Investments gone bad

Forum: Sister was sold financial product clearly not suited for her​

Mar 03, 2025

Some financial advisers are making a mockery of the risk profile assessment and selling financial products not suited to buyers.

My sister recently renewed her fixed deposit at a bank. She was persuaded to buy a financial product for investment that was not suited to her conservative characteristics.

I read through her risk profile assessment and was alarmed that she was assessed as a risk-taker when she is clearly not.

She is not an active stock investor or a bond buyer. She does not understand the workings of a bond and does not know the business of US technology stocks. Yet the financial product consists of mainly US technology stocks and bonds.

The financial adviser painted a glorified picture of high returns but was mute on the annual fee payable. When I questioned the adviser later, he informed me that there is an administration fee payable annually.

After the deduction of the annual administration fee, the returns for the financial product are about 2.5 per cent, about the same as a fixed deposit rate.

My sister managed to get out of the investment as it was within the 14-day cooling-off period, but she needed to pay some fees.


I do not understand how financial advisers are still getting away with practices such as not telling their clients that their initial investment amount is not guaranteed.

What’s worse is my sister’s risk profile indicates that she is willing to hold the investment product for another 99 years when she is already in her 60s. This is nonsensical and truly unacceptable.

Foo Sing Kheng

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SoftBank, Temasek among eFishery investors facing near wipeout​

The labour union of eFishery staged a protest attended by more than 100 employees in January at its headquarters in Bandung, Indonesia.PHOTO: EFISHERY WORKERS' UNION

Feb 24, 2025

Investigators hired by the board of eFishery have determined the Indonesian start-up is in far worse shape than they previously thought, and that investors are likely to get back less than 10 US cents (13 Singapore cents) for every dollar they invested, according to documents seen by Bloomberg News.

The company, which deploys feeders to fish and shrimp farmers in Indonesia, incurred several hundred million dollars in losses between 2018 and 2024 and misrepresented its financial figures for years, according to the documents and a person familiar with the matter who asked not to be identified because the information isn’t public.

“eFishery is not commercially viable in its current form,” said a presentation prepared for the firm’s investors by FTI Consulting Singapore, the adviser hired to review the business and take over management of the company.

The fallen start-up, whose financial backers include SoftBank Group and Singapore’s Temasek Holdings, had been a star of Indonesia’s start-up scene. eFishery was valued at US$1.4 billion in 2023 after it raised US$200 million from Abu Dhabi’s 42XFund and some of its earlier investors.

In all, global investors plowed around US$315 million into eFishery’s preferred shares over five funding rounds, according to the presentation. In late 2024, the company was rocked by allegations of misconduct and inflated sales and profits, which led to the dismissal of its co-founders Gibran Huzaifah and Chrisna Aditya.

The FTI presentation estimated that eFishery had around US$50 million in cash as of around mid-February, and recommended that much of the business be wound down. “The cash balance continues to deplete without a restructuring plan in place,” it said.

That’s bad news for preference shareholders, all of whom would be paid back on an equal, or pari passu basis in the event of a liquidation. The investors could get back 9.5 US cents on the dollar under an “optimistic scenario”, and just 8.3 US cents on the dollar under a “conservative scenario, according to the presentation. That would mean Abu Dhabi’s G42, which invested US$100 million in the April 2023 round, may get just US$8.3 million back less than two years later.

A spokesperson for FTI Consulting declined to comment. SoftBank didn’t immediately respond to a request for comment outside regular business hours, while a Temasek spokesperson declined to comment. G42 didn’t immediately respond to an e-mailed request for comment.

Before its downfall, eFishery said its business revolved around installing AI-driven smart fish feeders, sensors and automated supply chains that connected farmers to buyers via smartphone apps. It also helped farmers obtain financing from peer-to-peer lenders and financial institutions to pay for their feed and operational costs.

The company had claimed to have more than 400,000 fish feeders deployed, and investigators initially estimated the number was closer to 24,000. The current estimate is just 6,300, of which only 600 are sending back data, according to the presentation.

The investigators also found that there was a high default rate on the financing arrangements, and that eFishery bears all losses when farmers fail to repay their loans. “In theory, the proceeds from the harvest or cash collected from farmers should be repaid back to the lenders,” the presentation said. “In practice, however, eFishery faced significant challenges when it comes to collection from borrowers.”

Hampering the debt collection process were the huge distances and fragmented nature of Indonesia’s developing economy, where almost 10 per cent of the population lives below the poverty line. About 76 per cent of eFishery’s US$68 million in accounts receivable were deemed as bad debt more than 60 days overdue, with the company ultimately liable for the bulk of loans it facilitated with banks, according to the presentation.

“Substantial costs would need to be incurred to realise or recover these outstanding amounts from borrowers who are scattered all across the country,” it said.

The company’s fish and shrimp businesses were operating on thin margins and “severely loss making”, the presentation said. Key apps were not connected to eFishery’s accounting systems, and many farmers were manually matched with buyers, the investigators found.

Much of the advanced technology that the firm touted did not work as claimed, according to the presentation. None of eFishery’s PondTag sensors that were supposed to help remotely judge water quality and automate fish and shrimp feeders had been deployed. The limited data collection meant fish feed predictions were wrong almost half the time, the document said.

