China Won’t Start With Taiwan
https://www.19fortyfive.com/2023/09/china-wont-start-with-taiwan/
Effective U.S. deterrence in the Pacific might push China to shift its aims inland, where it could assess its capabilities against more vulnerable neighbors before engaging targets like Taiwan.
Xi’s persecution of China’s Uyghur minority has raised border security concerns with states like Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Afghanistan, which have limited ability to protect their sovereignty. Xi could leverage events like the collapse of Afghanistan and terrorist attacks on Chinese nationals as reasons to intervene militarily, perhaps through limited anti-terror campaigns. This would provide the PLA with valuable real-world experience and give Xi a chance to both assess PLA readiness and prove the value of his extensive reforms to the military. Evidence that those expensive reforms were successful could relieve political stress as China’s economy begins to falter. In the past, Russia’s military dominance in this region would have been a deterring factor, but their war in Ukraine has led to increased reliance on China, diminishing Moscow’s ability to credibly challenge Beijing.
China could also choose to intervene in a conflict in Southeast Asia. China shares a long border with Myanmar, a country embroiled in a seemingly interminable civil war since May 2021. China has long maintained proxy buffer states in Myanmar, and political and security concerns could create an opportunity for military experience. The threat of a climate refugee crisis in the Bengal flood plains could exacerbate perceptions of instability, or distract India from challenging an unprecedented Chinese intervention.
Myanmar is a member of ASEAN, but its regional partners have been ineffective in their efforts to address the conflict. Moreover, China’s actions in the South China Sea imply they don’t view ASEAN as a serious deterrent. As such, China might engage in military campaigns to “stabilize” the region, providing similar benefits to hypothetical actions in Afghanistan: military experience for the PLA, and resultant political capital for Xi.
A third target is perhaps more likely: militarily weak Mongolia. Mongolia’s shared border with China holds some of the world’s richest deposits of coal, uranium, molybdenum, copper, tin, and more. These resources could help fuel China’s growing nuclear programs, coal-plant construction, and electronic innovations — particularly regarding semiconductors. These expanding projects are critical if China wishes to protect itself from American trade warfare and international sanctions. Mongolia’s significant debt and recent domestic unrest, particularly related to coal production, have hindered Ulaanbaatar’s full utilization of these deposits and threatened the status quo in trade between Mongolia and China.
In 2022, the International Monetary Fund declared that Mongolia faces global shocks, border conflicts, and economic stagflation. Mongolia’s “political instability” is capable of “significantly disrupting strategic mining projects” favoring China, the IMF stated. With no formal foreign defense commitments and a tiny military, Mongolia’s precarious situation might tempt Beijing to forcefully seize and exploit underutilized border resources, providing invaluable and relatively low-risk real-world experience to the PLA, extremely valuable resources, and much-needed political capital for Xi Jinping.
https://www.19fortyfive.com/2023/09/china-wont-start-with-taiwan/
Effective U.S. deterrence in the Pacific might push China to shift its aims inland, where it could assess its capabilities against more vulnerable neighbors before engaging targets like Taiwan.
Xi’s persecution of China’s Uyghur minority has raised border security concerns with states like Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Afghanistan, which have limited ability to protect their sovereignty. Xi could leverage events like the collapse of Afghanistan and terrorist attacks on Chinese nationals as reasons to intervene militarily, perhaps through limited anti-terror campaigns. This would provide the PLA with valuable real-world experience and give Xi a chance to both assess PLA readiness and prove the value of his extensive reforms to the military. Evidence that those expensive reforms were successful could relieve political stress as China’s economy begins to falter. In the past, Russia’s military dominance in this region would have been a deterring factor, but their war in Ukraine has led to increased reliance on China, diminishing Moscow’s ability to credibly challenge Beijing.
China could also choose to intervene in a conflict in Southeast Asia. China shares a long border with Myanmar, a country embroiled in a seemingly interminable civil war since May 2021. China has long maintained proxy buffer states in Myanmar, and political and security concerns could create an opportunity for military experience. The threat of a climate refugee crisis in the Bengal flood plains could exacerbate perceptions of instability, or distract India from challenging an unprecedented Chinese intervention.
Myanmar is a member of ASEAN, but its regional partners have been ineffective in their efforts to address the conflict. Moreover, China’s actions in the South China Sea imply they don’t view ASEAN as a serious deterrent. As such, China might engage in military campaigns to “stabilize” the region, providing similar benefits to hypothetical actions in Afghanistan: military experience for the PLA, and resultant political capital for Xi.
A third target is perhaps more likely: militarily weak Mongolia. Mongolia’s shared border with China holds some of the world’s richest deposits of coal, uranium, molybdenum, copper, tin, and more. These resources could help fuel China’s growing nuclear programs, coal-plant construction, and electronic innovations — particularly regarding semiconductors. These expanding projects are critical if China wishes to protect itself from American trade warfare and international sanctions. Mongolia’s significant debt and recent domestic unrest, particularly related to coal production, have hindered Ulaanbaatar’s full utilization of these deposits and threatened the status quo in trade between Mongolia and China.
In 2022, the International Monetary Fund declared that Mongolia faces global shocks, border conflicts, and economic stagflation. Mongolia’s “political instability” is capable of “significantly disrupting strategic mining projects” favoring China, the IMF stated. With no formal foreign defense commitments and a tiny military, Mongolia’s precarious situation might tempt Beijing to forcefully seize and exploit underutilized border resources, providing invaluable and relatively low-risk real-world experience to the PLA, extremely valuable resources, and much-needed political capital for Xi Jinping.
