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Andrew MacGregor Marshall
There seems to be a significant degree of misunderstanding about how the issue of royal succession impacts Thailand's political crisis. The rather clueless blog post by Political Prisoners in Thailand attached below is the latest example. So let me spell it out as clearly as possible:
1. I have never argued that "the crisis is all about royal succession and a contest over that" and such an argument would clearly be unsupportable. Anybody who takes the time to read #กลียุค can see that my argument is considerably more nuanced.
2. It's widely known that since the 1970s, there has been a remarkably open preference at all levels of Thai society for the next monarch to be Princess Maha Chakri Sirindhorn rather than Crown Prince Maha Vajiralongkorn. This was even reflected in the Thai constitution, which has made room for a female monarch. So as PPT says: "the speculation about the prince and succession has been around for a very long time". This is not in dispute.
3. The most significant sociopolitical conflict in contemporary Thailand is between ordinary Thais who want the right to democratically elect their government and want equality under the law, and the entrenched old elite who want to maintain their power. The conflict between ordinary Thais trying to assert their rights and establishment Thais trying to protect their privileges has been fought over multiple centuries since the first Thai kingdoms. This is also not in dispute.
4. In contemporary Thailand, the royal succession is important for two reasons above all. Firstly, the next monarch will inherit full control of the Crown Property Bureau and Bhumibol's private wealth, conservatively estimated at $35+ billion. Secondly, the personality of the monarch is also crucial to the establishment's efforts to maintain ideological hegemony.
5. From the 1970s onwards, an intense antipathy has developed between the old Thai elite and Vajiralongkorn. Both sides hate each other, and the traditional establishment knows that if Vajiralongkorn becomes king, he will use his position to take revenge on those who have disrespected him. This is an existential fear for men like Prem Tinsulanonda, Anand Panyarachun, and most of the palace hierarchy.
5. Vajiralongkorn has HIV and a rare form of acute leukaemia, and in 1996 he banished and disowned all his legitimate male heirs. This reassured the traditional elite that Vajiralongkorn was not a serious threat to them, and that their political and economic dominance could be preserved even after the royal succession.
6. The rise of Thaksin Shinawatra fundamentally altered this political calculus. Thaksin was the first Thai leader in living memory who could challenge Bhumibol's popularity, and he was also a financial patron of the crown prince. Like Vajiralongkorn, he became a political outcast, hated and distrusted by the old elite.
7. By 2005 the old elite realized that they faced an existential threat from an alliance of Thaksin and Vajiralongkorn that could politically and financially dominate Thailand after the death of Bhumibol, with the help of the royal fortune. Thaksin's remarkable landslide reelection in February 2005 signalled that he would be a dominant force in parliamentary politics for many years. Meanwhile, Vajiralongkorn's wife Srirasmi gave birth to a legitimate male heir in April 2005, bolstering the prince's dynastic claim. Although the old elite fear and oppose democracy, the threat posed by Thaksin and Vajiralongkorn was much more immediate and serious. Prem Tinsulanonda coordinated a coup in September 2006 to try to neutralise the threat.
8. The coup was a catastrophic strategic miscalculation for the old elite because it entangled their succession conflict with the wider struggle over democracy, and because Bhumibol had no intention of changing his designated heir. Despite his disappointment over Vajiralongkorn's antics, the king is highly conservative and believes his son should become Rama X.
9. Realizing that the coup was a disaster that left them more isolated and vulnerable than before, the elite launched a desperate effort in 2007 to sabotage the succession by leaking embarrassing video and photographs of Vajiralongkorn and Srirasmi, and by spreading the information that the crown prince has HIV. They succeeded in persuading Sirikit to drop her support for Vajiralongkorn. She began conspiring with them to freeze the crown prince out of the succession, so that she could rule as regent when Bhumibol dies, on behalf of Vajiralongkorn's youngest son Dipangkorn.
10. In order for the elite's plan to sabotage the succession to succeed, they need control of parliament, because the national assembly must formally ratify the next monarch. Thaksin hopes to play kingmaker by using his control of parliament to block any attempt to stop the prince. This is why the elite are desperate to find a way to ensure Thaksin is not in control of parliament when Bhumibol dies. Although they claim to revere the king, the traditional establishment and palace network plan to defy Bhumibol's wishes on succession. They accuse Thaksin of being an enemy of the king, but Thaksin is trying to ensure the king's choice of heir becomes the next monarch. Thus, although he is doing so for his own ends, Thaksin is following the king's wishes while the "royalist" elite are ignoring Bhumibol's wishes.
11. Sirikit's severe stroke in July 2012 ended her ambitions of being regent. The old elite now support Sirindhorn as regent to stop the prince.
12. While Thais have long been privately aware of the rivalry between Vajiralongkorn and Sirindhorn, until recently the overwhelming foreign academic and journalistic consensus has been that the crown prince is the inevitable heir and that there is no significant conflict over succession. My articles #thaistory and #กลียุค have shown in detail that this consensus was wrong. Recent events have proven my thesis to be correct, and as a result the consensus has changed. It is now widely recognized that the succession struggle is the decisive factor in determining the behaviour and strategy of the elite. But this does not mean that the wider struggle for democracy is unimportant. Far from it. The crucial point is that the succession conflict and democracy struggle have become entangled.
