Excellent letter that rebuts Minister over PA neutral claim

http://www.theonlinecitizen.com/2015/12/bilahari-kausikan-loose-and-at-large/
Bilahari Kausikan – Loose and at Large 0
BY ONLINECITIZEN ON DECEMBER 17, 2015 COMMENTARIES
By Jeannette Chong-Aruldoss

The day was 31 October 2015 and I was in the famous university town of Cambridge in the United Kingdom.

I was there to attend a conference with the enticing title "The Legacy of Lee Kuan Yew and the Future of Singapore". The Conference featured an impressive line-up of speakers comprising distinguished Singaporean and non-Singaporeans with in-depth knowledge of Singaporean history and politics.

Oxford historian Dr Thum Ping Tjin and Singapore's Ambassador-at-Large Mr Bilahari Kausikan were among the Singaporean speakers I was eager to hear.

Dr Thum Ping Tjin

Dr Thum’s topic was "Lee Kuan Yew’s political legacy". In his presentation, Dr Thum reviewed the historical context of Mr Lee Kuan Yew's rise to prominence and the political ascendance of the People's Action Party (PAP) in the pioneer years of Singapore.

In the course of his comprehensive historical analysis, Dr Thum made the point that the era which saw the independence of Singapore was marked by robust political competition. Democracy, debate and dissent characterised the early phase of Singapore's political history. However, the subsequent period was marked by intolerance for dissent, which has become the one enduring legacy of Mr Lee.

It was interesting to hear Dr Thum because his perspective of Mr Lee's role in Singapore's history dissented from the narrative circulated by official sources in Singapore.

Mr Bilahari Kausikan

Mr Bilahari's topic was "Lee Kuan Yew's cast of mind and its lasting influence". As I leaned forward to listen, I had not bargained to be in for some unpleasant surprises.

To my amazement, Mr Bilahari departed from his prepared transcript at least twice to take two digs at Dr Thum - to make it clear to the audience that he was not in agreement with Dr Thum’s point of view.

On Dr Thum’s view that the PAP government was intolerant of dissent, Mr Bilahari argued that since Dr Thum was able to express his dissenting views about Mr Lee’s political role, then Dr Thum can’t be right to complain that the PAP government was intolerant of dissent.

I was taken aback. I failed to see the logic of Mr Bilahari's reasoning. Dr Thum had expressed his dissenting views to an international audience at an overseas conference, not in Singapore. Has Dr Thum been free to express his dissenting views in Singapore without adverse repercussions?

Mr Bilahari's second swipe at Dr Thum was more caustic. He called Dr Thum "a young academic trying to make a name for himself" - implying that Dr Thum was propagating an alternative version of Singapore’s history so as to draw attention to himself.

Some in the audience booed Dr Bilahari on hearing his ungracious words against Dr Thum.

I was shocked - and ashamed - that a high-ranking diplomat would deem fit to speak against a fellow Singaporean speaker at an overseas conference in front of an international audience.

By trying to attack Dr Thum's credibility, Mr Bilahari only succeeded in proving Dr Thum right about the PAP Government's intolerance for dissenting views.

But there was one more unhappy surprise in store for me.

"Some" opposition politicians

As Mr Bilahari drew his speech to a close, he said the key challenge ahead for Singapore was whether young Singaporeans would take the achievements of Mr Lee and his comrades for granted and be persuaded that Singapore was no longer vulnerable.

Having articulated what challenge laid ahead, I expected Mr Bilahari to conclude his speech by mentioning how the Singapore Government would handle the mindset of the next generation of Singaporeans.

Instead, Mr Bilahari opted to bring out the proverbial bogeyman, namely, PAP dissenters.

The exact words of Mr Bilahari's concluding remarks were as follows:

""""The key challenge is internal: that a new generation of Singaporeans will take the achievements of Mr Lee and his comrades for granted and be persuaded that Singapore was no longer vulnerable. Some opposition politicians and their fellow travellers among the intelligensia have tried to do just that. They either do not understand their own country and region or place their ambition above the national interest. Fortunately, as the results of our recent General Election have demonstrated, the majority of my compatriots do not believe them."""""[1]

Thus, Mr Bilahari thinks that "some" opposition politicians (and their sympathisers) are busy working against the interests of Singapore and Singaporeans; but fortunately, most Singaporeans are wise to the ruse, as results of the recent General Election show.

Mr Bilahari's remarks are disturbing. Inherent in his choice of words is the insidious attitude that “some” opposition politicians are a pain in the neck, self-seeking and distracting our good government from protecting our nation and serving Singaporeans.

Mr Bilahari is entitled to his own personal views.

But Mr Bilahari was not speaking at the Cambridge conference in his personal capacity. He was invited to speak at the conference on the basis of his credentials as Ambassador-at-Large and Policy Advisor in the Singaporean Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Mr Bilahari was speaking at the overseas venue in an official capacity, as a diplomat and civil servant.

The Singapore civil service and the salaries of civil servants are funded by taxpayers’ money. Singaporeans are entitled to be served by a non-partisan civil service in which civil servants do not comment on politics or on politicians or take sides with any political party.

I do not think that a country with a functioning democracy would have a civil servant, much less a senior diplomat, speak against opposition politicians at a public forum.

Mr Bilahari is a civil servant and has no business to comment against opposition politicians in public platforms. By so doing, Mr Bilahari has provided observers with clear evidence that our civil service is partisan and partial to the ruling party.

Moreover, Mr Bilahari is a diplomat. I am at a loss as to how Mr Bilahari can be said to be serving his country and his countrymen by highlighting the electoral victory of the ruling party.

