SG in ménage à trois with US and China for next 30 years

[LITTLEREDDOT]

How will Singapore cope as the vice of US-China rivalry tightens?​

Beyond repeating the point that we don’t want to be forced to choose, there are steps – external and internal – that Singapore can take to ease the pressure from the two superpowers.​

Joseph Chinyong Liow

Much of the posturing by the US and China is driven as much by domestic political interests as they are by anything else. PHOTO: REUTERS

OCT 13, 2023

The bilateral relationship between the two largest economies in the world is not in a good place, and has not been so for many years now.
If anything, the situation remains brittle, and further deterioration can be easily triggered by another “balloon incident”, another round of tariffs and sanctions, an incident at sea, or a visit involving Taiwan. For us in South-east Asia, the proverbial question of “choice” hangs like the Sword of Damocles over our region.
We have come a long way from Jan 13, 2009, when the former national security adviser in the Carter administration, Mr Zbigniew Brzezinski, proposed that the United States and China should work together to tackle a laundry list of problems afflicting the world. His proposal quickly morphed into the idea of a G-2.
Fast-forward to the present. We know that the G-2 failed to materialise in any substantive way. What set off this tailspin?

Power transition​

The Power Transition Theory is probably the most popular in terms of efforts to explain what is going on in US-China relations today.
Basically, this theory proposes that when an ascendant state rises to the point of equivalence of power to the dominant state in the international system, and is dissatisfied with the status quo, the likelihood of war is very high because the rising power will want to challenge and displace the incumbent, and the incumbent will not want to cede dominance.
It is clear in today’s context who is the ascendant power, and who is the incumbent power.

Tensions are further heightened by what is called the Security Dilemma. Measures taken by a state to increase its own security tend to heighten the sense of insecurity of other states, leading them to take their own measures to feel more secure, which in turn heightens the insecurities of the first state.
Needless to say, the dynamic also plays out in the Asia-Pacific, where China’s assertiveness has made smaller regional states less secure, resulting in their efforts to strengthen ties with the US. This has in turn made China feel less secure as Beijing accuses the US of trying to contain it. We also see something of this dynamic in the Taiwan Strait.
And today, interactions between the two great powers have also taken on a decidedly ideological flavour, with President Joe Biden casting US-China rivalry as democracy versus autocracy.

Domestic politics​

Much of the posturing by the US and China is driven as much by domestic political interests as it is by anything else. That American society is deeply polarised along political lines today is obvious to all. There is, however, one exception – China policy, where both parties are in lockstep on the need to take a hard line. Yet, at the same time, both are also tripping over each other to demonstrate how hawkish they can be while criticising the other party for being weak on China. We can expect this to ramp up as elections loom.
As for China, the fact that America persistently calls it out over Xinjiang, Tibet, Hong Kong and, most provocative of all in Beijing’s view, Taiwan, projects US-China rivalry onto Chinese domestic politics. The downturn in US-China relations feeds into a very nationalistic narrative that casts the United States as being dead-set on preventing the Chinese Dream from becoming reality.

Something also needs to be said about the role of leaders. We have to ask how much of a role did Donald Trump, the iconoclastic former president of the US, or Mr Xi Jinping, the most titled leader in the history of modern China, play in escalating strategic competition?
As a princeling, Mr Xi considers himself the legitimate heir of the Communist Party of China’s “mandate of heaven” established by Mao Zedong. As an ideologue, he seems very convinced that he knows what is best for his party and his country. Therein lies the foundation of that singular focus that has driven him to reshape China today as a strong and decisive leader leading in challenging times.

Options for Singapore​

So, where does all this leave Singapore, as a small country caught up in the waves of great power rivalry?
While Singapore would much prefer not to be placed in a position where it has to choose sides, and it would indeed be wise to avoid being entangled in the US-China rivalry, the harsh reality is that, unless the geopolitical climate changes, we will increasingly find ourselves squeezed.
So, how do we prepare for this growing pressure?
First, both the US and China are important to Singapore, so we have to maintain good relations with both, and avoid casting US-China competition in binary terms. In fact, we should turn the issue on its head: Perhaps what we should also be asking is how do we make them choose us?
The answer to that question lies in our value proposition to them. As a small country whose relevance to the international community is not at all self-evident, and that is heavily dependent on economic linkages with the rest of the world, not least the major economies of the US and China, it behoves us to make ourselves relevant to their strategic, economic and commercial interests, so that neither would want to make us choose.
How do we do that? This leads to my second point. In order to figure out our value proposition for them, we need to understand them better, to understand what makes them tick.
American and Chinese society, politics and decision-making have undergone profound changes in recent years. Once an ardent advocate of economic liberalism and free markets, the US has now embarked on industrial policy. China, too, today looks very different compared with the one that so captivated the world when it hosted the Olympics in 2008.
Better understanding them means more than just understanding how policies are made in Washington DC or Beijing. It is in the nature of being a big power that they don’t put in too much effort and attention learning about small countries, but as a small country, we cannot afford that luxury. We have no choice but to invest time, effort and resources to better understand the big powers around us.
We also need to understand that even if great powers might genuinely not want to foist a choice on small states, make no mistake, they pay close attention to the choices made, and right or wrong, they will draw conclusions from them.
In recent years, American friends (as well as friends from countries from the region that are allies of the US) would frequently ask why Singapore was gravitating towards China. At the same time, Chinese friends would ask why Singapore is so emphatic in our support for a US presence in the region. It is precisely because Singapore has developed a strong international reputation for punching above our weight that how we manage our relations with the US and China in this present climate of growing geopolitical rivalry is of great interest to the rest of the world, not least, to the US and China themselves.

