Singapore Land Authority Corruption Case: What can be done to prevent future fraud

Watchman

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Singapore Land Authority Corruption Case: What can be done to prevent future fraud

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The smashed Ferrari that Lim, Koh’s colleague, crashed last December along Nicoll Highway. No one in SLA realised that the driver, named in reports as Lim Chai Meng, was their colleague as he was known as Chris Lim in the office. — PHOTO: SHIN MIN

Like many Singaporeans, I was shocked to read about the high-profiled corruption case involving a senior Singapore Land Authority (SLA) officer holding the rank of deputy director. It is believed that he would be in the coveted superscale pay scale based on his title of deputy director and most likely is drawing a salary of at least $10,000 a month excluding year end and performance bonuses.

The superscale salary range is meant for our government scholars or senior civil servants who climbed slowly through the ranks. It goes to show that there is no sure way to prevent senior civil servants from exploiting the system for personal gains even if they are highly paid. More checks and balances seem to be the only way to prevent senior civil servants from fleeing the system.

Koh Seah Wee, deputy director of SLA’s Technology and Infrastructure Department (TID) and Christopher Lim Chai Meng, a manager in the same department, are believed to have created false invoices through various business entities for fictitious IT maintenance goods and services that were not delivered.

The amount pilfered was also huge – $12 million over a two-year period starting from Jan 2008 to March this year. I am glad that at least $10 million of the loot has been recovered.

Mr Koh also shockingly faces a massive 249 counts of cheating and other offences revealing a elaborate system of fraud at the highest level. It is believed that the two culprits could be assisted by other departmental officers involved in the scam – either through fraudulent malpractices or possible passive collaboration – as it is almost impossible to pull off such a systematic massive fraud without being caught by the internal checks and balances in place at most government agencies.

Exploitation of Government Gebiz Tender System

However, its still a mystery how the two culprits could collaboratively exploit the government tender gebiz system which is considered to be fool-proof. Before a government body can consider awarding a job to the public, they need to call for a tender exercise and a quote of at least three different companies need to be put up. Authority for approval also requires two signatures if not more. There is obviously a very serious systemic fault at the SLA for the culprits to regularly cheat the tender system at the highest level.

The culprit Mr Koh Seah Wee, aged 40 years old, also drove a $1.55-million Lamborghini and a $300,000 Mercedes- Benz. The cars are registered in his wife’s name probably to avoid possible detection. He also invested in a Siglap property and invested in millions of dollars on unit trusts and shares. I am pretty sure that he didn’t drive that million-dollar car to work as that will certainly give him away. Nevertheless, both the culprits’ flamboyant lifestyle of extravagant spending was not picked up by anyone from the CPIB or internal staff.



Panel Findings Need To Be Made Public

In June this year, the Ministry of Law established an independent review panel to identify how the irregularities could have occurred. It is also unsure why it took so long for the government to publicise the fraud case – a lengthy three months have passed before the case was made known to the public.

The investigative panel was chaired by a senior government official of another ministry and consisted of members from other ministries. I am unsure how impartial this panel would be as all the members are civil servants. The findings were also unpublicised and no one really knows what systemic weaknesses of the system that require tweaking.

A panel consisting of a mixture of executives from the private and public sector will be more appropriate given the high-profiled nature of the case. The panel should also made public its findings so that there is proper accountability here. As of now, the government has fallen short on this aspect.

More worrying was the fact that the irregularites were only found out when someone new took over the work function from one of the culprits. He quickly detected that something was amiss and decided to spill the beans to his superior.

One wondered how long the scam will go undetected if the culprit continued in his position. As most statutory boards have their own internal auditting, he may have developed a way to circumvent the check resulting in a massive fraud that went undetected for two years.

Whistle Blower System Needs To Be In Place

I always believed that the check system is very much in place in most government bodies to deter possible fraud at the junior level. However, if a senior staff officer decided to cheat the system in collaboration with other officers, there is not much the government can do via its own set of internal checks and balances unless there is a sound whistle blowing system in place.

The whistle blower needs to feel safe and his identity uncompromised when he reports a suspected fraud. Even when he is called for a face-to-face investigative interview, it is done by a neutral body to ensure that his job stays secure. If not, no one in their right mind will want to step forward when they suspect something is amiss at work.

Who can you turn to now if your public service’s departmental colleague is found to be suspicious of corruption without suffering a melt down in your own career? Our CPIB – the current national corruption buster – is also seen as a mystique government body that is view with fear and is not seen as approachable. They need to come out of their ivory tower and make their presence felt by visiting sensitive ministries and statutory boards with regular previews of what staff can do if they want to report a fraud case.

Moreover, for most fraud cases, nothing is seen as black or white and staff rather wave away their suspicion as pure sensitivity than doggedly pursuing it all the way. The chief thought of most people will be: “What will happen to me if the suscipion is unwarranted – will I lose my job?” With such thought in mind, many will rather ignore their sixth sense than plunging into unchartered territories of reporting a possible fraud involving your boss.

I remembered been pushed away by my superior when I reported a case of work discrimination of my direct boss when I worked in the civil service many years ago. I felt helpless and of course unjustified that nothing was done to look into my allegation. There was nothing that I could do further if my superior is unwilling to look into my case.

On 26 May this year, Channel News Asia has also reported that a total of four government agencies – MDA, MOE, MTI and Mindef were found by the Public Accounts Committee for lapses in the way they have managed finances. The MDA is also found to be a serial offender and has consistently failed the auditting findings. Among its many lapses then included the failure to collect $9.89 million in revenue from investment in 46 films. Contractual obligations were also not followed through. For example, it did not bring to task the underperformance of a sloppy contractor at the Institute of Technical Education (ITE).

Among the other agencies taken to task, the Education Ministry was rapped for paying more than necessary on school cleaning contracts while the Defence Ministry was found to have carried out wrongful certification for a consultancy project, resulting in advance payment of $289,499 to the Defence Science and Technology Agency (DSTA).

The government needs to realise that money belonging to statutory boards and ministries comes from the tax paying public. It needs to be held accountable if there is a systemic accounting weakness within the civil service and must be thoroughly transparent when it comes to publicising any accounting shortcomings.

Proposals To Counter High-Level Graft

I propose the following measures to counter further possible high-level graft in the future:

1. A proper whistle blower system must also be put in place at all ministries and statutory boards so that staff can go to a safe place to air their suspicion without suffering a career backlash. The CPIB can come into the picture here by conducting regular talks in sensitive departments of our ministries and statutory boards. If not, my fear is that senior staff will be able to fleece the system undeterred and very much on the upper hand.

2. Senior civil servants must annually be made to declare their assets and that of their immediate family members so that if there are any financial irregularities, a probe can be conducted immediately. It is clear that this is not in place yet or else the culprits’ ill-conceived gains will be out in the open sooner.

3. Hopefully, a heavy sentence will be imposed on the culprits to deter others from committing similar offences in future.

4. Key appoint-holders in sensitive positions need to be regularly rotated to prevent them from exploiting the system undetected. From this case, its obvious that if the new guy was not appointed to oversee Mr Koh’s position, the fraud will continue unchecked for a very long time. The internal audit has clearly failed to stem the fraud and this also needs to be reviewed.

Singapore needs to upkeep its corruption-free tag fiercely so that investors will have faith in our governance and system. The citizens of the country will also want nothing less.
 
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