Tell that to the countries that have now suspended the 737 Max from service.
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BOEING's BLACK-HEARTED MURDER MARKETING STRATEGY caused 737 MAX CRASHES! Exposed!
- Thread starter Ang4MohTrump
- Start date
Tell that to the countries that have now suspended the 737 Max from service.
These Days Chow Ang Moh Intergrities are ALIKE RATS & Ah Nehs!
The suspension is the usual overkill. It's an CYA response which is the safest route to take. In other words it is to pacify people like yourself.
That does not mean it is rational or logical.
Must PERMANENTLY REVOKE Boeing's Qualification based on INTEGRITY FRAUD from Civil Aviation Business.
All volvos, ftom cheapest to most expensive models, are fully equipped wrt safety equipment.
This is ridiculous. How can a safety feature be an extra ? We are not talking about extra sensory feature or surround sound feature. Shouldn't safety features be a total package given the level of risk and vulnerability of a mechanism's failure.
You should take the 737 Max 8 yourself ... but then again ... who 's going to pilot the plane?
If this is not fake news .... Boeing is dead meat !https://www.rt.com/news/454489-boeing-737-max-optional-extras/
Doomed Boeing 737 Max missing 2 key safety features that were sold as ‘optional extras’
Published time: 22 Mar, 2019 13:30
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File photo: © Pexels / Marina Hinic
An alarming new report says that the two fatal Boeing 737 Max 8 crashes which killed almost 350 people were missing safety features which were sold as optional extras by the manufacturer, and not included as standard.
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As entire fleets of the Boeing 737 Max 8 aircraft remain grounded across the globe amid investigations into safety practices at the airline giant, details have emerged about missing safety features, including additional sensors that would have operated as fail safes for the existing ones on board the aircraft and alerted the pilots to any potential issues.
The “angle of attack (AOA) disagree” light warns the pilot when the plane is about to stall based on factors such as the airflow and nose direction, but this does not come as standard when airlines purchase the aircraft.
Also on rt.com Captain of doomed Ethiopian airliner had ZERO hours of 737 MAX 8 simulator training – report
Another missing feature was the AOA indicator which gives pilots a visual representation of the airflow relative to the aircraft’s nose.
The Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS) is designed to detect an imminent stall and adjust the plane’s stabilizers to pitch the nose forward to increase airspeed, thus preventing a stall. However, when this is improperly timed, it can be fatal.
To make matters worse, another anti-stall system that does come as standard on the Boeing 737 Max planes reportedly only used one sensor at a time despite having two. Had the additional sensors been fitted and in use, the pilots could potentially have overridden the MCAS and prevented the tragic loss of life.
In response to the tragedies involving Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 on March 10 and Lion Air Flight 610 five months earlier, Boeing will add the AOA disagree light as an update by the end of April, a source told the New York Times, and both sensors will operate by default. The AOA indicator will still be considered an optional extra, however.
Also on rt.com Ethiopian Airlines Boeing 737 MAX 8 crash: Questions that remain unanswered
Boeing charges extra for things ranging from superficial things like leather seats to back-up fire extinguishers. Brazilian carrier Gol Airlines reportedly paid $6,700 extra for crew oxygen masks, and $11,900 for a weather radar system control panel.
Former Boeing engineers have reported that the company may have misled the Federal Aviation Authority about the efficacy of and risk associated with the MCAS, adding that Boeing didn’t have any external oversight for the aircraft’s safety certification.
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Rush to come out 737 Max 8 jet - who cares about extra safety features ? They can come later... go, go, go
Boeing faced an unthinkable defection in the spring of 2011. American Airlines, an exclusive Boeing customer for more than a decade, was ready to place an order for hundreds of new, fuel-efficient jets from the world’s other major aircraft manufacturer, Airbus.
The chief executive of American called Boeing’s leader, W. James McNerney Jr., to say a deal was close. If Boeing wanted the business, it would need to move aggressively, the airline executive, Gerard Arpey, told Mr. McNerney.
To win over American, Boeing ditched the idea of developing a new passenger plane, which would take a decade. Instead, it decided to update its workhorse 737, promising the plane would be done in six years.
The 737 Max was born roughly three months later.