Singapore can of course boldly proclaim that what we will choose is not sides but what’s in our national interest, but the situation has become very complex.
Take Singapore’s position on the Russian invasion of Ukraine, for example. The Singapore Government has made its position very clear, and has gone to great lengths to explain it. Yet there are still a considerable number of Singaporeans who persist in – in fact, insist on – viewing Singapore’s position on the Ukraine war through US-China lenses, even though our opposition to the invasion has nothing to do with our relationship with Washington or Beijing.
Another example is how some citizens understand and process narratives emanating from some external powers that are designed to appeal to diasporic communities. Herein lies a curious but disconcerting twist that is manifested in two ways. First, it speaks to the sophisticated ways in which some external powers may foist choice without obviously saying or doing so, through the narratives they propagate. And second, it poses the disturbing question of whether it is external powers that are forcing us to “choose sides” as it were, or our own population.
This means that our leaders and policymakers will need to explain, educate, explain, educate, and then explain some more, why our foreign policy imperatives and priorities are what they are.
Finally, rather than obsess reactively over choice, we should be forward leaning and proactive to stay ahead of the geopolitical curve.
A forward-leaning diplomatic posture must also involve reinforcing old partnerships and seeking out new ones with other regional powers and with neighbours in Asean, who themselves are trying to avoid becoming entangled in the US-China rivalry. This creates maximum room for autonomy and manoeuvre, which is vital for small states. Indeed, as powerful as the US and China are, they are not the only two countries that count.
There should be no question that the US and China are locked in intense strategic competition that grows sharper by the day.
At the risk of simplifying very complex dynamics, perhaps the definitive questions for the great powers themselves, at the end of the day, are really these. For the US, is it prepared to accept that China is a global power, and to accommodate it? And for China, is it prepared to acknowledge the US is and will remain a major player with deep and legitimate interests in the Asia-Pacific region, and to accept it? In that respect, both are likely prepared to coexist, but at this point, the problem seems to be that both want to do it on terms that are advantageous to them.
All this is to say that while bilateral relations between the two great powers are not in a good place at present, further deterioration can be tempered, and competition managed, if both parties are prepared to turn away from zero-sum calculations.
And by way of a final observation, let me say this. It is not easy to find many countries that have the scope and depth of relations with both the US and China that Singapore has. So, in that sense, we are in a somewhat unique position. And because of this, while we must certainly be realistic about what we think we can do vis-a-vis the two great powers, I also believe that we can do more than we think.

• Joseph Chinyong Liow is Tan Kah Kee chair in comparative and international politics and dean of the College of Humanities, Arts and Social Sciences at Nanyang Technological University. These are edited excerpts from the first IPS-Nathan Lecture he delivered on Tuesday.

 

[k1976]

S'pore should prepare for up to 30 years of US-China rivalry: George Yeo​

Former foreign minister George Yeo suggested that Singapore work on reconnecting with its South-east Asian neighbours and establishing its own identity. ST PHOTO: FELINE LIM

Justin Ong
Political Correspondent
JAN 11, 2022


SINGAPORE - Singapore should prepare for "easily" up to 30 years of competition between the United States and China, which could take the form of skirmishes off the sea or proxy wars, said former foreign minister George Yeo on Tuesday (Jan 11).
To avoid being caught in between and to maintain sovereignty, he suggested that Singapore work on reconnecting with its South-east Asian neighbours and establishing its own identity - one where being Singaporean means being "bigger" than just a nationality.
Mr Yeo, who is currently a visiting scholar at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, was speaking as a panellist at a curtain-raiser for the annual Singapore Perspectives conference organised by the Institute of Policy Studies think-tank.
This year's event, with the theme "City", comprises seven virtual forums on Jan 13 and 17, and a physical conference on Jan 24.
Asked by moderator and ambassador-at-large Chan Heng Chee if he saw Singapore being among the great cities in the region and the world in the next two decades or so, Mr Yeo said that if the Republic can position itself well in a flourishing Asia, its prospects would be bright.
"There's no guarantee because we're in competition with others. There's always the possibility that we may make bad mistakes," he added.
"For example, the current tension between the US and China will mark this period of history and it will go on for years to come… sometimes high tension, sometimes low tension."

