angeluscorpius
1:17, reasons why Singapore saw this wargame as a threat. To add: (4) Lack of notification. When countries conduct wargames, they would, as a matter of courtesy and prudence, inform their neighbours so that the neighbour would not be unduly worried, or respond inappropriately (like launch a counter attack). Malaysia did not inform Singapore. Interestingly, Indonesia let slip the information to Singapore. Which was nice of them. (5) 2:05 "The purpose of the exercise was to test the response of Malaysia and Indonesia in case a neighbouring country turned hostile." Hmmm.... I wonder which neighbouring country might they mean? Those dastardly Filipinos? The cunning Thais? Surely, they cannot mean sweet, innocent little Singapore? Oh but they left Singapore out of the wargame. That's telling.... I THINK THEY MEANT SINGAPORE! (6) New PM. In 1991 Goh Chok Tong had just taken over from Lee Kuan Yew as PM of Singapore. Meanwhile in Malaysia, Mahathir was still holding onto power and trying to catch up with Singapore/Lee Kuan Yew. While Lee Kuan Yew was PM, Mahathir would NEVER have tried to do a "Pukul Habis" or he would be the one to "habis". BUT.... with a new PM.... Mahathir (or Malaysia) wanted to test the new PM. See if he was as tough as LKY... Two things might happen. One, Goh Chok Tong panics and attacks Malaysia, or Two, Goh Chok Tong folds under pressure and LKY has to step back up as PM. Unfortunately (for Mahathir), PM Goh got advice from his generals and his ministers. And I suspect classified intelligence briefing as to the real intent of the wargames. PM Goh would be right to be reasonably sure that no attack is imminent, and that it was just an attempt to startle us. But he also went with his generals' advice to conduct mobilisation. National Day was a particularly vulnerable time for Singapore. The entire govt was gathered in one place. Singapore is small, and the site of the wargame was just minutes away by jet fighters. A consolidated attack could wipe out our entire govt. I am sure there were contingency plans for evacuating the Ministers in case of an attack, and emergency bomb shelters or makeshift shelters and evacuation plans. 1991 was a particularly "vulnerable" or uncertain year. LKY had handed over PMship to GCT, and this was the formal stepping down of our founding PM. Questions as to the continued viability of Singapore was pertinent. If Malaysia's wargame had panicked GCT into attacking Malaysia the premise of the wargame (at 2:05) "in case a neighbouring country turned hostile" would have been proven and given Malaysia the excuse to counter-attack and possibly re-take Singapore and maybe merge Singapore back into the Federation. At least in the Malaysian military's estimation. On the other hand, if GCT had a meltdown and LKY had to step back up, that would also have been humiliating and throw Singapore's viability and desirability as a investment destination into question. And Malaysia would also win. But neither of Malaysia's best and second best scenario emerged. PM Goh did not panic or fall to pieces. Singapore responded professionally, resolutely, and with commendable restraint. In the aftermath, there were some scoffing remarks from Malaysia about why Singapore "panicked" and had a mobilisation. IIRC, PM Goh said something along the lines of "I was not worried, but my generals advise that we should have a mobilisation, as a matter of prudence. So we did. I trust the Malaysians, but I pay my generals a lot, so I should listen to them."
Char Azn
Side Note: Not only did the Malaysian and Indonesians not intimidate us, the speed at which we could mobilized our troops actually intimidated the Malaysian military top brass instead.
Last edited:
