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How a tactical arms-for-piracy alliance between Yemeni rebels and Somali militants is opening new options for both groups

on a warm April day on Yemen’s western coast, a barrage of 14 U.S. airstrikes rained down on the Ras Isa oil terminal, killing at least 80 people and wounding scores more. The U.S. campaign had come to a head after more than a year of bombardment in response to Houthi militants’ offensive against vessels transiting the Red Sea, which they claimed was in solidarity with Palestinians in Gaza. Human rights groups called the U.S. attack an apparent war crime. For the Houthis, the charred remains of tankers and infrastructure marked the loss of a crucial revenue stream.
On the other side of the Gulf of Aden and relatively removed from the spotlight, Somalia’s al-Shabab was in the midst of staging a comeback. Locked in a grinding war with Somali, regional and U.S. forces, its fighters — many barefoot and wielding aging AK-47 rifles — advanced to around 120 miles from the capital, Mogadishu.
In mid-April, they stormed the strategic town of Adan Yabal, where residents described deafening explosions followed by gunfire from multiple directions. Joint Somali-U.S. airstrikes killed more than a dozen fighters, but the village, once declared liberated, fell again under al-Shabab’s black flag, as the latter pushed closer toward their goal of surrounding the capital.
The Houthis and al-Shabab operate on opposite shores of one of the world’s most strategic waterways. Their two campaigns were unfolding separately, but behind the scenes were becoming increasingly intertwined. Both needed to acquire resources in the face of military pressure, and they struck a deal: The Houthis would supply al-Shabab with weapons and, in return, al-Shabab’s pirates would divert naval patrols’ attention toward themselves, allowing smuggled weapons and shipments to reach Yemen’s Houthi-controlled ports.
Being neighbors, Yemen and Somalia have long been connected through smuggling networks, trafficking everything from weapons and narcotics to people. Yazeed al-Jeddawy, a research coordinator at the Sana’a Center for Strategic Studies, said the relationship between the Houthis and al-Shabab became more visible during a surge in piracy in the Red Sea and the Bab al-Mandab strait (between the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden) in early 2024. The trend was quickly linked to growing collaboration between the two groups.
At first glance, the relationship seems unlikely. The Houthis have spent years fighting fierce battles against al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), Sunni Islamists ideologically opposed to the Houthis’ Zaydi Shiism. But in recent years, this dynamic changed. The two groups quietly exchanged prisoners and, by early 2024, the Houthis were backing AQAP attacks on forces belonging to Yemen’s internationally recognized government, according to the United Nations. Now, the Houthis’ cooperation with al-Shabab, al Qaeda’s East African affiliate, no longer seems far-fetched.
When I asked Somalia’s special presidential envoy for stabilization and civilian protection, Omar Hashi, about the nature of the two groups’ relationship, he described it as purely commercial and not ideological, saying the only common denominator between them was the “fight against conventional governments” and “the need for resources and arms.”
Hashi begrudgingly warned that the militias were hard to contain, despite international pressure. “[Al-Shabab] will find the means to get arms, and the Houthis will also find a means to smuggle.” Their mutual dependence makes their shared trade routes access points for collaboration, but Hashi stressed the ongoing efforts by Somali and allied forces to prevent their operations.
According to a U.N. report seen by New Lines, at least two meetings between the Houthis and al-Shabab were held in July and September 2024. So far, officials have confirmed that al-Shabab has received light weapons from the Houthis — assault rifles, light machine guns and sniper rifles. Taimur Khan, a Gulf investigator at Conflict Armament Research, told New Lines that serial numbers matched weapons seized from dhows bound for the Houthis, while markings on weapons seized in Somalia pointed to a direct Houthi origin.
What had once been regarded as clandestine cooperation has fast become a global concern, and the U.S. knows it. The commander of the U.S. Africa Command, Gen. Michael Langley, has warned that a deeper Houthi presence in East Africa would be a greater threat to global trade and shipping, and bring “a highly capable, belligerent actor into a region already struggling against [the Islamic State group] and al-Shabab.”
That warning points to a reality already taking shape: The Houthis’ alliance with Somali militants has become a crucial component of the Yemeni militia’s war efforts. This partnership has helped uphold the Houthis’ domestic arms manufacturing and assembly programs and, by extension, their Red Sea campaign. Behind their globally disruptive maritime offensive lies a complex supply network that goes far beyond Iran’s well-known sponsorship.