Singaporeans will be best served if our civil servants spend their time thinking of ways to improve their efficiency instead of using opposition politicians as lame excuses for their inadequacies.

Mr Bilahari and his fellow diplomats should focus on dealing with our foreign foes and on how to fix them[2], instead of thinking about how to defeat opposition politicians.

PAP dissenters are not “the enemy”. On the contrary, political dissenters and opposition politicians serve the nation by holding the PAP Government accountable to Singaporeans. Their continued presence in the political arena is indispensable to the operation of democracy in Singapore.

That day in Cambridge, I was saddened to see Mr Bilahari throwing punches against his own countrymen in front of an international audience in his capacity as Singapore's official representative. I do not understand how our Ministry of Foreign Affairs could allow its diplomats to express sardonic remarks against our own Singaporeans at an overseas venue.

A “sardonic diplomat" is a contradiction, an oxymoron. Till now, I am still pondering the enigma of the oxymoron which is Mr Bilahari.

Looks Japanese but name was Chinese. I could be wrong. Son passed away at a young age.

Leongsam said:

??? I was at his wedding.... and yes... he married a female... a Japanese girl.

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He was quick to respond:

http://mothership.sg/2015/12/spore-...ikan-cross-swords-after-cambridge-conference/

And with Balji he frames himself as follows:

http://mothership.sg/2015/11/pn-balji-vs-bilahari-kausikan-meow-meow-hiss/


So after a while it's become completely normal for him to say "it's Bilahari"?

Scroo - If curious ask your contacts about the incident that triggered the hentak kaki at MFA and how long it took to gerak again.

Bossman - I don't doubt his integrity and reliability as a genuine friend but it's the unwillingness to confront the obvious at home which is morally indefensible for individuals with such calibre of insight and intellect. There is always a reason but that inertia leads to stagnation and despite our views on a number of things that are right on the island there is an even greater need now to correct it at least address the things that are going wrong. If that is the pitch then this society will always remain delicate and fragile and no number of Mexicans can protect us then.

scroobal said:

Looks Japanese but name was Chinese. I could be wrong. Son passed away at a young age.

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I'm afraid I can't be impartial when judging the guy because I know him so well. He is abrasive but we got along very well so when I see the content of his speeches I just think "that is typical of Bila! He's just being himself and enjoying the outrage."

Thanks Bro. Clearly he could not make the connection between the invitation from Fitzwilliams College and his title as Ambassador at Large vis-a-vis his bunfight over the meaning of expenses.

gatehousethetinkertailor said:

He was quick to respond:

http://mothership.sg/2015/12/spore-...ikan-cross-swords-after-cambridge-conference/

And with Balji he frames himself as follows:

http://mothership.sg/2015/11/pn-balji-vs-bilahari-kausikan-meow-meow-hiss/


So after a while it's become completely normal for him to say "it's Bilahari"?

Scroo - If curious ask your contacts about the incident that triggered the hentak kaki at MFA and how long it took to gerak again.

Bossman - I don't doubt his integrity and reliability as a genuine friend but it's the unwillingness to confront the obvious at home which is morally indefensible for individuals with such calibre of insight and intellect. There is always a reason but that inertia leads to stagnation and despite our views on a number of things that are right on the island there is an even greater need now to correct it at least address the things that are going wrong. If that is the pitch then this society will always remain delicate and fragile and no number of Mexicans can protect you then.

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An outright Balls carrier of Harry and PAP.

I do remember someone mentioning that his father was major fan of old man and Raja. The father must have cast them as heroes to his son. You can sense that he is indeed precious about them.

shittypore said:

An outright Balls carrier of Harry and PAP.

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http://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/singapore/bilahari-kausikan-on-the/2235302.html
SINGAPORE: Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong has posted on Facebook a speech by Ambassador-at-Large Bilahari Kausikan, which was delivered on Oct 31, when Fitzwilliam College of Cambridge University held a conference on the legacy of the late Mr Lee Kuan Yew.

Below is PM Lee's post in full, including the speech by Mr Kausikan:

Last Saturday, Fitzwilliam College (my father’s old college) of Cambridge University held a conference on the legacy of Mr Lee Kuan Yew. Ambassador-at-Large Bilahari Kausikan spoke at the event. He recounted his personal experience working with Mr Lee, and made telling points about the external challenges that a small country in Southeast Asia will always face. I found it well worth reading, and hope you will too. - LHL

Ambassador-at-Large Bilahari Kausikan spoke at a Conference on the legacy of Lee Kuan Yew and the future of Singapore at Fitzwilliam College, Cambridge, on 31 October 2015.



"Thank you for inviting me to join you in paying tribute to the memory and legacy of Mr Lee Kuan Yew.

My generation of Singapore Foreign Service officers were privileged to have had the opportunity to work with Mr Lee and his comrades: Dr Goh Keng Swee and Mr S Rajaratnam.

These three men defined the essentials of our foreign policy. Their ideas were formed by the imperatives of survival in the less than benign environment in which Singapore found itself on 10th August 1965, the morning after what was politely termed ‘Separation’.

My colleagues and I learnt our trade from them.

We did so in very humble capacities: taking notes at their meetings or seeing to the necessities of their travels, but still privileged to observe them at close quarters and absorb something of their modes of thought and operating style. It was a unique apprenticeship. Then as we assumed more senior positions, we came to understand a little more of their considerations by sitting-in on their policy discussions and even occasionally contributed our mite to their decisions.

Some of us had studied international relations as an academic subject before joining the Foreign Service. But after 35 years, I have concluded that any resemblance between what I had studied and what I eventually did for a living was purely coincidental. Our real education in the realities of the diplomacy of a small country only started when our professional lives were touched, however tangentially, by Mr Lee and his comrades.
The most valuable thing they imparted to us was a cast of mind.

Mr Rajaratnam, our first Foreign Minister, has described his first meeting with the international press as Foreign Minister. It was only a few days after we had independence thrust upon us. Relations with Malaysia were fraught with racial tension; Sukarno’s Indonesia was still fighting an undeclared war against us and to our north in Indochina, the Cold War had turned hot.

The newsmen were braying for information on how newly independent Singapore would conduct itself. ‘What’, Mr Rajaratnam told us he asked Mr Lee, ‘shall I tell them?’ ‘Just wear a tie, Raja”, was the answer, ‘you’ll think of something’.

Big countries may delude themselves about being always in control of events. Small countries cannot afford such illusions. For small countries, foreign policy is usually a series of not always neat or consistent improvisations to a messy and unpredictable reality. The future can at best be only dimly glimpsed and in any case cares not a whit for your concerns. So you must pragmatically adapt yourself to it.

One must of course set goals. But having done so, more often than not the most one can do is keep a distant star in sight as one tacks hither and tither to avoid treacherous reefs or to scoop up opportunities that may drift within reach.

Successful navigation requires a clinical – indeed cold-blooded – appreciation of the world as it is and not as you may wish it to be. This is harder than you may think. Diplomacy is an area of human endeavour that is more than usually susceptible to self-deception and wishful thinking.

Mr Lee and his comrades were not devoid of idealism. Singapore as it is today would not otherwise exist. They risked their lives to make it so.

But idealism must be rooted in a hard-headed understanding of the realities of human nature and power. Without power nothing can be achieved. And even with power not everything desirable will always be feasible. No matter how fervently one may wish that they may be liberated from the surly bonds of earth, pigs are never going to sprout wings and fly.

Understanding requires information. Mr Lee had intense intellectual curiosity. He sought information without regard for hierarchy. He was tolerant of alternate views or at any rate, he was tolerant of the young and brash desk officer as I then was who, too green to know that the tiger is dangerous, ventured on occasion to argue with him.

The tiger’s roar is fearsome and its fangs are sharp. Mr Lee sometimes tried to intimidate you into agreement. But if you stood your ground with reasoned arguments, he listened even if he did not agree. And I am here to tell the tale.

Mr Lee and his comrades were impatient of complexity for complexity’s sake; for the sake of showing off how clever one was. He did not suffer fools. If he sought a view, it was to be taken for granted you had something useful to say and would say it in the fewest possible words. And if you didn’t know, say so.

What Mr Lee and his comrades possessed to a greater degree than anyone else I have ever met, was an uncanny ability to zero into the core of even the most complicated problem or situation. They wielded Occam’s razor with great intellectual ruthlessness, slashing through the pious obfuscations which too often shroud international issues.

Margaret Thatcher once said of Mr Lee: ‘He was never wrong’. That is of course, not true. Nobody can be always right, particularly in international affairs where most of the time most of the factors are going to be unknown or only partially known and where even the effort to know may change what you are trying to know

But Mr Lee and his comrades were never shy about changing their minds. Again this is harder than you may think. Too often vested interests, stubbornness or just plain pride stands in the way. Too many people believe their own propaganda. Mr Lee and his comrades avoided this most common of pitfalls because their laser-like focus was always the national interest of Singapore. And they never confused ideology with interest.

Diplomacy is not all about being pleasant or making oneself agreeable. It is about defending and advancing the national interest, preferably by being pleasant and agreeable, but if necessary by any appropriate means. In this respect, having to stand your ground in the face of the tiger’s roar – and in the shadows of diplomatic politesse lurk many wild beasts – was another valuable lesson.

This is particularly so in Southeast Asia, where majority Chinese Singapore which organizes itself on the basis of multiracial meritocracy, is something of an anomaly. We live in a region where the Chinese are typically a minority and not a particularly welcome one, and where our neighbours organize themselves on the basis of very different principles.

Perhaps Mr Lee’s greatest mistake was, during the period when we were part of Malaysia, to underestimate the lengths to which the Malay leadership in Malaysia would go to defend ‘Ketuanan Melayu’ – Malay dominance. It was not a mistake that he or any of our leaders ever made again.

The basic issue in Singapore’s relations with our neighbours is existential: the implicit challenge that by its very existence a Chinese majority Singapore organized on the basis of multiracial meritocracy poses to systems organized on the basis of different and ultimately irreconcilable principles. That we have the temerity to be successful, adds to the offence.

None of this means we cannot cooperate with our neighbours: we must, we can and we do. But we must do so from a position of strength. Mr Lee was a lawyer and had a deep belief in the rule of law. Yet as a former Chief of the Malaysian Armed Forces has recounted, Mr Lee told him: “if PAS comes into power … and tries to meddle with the water in Johor Bahru, I’ll move my troops in. I will not wait for the Security Council to solve this little problem.”

But Mr Lee also once told an Israeli General who had helped start our armed forces that Singapore had learnt two things from Israel: how to be strong, and how not to use our strength; meaning that it is necessary to get along with neighbours and no country can live in perpetual conflict with its neighbours.

But we are different and we must remain different to survive. Small countries have no intrinsic relevance. To small countries, relevance is an artefact created by human endeavour and having been created, must be maintained by human endeavour. To remain relevant we cannot be ordinary. We cannot be just like our neighbours. We have to be extraordinary. Yet being extraordinary does not always endear us to our neighbours.