Mr Yeo said that if Singapore remains just a city-state, it would find itself frequently between a rock and a hard place.
Singapore thus needs to organically "reroot" itself in the region and become a capital city of Asean, he added, noting Singapore's links to other members of the 10-nation bloc through their sizeable communities here.
Working through Asean, Singapore can better navigate the big powers - not by taking sides, but by leaning "a little to the other side" in the event anyone pushes Singapore too hard.


Mr Yeo said Singapore's leaders must have the foresight to steer the nation away from potential conflict and danger.
"We are part of many networks - the American network, the Chinese network, the Indian network. And every network has to capture us, naturally, so we have to be careful," he cautioned. "We are friendly to everybody, but we are autonomous."
Also taking part in the in-person panel discussion was former chief city planner Liu Thai Ker, though their audience was an online one. Viewers could submit questions - one of which was how Singapore could thrive amid conflicting spheres of influence between China and the US.


Mr Yeo said the challenge for the country - where about three-quarters of the population identify as ethnically Chinese - was not outside but "inside".
"Who are we as Singaporeans?" he asked. "Is Singapore just a facility, a convention centre, a good hotel, a restaurant - or is it something more? Does it stand for values which others are happy to associate with?"
Mr Yeo added: "Singapore is special because our different communities retain their ancestral cultures… and we encourage them to be proud of their ancestral cultures. Our diversity is not based upon everybody curbing themselves to become Singaporean, but everybody being bigger in accepting others who are not like themselves.
"If we can make this happen - that to be Singaporean is to be bigger than what you were when you were in China or India or Indonesia or Thailand… then to be a Singaporean is to become bigger."
Mr Yeo said this, and questions around how Singaporeans relate to one another, was something to think deeply about.
"The more comfortable we are with our own identity, the more open we'll be," he said. "If I know who I am, I can accept you for who you are… So identity is important, and Singapore's identity is complicated because it is made up of constituent identities."

No worries, we are 万福金安with good hands around, he will fix all problems de

 

[k1976]

How will Singapore cope as the vice of US-China rivalry tightens?​

Beyond repeating the point that we don’t want to be forced to choose, there are steps – external and internal – that Singapore can take to ease the pressure from the two superpowers.​

Joseph Chinyong Liow

Much of the posturing by the US and China is driven as much by domestic political interests as they are by anything else. PHOTO: REUTERS

OCT 13, 2023

The bilateral relationship between the two largest economies in the world is not in a good place, and has not been so for many years now.
If anything, the situation remains brittle, and further deterioration can be easily triggered by another “balloon incident”, another round of tariffs and sanctions, an incident at sea, or a visit involving Taiwan. For us in South-east Asia, the proverbial question of “choice” hangs like the Sword of Damocles over our region.
We have come a long way from Jan 13, 2009, when the former national security adviser in the Carter administration, Mr Zbigniew Brzezinski, proposed that the United States and China should work together to tackle a laundry list of problems afflicting the world. His proposal quickly morphed into the idea of a G-2.
Fast-forward to the present. We know that the G-2 failed to materialise in any substantive way. What set off this tailspin?

Power transition​

The Power Transition Theory is probably the most popular in terms of efforts to explain what is going on in US-China relations today.
Basically, this theory proposes that when an ascendant state rises to the point of equivalence of power to the dominant state in the international system, and is dissatisfied with the status quo, the likelihood of war is very high because the rising power will want to challenge and displace the incumbent, and the incumbent will not want to cede dominance.
It is clear in today’s context who is the ascendant power, and who is the incumbent power.

Tensions are further heightened by what is called the Security Dilemma. Measures taken by a state to increase its own security tend to heighten the sense of insecurity of other states, leading them to take their own measures to feel more secure, which in turn heightens the insecurities of the first state.
Needless to say, the dynamic also plays out in the Asia-Pacific, where China’s assertiveness has made smaller regional states less secure, resulting in their efforts to strengthen ties with the US. This has in turn made China feel less secure as Beijing accuses the US of trying to contain it. We also see something of this dynamic in the Taiwan Strait.
And today, interactions between the two great powers have also taken on a decidedly ideological flavour, with President Joe Biden casting US-China rivalry as democracy versus autocracy.