In essence, eFishery was “operating like a traditional trading business without technology”, the presentation said, noting that this helped explain the comp

I once put a few grand into collectibles thinking they’d rise fast, but the market took a dump shortly after. Learned the hard way to avoid hype-driven stuff. Surprisingly, I made better returns flipping cs2 skins — faster turnover, more control, and less emotional baggage than stocks or long-term toys. At least with those, I could cut losses quickly and move on.

Jail for ‘key cog’ in cryptocurrency scam in which investors in Singapore lost $1.1m​

Shaffiq Alkhatib
May 06, 2025

SINGAPORE – He was the chief executive of a firm that offered investment schemes, claiming to have 300,000 physical mining machines capable of generating revenue by mining cryptocurrencies.

But this turned out to be a hoax. Lu Huangbin’s firm, A&A Blockchain Technology Innovation, was in fact running a Ponzi scheme.

According to his charges, the company induced 12 investors to part with more than $1.8 million in total. They later suffered losses totalling about $1.1 million.

On May 6, the 61-year-old Chinese national was sentenced to 4½ years’ jail and a fine of $6,000. Lu, who has made no restitution, pleaded guilty to multiple charges, including six counts of cheating.

Nine other charges were considered during his sentencing.

Lu was the last person linked to the case to be dealt with in court. Three others were earlier handed jail sentences.

One of them, Dutch national Yang Bin, then 61, was sentenced to six years’ jail and a fine of $16,000 in August 2024.

At the time of the offences, Yang was the chairman of A&A Blockchain Technology Innovation and was the mastermind of the scam.

Another man, Chinese national Wang Xinghong, then 40, was sentenced to five years’ jail on Aug 6, 2024. He was the firm’s chief technological officer.

A third Chinese national, Chen Wei, then 43, was a director at the company and also Yang’s personal assistant. He was sentenced to four years’ jail and a fine of $6,000 in September 2024.

Deputy Public Prosecutor Wong Shiau Yin told the court on May 6 that Lu was a “key cog” in the scam linked to the firm, which was incorporated on April 20, 2021.

Between May that year and February 2022, it offered a scheme to investors in Singapore.

Known as the A&A Chain Mining Scheme, the company promised investors a fixed daily return of 0.5 per cent on their investments, purportedly generated through the mining of cryptocurrencies.

In its marketing materials – including presentation slides and promotional videos – the company claimed to have an agreement with Yunnan Shun Ai Yun Xun Investment Holdings to acquire 70 per cent ownership of 300,000 mining machines in China.

These machines were said to be able to mine cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin and Ethereum.

However, the firm did not enter into any such agreement with Yunnan Shun Ai Yun Xun Investment Holdings.

DPP Wong said: “In fact, (A&A Blockchain Technology Innovation) did not mine cryptocurrency to generate revenue. Instead, (it) operated a money circulation or ‘Ponzi’ scheme, using monies from later investors to pay returns owed to earlier investors.”

Lu and his family had invested around US$57,000 (S$73,600) in the scheme and received some US$136,000 in returns.

He did not have a valid work pass in Singapore when he worked as the firm’s chief executive.

The prosecutor also said that between May 2021 and February 2022, the company attracted investments from over 700 investors in Singapore, amounting to around $6.7 million.

Court documents did not disclose if these investors were linked to Lu’s cheating offences.

The documents also did not state how the offences came to light, but all four men were charged in 2023.

Jail for man who used bogus wine investment scheme to pocket $12.67m of investors’ funds​

Shaffiq Alkhatib
May 22, 2025

SINGAPORE – A man, who set up a company that dealt with wines, and an alleged accomplice devised a fraudulent investment scheme involving the beverage to cheat over 200 investors of millions of dollars between 2008 and 2011.

Based on police investigations, victims linked to the company’s fraudulent sale of wines paid more than $14 million in total.

Eldric Ko, 51, who incorporated Premium Liquid Assets (PLASG) in October 2005 and jointly ran its business with Koo Han Jet, went on to misappropriate $12.67 million of the investors’ funds.

Deputy Public Prosecutor Michelle Tay said that Ko, a Singaporean, then squirreled away $8 million for his and Koo’s personal benefits.

On May 22, Ko, who has not made any restitution, was sentenced to seven years and two months’ jail after he pleaded guilty to one count of criminal breach of trust (CBT) involving more than $10 million, and two counts of dealing with his ill-gotten gains.

Twelve other charges were considered during his sentencing. Koo is still at large after he left Singapore in May 2011.

DPP Tay told the court that Ko was PLASG’s sole director and shareholder until Jan 2, 2009. After that, he installed his stepfather as its nominee director, even though the latter played no role in the company’s business.

Court documents stated that PLASG offered wine investment schemes to members of the public, purporting to source for wine from various suppliers in France and sell the beverage to investors.

After operating the business for a few years, Ko realised that PLASG was selling more wine than what the company could purchase.

Part of the reason was because the business was not making enough profits to cover its costs for items such as marketing and rental.

DPP Tay said: “The accused knew that, with the way that he and Koo were running PLASG’s business, PLASG had growing liabilities to its investors, which were more than PLASG’s assets, and which PLASG could not fulfil.

“In the accused’s words, there was a ‘hole’ that kept getting bigger.”

She added that in response to PLASG’s growing liabilities to investors, the pair devised the “En Primeur (EP) wine investment scheme” under the company in 2008.

The prosecutor said that the two men then entered into a conspiracy to trick investors into believing that PLASG would transfer ownership of EP wines to them.

The investors would be dishonestly induced to deliver monies to PLASG for the purchase of these EP wines.

DPP Tay said: “The accused and Koo never intended the EP scheme to be a genuine wine-selling scheme... (They) never intended to purchase the EP wines that they had purported to sell to investors, and they, in fact, never sourced for EP wines from any suppliers.”

According to court documents, the two men then entered into a conspiracy to commit CBT by misappropriating the investors’ funds under the EP scheme.

On Aug 7, 2008, Ko incorporated a shell entity in the British Virgin Islands called Grand Millesimes Limited (GML), which had no actual business activities and was not a real wine supplier.

The prosecutor said the two men agreed to use GML as a fictitious supplier of wines for the EP scheme.

She added that as part the conspiracy, Koo forged invoices issued by GML, which purported to be for the sale of wine to PLASG before sending these invoices to Ko.

Ko then used these forged invoices to justify his transfers of EP investors’ funds from PLASG’s bank account to another one in Switzerland belonging to GML.

After that, he transferred the ill-gotten gains from the Swiss account to a third account in Singapore.

DPP Tay said: “(Ko) deliberately chose to layer his funds transfers in this manner... because he believed that the Singapore police would not be able to obtain information about his overseas account and the illicit transactions.

“After the accused transferred the monies to (the third bank account), he distributed Koo’s share of their illicit benefits from their criminal breach of trust offence... through illegal money remittance businesses and in cash.”

Among other things, Ko misappropriated over $10 million in total between February and October 2009.

Court documents did not disclose how the offences came to light but from May 2011, the police received more than 240 reports against PLASG over its fraudulent sale of wines.

Koo left Singapore on May 3, 2011, and Ko did the same 25 days later before the police started investigating the case.

Ko’s bank account in Switzerland was closed in November that year.

He was arrested when he finally returned to Singapore in May 2024. Reasons for his return were not stated in court documents.

Singtel-owned Optus to pay $83 million fine over alleged sales misconduct​

Optus was accused of "unconscionable conduct" in its sales tactics with hundreds of consumers.PHOTO: OPTUS

Jun 18, 2025

SINGAPORE - Australia’s competition watchdog said on June 18 that Singtel subsidiary Optus has reached a settlement over allegations of “unconscionable conduct” in selling telecoms goods and services to hundreds of consumers.

The settlement includes an A$100 million (S$83.4 million) fine, the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) said in a statement, adding that the federal court is yet to determine whether the penalty is appropriate.

The legal proceedings, filed in the Federal Court of Australia, accused Optus of acting unconscionably and conducting inappropriate sales practices in dealings with around 429 customers between August 2019 and July 2023.


The penalty is fully provided for in the previous financial year ended March 31, 2025, Optus said.

Under the terms of the enforceable undertaking, Optus said it is taking steps to address the misconduct.

These include making changes to its retail processes, systems and sales incentives.

It added that it has apologised to affected customers and is providing them with remediation.

Sales misconduct​

In October 2024, Singtel announced that ACCC had lodged legal proceedings against Optus for allegedly selling mobile phones and plans to vulnerable customers, including individuals with diminished cognitive capacity and learning disabilities.

Sales staff allegedly manipulated credit check results without consumers’ knowledge to sell mobile phones and plans they could not afford, as well as failed to explain the terms and conditions in an understandable manner.


The company was also accused of engaging debt collectors to pursue customers, despite knowing that their contracts were created fraudulently.

It allegedly referred and sold consumers’ debt to third-party debt collection agencies.

This caused many consumers to suffer financial harm, incurring thousands of dollars of debt, as well as non-financial harm, such as shame, fear and emotional distress about the debts or from being pursued by debt collectors, said ACCC chairwoman Gina Cass-Gottlieb.

In response to the allegations, Optus said it was addressing affected customers by providing refunds, waiving outstanding debts and allowing them to keep their mobile phones.

Shares of Singtel were up 0.8 per cent, or three cents, to $3.96 as at 11.13am on June 18. THE BUSINESS TIMES, REUTERS

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Jail for pair linked to bogus scheme with more than 2,000 S’pore investors, over $13.7m in losses​

Leong Koon Wah (left) and Ng Kuan Chuan at the State Courts in March 2022. They were jailed on Jan 3 over a bogus investment scheme.ST PHOTOS: KELVIN CHNG

Shaffiq Alkhatib
Jan 03, 2025

SINGAPORE - He was the managing director of a firm called Singliworld which lured more than 2,000 investors in Singapore into an “investment scheme” that promised trading returns as high as 13 per cent per month.

But the scheme turned out to be fraudulent and there was a loss of over US$10 million (S$13.7 million) after more than US$21 million was collected from the investors, which also included thousands from other countries.

On Jan 3, Leong Koon Wah, 51, who was Singliworld’s managing director at the time of the offences, was sentenced to 10 years and six months in jail, and ordered to pay a penalty of $3,658,600.

He will spend an additional 18 months behind bars if he fails to fork out the amount.

Leong was also a director at three other firms – Singliworld HK, Triumph Global (Asia), which was incorporated in Hong Kong, and Union Markets, a New Zealand-incorporated company.

As at May 2015, Leong had earned approximately US$3.1 million through multi-level marketing (MLM) despite having invested only a total of US$1,000 himself.

He also held several accounts linked to the scheme in his wife’s name even though she had not made any investments. He earned around US$3.4 million through her accounts.

Ng Kuan Chuan, 38, who was also a director at Triumph Global and Singliworld HK, was sentenced to seven years and six months’ jail after earning some US$300,000.

Ng, who was involved in the management of Union Markets, was also ordered to pay a fine of $300,000 and will spend another six months behind bars in default.

After an 88-day trial, District Judge Soh Tze Bian convicted the two Malaysian men of carrying on Singliworld’s business between March 2014 and May 2015, thereby inducing customers to invest in Singliforex – a scheme where their money would purportedly be used to trade in foreign exchange.

These customers were led to believe that professional traders would conduct the trading on their behalf through “foreign exchange brokerages” – Triumph Global and Union Markets.

However, no such trading had taken place and the scheme was unsustainable.

Judge Soh also convicted the pair of offences involving Triumph Global and Union Markets. The men had carried on the business of foreign exchange trading linked to these two firms even though the companies did not have the necessary licences.

Leong had also pleaded guilty to two other charges involving Singliworld. According to court documents, it had promoted a pyramid-selling scheme between February 2014 and May 2015.

Singliworld had also carried on the business of foreign exchange trading even though it was not licensed to do so.

In his oral grounds of decision in December 2024, Judge Soh said that the Singliforex scheme exhibited multiple hallmarks of fraudulent activity, each of which underscored its deceptive and unsustainable nature with fraudulent features.

He added: “In my view, the scheme preyed on investors’ trust through deliberate misrepresentations, manipulation of outcomes, and unsustainable financial practices.

“By combining the illusion of professional trading, guaranteed profits, and MLM incentives, Leong and Ng as the perpetrators maintained a deceptive front while systematically misappropriating funds, ensuring the eventual collapse of the scheme.”

In earlier proceedings, the prosecution told the court that Leong incorporated Singliworld in December 2012 and was its “directing mind”. He later employed administrating staff from March to May 2015.

Singliword’s only business was promoting to members of the public the Singliforex scheme.

Leong and Singliworld promised prospective investors that a team of “professional traders” would purportedly trade in foreign exchange on behalf of the investors.

Ng was one of the people who had carried out the “trading” even though he was neither qualified nor licensed to do so.

From around March 20, 2014, to April 30, 2015, those who wished to participate in the Singliforex scheme had to open and maintain a forex trading brokerage account with Triumph Global.

From around May 7, 2015, they had to open and maintain such an account with Union Markets.

Deputy public prosecutors Nicholas Tan, Michelle Tay and Suriya Prakash stated in court documents that Singliforex investors were not allowed to have the “trading” done via a forex brokerage of their choice.

Investors were also locked out of their accounts at Triumph Global and Union Markets, and could not do any trading on their own.

At the time of the offences, Singliworld did not hold a capital markets services licence issued by the Monetary Authority of Singapore for leveraged foreign exchange trading.

Despite this, Singliworld held itself out as carrying on such a business between March 2014 and May 2015.

Leong had also devised a set of financial incentives so that Singliforex would be an MLM scheme, with incentives designed to encourage investors to refer and recruit others to participate in the scheme.

The prosecution said that Leong structured the Singliforex scheme to be pyramidal in nature, and placed himself at the apex of the pyramid.

On Jan 3, Leong and Ng were each offered bail of $300,000. Leong is expected to begin serving his sentence on Jan 31, while Ng intends to appeal against his conviction and sentence.

LITTLEREDDOT said:

Jail for pair linked to bogus scheme with more than 2,000 S’pore investors, over $13.7m in losses​

Leong Koon Wah (left) and Ng Kuan Chuan at the State Courts in March 2022. They were jailed on Jan 3 over a bogus investment scheme.ST PHOTOS: KELVIN CHNG

Shaffiq Alkhatib
Jan 03, 2025

SINGAPORE - He was the managing director of a firm called Singliworld which lured more than 2,000 investors in Singapore into an “investment scheme” that promised trading returns as high as 13 per cent per month.

But the scheme turned out to be fraudulent and there was a loss of over US$10 million (S$13.7 million) after more than US$21 million was collected from the investors, which also included thousands from other countries.

On Jan 3, Leong Koon Wah, 51, who was Singliworld’s managing director at the time of the offences, was sentenced to 10 years and six months in jail, and ordered to pay a penalty of $3,658,600.

He will spend an additional 18 months behind bars if he fails to fork out the amount.

Leong was also a director at three other firms – Singliworld HK, Triumph Global (Asia), which was incorporated in Hong Kong, and Union Markets, a New Zealand-incorporated company.

As at May 2015, Leong had earned approximately US$3.1 million through multi-level marketing (MLM) despite having invested only a total of US$1,000 himself.

He also held several accounts linked to the scheme in his wife’s name even though she had not made any investments. He earned around US$3.4 million through her accounts.

Ng Kuan Chuan, 38, who was also a director at Triumph Global and Singliworld HK, was sentenced to seven years and six months’ jail after earning some US$300,000.

Ng, who was involved in the management of Union Markets, was also ordered to pay a fine of $300,000 and will spend another six months behind bars in default.

After an 88-day trial, District Judge Soh Tze Bian convicted the two Malaysian men of carrying on Singliworld’s business between March 2014 and May 2015, thereby inducing customers to invest in Singliforex – a scheme where their money would purportedly be used to trade in foreign exchange.

These customers were led to believe that professional traders would conduct the trading on their behalf through “foreign exchange brokerages” – Triumph Global and Union Markets.

However, no such trading had taken place and the scheme was unsustainable.

Judge Soh also convicted the pair of offences involving Triumph Global and Union Markets. The men had carried on the business of foreign exchange trading linked to these two firms even though the companies did not have the necessary licences.

Leong had also pleaded guilty to two other charges involving Singliworld. According to court documents, it had promoted a pyramid-selling scheme between February 2014 and May 2015.

Singliworld had also carried on the business of foreign exchange trading even though it was not licensed to do so.

In his oral grounds of decision in December 2024, Judge Soh said that the Singliforex scheme exhibited multiple hallmarks of fraudulent activity, each of which underscored its deceptive and unsustainable nature with fraudulent features.

He added: “In my view, the scheme preyed on investors’ trust through deliberate misrepresentations, manipulation of outcomes, and unsustainable financial practices.

“By combining the illusion of professional trading, guaranteed profits, and MLM incentives, Leong and Ng as the perpetrators maintained a deceptive front while systematically misappropriating funds, ensuring the eventual collapse of the scheme.”

In earlier proceedings, the prosecution told the court that Leong incorporated Singliworld in December 2012 and was its “directing mind”. He later employed administrating staff from March to May 2015.

Singliword’s only business was promoting to members of the public the Singliforex scheme.

Leong and Singliworld promised prospective investors that a team of “professional traders” would purportedly trade in foreign exchange on behalf of the investors.

Ng was one of the people who had carried out the “trading” even though he was neither qualified nor licensed to do so.

From around March 20, 2014, to April 30, 2015, those who wished to participate in the Singliforex scheme had to open and maintain a forex trading brokerage account with Triumph Global.

From around May 7, 2015, they had to open and maintain such an account with Union Markets.

Deputy public prosecutors Nicholas Tan, Michelle Tay and Suriya Prakash stated in court documents that Singliforex investors were not allowed to have the “trading” done via a forex brokerage of their choice.

Investors were also locked out of their accounts at Triumph Global and Union Markets, and could not do any trading on their own.

At the time of the offences, Singliworld did not hold a capital markets services licence issued by the Monetary Authority of Singapore for leveraged foreign exchange trading.

Despite this, Singliworld held itself out as carrying on such a business between March 2014 and May 2015.

Leong had also devised a set of financial incentives so that Singliforex would be an MLM scheme, with incentives designed to encourage investors to refer and recruit others to participate in the scheme.

The prosecution said that Leong structured the Singliforex scheme to be pyramidal in nature, and placed himself at the apex of the pyramid.

On Jan 3, Leong and Ng were each offered bail of $300,000. Leong is expected to begin serving his sentence on Jan 31, while Ng intends to appeal against his conviction and sentence.

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Wow…happen 2014-15…now then go to court hah

LITTLEREDDOT said:

The bank cajoled and pressured Janet Tay into investing in accumulators, a.k.a. I-Kill-You-Later.

Retiree sues Credit Suisse over $1.6 million in investment losses​

Madam Janet Tay said the bank's relationship manager had under-reported the amount of shortfall in her account, resulting in a delay in selling her shares to cover the gap. ST PHOTO: MARK CHEONG

Joyce Lim
Senior Correspondent

Feb 7, 2022

SINGAPORE - A 68-year-old retiree is suing Swiss bank Credit Suisse in Singapore for US$1.2 million (S$1.6 million) over trading losses when the share market tanked in 2020.
Madam Janet Tay said the bank's relationship manager had under-reported the amount of shortfall in her account, which resulted in a delay in selling her shares to cover the gap. By then, the price had fallen further.
She is also accusing the relationship manager of pushing her to invest in other products amid the volatility of the market. As a result, the investment greatly reduced the loan-to-value ratio to support her portfolio of US$4 million.
Had that not been the case, Madam Tay said in her statement of claim that she would have held on to some of her shares and "been able to sell them at optimum or favourable prices".
The lawsuit, which commenced last year (2021), centres on the role and duty of care expected of the bank's relationship manager.
Madam Tay said a reasonable and competent bank like Credit Suisse and its relationship manager owed her a duty of care in providing its services and carrying out its various duties and obligations in relation to her trading account.
Prior to her retirement, Madam Tay, who has a first-class honours in accountancy from University of Singapore and a master's in business administration with distinction from London Business School, used to run a management consultancy firm.

Madam Tay, who is represented by Mr Philip Ling and Ms Eunice Wong from Wong Tan & Molly Lim LLC, said in her statement of claim filed last August that she had known Ms Tania Chew, an employee of Credit Suisse's Singapore branch, since 2004.
Then, the latter was working at DBS Bank and was assigned as the relationship manager to handle her DBS Treasures account.
Madam Tay said she moved her investment portfolio to Credit Suisse on two occasions when approached by Ms Chew.


Subsequent to the opening of a trading account in 2018, Madam Tay had been giving instructions to Ms Chew to carry out various trades and transactions.
She said Ms Chew was well aware that she does not have or use any online banking services under the account, and Ms Chew had taken it upon herself and "assumed the duty and responsibility, to inform, advise and update" her on the status of her account.
Madam Tay said she relied on Ms Chew to inform her of any shortfall under the account and advise her on the actions to rectify it.
In her statement, Madam Tay said Ms Chew informed her of a US$200,000 shortfall on the morning of March 9, 2020. But it was only around 4.50pm that Ms Chew advised her to sell her Credit Suisse shares to reduce the inadequacy.


