fares....well run system...not expecting 100%...but well run....efficient....on time.....our duty to our employers to be at work ON TIME......

wtf..you blame us commuters?

 

[jw5]

Re: Breaking (25 Mar): SMRT Track Accident: Families of dead Duo planning Joint Pray

You blame the commuters..wtf!...we are paying fares to travel...we expect fair services...we pay for an expensive government....what do we expect?..QUALITY, RELIABILITY, INTEGRITY....

as for train fares....well run system...not expecting 100%...but well run....efficient....on time.....our duty to our employers to be at work ON TIME......

wtf..you blame us commuters?

We can only blame sinkies for being easily impressionable and manipulated. :(