Domestic politics​

Much of the posturing by the US and China is driven as much by domestic political interests as it is by anything else. That American society is deeply polarised along political lines today is obvious to all. There is, however, one exception – China policy, where both parties are in lockstep on the need to take a hard line. Yet, at the same time, both are also tripping over each other to demonstrate how hawkish they can be while criticising the other party for being weak on China. We can expect this to ramp up as elections loom.
As for China, the fact that America persistently calls it out over Xinjiang, Tibet, Hong Kong and, most provocative of all in Beijing’s view, Taiwan, projects US-China rivalry onto Chinese domestic politics. The downturn in US-China relations feeds into a very nationalistic narrative that casts the United States as being dead-set on preventing the Chinese Dream from becoming reality.

Something also needs to be said about the role of leaders. We have to ask how much of a role did Donald Trump, the iconoclastic former president of the US, or Mr Xi Jinping, the most titled leader in the history of modern China, play in escalating strategic competition?
As a princeling, Mr Xi considers himself the legitimate heir of the Communist Party of China’s “mandate of heaven” established by Mao Zedong. As an ideologue, he seems very convinced that he knows what is best for his party and his country. Therein lies the foundation of that singular focus that has driven him to reshape China today as a strong and decisive leader leading in challenging times.

Options for Singapore​

So, where does all this leave Singapore, as a small country caught up in the waves of great power rivalry?
While Singapore would much prefer not to be placed in a position where it has to choose sides, and it would indeed be wise to avoid being entangled in the US-China rivalry, the harsh reality is that, unless the geopolitical climate changes, we will increasingly find ourselves squeezed.
So, how do we prepare for this growing pressure?
First, both the US and China are important to Singapore, so we have to maintain good relations with both, and avoid casting US-China competition in binary terms. In fact, we should turn the issue on its head: Perhaps what we should also be asking is how do we make them choose us?
The answer to that question lies in our value proposition to them. As a small country whose relevance to the international community is not at all self-evident, and that is heavily dependent on economic linkages with the rest of the world, not least the major economies of the US and China, it behoves us to make ourselves relevant to their strategic, economic and commercial interests, so that neither would want to make us choose.
How do we do that? This leads to my second point. In order to figure out our value proposition for them, we need to understand them better, to understand what makes them tick.
American and Chinese society, politics and decision-making have undergone profound changes in recent years. Once an ardent advocate of economic liberalism and free markets, the US has now embarked on industrial policy. China, too, today looks very different compared with the one that so captivated the world when it hosted the Olympics in 2008.
Better understanding them means more than just understanding how policies are made in Washington DC or Beijing. It is in the nature of being a big power that they don’t put in too much effort and attention learning about small countries, but as a small country, we cannot afford that luxury. We have no choice but to invest time, effort and resources to better understand the big powers around us.
We also need to understand that even if great powers might genuinely not want to foist a choice on small states, make no mistake, they pay close attention to the choices made, and right or wrong, they will draw conclusions from them.
In recent years, American friends (as well as friends from countries from the region that are allies of the US) would frequently ask why Singapore was gravitating towards China. At the same time, Chinese friends would ask why Singapore is so emphatic in our support for a US presence in the region. It is precisely because Singapore has developed a strong international reputation for punching above our weight that how we manage our relations with the US and China in this present climate of growing geopolitical rivalry is of great interest to the rest of the world, not least, to the US and China themselves.

Singapore can of course boldly proclaim that what we will choose is not sides but what’s in our national interest, but the situation has become very complex.
Take Singapore’s position on the Russian invasion of Ukraine, for example. The Singapore Government has made its position very clear, and has gone to great lengths to explain it. Yet there are still a considerable number of Singaporeans who persist in – in fact, insist on – viewing Singapore’s position on the Ukraine war through US-China lenses, even though our opposition to the invasion has nothing to do with our relationship with Washington or Beijing.
Another example is how some citizens understand and process narratives emanating from some external powers that are designed to appeal to diasporic communities. Herein lies a curious but disconcerting twist that is manifested in two ways. First, it speaks to the sophisticated ways in which some external powers may foist choice without obviously saying or doing so, through the narratives they propagate. And second, it poses the disturbing question of whether it is external powers that are forcing us to “choose sides” as it were, or our own population.
This means that our leaders and policymakers will need to explain, educate, explain, educate, and then explain some more, why our foreign policy imperatives and priorities are what they are.
Finally, rather than obsess reactively over choice, we should be forward leaning and proactive to stay ahead of the geopolitical curve.
A forward-leaning diplomatic posture must also involve reinforcing old partnerships and seeking out new ones with other regional powers and with neighbours in Asean, who themselves are trying to avoid becoming entangled in the US-China rivalry. This creates maximum room for autonomy and manoeuvre, which is vital for small states. Indeed, as powerful as the US and China are, they are not the only two countries that count.
There should be no question that the US and China are locked in intense strategic competition that grows sharper by the day.
At the risk of simplifying very complex dynamics, perhaps the definitive questions for the great powers themselves, at the end of the day, are really these. For the US, is it prepared to accept that China is a global power, and to accommodate it? And for China, is it prepared to acknowledge the US is and will remain a major player with deep and legitimate interests in the Asia-Pacific region, and to accept it? In that respect, both are likely prepared to coexist, but at this point, the problem seems to be that both want to do it on terms that are advantageous to them.
All this is to say that while bilateral relations between the two great powers are not in a good place at present, further deterioration can be tempered, and competition managed, if both parties are prepared to turn away from zero-sum calculations.
And by way of a final observation, let me say this. It is not easy to find many countries that have the scope and depth of relations with both the US and China that Singapore has. So, in that sense, we are in a somewhat unique position. And because of this, while we must certainly be realistic about what we think we can do vis-a-vis the two great powers, I also believe that we can do more than we think.

• Joseph Chinyong Liow is Tan Kah Kee chair in comparative and international politics and dean of the College of Humanities, Arts and Social Sciences at Nanyang Technological University. These are edited excerpts from the first IPS-Nathan Lecture he delivered on Tuesday.

Really way to cope...is to diam diam...we are always a Price taker mah, leemember?

 

[LITTLEREDDOT]

US and China must remain in close touch, PM Lee says, especially in view of hot-spot events in 2024​

US President Joe Biden and his Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping met on the sidelines of the Apec forum on Nov 15, seeking to reverse their deteriorating ties in their first in-person meeting in over a year. PHOTO: REUTERS

Bhagyashree Garekar

NOV 19, 2023

SAN FRANCISCO – Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong says the Biden-Xi meeting this week was an important step in keeping ties between the world’s two major powers more stable, but cautions that close contact at all levels including the highest must continue, especially in view of hot-spot events in 2024.
These include elections in the United States and Asia. Taiwan – a tinderbox in the relationship between China and the US – is two months away from holding its presidential polls, on Jan 13.
“There will be issues which will arise... various hot spots (from) which there can be developments. If they are in contact, I think you have a better chance of keeping things on an even keel,” he said.
In this unpredictable world, Singapore must continue to count on its wits to make a living for itself, he added.
US President Joe Biden and his Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping huddled for four hours on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (Apec) forum on Nov 15, seeking to reverse their deteriorating ties in their first in-person meeting in a year.
But while it was an important step, “I do not think China-US relations are amenable to quick fixes”, said PM Lee, sharing his assessment of the meeting during a wrap-up interview with the Singapore media on Nov 17, at the end of his six-day working visit to the US.
A key outcome of the Biden-Xi meeting was their decision to restore military lines of communication, disrupted by then US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s trip to Taiwan in August 2022.

Mr Biden and Mr Xi also agreed to address the flow of fentanyl precursors from China, which are fuelling the US opioid crisis, and they also discussed new commitments on climate change. Their mutual distrust lingers, however.
“These are deep differences in perspectives, in views and interests, in philosophies. It is also a contest for influence for a spot in the sun in the world,” said PM Lee.
The imperative for their meeting was clear, but it did not necessarily herald a return to the good old days, PM Lee added.


“They do need to work together because there are many problems which cannot be solved without both America and China participating together. And so, the two sides need to talk, in order to manage the differences, to be able to cooperate where they need to cooperate.
“The meeting was an important step in this direction,” he said.
But he cautioned: “It does not mean that things will now get better and better.”
PM Lee said: “I hope things can now begin to stabilise, and the two countries can continue to remain in close touch and at many levels.”
He noted that this would create stability, even if some tumult were to follow.
“Not everything which happens is anticipated, predictable,” he said, pointing out the probability of new situations looming.
“They have to stay in close touch with one another. There will be issues which will arise,” he said.


Besides the Taiwan election, Americans will also be heading to the polls. Mr Biden is seeking a second term and relations can quickly turn testy in view of harsh anti-China rhetoric that is frequently a part of American presidential campaigns.
China has carried out military manoeuvres in the Taiwan Strait, and many analysts in Washington claim there could be a potential invasion in the coming years of the self-governed island that Beijing seeks to unify with the mainland.
Mr Biden has signalled strong support for Taiwan, and on a few occasions said the US would defend it militarily if it were attacked, although his aides insisted there has been no change to the strategic ambiguity the US government maintains over its ties with Taipei.
Against this backdrop, the first in-person meeting in a year between Mr Biden and Mr Xi was a chance to offer assurances and prevent a dangerous escalation.
For Singapore, better vibes between its two most important partners hold promise, but the situation also means contending with uncertainties that have not ended.
“In this... open, less predictable, less multilateral environment, we have no choice but to say we continue to depend on free trade, depend on multilateralism, to work with other countries whom we can cooperate with, in order that we can make a living for ourselves,” PM Lee said.
In other words, it will be business as usual for the Republic, which must protect itself against shocks beyond its borders by doing business with multiple trading partners that may not be friendly with one another.
“That means you have got to export to America, you have got to attract investments from the US.
“You have got to do the same with China, with Asean, with India, and be partners with all of them, even though they may not all be partners with one another,” PM Lee said.
“And that is what we have been doing and that is one of the things which I have been doing on this trip here in San Francisco.”