The competitive pressure to build the jet — which permeated the entire design and development — now threatens the reputation and profits of Boeing, after two deadly crashes of the 737 Max in less than five months. Prosecutors and regulators are investigating whether the effort to design, produce and certify the Max was rushed, leading Boeing to miss crucial safety risks and to underplay the need for pilot training.
While investigators are still trying to determine the cause of the crash in Ethiopia this month and one in Indonesia in October, they are focused on a newly installed piece of software designed to avoid stalls. The software was meant to compensate for bigger, more fuel-efficient engines and ensure the plane flew the same way as an earlier version.
Months behind Airbus, Boeing had to play catch-up. The pace of the work on the 737 Max was frenetic, according to current and former employees who spoke with The New York Times. Some spoke on the condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the matter.
Engineers were pushed to submit technical drawings and designs at roughly double the normal pace, former employees said. Facing tight deadlines and strict budgets, managers quickly pulled workers from other departments when someone left the Max project. Although the project had been hectic, current and former employees said they had finished it feeling confident in the safety of the plane.
The specter of Boeing’s chief rival was constant. Airbus had been delivering more jets than Boeing for several years. And losing the American account would have been gutting, costing the manufacturer billions in lost sales and potentially thousands of jobs.
“They weren’t going to stand by and let Airbus steal market share,” said Mike Renzelmann, an engineer who retired in 2016 from Boeing’s flight control team on the 737 Max.
‘Intense Pressure Cooker’
Inside Boeing, the race was on. Roughly six months after the project’s launch, engineers were already documenting the differences between the Max and its predecessor, meaning they already had preliminary designs for the Max — a fast turnaround, according to an engineer who worked on the project.
“The timeline was extremely compressed,” the engineer said. “It was go, go, go.”
One former designer on the team working on flight controls for the Max said the group had at times produced 16 technical drawings a week, double the normal rate. “They basically said, ‘We need something now,’” the designer said.
A technician who assembles wiring on the Max said that in the first months of development, rushed designers were delivering sloppy blueprints to him. He was told that the instructions for the wiring would be cleaned up later in the process, he said.
His internal assembly designs for the Max, he said, still include omissions today, like not specifying which tools to use to install a certain wire, a situation that could lead to a faulty connection. Normally such blueprints include intricate instructions.
Boeing faced an unthinkable defection in the spring of 2011. American Airlines, an exclusive Boeing customer for more than a decade, was ready to place an order for hundreds of new, fuel-efficient jets from the world’s other major aircraft manufacturer, Airbus.
The chief executive of American called Boeing’s leader, W. James McNerney Jr., to say a deal was close. If Boeing wanted the business, it would need to move aggressively, the airline executive, Gerard Arpey, told Mr. McNerney.
To win over American, Boeing ditched the idea of developing a new passenger plane, which would take a decade. Instead, it decided to update its workhorse 737, promising the plane would be done in six years.
The 737 Max was born roughly three months later.
The competitive pressure to build the jet — which permeated the entire design and development — now threatens the reputation and profits of Boeing, after two deadly crashes of the 737 Max in less than five months. Prosecutors and regulators are investigating whether the effort to design, produce and certify the Max was rushed, leading Boeing to miss crucial safety risks and to underplay the need for pilot training.
While investigators are still trying to determine the cause of the crash in Ethiopia this month and one in Indonesia in October, they are focused on a newly installed piece of software designed to avoid stalls. The software was meant to compensate for bigger, more fuel-efficient engines and ensure the plane flew the same way as an earlier version.
Months behind Airbus, Boeing had to play catch-up. The pace of the work on the 737 Max was frenetic, according to current and former employees who spoke with The New York Times. Some spoke on the condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the matter.
Engineers were pushed to submit technical drawings and designs at roughly double the normal pace, former employees said. Facing tight deadlines and strict budgets, managers quickly pulled workers from other departments when someone left the Max project. Although the project had been hectic, current and former employees said they had finished it feeling confident in the safety of the plane.
The specter of Boeing’s chief rival was constant. Airbus had been delivering more jets than Boeing for several years. And losing the American account would have been gutting, costing the manufacturer billions in lost sales and potentially thousands of jobs.
“They weren’t going to stand by and let Airbus steal market share,” said Mike Renzelmann, an engineer who retired in 2016 from Boeing’s flight control team on the 737 Max.