The management of this paradox lies at the heart of our foreign policy and prescribes our most fundamental approaches: maintaining balance in Southeast Asia by facilitating the engagement of all major powers in our region, while fostering regional cooperation through ASEAN and maintaining our edge and keeping our powder dry.

Singapore and Southeast Asia in 2015 is obviously not the same as Singapore and Southeast Asia in 1965. But some things do not change: our geopolitical situation and how our neighbours chose to organize themselves.

The parameters of choice for small countries are never overly broad. The approach that Mr Lee and his comrades bequeathed to my generation of Foreign Service Officers and which we have tried to impart to our successors, still serves us well.

Our environment is still complicated and perilous. The US and China are competing for influence with a greater than usual intensity as they grope towards a new accommodation with each other and the region. Malaysia is on a political trajectory that has heightened racial and religious tensions and may well lead to violence. The haze that regularly envelopes Southeast Asia is a reminder that post-Suharto Indonesia is still an incoherent and rent-seeking polity which has yet to reach a stable political equilibrium.

The key challenge is internal: that a new generation of Singaporeans will take the achievements of Mr Lee and his comrades for granted as the natural order of things and be persuaded that we are no longer vulnerable.

Some opposition politicians and their fellow travellers among the intelligentsia have tried to do just that. They either do not understand their own country and region or place their ambitions above the national interest. Fortunately, as the results of our recent General Election have demonstrated, the majority of my compatriots do not believe them."

scroobal said:

Big countries may delude themselves about being always in control of events. Small countries cannot afford such illusions. For small countries, foreign policy is usually a series of not always neat or consistent improvisations to a messy and unpredictable reality. The future can at best be only dimly glimpsed and in any case cares not a whit for your concerns. So you must pragmatically adapt yourself to it.

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An excellent speech. I am in agreement 100% with all he said.

GoldenDragon said:

absolutely agree and i am with you on this. younger bro is a lawyer while sister is a PS. i believe it is a 3-rm flat.

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I respect (salam) this gentleman, who continues to live in a HDB flat, when he can afford to live in a much more comfortable house.

GoldenDragon said:

with his credentials, why still single? is he gay?

director
security branch malaysia

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In his younger days, based on what I saw, he was definitely not a gay.

Leongsam said:

??? I was at his wedding.... and yes... he married a female... a Japanese girl.

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I am unaware of that.
Are you one of his classmates during Pre-U days, on the ground floor (2 claas rooms from the armoury) at Bras Basah Road.

Quite a hard-hitting reality check piece - he has lately taken to referring to the Chinese as "pandas" in his postings which I believe is his typical display of unhappiness.

Of interest are the bits I have highlighted below - who is he referring to and what incidents?

http://www.todayonline.com/print/2108026

Standing up to and getting along with China


Southeast Asian countries must be able to stand up to China and get along with China at the same time, and ASEAN members who seem to have forgotten this aphorism, such as Cambodia and the Philippines, may well come to regret it, said Singapore’s Ambassador at Large Bilahari Kausikan.
By Bilahari Kausikan -
May 18
South-east Asian countries must be able to stand up to China and get along with China at the same time, and ASEAN members who seem to have forgotten this aphorism, such as Cambodia and the Philippines, may well come to regret it, said Singapore’s Ambassador at Large Bilahari Kausikan at a policy forum in Tokyo last week.

In his speech on security challenges in Asia, Mr Kausikan added that ASEAN will remain divided on the South China Sea issue, which has become a proxy for the power adjustments underway between the United States and China.

Over time however, a more symmetrical naval equation between the US and China would develop in the South China Sea and when that happens, both powers will reach some form of agreement that could be costly for some ASEAN countries, including Cambodia and the Philippines, he said.

On Singapore’s relationship with Beijing, Mr Kausikan noted that China constantly refers to Singapore as a ‘Chinese country’, adding that it is important for Singapore to reject such a characterisation.

Below is his speech at the forum held in the lead-up to the G7 summit in Japan next week:

My perspective is that of a small country in South-east Asia. Small countries look at the world very differently. Let me try to explain the difference by reference to two issues: the maritime disputes in the South China Sea (SCS) and the concept of the ‘Indo-Pacific’. What they have in common is what I consider the main security challenge of our times: Dealing with China.

The ‘Indo-Pacific’ is a concept that has become fashionable, particularly in two big countries: Japan and India. It may well make sense to you, but from my perspective it is a rather abstract concept. To a small country, the geographical scope is too vast and too vague to be meaningful as a geopolitical concept.

The ‘Indo-Pacific’ seems to me to be a euphemism for the “values diplomacy” that Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe used to talk about. Perhaps he has ceased to do so, at least in public, because the values in question, democracy, freedom and human rights, are protean terms, essentially contested concepts where a superficial consensus – often only of vocabulary-- masks basic and sometimes irreconcilable differences of interpretation.

More fundamentally, ‘values diplomacy’ seems itself a euphemism for a diplomacy whose primary focus is concern about China. This is not a game that any South-east Asian country will regard with great enthusiasm. I do not mean to suggest that we are not concerned about China. We are of course concerned as our region is contiguous to China, perhaps even more so than big countries. China poses unique challenges to Singapore. But our responses are different.

REMEMBERING A BASIC LESSON OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY

There is a school of thought that believes concern about China’s increasingly assertive behaviour will make ASEAN naturally gravitate towards the United States and its allies. This is true, but only to a degree. You will misinterpret developments in South-east Asia if you lose sight of this fact.