 

[LITTLEREDDOT]

When push comes to shove, China edges out US as S-E Asia’s preferred superpower: ISEAS survey​

Among the 1,994 respondents polled across the 10 Asean nations, 50.5 per cent indicated China as their preferred choice. PHOTO ILLUSTRATION: PIXABAY

Michelle Ng
Correspondent

APR 02, 2024

SINGAPORE China edges out the United States as South-east Asia’s preferred superpower by a narrow margin, if countries in the region were forced to choose between the two major powers, a survey has found.
The findings, published in the ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute’s The State Of South-east Asia 2024 report on April 2, indicated a notable shift in sentiments among respondents from the region, who had leaned towards the US in the last four surveys.
Among the 1,994 respondents polled across the 10 Asean nations, 50.5 per cent indicated China as their preferred choice, while 49.5 per cent selected the US, when asked a hypothetical question on which country the region should choose if it was forced to align itself with either.
In the 2023 survey, only 38.9 per cent of respondents picked China, with 61.1 per cent opting for the US.
The 2024 survey was conducted online from Jan 3 to Feb 23, and polled respondents from academia, think-tanks, research groups, businesses, civil society, the media and regional or international organisations, as well as governments. Eligibility criteria were tightened in this edition and respondents were screened on various criteria such as nationality, age, affiliation, education, general knowledge of Asean and level of interest in current affairs.
Respondents could take the survey in one of six language options: English, Bahasa Indonesia, Burmese, Khmer, Thai and Vietnamese.
First conducted in 2019, the annual survey aims to present a snapshot of the prevailing attitudes among people in a position to inform or influence policy on regional issues.


In the 2024 survey, China continues to be seen as the most influential economic power in South-east Asia, followed by Asean and the US. China was perceived as the most influential political and strategic power in the region, followed by the US.
The Asean nations’ perception of the bloc’s political and strategic influence is also on the rise, according to the survey.


Despite the positive perceptions about China, concerns about its growing regional political and strategic influence persist, with 73.5 per cent of respondents expressing unease, up from 68.5 per cent in 2023.


Confidence in the US has also waned, with nearly 60 per cent of respondents concerned about its growing strategic and political influence in the region, up from over 40 per cent in 2023.
The waning confidence in the US could be attributed partly to the escalating rivalry between China and the US, the ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute said in the report.
Although most respondents were worried about the US’ growing influence, there were exceptions, including those in the Philippines, Singapore and Vietnam, who perceived US influence more positively.
In a webinar on April 2 organised by the institute to discuss the findings, Ms Bonnie Glaser, managing director of US think-tank German Marshall Fund’s Indo-Pacific programme, noted that the results, which are sometimes contradictory, show the complexity of issues Asean faces.
Ms Glaser said that the slight shift towards China by Asean nations if they had to choose between China and the US could be due to the make-up of the respondents. She noted that unlike the 2023 poll, the 2024 survey had a higher proportion of private-sector or business-affiliated respondents, who might place more emphasis on China’s growing power.
In the 2024 survey, respondents affiliated with the private sector comprised 33.7 per cent of the total, increasing from 24.7 per cent in the 2023 poll. Conversely, respondents from academia, think-tanks or research institutions dropped to 23.6 per cent in the 2024 survey, down from 34.8 per cent in 2023.
Professor Danny Quah, dean of the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy at the National University of Singapore, cautioned that there is no need to “read too much” into China’s 1 percentage point lead over the US as the results are more indicative than prescriptive.
He said the underlying data shows more of a seesaw pattern rather than a direct trend leaning towards China. “By focusing on who crosses the 50 per cent mark, we lose sight of that,” he noted.
Since the hypothetical question of which country the region would choose if it was forced to align itself with either was added to the 2020 edition of the survey, the proportion of respondents picking either China or the US has fluctuated over the years.
For instance, 46.4 per cent of respondents picked China in 2020, and the proportion dropped to 38.5 per cent in 2021. It rose to 43 per cent in 2022, and dropped to 38.9 per cent in 2023, before rising to 50.5 per cent in this year’s survey.
Prof Quah said: “We need to distinguish statements about China and the concerns about the degree of influence, which are extremely high.
“The fact that China is acknowledged as most influential does not mean acceptance of that (influence). Similarly for the US.”