‘Intense Pressure Cooker’
Inside Boeing, the race was on. Roughly six months after the project’s launch, engineers were already documenting the differences between the Max and its predecessor, meaning they already had preliminary designs for the Max — a fast turnaround, according to an engineer who worked on the project.
“The timeline was extremely compressed,” the engineer said. “It was go, go, go.”
One former designer on the team working on flight controls for the Max said the group had at times produced 16 technical drawings a week, double the normal rate. “They basically said, ‘We need something now,’” the designer said.
A technician who assembles wiring on the Max said that in the first months of development, rushed designers were delivering sloppy blueprints to him. He was told that the instructions for the wiring would be cleaned up later in the process, he said.
His internal assembly designs for the Max, he said, still include omissions today, like not specifying which tools to use to install a certain wire, a situation that could lead to a faulty connection. Normally such blueprints include intricate instructions.
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A Cascade of Changes - no need pilot training , old man... we go automation... smart navigation.
Months before Boeing’s announcement of the Max, the commercial airplanes executive, Mr. Albaugh, critiqued the decision by Airbus to refit the A320 with bigger engines, which could alter the aerodynamics and require big changes to the plane.
“It’s going to be a design change that will ripple through the airplane,” Mr. Albaugh said in the meeting with employees.
“I think they’ll find it more challenging than they think it will be,” he told them. “When they get done, they’ll have an airplane that might be as good as the Next Generation 737,” a plane that Boeing had launched in 1997.
But a main selling point of the new A320 was its fuel-efficient engines. To match Airbus, Boeing needed to mount the Max with its own larger and powerful new engines.
Just as Mr. Albaugh had predicted for Airbus, the decision created a cascade of changes. The bigger engines altered the aerodynamics of the plane, making it more likely to pitch up in some circumstances.
To offset that possibility, Boeing added the new software in the Max, known as MCAS, which would automatically push the nose down if it sensed the plane pointing up at a dangerous angle. The goal was to avoid a stall. Because the system was supposed to work in the background, Boeing believed it didn’t need to brief pilots on it, and regulators agreed. Pilots weren’t required to train in simulators.
The push for automation was a philosophical shift for Boeing, which for decades wanted to keep pilots in control of the planes as much as possible. Airbus, by comparison, tended to embrace technology, putting computers in control. Pilots who preferred the American manufacturer even had a saying: “If it’s not Boeing, I’m not going.”
The new software system is now a focus of investigators who are trying to determine what went wrong in the Ethiopian Airlines crash and the Lion Air tragedy in Indonesia. A leading theory in the Lion Air crash is that the system was receiving bad data from a faulty sensor, triggering an unrecoverable nose dive. All 737 Max jets around the world are grounded, and Boeing has given no estimate of when they might return to flight.
Months before Boeing’s announcement of the Max, the commercial airplanes executive, Mr. Albaugh, critiqued the decision by Airbus to refit the A320 with bigger engines, which could alter the aerodynamics and require big changes to the plane.
“It’s going to be a design change that will ripple through the airplane,” Mr. Albaugh said in the meeting with employees.
“I think they’ll find it more challenging than they think it will be,” he told them. “When they get done, they’ll have an airplane that might be as good as the Next Generation 737,” a plane that Boeing had launched in 1997.
But a main selling point of the new A320 was its fuel-efficient engines. To match Airbus, Boeing needed to mount the Max with its own larger and powerful new engines.
Just as Mr. Albaugh had predicted for Airbus, the decision created a cascade of changes. The bigger engines altered the aerodynamics of the plane, making it more likely to pitch up in some circumstances.
To offset that possibility, Boeing added the new software in the Max, known as MCAS, which would automatically push the nose down if it sensed the plane pointing up at a dangerous angle. The goal was to avoid a stall. Because the system was supposed to work in the background, Boeing believed it didn’t need to brief pilots on it, and regulators agreed. Pilots weren’t required to train in simulators.
The push for automation was a philosophical shift for Boeing, which for decades wanted to keep pilots in control of the planes as much as possible. Airbus, by comparison, tended to embrace technology, putting computers in control. Pilots who preferred the American manufacturer even had a saying: “If it’s not Boeing, I’m not going.”