Concern over China has opened new diplomatic opportunities for the US and Japan in South-east Asia. This has been generally welcomed by ASEAN. But to small countries fated by geography to live in the midst of great power competition which has been the situation of South-east Asia for centuries, balancing, hedging and bandwagoning are not alternatives. We see nothing contradictory in pursuing all three courses of action simultaneously. To do so is built into our diplomatic DNA by centuries of sometimes bitter experiences.

Some years ago, I asked a senior Vietnamese official what leadership changes meant for Vietnam’s relations with China. Every Vietnamese leader, he replied, must be able to stand up to China and get along with China and if anyone thinks this cannot be done at the same time, he does not deserve to be a leader. To various degrees this is true of all South-east Asian countries.

It was a very distinguished American who famously said that a foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of inferior minds. He ought to have been a South-east Asian because this is an aphorism that countries in our region would do well to always keep in mind. The two ASEAN members who currently seem to have forgotten this basic lesson of South-east Asian history, Cambodia and the Philippines, may well come to regret it.

The idea of the ‘Indo-Pacific’ seems to have arisen from the common cast of mind of Prime Minister Abe and Prime Minister Narenda Modi of India. There is certainly a convergence of interests between Japan and India. But I believe translating the concept into a consistent policy will eventually prove disappointing.

India is an ancient civilisation that is not going to define itself in relation to anything but itself or allow itself to become a chip in anybody’s strategic game. Japan too is an ancient civilisation but one that in one way or another has always defined itself in relation to China, perhaps too much so.

The strategic attention of a continental-sized and complicated country like India will be more naturally inwardly directed. If there is a consistent outward focus, it is directed to the west towards Pakistan in which India’s concerns about Pakistan’s relationship China is only one factor, and not necessarily the most important factor. ‘Looking East’ will at best always be sporadic. That in any case is the experience of ASEAN’s relationship with India.

WHAT DOES CHINA WANT?

The Cold War had one virtue: Clarity of structure. Irrespective of where we stood on the ideological divide, and even if we pretended to be non-aligned as Singapore did, there was never much doubt as to how to position ourselves. The post-Cold War international system lacks such stark definition. China is not an enemy. But is China a friend? What does ‘friend’ mean anyway? Chinese friendship can sometimes be as overwhelming as Chinese enmity.

The US is certainly a friend. But it can be a very intrusive friend, too often unable to resist the temptation to whip the heathen along the path of righteousness.

What kind of power is China? There is no clear answer. On a global scale I do not think that China is clearly revisionist. To be sure, China has no strong reason to love an international order that it regards, not without justification, as heir to the order it holds responsible for what every Chinese schoolchild knows as ‘a hundred years of humiliation’.

It was never very realistic to expect China to passively be a ‘responsible stakeholder’ in an order it had little say in establishing. But that very same order facilitated China’s re-emergence as a major power. China is arguably the chief beneficiary of the post-Cold War international order. It has no strong reason to kick over the table and seek radical revisions of the existing order.

Beijing wants its new status acknowledged. But that is not the same thing as being revisionist. What exactly it does mean is difficult to define, even for China itself. Hence, the complexities of our times.

WHAT DOES AMERICA WANT?

The US now clearly needs help to maintain international order. But after the Cold War there is no over-riding strategic imperative for any major power to accept US leadership, except on an ad hoc basis. In any case, who can now offer help? The G-7 or G-20 can perhaps loosely coordinate economic policy but are not coherent strategic actors. Europe is tangled in knots of its own making. Japan, the Republic of Korea and Australia can only help regionally and the latter two already not without some ambivalence.

When China develops a credible second strike capability, Japan too must wonder about the credibility of US extended deterrence and hence about unconditional acceptance of US leadership.

The American people are themselves now reluctant to bear any burden, pay any price or meet any hardship to maintain international order: Donald Trump and Bernie Saunders are drinking from the same political well. The international order is now fraying at its edges, ‘a suit that no longer fits’ to borrow a phrase from Fu Ying, once my counterpart in China’s Foreign Ministry, with whom I otherwise do not usually agree. But there is no clear or viable alternative to what has been termed the liberal international order. It was not very ‘liberal’ if you disagreed with one aspect or another of it, but I shan’t quarrel over terminology.

The uncertainties are primarily focused on US-China relations. It is a relationship that defies easy characterisation. Profound interdependence of a new type coexists with deep strategic mistrust. The same could be said of Sino-Japanese relations or China-India relations or even European Union-Russia relations. But US-China relations have a unique impact, particularly in East Asia where the US and China are now groping towards a new modus vivendi with each other and with other countries in the region. Neither finds it easy. Neither really yet knows what exactly they want from each other or must concede to the other.

WHY THE SOUTH CHINA SEA IS IMPORTANT TO CHINA

The SCS has emerged as something of a proxy for the adjustments underway between the US and China. I do not think either is looking for trouble. War by design is highly improbable. Despite their bluster, China’s leaders know that war with the US can only have one outcome and place the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)’s most vital interest—its hold on power – in great jeopardy. China is not reckless. President Xi Jinping is a ‘princeling’; the CCP is his patrimony and I don’t think he will gamble with it. But rivalry is intrinsic to any major power relationship and nether will forswear pursuing their interests, at times robustly.

The CCP is today confronted with fundamental questions about itself as it embarks on complex second phase of reforms. These reforms must square the circle: give the market a larger role in crucial areas of the economy to maintain competitiveness, while preserving central political control by the Party. Can it be done? No one really knows. Social and labour unrest are endemic at the local level. The anti-corruption campaign has unsettled CCP cadres in every sector. But we should not assume failure. Unlike the former Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the CCP has proven to be an extremely adaptable creature, the latest and most successful iteration of a series of political experiments in search of wealth and power to resist western predations dating from the late Qing dynasty.

