The Present Case
21 In determining the appropriate sentence to be imposed in respect of the said charge, the factors to be considered include: (a) the level of culpability; (b) the degree of injury or property damage suffered; (c) evidence of alcohol consumption; (d) failure to stop to evade arrest; and (e) the existence of prior antecedents. In the case of Lim Meng Soon v Public Prosecutor [2007] SGHC 129, Justice Lee Seiu Kin in discussing the varying levels of culpability in respect of an offence of failing to render assistance stated:
“31. As with most offences, there is a spectrum of circumstances encompassing varying degrees of culpability, ranging from the least serious, where the driver reasonably contemplates negligible damage or the absence of injury, to the other extreme, where the driver perceives the carnage of crumpled metal, torn flesh and spilled blood. In between these extremes, there are varying shades of grey. Although the offence under s 84(8) is made out once there is death, injury or damage to property, the appropriate degree of punishment must depend on what the offender reasonably apprehends, and not the actual degree of damage that was occasioned, although they tend to be correlated…”
22 As the Accused in the present case is a first offender and there was no indication that she had driven while under the influence of drinks, I will only deal with her level of culpability, the degree of injury and property damage suffered and whether there was there was a failure to stop in order to evade arrest.
(a) Level of culpability
23 In the present case, the facts disclose that on 19 October 2008 at about 5.13 am, the accused was driving her father’s motorcar SDY 8668 S along Holland Road towards Ulu Pandan. While traveling straight, she had collided onto the rear of the victim’s bicycle, causing the victim to be flung onto the windscreen of the motor car and to fall to the left side of the road. The Statement of Facts however did not disclose in which lane of Holland Road the Accused and the victim were traveling on prior to the accident. I noted that in her mitigation, it was the Accused’s position that she was traveling in the middle lane and in response the prosecution stated that according to the victim, he was traveling on the double yellow line.
24 It was highlighted in her plea in mitigation and not disputed by the prosecution, that there was a canopy of trees along the stretch of road where she had been travelling. She was traveling at 60 km/h and was returning home after unsuccessfully looking for her cousin Charlene Tan. She had heard a loud bang at the left side of her front windscreen and her attention was immediately drawn to the point. She assumed it must be a rotten branch that had fallen on her windscreen. The window was cracked or shattered from the impact. I noted that this assumption by the Accused on the cause of the impact was not challenged by the prosecution. Bearing in mind that the incident occurred in the early hours of the morning at about 5.13 am, it was possible that the shadows cast from the canopy of trees would have had on impact on her line of sight resulting in her mistaken assumption as to the nature of the ‘object’ that had struck her windscreen.
25 Further, I noted that in the present case, in respect of DAC 59669/2009(“First Charge”) the Accused was originally charged with an offence of dangerous driving under Section 64(1) Road Traffic Act. This charge was subsequently reduced to one of inconsiderate driving under Section 65(b) Road Traffic Act (Cap 276) an offences with requires a lower degree of culpability.
26 Having considered the above factors, I was of the view that the present case was not one involving a high level of culpability evidenced by a willful or reckless disregard of the rules of the road and an apparent disregard for the great danger caused to others. It was also not an instance of a moderate level of culpability characterised by calculated risk-taking which created a substantial risk of danger. In my view, the present case involves a low level of culpability characterized by a lapse in concentration or a serious error of judgment on the part of the Accused. This was evidenced by the lack of awareness on her part that she had hit a cyclist and her mistaken assumption that a broken branch had landed onto the windscreen of the car. This was in all probability compounded by her anxiety as to the whereabouts of her cousin.
(b) Degree of injury and/or property damage suffered
27 From the facts and the medical report, I noted that the victim had suffered the following injuries:
a. 4 cm laceration over the right side of forehead;
b. Multiple abrasions and contusion left chest wall and scapular region;
c. Undisplaced fracture left scapula
The victim was observed for two days at the Singapore General Hospital and treated with suturing of forehead wound, analgesics and arm sling for the scapular fracture and discharged on 21 October 2008. It was also indicated in the medical report dated 2 September 2009 that he was given medical leave from 19 October 2008 to 16 November 2008. Nevertheless, it was not entirely clear whether the injuries suffered by the victim had caused him to be ‘during a period of 7 days in severe bodily pain or unable to follow his ordinary pursuits’. In respect of the property damage, on the facts, it was disclosed that the accused’s vehicle and the victim’s bicycle were moderately damaged as a result of the accident.
(c) Failure to stop to evade arrest?
28 According to her plea in mitigation, the Accused had not stopped the vehicle to check as she was under the mistaken assumption that it was a rotten branch that had fallen on her windscreen. Upon reaching home, she noticed that there were a few dents and scratches on the left front bumper. In her mind, there was no urgency to report as it involved a branch. She went to bed with the intention to make a report later in the morning and to inform the insurance company. It was not disputed that the police had come to her home before 8.00 am and had towed the car away. Her brother had called the police at about 9.00 a.m. and an officer responded informing him the driver of the vehicle is to call him. The Accused had immediately called one “Mr Lim Chee Wai”. I note as reflected in the charges, the investigation officer for the present case is Senior Staff Sergeant Woo Chee Wai.
29 From the above facts, it would appear that there was no deliberate attempt on the part of the Accused not to stop in order to evade arrest. The Accused had also immediately called the police once she was informed by the brother. Further, there was no evidence that she had intended to conceal the evidence from the impact as she had intended to make a report later in the morning and to inform the insurance company.
Conclusion
30 I was of the view that the present case was not one that required the imposition of a custodial sentence in view of the low level of culpability on the part of the Accused and the facts of the present case. Further, when I asked whether the prosecution wished to address me on sentence, the prosecution had indicated that he had no submissions on sentence. As stated by Justice Lee Seiu Kin in Lee Meng Soon’s case, the appropriate degree of punishment must depend on what the offender reasonably apprehends, and not the actual degree of damage that was occasioned. In my view, the case was one which involves a serious error in judgment on the part of the Accused which resulted in her lack of awareness or mistaken assumption as to the nature of what had actually hit the windscreen of the car. Accordingly in respect of DAC 59672/2009, I imposed a fine of $800 in default four days’ imprisonment and ordered the Accused to be disqualified for a period of twelve months’ for all classes of vehicles. Further, I was also of the view that the twelve months’ disqualification period for all classes of vehicles would be a sufficient deterrent to the Accused as she would have to go through the entire process of obtaining a driving licence all over again should she decide to drive again.
31 Dissatisfied with my decision, the Prosecution lodged a Notice of Appeal on 1 September 2010 against the sentence I imposed in respect of DAC 59672/2009 only. The Accused has paid the fines in respect of all the charges proceeded against her.
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