While Iran remains the Houthis’ primary backer, the latter have increasingly sought out different suppliers to reduce their singular reliance on Tehran. One of these lies further east, in China. Houthi leaders visited China in 2023 and 2024 to secure weapons parts, reportedly promising not to target Chinese vessels in return. The U.S. Treasury Department later sanctioned two China-based firms for supplying weapons components and “dual-use items,” a sign that the Houthis are changing from a proxy into a group tapping into global supply chains.
East Africa has quietly become a key node in that network. Smugglers navigate toward Kenya and Tanzania to avoid international naval surveillance before heading to Somalia. Al-Shabab controls some ports in eastern Somalia and has access to areas outside the jurisdiction of U.S.-led naval patrols. From there, dhows laden with crates slip past naval patrols using falsified documents and veer toward the Yemeni coast, helping fuel the Houthis’ drone and missile assembly lines.
But the support extends beyond just smuggling into something more direct. Somali groups may have played an active role in Houthi attacks. A U.N. report from October 2024 found that one-third of attacks on the Gulf of Aden took place outside areas that can be monitored by the Houthis’ radars. The implication was clear: Someone else was guiding the strikes. Somali fighters, perhaps operating from remote stretches of coastline, may have been directly involved in scouting targets and relaying coordinates.
Ibrahim Jalal, a regional security expert at Horizon Insights and co-author of a Carnegie Middle East Center report on the alliance, said the Houthis have even deployed a handful of coordinators to Somalia to help facilitate this cooperation on the ground.
Beyond al-Shabab, the Houthis have also cultivated ties with a broader range of Somali factions, including the local Islamic State affiliate and elements from the autonomous region of Somaliland in the north. These efforts are all part of a growing attempt at diversifying and expanding supply routes.
Both the Houthis and al-Shabab have played a role in disrupting the international order, but the impact of their alliance could soon grow further. So far, the threat in Somalia has been limited to simple weapons, but this could change. Behind closed doors, al-Shabab has requested drones and guided missiles. In exchange, the group would escalate piracy, a chaotic move that would draw the attention of naval patrols and open new lanes for Houthi weapons movements.
Evidence of this plan has surfaced across Somalia. Last year, in the sweltering August sun, security forces in the Puntland region pulled over a suspicious truck on the dusty road between Galkayo and Garowe. Hidden inside were five suicide drones and seven men with ties to al-Shabab and the Islamic State. According to one security official, the weapons had crossed the Red Sea from Yemen, slipping through the busy port of Bosaso.
Months later, two boats quietly slipped through Somali waters, one larger and the other trailing behind like a shadow. They carried no flags or identification, only cargo meant for al-Shabab. Their journey would be interrupted before reaching its destination, however. A U.S. strike halted the boats in their tracks, destroying both and more sophisticated weapons intended for the Somali militia.
Jalal, the security expert, said that two delegations from Somalia visited Yemen’s Hodeida as recently as a few weeks ago — one linked to Somaliland and the other to al-Shabab. They exchanged expertise with the Houthis and AQAP, and received not only drone training for use in Somalia but “cultural courses” tied to “Houthi indoctrination efforts” as well, in a dynamic that is still emerging.
With access to deadlier arms, al-Shabab could gain more territory and inch closer to Somalia’s capital. But the stakes would stretch beyond Somalia itself. The Houthis could use Somali soil to launch direct attacks during times of extreme pressure. On April 16, as U.S. strikes pounded Yemen, the Houthis declared their next “confrontation” with America would originate “from another country.” The thinly veiled threat was preceded by a U.N. report revealing that the group was actively considering launching attacks from Somalia’s coast. Iran’s weakened position after direct Israeli strikes and, later, the start of U.S.-Houthi ceasefire talks appear to have deterred those plans.
But the threat remains, and Somalia offers at least three potential launch points for direct or sponsored Houthi attacks: Somaliland, Puntland — where the Islamic State maintains a presence — and areas in central and southern Somalia now increasingly under al-Shabab’s control. Jalal said that, in the future, the Houthis could exploit these areas to push their reach beyond the Red Sea and into the Indian Ocean and Cape of Good Hope.
In this scenario, they would be seen as a force with transnational alliances and a battlefield beyond their borders. The Houthis would hold greater leverage in any future negotiations, with disarmament effectively off the table.
The Yemeni militia has discovered that survival and dominance depend on adaptability, a lesson reflected in the ties it has built with the once-antagonistic AQAP and its sister group across the Gulf of Aden. With this strategy, they are reshaping what it means to be a rebel group in the 21st century: less a proxy than a player in their own right. What began as solidarity with Gaza has evolved into something far more expansive: a demonstration of international reach, built on unlikely alliances and the ability to thrive in the shadows of chaos.