A shortfall refers to any financial obligation or liability that is greater than the cash on hand required to satisfy that obligation.
However, due to the falling US market, Madam Tay managed to sell only 8,000 shares, which lowered the shortfall by about US$28,000.
The following day (March 10), she was told that her shortfall stood at US$300,000, when it was in fact about US$673,000.
Due to the alleged misrepresentations by Ms Chew, Madam Tay said she was unable to clear the actual amount of shortfall and ended up selling her shares later when the market crashed further.
Prior to the incident, Madam Tay claimed that while she was on vacation in Australia around Feb 20, Ms Chew sent her messages on WhatsApp where she "repeatedly and persistently cajoled and pressured" her to purchase US dollar to Swiss franc FX accumulator products, which drastically reduced her loan-to-value ratio.
A loan-to-value ratio is a percentage measurement of the amount that can be borrowed against a share or a managed fund, using a margin loan.
As a result of the purchase on Feb 21, Madam Tay suffered losses amounting to US$634,275.
In court documents filed, she said the losses being claimed in the proceedings were sums she had earmarked for a charity which she started in 2010, in honour of her late mother Koh Seng Neo, to help underprivileged students from Raffles Institution who display academic potential.
Madam Tay added that she had placed great faith and trust in Ms Chew to advise and act in her best interests at all times, given that Ms Chew is the bank's relationship manager and their longstanding relationship of more than 16 years.


When contacted, Credit Suisse declined to comment as legal proceedings are ongoing.
In its defence filed, the bank denies any duty of care owed to Madam Tay.
Credit Suisse, which is represented by lawyers from Allen & Gledhill, said its relationship with her was governed by the terms of the contractual documents she had signed with the bank.
Credit Suisse said her account is a non-discretionary one, whereby it provided execution services and she was responsible for her own investment decisions.
Madam Tay was also responsible for managing and monitoring the portfolio and/or investments in her account.
No trial dates have been fixed yet.

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Builder.ai, an AI start-up with operations in Singapore, overestimated sales by 300%​

The company, valued at about US$1.5 billion in its last fund-raising round, is now planning to file for bankruptcy.

May 23, 2025

LONDON – When Builder.ai was seeking an emergency loan in 2024, the start-up gave lenders a revenue forecast that proved to be four times its actual sales, people familiar with the matter said.

A group of creditors, led by Israeli firm Viola Credit, were originally told that Builder.ai projected sales of US$220 million (S$284 million) for 2024, the people said. The company later disclosed that the actual revenue amount for the year turned out to be about US$50 million, they said.

That revelation was one of the factors that ultimately led the lenders to seize most of the UK-based artificial intelligence (AI) start-up’s cash, the people said.

The company, which has operations in Singapore and was valued at US$1.5 billion in its last fund-raising round, is now planning to file for bankruptcy.

It marks the biggest collapse of an AI start-up since ChatGPT’s 2022 release ushered in a surge of investment in the industry.

Builder.ai’s founder and former chief executive Sachin Dev Duggal has not responded to several requests for comment via phone and e-mail. Builder.ai and Viola declined to comment. Representatives from the other members of the creditor consortium didn’t respond to requests for comment.

The board was first alerted that something was amiss in December, when Mr Duggal came back asking for more funds after the loan, one of the people said. It conducted another round of due diligence and found that revenue was actually on track to be near US$100 million, the people said.

By February, the Builder.ai board pushed out Mr Duggal and had authorised a US$75 million injection into the company, one of the people said. It appointed Mr Manpreet Ratia – an executive from its Singapore-based investor Jungle Ventures – as CEO and assigned an independent auditor to go through the books. That audit revealed that the final revenue figure for the year was about US$50 million, the people said.

At that point, the creditor consortium seized the cash in the company’s bank accounts, about US$37 million.

Builder.ai, whose platform lets businesses quickly create custom smartphone apps, was an early success story for European tech, raising funds from Microsoft and the Qatar Investment Authority. The World Bank Group’s International Finance Corporation, Hollywood mogul Jeffrey Katzenberg’s WndrCo, Lakestar and SoftBank Group’s Deepcore incubator have also invested in the company.


In a letter on May 20 to employees that was shared with Bloomberg, the company said it was “unable to recover from historic challenges and past decisions that placed significant strain on its financial position”. Builder.ai said it will appoint an administrator to oversee the process. BLOOMBERG

Hyflux sought other funding sources for Tuaspring as it had problems getting bank loans: Prosecution​

Hyflux founder Olivia Lum arriving at the State Courts on Aug 11.

Aug 11, 2025

SINGAPORE – Hyflux looked to mom-and-pop investors to fund its Tuaspring project because it had trouble getting bank loans, the prosecution said on the first day of the trial involving former senior executives of the failed water treatment plant.

Deputy Chief Prosecutor Christopher Ong noted that a group of banks initially said they were willing to finance the project. But in 2011, they raised concerns after learning of Hyflux’s strategy of selling electricity to subsidise the sale of water to PUB.

Hyflux eventually issued preference shares to fund the integrated water and power project. The company’s collapse left about 34,000 investors of perpetual securities and preference shares, who had sunk in a combined $900 million, with nothing.