President Xi Jinping has termed the CCP’s role as leading the “Great Rejuvenation” of the Chinese nation after a century of weakness and humiliation. But the outcome of reforms, even if completely successful, will be slower growth, as the CCP has itself acknowledged. The “Great Rejuvenation” must therefore be as much, if not more, outwardly than internally directed. Externally, it is increasingly an essentially revanchist narrative. Herein lies the importance of the SCS to China. Put simply, it is the least risky way of putting some shreds of meat on the bare bones of the historical narrative by which the CCP justifies its right to rule.

The US defines its interests in the SCS in terms of upholding international law and freedom of navigation. These are important interests but not of the same order as the CCP’s primary interest which is existential: the legitimacy and ultimately the survival of the CCP. The US has made clear that the US-Japan alliance covers the Senkaku (or Diaoyu in Chinese) islands; it has been ambiguous about the US-Philippines alliance, and hence in effect made clear, that it does not cover the disputed areas in the SCS. War in support of the principal US East Asian ally is credible, if unlikely. War over rocks, shoals and reefs would be absurd.

WHAT PRICE SINO-AMERICAN AGREEMENT?

I doubt that China can be deterred from stopping its reclamation activities and deploying military assets on the artificial islands it is creating. But I doubt too that China can deter the US from operating in the SCS. Military assets that cannot be used are a weak deterrent. To use them to deny access must evoke a US response. This confronts the CCP with Hobson’s choice: Escalate and risk war or at least serious conflict which will jeopardise CCP rule; or respond weakly which will expose the hollowness of the “Great Rejuvenation” which will also shake confidence in CCP rule. The CCP will not willingly place itself in such an invidious position.

China’s bluster masks this dilemma. Beijing has carefully kept each action in the SCS below a threshold that must draw a response from even the most reluctant of US administrations. Miscalculations and accidents can of course happen. If an accident occurs, the highly nationalistic public opinion that the CCP both cultivates and fears could lead Beijing down a path it does not want to travel. But the probability of accidents can be minimised.

China has of late taken a more positive attitude towards rules of engagement for unplanned encounters at sea and in the air, not just in the Western Pacific where the US and China have reached formal agreement on a basic Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea, but also in the SCS. If we look past the chest-thumping by both sides, the probability of US-China competition in the SCS becoming ritualised is not to be discounted.

I think the process is already underway. In my view there are less differences between the US and China on freedome of navigation than immediately meets the eye. I think differences over what military activities are acceptable in another country’s Exclusive Economic Zone reflect differences of capability rather than irreconcilable differences of concept. As capabilities grow, concepts can converge, and as concepts converge so also may interests.

Over time a more symmetrical naval equation must develop in the SCS. When this occurs, it is likely that some implicit or de facto agreement over the SCS will be reached between the US and China. When this occurs– and I believe it is more a question of when and how, not whether – countries like Cambodia and the Philippines will find themselves far out on a limb. When big countries reach agreement they generally try to make small countries pay the price.

Lest you think I am indulging in paranoid fantasies, let me remind you that at the 1981 International Conference on what was then called Kampuchea, the US took China’s side against ASEAN on the central question of whether or not the status quo ante should be restored after the Vietnamese withdrew and thus whether the Chinese-backed Khmer Rouge should automatically return to power.

The then Assistant Secretary of State for our region, the late John Holdridge, even threatened my Foreign Minister with “blood on the floor” if Singapore did not relent in our insistence that the Cambodian people be allowed to exercise their right to internal self-determination through UN-supervised elections. When the US eventually relented it was probably because it dawned on the administration how the New York Times headline would read if it became generally known that the US was supporting a genocidal regime.

Nor are such dark thoughts peculiar to South-east Asia. Ever since the 1972 ‘Nixon Shock’ Japan has periodically harboured worries about being ‘passed’. Is that concern now passé? If I was Japanese I would not think so.

MOOD IN AMERICA

Nothing I have said is intended to imply that the US presence in South-east Asia is unwelcome. But in South-east Asia the American porridge is always going to be too hot or too cold. It is extremely difficult to get the temperature just right to suit the tastes of all countries in a politically diverse region. Some countries will always fear abandonment while others will always fear entanglement.

This is the reality that inevitably confronts an off-shore balancer and its allies. It is one of the burdens of global power. But of late the US has itself unnecessarily added to its own burdens.

American intervention in Iraq, and later in Libya and Syria in support of the United Kingdom and France, left those countries irrevocably broken. But the US is now is doing its best to walk away. When the ‘Arab Spring’ broke out – a singularly inappropriate metaphor because after spring inevitably comes summer and Arab summers are notoriously hot -- within the space of a mere week the US shifted from treating Hosni Mubarak as a valued and steadfast 30-year ally to unceremoniously dumping him. In South-east Asia, this evoked echoes of how the US had treated Suharto, another 30-year ally.

The US drew a ‘red-line’ in Syria which quickly faded entirely away as the Barack Obama administration desperately grabbed at the threadbare line thrown to it by Russia.

And all this at a time when China was constantly reminding ASEAN in ways subtle and not so subtle that it was a geographical fact, whereas the American presence in South-east Asia was only a geopolitical calculation.

In this respect, the metaphor of the ‘pivot’ or ‘rebalance’ was also singularly inappropriate, connoting discontinuity. What ‘pivots’ or ‘rebalances’ one way could swing another. Instead the stress should have been on the essential continuity of US policy in East Asia over the last 30 years or more, which has the additional advantage of being true. The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) helps mitigate the possibility of a sharp swing in US policy. But is not a substitute for political consistency.