On the issue of trust in the major powers, the level of distrust in China crept up in the 2024 survey.
Slightly over half the respondents indicated either “little confidence” or “no confidence” that Beijing would do the right thing when it comes to contributing to global peace, security, prosperity and governance. This was a slight increase from the 49.8 per cent in 2023.
Around a quarter were either “confident” or “very confident” that China would contribute positively, while the remaining quarter had “no comment”.


Among those who distrust China, 45.5 per cent think its economic and military power can be used to threaten their countries’ interests and sovereignty. More than a third of Singapore respondents had the same sentiment.
Levels of distrust towards China were higher than levels of trust in all Asean countries, except Laos. In particular, respondents from the Philippines, which has had a series of run-ins with China in the South China Sea, recorded the highest level of distrust.
Japan continues to be the region’s most trusted power, with 58.9 per cent of respondents expressing confidence in the country. The US was second at 42.4 per cent, followed by the European Union at 41.5 per cent, China at 24.8 per cent and India at 24.2 per cent.
While more respondents indicated trust towards the US than distrust, the findings show a significant drop in trust from more than half of the respondents in 2023, a sign that South-east Asia could be treading cautiously ahead of the US presidential election in November.
Negative sentiment towards the Joe Biden administration by way of US engagement with the region has also risen, as more than one-third of respondents felt that US engagement has decreased or decreased significantly in 2024.
On assessing the future of China’s relations with the Asean bloc, more than half of the respondents anticipated an improvement in the next three years.
Those from Singapore and Myanmar held the most neutral stance on their countries’ relations with China, expecting the status quo to be maintained.


Among those who anticipate an improvement in future relations with Beijing, the region’s top concern was China’s growing economic dominance and political influence in their countries – a telling sign that China’s willingness to use coercion to achieve its aims does not sit well with most South-east Asians.
The top concerns among Singapore respondents were China’s use of economic tools and tourism to punish the Republic’s foreign policy choices, as well as China’s interference in Singapore’s domestic affairs, including through social media and influence over the ethnic Chinese citizens in the country.
Bolstering Asean’s resilience and unity continues to be the most popular option among respondents to counter pressure from both the US and China amid escalating tensions.
The second-most popular option is adhering to Asean’s traditional stance of not siding with either China or the US, though support has slid marginally. Among Singapore respondents, this view rose to 35.9 per cent from 33.7 per cent in 2023.
On the findings, ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute director and chief executive Choi Shing Kwok said: “The results reflect heightened regional concerns over economic issues and the risk that unrestrained geopolitical rivalry can adversely affect the region’s interests in the short to medium term.”
On the other hand, the region remains hopeful that major powers can cooperate on issues of mutual benefit and welcomes other major powers in the region to engage more closely with Asean, said Mr Choi.

 

[LITTLEREDDOT]

South-east Asia’s turn towards China may not last, say US analysts​

China Coast Guard vessels firing water cannon at a Philippine vessel on a resupply mission at Second Thomas Shoal on May 4. PHOTO: REUTERS

Bhagyashree Garekar
US Bureau Chief

APR 07, 2024

WASHINGTON – China’s status as South-east Asia’s preferred superpower in a new ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute survey is likely to be short-lived, say analysts.
The annual survey of 1,994 policymakers, journalists, businessmen and analysts in Asean nations showed that they would prefer China over the US – if forced to align with either strategic rival – by a narrow margin of 50.5 per cent to 49.5 per cent.
The findings, published in the institute’s The State Of South-east Asia 2024 report on April 2, point to a reversal of trends seen in the last four surveys. In 2023, 61.1 per cent chose the US, while 38.9 per cent went with China.
Analysts told The Straits Times that the findings are not too surprising and do not necessarily mean the region is uncritically closer to China.
The survey is consistent with trends seen in data from other sources over recent years, said Mr Gregory Poling, who directs the South-east Asia Programme and Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative at the Washington-based Centre for Strategic and International Studies.
“That said, I’m not prepared to say those trends are towards a long-term preference for China,” he said, noting that the Gaza war – identified as the region’s top geopolitical concern – had impacted responses captured in the survey.
The downward trend in trust for the US appears concentrated among the three Muslim-majority countries of the region, which suggests it is tied to the war in Gaza, he said.

Since Malaysian and Bruneian elites were already more pro-China, the real shift here is the big swing in Indonesia, he pointed out.
“It’s too soon to say whether the shift in Indonesian opinion is long-term, like we saw under the Bush administration, or a short-term signal of frustration,” he added.
During the George W. Bush years, Indonesia had opposed the US invasion of Iraq after the Sept 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. It was also concerned that the war on terror fed Islamic xenophobia.