In his opening statement to the State Court on Aug 11, Mr Ong said Lum did not disclose information about business risks because she did not want to detract from the positive news of winning a landmark water project, and feared deterring investors.

Hyflux had won a tender for Singapore’s second and largest desalination plant with the lowest submitted bid. It had proposed to sell water to PUB at a first-year tariff price of $0.45/m3, undercutting its competitors by at least 27 per cent.

“At this price, the desalination plant would operate at a loss,” Mr Ong said.

“To make the project financially viable, and also fulfil PUB’s requirement to procure or produce electricity for the desalination plant at Hyflux’s cost, Hyflux intended for the power plant to supply electricity to the desalination plant, while actually selling the vast majority of the power that it generated to the national grid.”

It was only from this sale that Hyflux would be able to make up for the desalination plant’s losses and make the project profitable.

But Hyflux had no prior experience in power generation, much less selling electricity. The Tuaspring project would be the first time Hyflux entered the electricity market, the prosecution said.


In total, seven people have been charged over Hyflux’s intentional failure to disclose information relating to Tuaspring, among other things.

Six of them – Hyflux founder and former chief executive Olivia Lum Ooi Lin, former chief financial officer Cho Wee Peng, and former independent directors Teo Kiang Kok, Christopher Murugasu, Gay Chee Cheong and Lee Joo Hai – are contesting their charges in a 56-day trial scheduled to run from Aug 11 to Feb 5, 2026.

The prosecution will proceed on 11 charges, including two of the six charges Lum faces. The remaining four charges against Lum are stood down.

It is expected to rely on testimony from former Hyflux employees and bank representatives who were involved in negotiations on financing the Tuaspring integrated water and power project.

How it all unfolded​

To finance the Tuaspring project, which was initially projected to cost $890 million, Hyflux sought a term loan of about $527 million from a consortium of banks.

Six banks signed in-principle commitment letters in October 2010 indicating their willingness to finance the project. But they had not been told of Hyflux’s plan to build a power plant and sell excess electricity to the grid at the time, Mr Ong noted.


In November 2010, when they found out about Hyflux’s power strategy, they “raised serious concerns”. In January 2011, they told Hyflux that they could not lend it money on the terms previously indicated, as the power plant introduced new “merchant sale risk and operational risk”.

On 4 July 2011, only three of the original six banks - DBS, Mizuho Corporate Bank and Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corporation - extended Hyflux financing of $150 million for the construction of the desalination plant. This financing was eventually terminated by Hyflux.

Tuaspring was ultimately financed by a shareholder’s loan of $840.4 million by Hyflux in October 2011, which was in turn refinanced with Maybank Singapore and Maybank Kim Eng Securities in September 2013.

The case against Lum​

In January 2011, in the midst of their negotiations with the banks, Hyflux’s management began to contemplate issuing of preference shares to raise funds.

On 19 January 2011, Hyflux senior vice president, legal (business) Ms Yang Ai Chian informed the Board of the need to issue preference shares to “increase our funding options” for “several new major projects” that Hyflux was expected to win that year.

In reality, this money was meant to fund Tuaspring because of the challenges Hyflux faced in getting bank financing.

On 13 April 2011, Hyflux lodged an offer information statement with the Monetary Authority of Singapore to issue up to $200 million in 6% preference shares. These were oversubscribed and the offer amount was increased. Hyflux ultimately raised $400 million.

But the statement did not mention risks arising from Hyflux’s entry into the electricity business, or those associated with Hyflux’s strategy for Tuaspring, which could affect the company’s financial position or results, the prosecution said.

The information was omitted because Lum wanted to downplay Tuaspring’s significant exposure to the electricity market, both in Hyflux’s announcement that it had been named the “preferred bidder” for the desalination project, as well as in the offer information statement, the prosecution said.

“Lum was determined that Hyflux had to win the bid and cement its status as a global leader in the water treatment and desalination industry. Hyflux was facing setbacks in its Middle Eastern ventures and winning the Tuaspring bid was critical for strengthening the company’s order book,” Mr Ong said.

“She did not want to detract from the positive news of winning a landmark water project, by revealing the Tuaspring Project’s reliance on electricity sales, and the fact that the low tariff price – the key to winning the tender – was only viable because of such electricity sales.”

The prosecution also said Lum was well aware of the banks’ negative reactions regarding the power plant component of the project, and feared that full disclosure might deter investors and compromise Hyflux’s ability to raise funds through the planned preference shares.

This, in turn, could jeopardise financial close for the project and potentially result in losing the bid, the prosecution said.

The desalination plant of the Tuaspring Project became operational on September 18, 2013. But its power plant only became operational nearly two years later, on or around August 2015. It began selling electricity commercially on 18 February 2016.

In March 2011, the average Uniform Singapore Energy Price had been around $187 per megawatt hour (MWh). By February 2016, this had fallen to around $49.10 per MWh.

As the profitability of Tuaspring depended on electricity sales, this fall in electricity prices hit Hyflux hard. In its 2017 annual report, it reported a $115.6 million after tax loss.

The report stated that the weak power market in Singapore drove losses for the first time in Hyflux’s history, with the Tuaspring Project accounting for the majority of the losses.

On 21 May 2018, Hyflux suspended trading of its shares. The next day, Hyflux announced that it had applied to seek court protection for debt reorganisation.

