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President Donald Trump’s decision to bomb nuclear enrichment facilities in Iran surprised some. Here are the five main miscalculations the Iranian regime made that led to this point. The Iranian regime has seen its miscalculations surface in layers, like the peeling of an onion. Though no one can predict the future and some things remain unclear, it is important to examine five mistakes.
1. Iran’s leaders thought Trump was bluffing and wouldn’t attack directly.
President Trump was not lying when he said he didn’t want to start new wars. Perhaps military action could have been prevented if Iran’s leaders offered inspections, negotiated in good faith, and were ready to seriously constrict uranium enrichment.
Many news reports and podcasts made the regime think the isolationist wing of Trump’s power base had his ear, and the public would fear attacks on US servicemen in the region so much it would be too costly to attack. Trump did kill General Qassem Soleimani in his first term, but he didn’t go further. The stealth B-2 bombers that dropped the huge bombs on Iran’s nuclear facilities cost more than $2 billion each, and the regime may have thought Trump would be risk averse to seeing them shot down. While it is extremely difficult to take down B-2 planes, seeing that no Israeli planes were shot down and Iran’s defenses were weakened likely emboldened Trump.
2. Iran’s leaders thought proxies and “allies” would make them bulletproof.
With the well-armed Hezbollah, the Houthis disrupting shipping routes, Hamas in Gaza, and Iranian proxy forces in Syria, Tehran thought Israel and the US would be too scared to attack it directly.
Iran never imagined Hezbollah’s power would be reduced so quickly, it did not expect the Syrian government to fall in the way that it did, and it did not expect to see Hamas and the Houthis so weakened. The Iranian regime, which assisted Russia in its war against Ukraine with drones, and provides a huge amount of oil to China, also imagined the potential threat of Russia or China coming to its aid might scare off any significant attack. There remains a possibility that China, North Korea, or Russia could get involved militarily — but it is unlikely. More likely the Houthis will resume firing missiles.
3. Iran misunderstood the larger ramifications of the attacks of October 7.
Seeing great schisms in Israel over the judicial reform issue, Iran hoped Israel would implode after October 7 — or at the very least, see the ousting of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Iran likely believed that the information and PR campaign against Israel — falsely calling it a genocidal entity — would weaken it and make Israel too afraid to make bold moves. Instead, it made the Israeli public united on the need to take the threat of Iran seriously and be more proactive.
4. Iran underestimated the Mossad and Shin Bet, Israel’s security services.
It was a huge blow that Israel, said to have the best security services in the world, did not know Hamas was going to attack when it did on October 7, 2023.
But for the Mossad to be able to not only kill numerous Iranian generals at the same time, but deploy drones and other equipment on Iranian soil likely took the regime (and the level of infiltration Israel has achieved) by surprise. Iran not only underestimated the Mossad’s ability, but it likely didn’t understand its brutality against its citizens would allow the Mossad to get Iranian assets so consistently on the ground.
5. Iran though Israel’s muted response in 2024 meant it would not be more aggressive.
In April and October of 2024, Iran launched ballistic missiles at Israel. The Jewish State responded by weakening Iran’s air defenses, but it did not go after any major installations. It is quite possible that the regime felt that since Israel did not become more aggressive, it was a sign that the Jewish State wouldn’t risk a major direct attack. But as we’ve seen, they were very, very wrong.
1. Iran’s leaders thought Trump was bluffing and wouldn’t attack directly.
President Trump was not lying when he said he didn’t want to start new wars. Perhaps military action could have been prevented if Iran’s leaders offered inspections, negotiated in good faith, and were ready to seriously constrict uranium enrichment.
Many news reports and podcasts made the regime think the isolationist wing of Trump’s power base had his ear, and the public would fear attacks on US servicemen in the region so much it would be too costly to attack. Trump did kill General Qassem Soleimani in his first term, but he didn’t go further. The stealth B-2 bombers that dropped the huge bombs on Iran’s nuclear facilities cost more than $2 billion each, and the regime may have thought Trump would be risk averse to seeing them shot down. While it is extremely difficult to take down B-2 planes, seeing that no Israeli planes were shot down and Iran’s defenses were weakened likely emboldened Trump.
2. Iran’s leaders thought proxies and “allies” would make them bulletproof.
With the well-armed Hezbollah, the Houthis disrupting shipping routes, Hamas in Gaza, and Iranian proxy forces in Syria, Tehran thought Israel and the US would be too scared to attack it directly.
Iran never imagined Hezbollah’s power would be reduced so quickly, it did not expect the Syrian government to fall in the way that it did, and it did not expect to see Hamas and the Houthis so weakened. The Iranian regime, which assisted Russia in its war against Ukraine with drones, and provides a huge amount of oil to China, also imagined the potential threat of Russia or China coming to its aid might scare off any significant attack. There remains a possibility that China, North Korea, or Russia could get involved militarily — but it is unlikely. More likely the Houthis will resume firing missiles.
3. Iran misunderstood the larger ramifications of the attacks of October 7.
Seeing great schisms in Israel over the judicial reform issue, Iran hoped Israel would implode after October 7 — or at the very least, see the ousting of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Iran likely believed that the information and PR campaign against Israel — falsely calling it a genocidal entity — would weaken it and make Israel too afraid to make bold moves. Instead, it made the Israeli public united on the need to take the threat of Iran seriously and be more proactive.
4. Iran underestimated the Mossad and Shin Bet, Israel’s security services.
It was a huge blow that Israel, said to have the best security services in the world, did not know Hamas was going to attack when it did on October 7, 2023.
But for the Mossad to be able to not only kill numerous Iranian generals at the same time, but deploy drones and other equipment on Iranian soil likely took the regime (and the level of infiltration Israel has achieved) by surprise. Iran not only underestimated the Mossad’s ability, but it likely didn’t understand its brutality against its citizens would allow the Mossad to get Iranian assets so consistently on the ground.
5. Iran though Israel’s muted response in 2024 meant it would not be more aggressive.
In April and October of 2024, Iran launched ballistic missiles at Israel. The Jewish State responded by weakening Iran’s air defenses, but it did not go after any major installations. It is quite possible that the regime felt that since Israel did not become more aggressive, it was a sign that the Jewish State wouldn’t risk a major direct attack. But as we’ve seen, they were very, very wrong.