There seems to be a significant degree of misunderstanding about how the issue of royal succession impacts Thailand's political crisis. The rather clueless blog post by Political Prisoners in Thailand attached below is the latest example. So let me spell it out as clearly as possible:
1. I have never argued that "the crisis is all about royal succession and a contest over that" and such an argument would clearly be unsupportable. Anybody who takes the time to read #กลียุค can see that my argument is considerably more nuanced.
2. It's widely known that since the 1970s, there has been a remarkably open preference at all levels of Thai society for the next monarch to be Princess Maha Chakri Sirindhorn rather than Crown Prince Maha Vajiralongkorn. This was even reflected in the Thai constitution, which has made room for a female monarch. So as PPT says: "the speculation about the prince and succession has been around for a very long time". This is not in dispute.
3. The most significant sociopolitical conflict in contemporary Thailand is between ordinary Thais who want the right to democratically elect their government and want equality under the law, and the entrenched old elite who want to maintain their power. The conflict between ordinary Thais trying to assert their rights and establishment Thais trying to protect their privileges has been fought over multiple centuries since the first Thai kingdoms. This is also not in dispute.
4. In contemporary Thailand, the royal succession is important for two reasons above all. Firstly, the next monarch will inherit full control of the Crown Property Bureau and Bhumibol's private wealth, conservatively estimated at $35+ billion. Secondly, the personality of the monarch is also crucial to the establishment's efforts to maintain ideological hegemony.
5. From the 1970s onwards, an intense antipathy has developed between the old Thai elite and Vajiralongkorn. Both sides hate each other, and the traditional establishment knows that if Vajiralongkorn becomes king, he will use his position to take revenge on those who have disrespected him. This is an existential fear for men like Prem Tinsulanonda, Anand Panyarachun, and most of the palace hierarchy.
5. Vajiralongkorn has HIV and a rare form of acute leukaemia, and in 1996 he banished and disowned all his legitimate male heirs. This reassured the traditional elite that Vajiralongkorn was not a serious threat to them, and that their political and economic dominance could be preserved even after the royal succession.
6. The rise of Thaksin Shinawatra fundamentally altered this political calculus. Thaksin was the first Thai leader in living memory who could challenge Bhumibol's popularity, and he was also a financial patron of the crown prince. Like Vajiralongkorn, he became a political outcast, hated and distrusted by the old elite.
7. By 2005 the old elite realized that they faced an existential threat from an alliance of Thaksin and Vajiralongkorn that could politically and financially dominate Thailand after the death of Bhumibol, with the help of the royal fortune. Thaksin's remarkable landslide reelection in February 2005 signalled that he would be a dominant force in parliamentary politics for many years. Meanwhile, Vajiralongkorn's wife Srirasmi gave birth to a legitimate male heir in April 2005, bolstering the prince's dynastic claim. Although the old elite fear and oppose democracy, the threat posed by Thaksin and Vajiralongkorn was much more immediate and serious. Prem Tinsulanonda coordinated a coup in September 2006 to try to neutralise the threat.
8. The coup was a catastrophic strategic miscalculation for the old elite because it entangled their succession conflict with the wider struggle over democracy, and because Bhumibol had no intention of changing his designated heir. Despite his disappointment over Vajiralongkorn's antics, the king is highly conservative and believes his son should become Rama X.
9. Realizing that the coup was a disaster that left them more isolated and vulnerable than before, the elite launched a desperate effort in 2007 to sabotage the succession by leaking embarrassing video and photographs of Vajiralongkorn and Srirasmi, and by spreading the information that the crown prince has HIV. They succeeded in persuading Sirikit to drop her support for Vajiralongkorn. She began conspiring with them to freeze the crown prince out of the succession, so that she could rule as regent when Bhumibol dies, on behalf of Vajiralongkorn's youngest son Dipangkorn.
10. In order for the elite's plan to sabotage the succession to succeed, they need control of parliament, because the national assembly must formally ratify the next monarch. Thaksin hopes to play kingmaker by using his control of parliament to block any attempt to stop the prince. This is why the elite are desperate to find a way to ensure Thaksin is not in control of parliament when Bhumibol dies. Although they claim to revere the king, the traditional establishment and palace network plan to defy Bhumibol's wishes on succession. They accuse Thaksin of being an enemy of the king, but Thaksin is trying to ensure the king's choice of heir becomes the next monarch. Thus, although he is doing so for his own ends, Thaksin is following the king's wishes while the "royalist" elite are ignoring Bhumibol's wishes.
11. Sirikit's severe stroke in July 2012 ended her ambitions of being regent. The old elite now support Sirindhorn as regent to stop the prince.
12. While Thais have long been privately aware of the rivalry between Vajiralongkorn and Sirindhorn, until recently the overwhelming foreign academic and journalistic consensus has been that the crown prince is the inevitable heir and that there is no significant conflict over succession. My articles #thaistory and #กลียุค have shown in detail that this consensus was wrong. Recent events have proven my thesis to be correct, and as a result the consensus has changed. It is now widely recognized that the succession struggle is the decisive factor in determining the behaviour and strategy of the elite. But this does not mean that the wider struggle for democracy is unimportant. Far from it. The crucial point is that the succession conflict and democracy struggle have become entangled.