The new software system is now a focus of investigators who are trying to determine what went wrong in the Ethiopian Airlines crash and the Lion Air tragedy in Indonesia. A leading theory in the Lion Air crash is that the system was receiving bad data from a faulty sensor, triggering an unrecoverable nose dive. All 737 Max jets around the world are grounded, and Boeing has given no estimate of when they might return to flight.
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karma for sabotaging bombardier c series.
I would have no problems with that at all. Flying is far safer than driving on the roads of NZ.
All machines will fail at a certain point. It’s through such failures that improvements can be made for future generations.
You can say what you will, but once up in the air, your balls will shrink when the plane does a nose dive .
2 fatal crashes within a span of 5 months and 350 lives lost. I don’t see any similar comparison with driving on the NZ roads.
I think you are just offering your contrarian view to stimulate debate and to keep things lively. Essential flight safety features are ok as optional extra? You are quite the jester.
Breakingviews - Airbus can only nibble at Boeing’s 737 lunch
Ed Cropley
LONDON (Reuters Breakingviews) - Boeing’s losses are not Airbus’ gains. The $215 billion U.S. aerospace giant may have suspended deliveries of its ill-fated 737 MAX 8 jet after two crashes in five months, and that theoretically should benefit its European peer. Unfortunately for 91 billion euro Airbus, chock-full production lines and order books stretching for years mean it can’t take up much slack.
As the two pillars of a global aircraft-making duopoly, each firm keeps its eyes firmly trained on the other. A case in point is the Airbus A320neo, a 200-seater jet equipped with two state-of-the-art engines that reduced fuel consumption by as much as 15 percent. When cost-conscious airlines jumped on the A320neo, Boeing responded by sticking the same engines onto its 737, the mid-range workhorse of the skies. Entering commercial service in 2017, the plane quickly became the bestseller in Chief Executive Dennis Muilenburg’s hangar.
Panicking over what happens to the 4,600 MAX 8s on Boeing’s order books partly explains the $23 billion wiped off its market value since the Ethiopian tragedy. Even if the ultimate downside isn’t a total scrapping of the model, Boeing’s pain should still be Airbus’ gain. For airlines with cold feet about large 737 orders – European low-cost carrier Ryanair, for instance, has orders for 135 – the logical next step is to shop elsewhere.
Yet while the European group’s shares are up over 5 percent since the disaster, that’s less than 5 billion euros ($5.6bn) in market value. Switching supplier carries financial penalties for operators, and Airbus can’t just magic up hundreds of new planes. Its A320neo production is already running at full steam to meet the 3,600 orders on its books. Its production lines are churning out over 50 units a month – but at that rate it will still take the best part of six years to meet demand.
Expanding production would take years and billions of dollars of investment, by which time Boeing would probably have ironed out whatever issues arise. Instead of a viable alternative, disgruntled Boeing customers would merely be joining the back of a six-year queue. Hence, instead of a major windfall for Airbus, the upshot could just be fewer overall planes globally.
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-...n4i3Tj8TMIgkJp9jtc9176QO1ltcMASbpTvbIijwwUjeA
Ed Cropley
LONDON (Reuters Breakingviews) - Boeing’s losses are not Airbus’ gains. The $215 billion U.S. aerospace giant may have suspended deliveries of its ill-fated 737 MAX 8 jet after two crashes in five months, and that theoretically should benefit its European peer. Unfortunately for 91 billion euro Airbus, chock-full production lines and order books stretching for years mean it can’t take up much slack.
As the two pillars of a global aircraft-making duopoly, each firm keeps its eyes firmly trained on the other. A case in point is the Airbus A320neo, a 200-seater jet equipped with two state-of-the-art engines that reduced fuel consumption by as much as 15 percent. When cost-conscious airlines jumped on the A320neo, Boeing responded by sticking the same engines onto its 737, the mid-range workhorse of the skies. Entering commercial service in 2017, the plane quickly became the bestseller in Chief Executive Dennis Muilenburg’s hangar.
Panicking over what happens to the 4,600 MAX 8s on Boeing’s order books partly explains the $23 billion wiped off its market value since the Ethiopian tragedy. Even if the ultimate downside isn’t a total scrapping of the model, Boeing’s pain should still be Airbus’ gain. For airlines with cold feet about large 737 orders – European low-cost carrier Ryanair, for instance, has orders for 135 – the logical next step is to shop elsewhere.