The American system impels each new administration to stress difference even when there is none. Do not assume everyone in South-east Asia understands the eccentricities of the US system and can make appropriate judgements about political rhetoric.

But I do not think that what Mr Trump and Ms Hillary Clinton have said about the TPP can be entirely dismissed as campaign rhetoric. They were responding to a political mood that any new President cannot ignore whatever her own inclinations.

HAVING MAXIMUM RANGE OF OPTIONS

Let me concede that ASEAN has not dealt with the complexities of the SCS particularly well. ASEAN’s basic and enduring purpose is to maintain a modicum of order and civility in relations among its members in a region where this is not to be taken for granted. On this score ASEAN has not done badly. But ASEAN is divided on the SCS and will remain divided.

We occasionally are able to come up with useful statements on the SCS. Still, statements are only just that: Statements that do not change realities on the ground.

ASEAN constantly stresses its ‘centrality’. But if ASEAN is ‘central’ it is not because of our strategic weight but because our lack of strategic weight enables major powers to find ASEAN-led forums such as the ASEAN Regional Forum and the East Asia Summit occasionally useful, while remaining confident that ASEAN cannot frustrate their most vital designs.

And if we look like doing something even minimally effective on the SCS, China will not hesitate to divide ASEAN as it did in 2012 and again just a few weeks ago. I don’t think China was behaving unusually.

It was behaving as all big countries do on issues which they consider their core interest.

If I am right about how China defines its primary interest in the SCS, then it connects directly with the most vital of all its interests.

For a hundred years, the legitimacy of all Chinese governments has been measured by its ability to defend China’s borders and sovereignty. The artificial islands may be of limited military utility, but they serve a vital domestic purpose and additionally impresses the natives – that’s us – with China’s inescapable contiguity.

Of late China has even taken umbrage at referring to the disputed areas as being in dispute because they have been Chinese territory since “ancient times”, or so they claim.

What autonomy ASEAN currently enjoys on the SCS is due to the US presence which is an irreplaceable element of the regional balance.

But ASEAN does not define balance as being directed against one major power or another as during the Cold War. The small countries of South-east Asia conceive of ‘balance’ as an omnidirectional state of equilibrium that will allow us to maintain the best possible relationship with all the major powers and avoid being forced into invidious choices.

Avoiding invidious choices does not mean avoiding taking positions, lying low, saying nothing meaningful and hoping for the best. To duck on such a central issue as the SCS is to surrender autonomy.

What it does mean is leaving open the maximum range of options when positions are taken, or at least this is how Singapore sees it.

Unfortunately not all my ASEAN brethren regard balance in this manner. Balance in this sense requires psychological as well as material equilibrium; it is a frame of mind.

The US is an irreplaceable component to the material balance. But while the US and its allies can build capacity in those ASEAN countries that are deficient, warships, fighter aircraft and submarines are necessary but insufficient conditions to maintain such a frame of mind.

And as I have argued, some US actions have even undermined psychological equilibrium in South-east Asia.

Internal developments in ASEAN members are crucial to maintaining psychological equilibrium. Here what happens on land is as important as what happens at sea.

China’s growing economic ties with South-east Asia and the many infrastructure projects planned or underway are binding southwest China and mainland South-east Asia into one economic space. This is to be welcomed on economic grounds but inevitably changes calculations of interest.

It was a strategic mistake for the US and Japan to have stayed out of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). Japan is investing in South-east Asian infrastructure. But what Japan alone can do in mitigation is limited. If the US and Japan were in the AIIB, it would have had a greater effect. Fortunately it is not an irreversible mistake.

ASEAN countries are not alone in being psychologically vulnerable. It was not too long ago that a former Australian Prime Minister concluded, for broadly similar economic reasons, that Australia’s alliance with the US had become a strategic liability.

SINGAPORE IS NOT A CHINESE COUNTRY

If Singapore has been more resistant to this Chinese tactic it is not because we are less venal than others or because of our superior wisdom, but from harsh necessity.

We are the only ethnic Chinese majority country in a region where the Chinese are typically a less than fully welcome minority. We organise ourselves on the basis of multiracial meritocracy where typically countries in our region organise themselves on the basis on the dominance of one ethnic group or another.

China nevertheless constantly refers to Singapore as a ‘Chinese country’ who should therefore ‘understand’ China better and hints at undefined but vast rewards if we should ‘explain’ China to other ASEAN countries.

We politely but firmly tell the Chinese that we are not a Chinese country. We understand all too well that when the Chinese seek our ‘understanding’ they mean ‘obey’ and by ‘explain’, they mean use whatever influence we may have in ASEAN on their behalf.

If we were ever foolish enough to accept their characterisation and do their bidding, the multiracial meritocratic compact on which independent Singapore rests would be at least severely strained if not broken.

Singapore’s success rests on this foundation of social cohesion. Once lost it will be very difficult if not well-nigh impossible to regain, particularly if the government is regarded as complicit.

But it would be equally foolish to alienate China which even at a slower rate of growth is going to be a major factor in our economic future. Maintaining a good relationship with China, while retaining the autonomy to pursue our own interests as we define them is not a matter of choice; for us it is a matter of survival.

We have so far managed this delicate balancing act. But Singapore is only 50 years old and not all my compatriots understand this reality and are not immune to Chinese seductions.