On 18 May 2019, PUB took over the Tuaspring desalination plant. On 1 June 2022, a wholly owned subsidiary of Malaysia-based YTL Power International, YTL Powerseraya, completed its acquisition of the Tuaspring power plant.

By 16 November 2020, Hyflux entered judicial management and into liquidation on 21 July 2021.

Other witnesses include a lawyer from Stamford Law Corporation, who was Hyflux’s external legal counsel on the April 2011 offer information statement; an SGX representative who will provide evidence on the sequence of events that led to this case being investigated; and a PUB representative, who will testify to PUB’s dealings with Hyflux and its employees and management during the tender and award process for Tuaspring.

The Prosecution will also adduce evidence from a securities expert, Mr Kevin Gin who will address why the omitted information ought to have been disclosed by Hyflux.

The hearing continues.

Hyflux investigator ‘took advantage’ of Olivia Lum’s inability to recall events: Davinder Singh​

Hyflux founder and former chief executive Olivia Lum leaving the State Courts on Aug 11.

• Hyflux's founder's lawyer argues banks gave "in-principle management support" for a loan despite concerns about the power plant plan.
• Banks initially raised "serious concerns" in 2011 about Hyflux's electricity sales strategy influencing their willingness to finance Tuaspring.
• The defence suggests the prosecution witness unfairly omitted evidence, like the January 2011 letter, to support the case against Olivia Lum.

Aug 12, 2025

SINGAPORE – Despite earlier concerns about Hyflux’s Tuaspring project, a group of banks still gave “in-principle management support” for loans of up to $527 million, argued the lead lawyer for Hyflux founder Olivia Lum on the second day of her trial.

To support his case, Senior Counsel Davinder Singh made reference to a letter issued by the banks to Hyflux on Jan 14, 2011, after they finished reviewing Hyflux’s plan to build a desalination plant and a power plant, and sell excess electricity from the power plant to the grid.

In the letter, they said they had “in-principle management support for a credit facility of up to $283 million for the desalination plant and shared infrastructure, and a credit facility of up to $244 million for the power plant”, as long as Hyflux met certain criteria, such as being named “preferred bidder” for the project.


The letter was sent 10 days after they had raised concerns about risks arising from Hyflux’s strategy of selling electricity to subsidise the sale of water to PUB.

In his cross-examination of the Commercial Affairs Department’s lead investigating officer, Ms Jacqueline Wei Maojun, Mr Singh asked why she did not show Lum the entire letter when she was questioned in 2020, or give her a complete picture of the banks’ position. He said the letter showed that the banks were prepared to give their support, despite their concerns.

Ms Wei replied: “They were willing to give support, but not approval yet.”

Mr Singh said: “I suggest to you that you took advantage of Lum’s inability to recall what happened many years ago.”

Ms Wei replied: “There’s no need for me to hide any information from her, because she will always clarify the answers she gave to statements... I have control over questions I want to ask.”

Mr Singh said: “You have control, but you also have a duty to be fair. Not showing her the in-principle commitment in the Jan 14, 2011, letter was unfair.”


Ms Wei replied that she was focused on finding out what happened to the desalination plant’s funding, rather than the banks’ concerns.

Mr Singh said: “I am putting it to you that the reason you didn’t show her the Jan 14 letter is you were trying to create a scenario for the conclusion of your investigations, that the banks were affected by concerns over merchant sale risk.” He was referring to the risk of selling electricity to the grid.

Ms Wei disagreed. “It would have been better for me to ask the banks directly,” she said.

Six banks signed in-principle commitment letters in October 2010 indicating their willingness to finance the project. But they had not been told of Hyflux’s plan to build a power plant and sell excess electricity to the grid at the time, the prosecution said on the first day of the trial.

In November 2010, when they found out about Hyflux’s power strategy, they “raised serious concerns”. In January 2011, they told Hyflux that they could not lend it money on the terms previously indicated, as the power plant introduced new “merchant sale risk and operational risk”.

Later that month, they informed Hyflux of their “in-principle management support”.


On July 4, 2011, three of the original six banks – DBS, Mizuho Corporate Bank and Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corporation – extended financing of $150 million for the construction of the desalination plant. This financing was eventually terminated by Hyflux.

Pointing to the announcement that Hyflux had secured financing of $150 million, Mr Singh asked Ms Wei if there was any reason to doubt that this was a bridging loan – an interim measure to give the banks time to assess their concerns and Hyflux’s request for project financing.

He said: “When the prosecution says this financing of $150 million was eventually terminated by Hyflux, what really happened is that it wanted to repay the money ahead of time.”

Mr Singh also referred to a Dec 3, 2013, news release from Hyflux that its subsidiary Tuaspring had secured a $720 million, 18-year term loan facility to fund the development of the desalination and power plant facilities in September that year. The financing was provided by Maybank Singapore and Maybank Kim Eng Securities.

“You would agree with me that this is... an endorsement by a leading bank of its faith in the project, correct?” Mr Singh asked.

Ms Wei replied: “It shows a willingness to lend.”

Mr Singh noted that the prosecution is not calling on anyone from Maybank as a witness. “I suggest to you that the reason prosecution has not produced Maybank documents, and is not calling Maybank as witness, is because that would undermine the prosecution’s case.”

Ms Wei disagreed.

The hearing continues.