Mr Poling noted that other questions in the survey, like those related to the South China Sea, reveal greater distrust of China among Indonesian elites – as do other recent surveys, such as from the Foreign Policy Community of Indonesia.
“So there is reason to think these numbers could revert to a modestly pro-US tilt,” he said.
The survey’s methodology is also worth poring over, analysts said.
It is a survey of elites, and a tiny fraction of elites, in the cases of Indonesia, the Philippines, Vietnam, Thailand and Myanmar, Mr Poling said.
“It still has value as a data point, but should not be treated as a definitive reflection of elite opinion in the larger countries of the region,” he said.

In addition, he pointed out that ISEAS had designed the survey as a proxy for Asean as an institution, not South-east Asia as a region.
To do this, the survey weighed each country’s responses equally – each country’s responses were averaged and then counted as 10 per cent of the total. That skewed the overall averages in favour of the smallest countries, which lean more towards China.
“So by all means, we should note that the opinions of those elites who respond to ISEAS’ survey have shifted, but we can’t infer from that about where public or overall elite opinion in most of the region stands,” he said.
Likewise, Mr Blake Berger, associate director at the Asia Society Policy Institute in New York, said he would not read too much into the close 50-50 split in preference.
“It shouldn’t exactly be a surprise that the US took a hit in terms of confidence, especially as respondents relayed that the Israel-Gaza conflict topped South-east Asia’s list of geopolitical concerns,” he said.
The swing in opinion in Malaysia, Indonesia and Brunei, where more than 70 per cent of respondents said they would align with China, might appear concerning from a US foreign policy perspective, he said.
But this finding needs to be juxtaposed against answers to the question about whom the region trusted, he said.
Pointedly, China was seen as the fourth-most trusted partner, garnering 24.8 per cent support, while the US received 42.4 per cent of the vote, coming behind Japan, the country named as the region’s most trusted partner.
Mr Berger ascribed the shift away from the US to its failure to capture the public imagination in the trade-driven region.
“The US’ lack of a comprehensive strategy to economically engage South-east Asia has provided China avenues to make significant inroads in terms of regional influence,” he said.

Over the past decade, Asean’s trade in goods with China more than doubled, reaching US$722 billion (S$974 billion) in 2022 and accounting for nearly one-fifth of the grouping’s global trade.
Since 2020, Asean and China have been each other’s largest trading partners, amid the signing of notable agreements like the Asean-China Free Trade Agreement and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership.
In comparison, the US was Asean’s second-largest trading partner, with goods and services trade with it amounting to an estimated US$520 billion in 2022 after almost doubling over a decade.
But despite having a smaller trading volume with the region, the US is still a vital export market for Asean goods. In 2021, Asean’s goods trade surplus with the US was US$145.9 billion, compared with its goods trade deficit with China of US$107.7 billion that same year.
The Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), the Biden administration’s main vehicle for engaging the region, has failed to shore up regional confidence in the US’ economic engagement strategy, Mr Berger said.
The region remains sceptical that the two-year-old framework, which does not provide access to US markets, will deliver meaningful returns. Instead, the region fears that the IPEF will also raise compliance and adjustment costs of trading with the US.
Even as it considers options to diversify away from greater dependence on China, the region’s expectations of a more robust economic engagement with the US are unlikely to be met. Free trade is an unpopular topic with both Republicans and Democrats, especially in an election year.
Where the US could score higher was on the strategic side, said Mr Berger.
The survey surfaces increasing turbulence and “aggressive behaviour” in the South China Sea as the region’s second top geopolitical concern, he noted.
“This poll number, taken alongside the lack of trust in China, underscores that there’s far more nuance in the region’s outlook on both the US and China than the response to the ‘who would you align with’ question would have readers believe,” he said.

Thus, an interpretation of the 2024 poll as an indication that the region is turning to China or that this is part of a larger trend line in the region cannot be sustained, he said.
“The see-saw nature of the region’s stance on China only underscores this point,” he added.
The survey has also raised a question about Asean’s efficacy.
One implication of a more dominant China is the further diminishment of Asean as an organisation protecting and enhancing the sovereignty of regional states, Mr Berger said.
“Should China’s growing influence in South-east Asia coincide with an even more aggressive approach to the South China Sea and the further sidelining of Asean, that’s a situation that doesn’t bode well for any regional actor,” he said.
The ripples from the survey have also reached the Biden administration.
A State Department spokesman, while acknowledging the survey, reiterated that the United States was committed to delivering for the Indo-Pacific, with its vision for an open, connected, prosperous and secure region.
“In collaborating with our allies and partners in the region, we are not imposing a solution, but listening intently to their priorities and addressing their concerns,” the spokesman said.