This understanding must be, has been and I have no doubt, will sooner or later again, have to be enforced by the exercise of the coercive powers that are the legitimate monopoly of the state. And exercised in a way that is entirely in accordance with our laws, but will probably be regarded by some of our partners, the US and Japan included, as arbitrary and in conflict with ‘values’ that they hold dear.

We have also deployed such powers against American and European attempts to influence our internal dynamics and again I have no doubt we will have to do so again in the future. Therefore the less said about ‘values diplomacy’ under any guise the better.

Click here to read the full article on TODAYonline

I am stumped by what he meant for both the points that you highlighted. In the second one he includes Europe and I can't recall any European intervention in local politics in the 50 years since 1965. The only isolated incident was a mole that was uncovered but that was business as usual. Except for the Hendrickson Affair and the attempt to bribe Yoong Siew Wah, the American's have acted as the Govt proxy when they were invited to attend Chee's events.

The first comment about Chinese seduction seems ominous.

Then again Bilahari tends to makes thing rather grandiose when it is not. The Europeans, the Americans and the Chinese have better and more important things to do than worry about Singapore or even Asean. The Americans value bilateral arrangements and diplomacy as most countries do. Asean failed as an economic bloc and now spends it time trying to find a purpose for its existence.

gatehousethetinkertailor said:

Quite a hard-hitting reality check piece - he has lately taken to referring to the Chinese as "pandas" in his postings which I believe is his typical display of unhappiness.

Of interest are the bits I have highlighted below - who is he referring to and what incidents?

http://www.todayonline.com/print/2108026

Standing up to and getting along with China


Southeast Asian countries must be able to stand up to China and get along with China at the same time, and ASEAN members who seem to have forgotten this aphorism, such as Cambodia and the Philippines, may well come to regret it, said Singapore’s Ambassador at Large Bilahari Kausikan.
By Bilahari Kausikan -
May 18
South-east Asian countries must be able to stand up to China and get along with China at the same time, and ASEAN members who seem to have forgotten this aphorism, such as Cambodia and the Philippines, may well come to regret it, said Singapore’s Ambassador at Large Bilahari Kausikan at a policy forum in Tokyo last week.

Click to expand...

Yes I found it odd that he included the European reference - he did go full monty on ASEAN in his third sermon from the mount though - there is indeed lots of material there on the regional dynamics in particular the position of Singapore as a majority Chinese island - he is a big fan of Israel so I do wonder if he similarly subscribes to the notion of being entrenched in a sea of hostile single majority states that are not Chinese - I don't buy the whole spiel about meritocracy but can understand why that is the necessary mantra. I sense that he probably has heard of how some amongst them seem more exuberant about the growing assertions of China in the region - the lecture is much more digestible on paper than actually listening to him. He also made similar reference to how unnamed states had tried to indulge in our domestic matters very recently after the old man passed and his FO to them was quite ominous as well.

One of his opening gambits did make me chuckle: "Since I am going to be cutting close to the bone of our own region, I ought to make explicit what should already have been obvious to all but the most determinedly obtuse: in this entire series of lectures I am speaking for no one but myself."


http://lkyspp.nus.edu.sg/ips/event/201516-ips-nathan-lectures-lecture-iii-southeast-asia-and-asean

winnipegjets said:

How did Kee Chiu manage to be a scholar? His thinking is idiotic. There is something truly wrong with our scholastic system when we have scholars like Kee Chiu.

Click to expand...

Simple! He is a paper scholar just like he is a paper general. Exam-smart but empty vessel! Only knows how to spot exam questions and score high marks. As good as brain-dead! The PAP scholastic system is designed for people like him to be perpetual yesmen and groupthinkers and most importantly; not to rock the establishment boat!

I note that he likes to use the word "obtuse" or something similar at the start or even in the middles of a presentation. Kumar incorporates this as part of his comedy routine.

I sense that the Govt has given him a role to message their intentions and thoughts in a blunt and clinical manner without officially owning up to it. The late Samad Ismail in his earlier interaction told Old Man to get someone else to do the deed so your hand is clean or something to that effect.

gatehousethetinkertailor said:

One of his opening gambits did make me chuckle: "Since I am going to be cutting close to the bone of our own region, I ought to make explicit what should already have been obvious to all but the most determinedly obtuse: in this entire series of lectures I am speaking for no one but myself."


http://lkyspp.nus.edu.sg/ips/event/201516-ips-nathan-lectures-lecture-iii-southeast-asia-and-asean

Click to expand...

scroobal said:

Instead, Mr Bilahari opted to bring out the proverbial bogeyman, namely, PAP dissenters.

The exact words of Mr Bilahari's concluding remarks were as follows:

""""The key challenge is internal: that a new generation of Singaporeans will take the achievements of Mr Lee and his comrades for granted and be persuaded that Singapore was no longer vulnerable. Some opposition politicians and their fellow travellers among the intelligensia have tried to do just that.

Click to expand...

Classic strawman argument. Put words into the opposition's mouth and then attack them. In front of an international audience some more.

Just read Bilahari's reply to JCA. Fucking condescending and arrogant and rude.

scroobal said:

I note that he likes to use the word "obtuse" or something similar at the start or even in the middles of a presentation. Kumar incorporates this as part of his comedy routine.

I sense that the Govt has given him a role to message their intentions and thoughts in a blunt and clinical manner without officially owning up to it. The late Samad Ismail in his earlier interaction told Old Man to get someone else to do the deed so your hand is clean or something to that effect.

Click to expand...

An excellent observation. Now I must somehow incorporate that into my online vocabulary. Should not be difficult since opposition supporters are not the sharpest tools in the shed. Teehee!