Singapore is placed in Band D.
Overall,
the defence and security sector
is characterised by a dearth of public information, offset by strong controls
against personnel corruption risks.
Regarding
political corruption risk
,
restrictions on the formation of societies relating to government or
national security matters limit Civil Society Organisation (CSO)
engagement with the government on defence. The Anti
-
Defamation Act,
Official Secrets Act, and the Sedition Act serve to deter strong commentary
or investigative journalism, forcing the media to practice self
-
censorship
with regard to many political matters, including defence and security
issues. The Defence Supply Committee, which oversees defence policies
and budgets, is provided with minimal information to help guide decision
-
making. Sources of defence income other than central allocation are not
published or scrutinised. Both internal and external auditing procedures of
military expenditure lack transparency. While the intelligence agencies are
subject to limited controls, the selection criteria for the selection of top
positions within the agencies are unclear. Nonetheless, Singapore has
signed up to relevant international anti
-
corruption instruments and an
openly stated Anti
-
Corruption Policy exists, albeit not for the defence and
security sector specifically. Singapore’s Corrupt Practices Investigation
Bureau is globally renowned for its efficiency.
In
financial corruption risk
, no information exists on asset disposal or on
any scrutiny it may be subjected to. The percentage of defence
expenditure allocated to secret items is not known publicly, and there is
no evidence to indicate that audit reports of the annual accounts of the
security sector and other secret programs are provided to the legislature.
However, there is no evidence of illegal private enterprise by military or
defence officials.
In terms of
personnel corruption risk
, effective measures
appear to be in
place for deterring facilitation payments and bribery. Whistle
-
blowing is
strongly encouraged, with no evidence of adverse consequences for
whistle
-
blowers. Personnel in sensitive positions are paid special scrutiny.
Systems of payment are well
-
established and transparent, and promotions
are based on an objective and meritocratic process. There is no evidence
implying that corruption occurs to avoid conscription or to gain preferred
postings in the recruitment process. Despite the lack of a published
military Code of Conduct, publicity surrounds cases of corrupt officials
being prosecuted and convicted.
Regarding
operations corruption risks
, there is no evidence of training
on corruption risks during deployment or in contracting whilst deployed.
Peace
-
keeping activities are reportedly not accompanied by concerns over
corruption in the field and there is no indication of corruption monitors
being deployed. Only limited laws regulate the private security sector.
In relation to
integrity in defence procurement
, no defence specific
legislation regulates defence and security procurement. Only abbreviated
information on the procurement cycle process is made public, and
sporadically, details are released about actual or intended purchases.
There is no evidence of any oversight mechanism or the existence of a
formal tender board and its auditing procedure. No formal mechanisms
for companies to complain about perceived malpractice or formal
sanctions to punish corrupt suppliers are found to be in place