Yet while the European group’s shares are up over 5 percent since the disaster, that’s less than 5 billion euros ($5.6bn) in market value. Switching supplier carries financial penalties for operators, and Airbus can’t just magic up hundreds of new planes. Its A320neo production is already running at full steam to meet the 3,600 orders on its books. Its production lines are churning out over 50 units a month – but at that rate it will still take the best part of six years to meet demand.
Expanding production would take years and billions of dollars of investment, by which time Boeing would probably have ironed out whatever issues arise. Instead of a viable alternative, disgruntled Boeing customers would merely be joining the back of a six-year queue. Hence, instead of a major windfall for Airbus, the upshot could just be fewer overall planes globally.
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-...n4i3Tj8TMIgkJp9jtc9176QO1ltcMASbpTvbIijwwUjeA
There is no such thing as "essential" everything is relative.
Parachutes could be deemed to be essential for savings lives if the plane can no longer fly but you don't see every passenger issued with one when they board the plane.
Are we really going to prolong this "discussion"? Fuck it, why not?
Essential = everything that allows the plane to take off, keep flying, and land safely. Nothing relative with that concept.
I prefer taking the slow boat, I don't fly. So I don't need a parachute.
At Boeing factory, pilots simulate New Boeing Software ... Looks good ... can land plane safely ...
Pilots from several airlines met with Boeing executives in Renton, Wash., on Saturday to discuss proposed changes to the 737 Max, two of which have crashed in recent months.
The meeting on Saturday, with about a dozen pilots and trainers, was part of Boeing’s effort to manage the crisis set off by the crash of Lion Air Flight 610 in October and the crash of Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 under similar circumstances this month. Boeing and people briefed on the meeting confirmed it.
In addition to reviewing proposed modifications to new anti-stall software and cockpit displays, pilots from five airlines strapped into flight simulators to see how they would have handled the situation that is believed to have brought down Lion Air Flight 610 in Indonesia, according to two people briefed on the meeting.
In each case, the pilots using the simulators were able to land the plane safely.
Pilots from several airlines met with Boeing executives in Renton, Wash., on Saturday to discuss proposed changes to the 737 Max, two of which have crashed in recent months.
The meeting on Saturday, with about a dozen pilots and trainers, was part of Boeing’s effort to manage the crisis set off by the crash of Lion Air Flight 610 in October and the crash of Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 under similar circumstances this month. Boeing and people briefed on the meeting confirmed it.
In addition to reviewing proposed modifications to new anti-stall software and cockpit displays, pilots from five airlines strapped into flight simulators to see how they would have handled the situation that is believed to have brought down Lion Air Flight 610 in Indonesia, according to two people briefed on the meeting.
In each case, the pilots using the simulators were able to land the plane safely.
Theory on the Lion Air Flight Crash ...same as the Ethiopian Airlines flight.. In short, it is due to a SOFTWARE BUG.
A leading theory is that the Lion Air flight crashed because the anti-stall software received erroneous data, forcing the plane into a nose-dive. The Ethiopian Airlines flight also crashed after an erratic takeoff.
In simulations using the current software, pilots were able to disable the anti-stall software using existing procedures, and land the airplane safely.
The simulations using the updated software required less intervention by the pilots.
The software, known as MCAS, is designed to push the nose of the plane down if it detects the plane pointing up at a dangerous angle that might induce a stall. To determine when it is needed, the software takes data from two so-called angle of attack sensors on the side of the plane, which measure whether the fuselage is pointing up or down.
But when it was originally designed, the software only responded to data from one sensor at a time.
A leading theory is that the Lion Air flight crashed because the anti-stall software received erroneous data, forcing the plane into a nose-dive. The Ethiopian Airlines flight also crashed after an erratic takeoff.
In simulations using the current software, pilots were able to disable the anti-stall software using existing procedures, and land the airplane safely.
The simulations using the updated software required less intervention by the pilots.
The software, known as MCAS, is designed to push the nose of the plane down if it detects the plane pointing up at a dangerous angle that might induce a stall. To determine when it is needed, the software takes data from two so-called angle of attack sensors on the side of the plane, which measure whether the fuselage is pointing up or down.
But when it was originally designed, the software only responded to data from one sensor at a time.
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