https://www.algemeiner.com/2023/06/25/destroying-the-myth-of-israels-impermanence/
Hamas and the PIJ are less prepared to wait than the PA, and their chosen tactic is not diplomacy but terror, which they hope will so wear down the Jews that they will finally abandon the territory they currently control to its rightful owners, the Palestinians.
On social media, Palestinian children from toddlers to teens can view slick videos that reinforce the message from the Mufti and the leaders of the terror groups: don’t worry, the end is nigh for the “Zionist entity.” Remember, children, the Crusader states (known in Europe collectively as “Outremer”), lasted only from 1095 to 1291, less than two centuries. And those Crusader kingdoms were backed by most of the Christian powers of Europe. But the Jewish state has nothing like that same support. How can a country with fewer than seven million Jews, and a land area of 8,500 square miles, hold out against 400 million Arabs, who possess 14 million square miles of territory, and trillions of dollars in still-untapped oil wealth? Just keep telling young Palestinians that Israel can’t last much longer, and by dint of repetition, despite Israeli victories against all comers, they will believe that claim to be true.
First, the PLO never renounced terrorism, but continued its attacks on Israel. It was joined by other terror groups that soon overshadowed it – Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and the Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigade. Israel pulled entirely out of Gaza in 2005, after having razed its 21 Jewish settlements. A group of Jewish American donors paid $14 million for the greenhouses those settlers had built, and used to develop a thriving business, growing flowers for export to European market. The new owners turned them over to the Palestinians so that they might continue the profitable business. Instead, the Palestinians in Gaza looted the greenhouses, walking off with irrigation hoses, water pumps, and plastic sheeting, rendering them inoperable.
Since 2007 Hamas has ruled Gaza with an iron fist, and has used the Strip as a base from which to hurl rockets into Israel and from where terrorists are sent through tunnels into Israel, to kidnap or kill Israelis. As a consequence of these attacks, Israel has had to fight four campaigns against Hamas in Gaza to temporarily buy quiet on its southern flank.
Israel disengaged from Gaza because the military deemed it too burdensome a task to keep troops in Gaza to protect the settlers, and to keep the Palestinians otherwise under control; it was easier, and much less expensive, for the IDF to simply patrol the border between Gaza and Israel. But that is not how the Palestinians saw it. They saw it only as a retreat, a symbol of Israeli weakness.
Israel should make clear it does not intend to ever give up control of security in Area B. At the same time, Israel should close down all of the settlements the Palestinians have been building illegally in Area C. That is the way to make clear to the Palestinians that Israel has no intention of giving up its claim to Judea and Samaria, even if the Palestinians in Area A will effectively rule themselves in 18% of the territory.
Another sign of Israeli weakness, in the Palestinian view, was the disastrous prisoner swap Jerusalem made in 2011, when 1,027 Palestinian prisoners, including many terrorist murderers, were exchanged for one Israeli soldier, Gilad Shalit, who had. been held by Hamas for five years. No more prisoner swaps should be made by Israel except on a one-for-one basis, and no murderers should ever again be part of any exchange.
Many Israelis on the left and center still choose to believe that the conflict with the Palestinians can be resolved “If” Israel were willing to make certain concessions. That is, if only Israel stops building more settlements, if only Israel agrees to give up control of the Temple Mount to an international body, if only Israel allows a certain number of Palestinians abroad to exercise the “right of return,” then, these Israelis have allowed themselves to believe, peace will be possible. But they are wrong. The Palestinians all share the same goal: the elimination of the Jewish state. No matter how reduced it may be in size, Israel cannot be allowed to continue to exist. The “moderates” of the PA differ from the “extremists” in Hamas and PIJ not in the ultimate goal – the disappearance of Israel – but only in timing and tactics. The PA is prepared to wait, and to use diplomacy to squeeze Israel back within the 1949 armistice lines that Abba Eban once described as “the lines of Auschwitz.” Within those lines, Israel would have only a nine-mile-wide waist from Qalqilya to the sea, allowing an invader from the east to slice the country in two in a few hours. Only then, with Israel much diminished – and the PA is prepared to wait — would the PA be ready to try again, joining allied Arab states in mounting another assault on Israel.
Hamas and the PIJ are less prepared to wait than the PA, and their chosen tactic is not diplomacy but terror, which they hope will so wear down the Jews that they will finally abandon the territory they currently control to its rightful owners, the Palestinians.
Many Palestinian leaders, like the Grand Mufti Muhammed Hussein, keep assuring Palestinians that they needn’t worry, Israel will eventually be destroyed; the Haram al-Sharif will be solely controlled by the Muslims; all of Jerusalem will be in Palestinian hands; and “Palestine” – from the river to the sea — will again be part of Dar al-Islam, when all the Jews are expelled or killed.
On social media, Palestinian children from toddlers to teens can view slick videos that reinforce the message from the Mufti and the leaders of the terror groups: don’t worry, the end is nigh for the “Zionist entity.” Remember, children, the Crusader states (known in Europe collectively as “Outremer”), lasted only from 1095 to 1291, less than two centuries. And those Crusader kingdoms were backed by most of the Christian powers of Europe. But the Jewish state has nothing like that same support. How can a country with fewer than seven million Jews, and a land area of 8,500 square miles, hold out against 400 million Arabs, who possess 14 million square miles of territory, and trillions of dollars in still-untapped oil wealth? Just keep telling young Palestinians that Israel can’t last much longer, and by dint of repetition, despite Israeli victories against all comers, they will believe that claim to be true.
In the Oslo Accords, Israel accepted the PLO as the representative of the Palestinians, and the PLO said it renounced terrorism and recognized Israel’s right to exist in peace. Both sides agreed that a Palestinian Authority (PA) would be established and assume governing responsibilities in the West Bank and Gaza Strip over a five-year period. The Accords proved to be a disaster for Israel.
First, the PLO never renounced terrorism, but continued its attacks on Israel. It was joined by other terror groups that soon overshadowed it – Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and the Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigade. Israel pulled entirely out of Gaza in 2005, after having razed its 21 Jewish settlements. A group of Jewish American donors paid $14 million for the greenhouses those settlers had built, and used to develop a thriving business, growing flowers for export to European market. The new owners turned them over to the Palestinians so that they might continue the profitable business. Instead, the Palestinians in Gaza looted the greenhouses, walking off with irrigation hoses, water pumps, and plastic sheeting, rendering them inoperable.
Since 2007 Hamas has ruled Gaza with an iron fist, and has used the Strip as a base from which to hurl rockets into Israel and from where terrorists are sent through tunnels into Israel, to kidnap or kill Israelis. As a consequence of these attacks, Israel has had to fight four campaigns against Hamas in Gaza to temporarily buy quiet on its southern flank.
The Oslo Accords were violated by the Palestinians from the get-go. It’s time, the author suggests, to stop giving up any more territory in Judea and Samaria, as Israel effectively did in Area A, where the Palestinians now have complete civil and security control, and, less completely, in Area B of the West Bank, where Palestinians have civil control but Israel still retains military control. Israel should stop trying, the author argues, to cajole the Palestinians into a final agreement by offering to give up more territory to their control.
Area A, where the Palestinians have both domestic and security control, includes 18% of the West Bank. Area B constitutes 22% of the land area of Judea and Samaria, so together they certainly constitute a “major part” – 40% — of Judea and Samaria, where Israel no longer has complete sovereignty.
Israel disengaged from Gaza because the military deemed it too burdensome a task to keep troops in Gaza to protect the settlers, and to keep the Palestinians otherwise under control; it was easier, and much less expensive, for the IDF to simply patrol the border between Gaza and Israel. But that is not how the Palestinians saw it. They saw it only as a retreat, a symbol of Israeli weakness.
Israel should make clear it does not intend to ever give up control of security in Area B. At the same time, Israel should close down all of the settlements the Palestinians have been building illegally in Area C. That is the way to make clear to the Palestinians that Israel has no intention of giving up its claim to Judea and Samaria, even if the Palestinians in Area A will effectively rule themselves in 18% of the territory.
Another sign of Israeli weakness, in the Palestinian view, was the disastrous prisoner swap Jerusalem made in 2011, when 1,027 Palestinian prisoners, including many terrorist murderers, were exchanged for one Israeli soldier, Gilad Shalit, who had. been held by Hamas for five years. No more prisoner swaps should be made by Israel except on a one-for-one basis, and no murderers should ever again be part of any exchange.
This charge is unfair. Israel and Egypt have long cooperated on fighting both Islamic State and Hamas, which is merely the Gazan branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, and thus the mortal enemy both of Israel and of Egypt’s General El-Sisi. The Israelis do not “run with indecent haste” to Cairo when Hamas or the PIJ lets loose rockets into Israel. They use Egypt as a conduit to send messages, including threats of overwhelming retaliation, to the terror groups in Gaza. Egypt is a security ally of Israel and an enemy of Hamas. Israel wants both to keep Egypt apprised of all that Hamas is doing, and to make sure Cairo stays on Israel’s side, should the IDF feel it has to take severe measures, including a possible incursion into Gaza to flatten Hamas, which would undoubtedly result in the deaths of some Palestinian civilians. Better to keep Egypt fully in the loop, so that it doesn’t feel gobsmacked by a ferocious Israeli response in Gaza. Informing the Egyptian ally about what a common enemy – Hamas – is doing, and using that ally to convey messages to that enemy, in an attempt to tamp down tensions, makes eminent sense.
