The People’s Action Party and the Workers’ Party have been girding themselves for the next general election, likely to be held in 2015. The other political parties however do not seem to have done anything to make themselves electable.
The PAP has introduced a number of initiatives to improve its prospects with the ground. Among these initiatives are the Pioneer Generation Package, changes to the Central Provident Fund schemes, and increasing the stock of public housing and moderating housing prices. These initiatives, though likely to have some positive effect for the PAP, are expected to be only the initial tranche of populist measures that the Government will likely introduce in advance of the next GE.
The bulk of the Government’s populist measures – perhaps 80% of pre-election sweeteners – will probably be rolled out in the February 2015 Budget and subsequently in announcements to coincide with Singapore’s 50th National Day – the Golden Jubilee. Very few voters will argue with being at the receiving end of the Government’s sudden generosity, even if that generosity is to be of temporary duration.
For its part, the WP has slowly been recruiting qualified people into its ranks, including some personalities prominent within their own professions. Some of these individuals will be the WP’s likely election candidates. They will be backed up by a growing corps of party members and volunteers who will undertake the mammoth logistical challenge imposed by the multi-seat GRCs (Group Representation Constituencies).
Equally significant, is the fact that the WP has slowly but surely been establishing its own ecosystem in a part of the eastern half of the island. This has been made possible by the fact that the three WP-held constituencies – Aljunied, Hougang and Punggol East – are virtually adjacent to each other and, therefore, can be conveniently knitted together into a single whole. This makes it difficult for the WP to be dislodged from those constituencies and, more importantly, this ecosystem – that constitutes not just a geographical, but also a social and philosophical, construct -- forms a jumping off point for the WP to launch effective election campaigns into neighbouring constituencies, especially East Coast and Tampines GRCs. The WP is well poised to make further advances at the next GE.
In contrast to the preparations by the PAP and WP, the other political parties have not done anything notable to enhance their electoral prospects. Instead of consolidation among what are effectively and very simply “bit players” in Singapore politics, there has in fact been unnecessary fragmentation in that marginal sphere. A notable example of this has been the emergence of the Singaporeans First Party. Like the pre-existing smaller parties, this new party simply gives the impression of having enough people to form a central executive committee but not enough within its rank-and-file to do the necessary grunge work (the logistics) to bring in the vote for the party and its leaders.
The lack of a critical mass of members and volunteers is also something that plagues other smaller parties. Going online to make their case in social and alternative media sites does not enhance the prospects of these smaller parties. As I have mentioned a number of times in the past, socio-political blogs are heavily populated by anti-PAP elements (i.e., those who make up the 25% of the irreducible core of anti-PAP voters). As such it is pointless to initiate political engagement in those blogs when the key demographic the opposition needs to reach out to – the around 35% of voters who make up the middle ground – hardly spend much time on those blogs. For that reason, and very wisely, the overwhelming portion of the WP’s political engagement has been offline.
For the Singapore Democratic Party, there are a number of obstacles to it improving much beyond its rather dismal average vote of 36.76% in GE2011. Chief among these obstacles is the person of Dr Chee Soon Juan. A majority of middle ground voters have a strong, and visceral, dislike for Dr Chee. They consider him to be politically toxic. This is borne out by the fact that as secretary-general of the SDP, Dr Chee led the SDP into four general elections (1997, 2001, 2006 and 2011) and suffered four crushing defeats. Yet, Dr Chee shows no sign of wanting to leave the party, whereas the honourable and decent thing for a leader who truly believes in both the spirit and letter of democracy would be to resign following an initial general election debacle.
If Dr Chee and some of his closest associates, such as his sister Ms Chee Siok Chin and party Vice-Chairman Mr John Tan, among a few others, were to depart the SDP, and were replaced by suitably qualified individuals without association to the previous 20 years of the SDP’s history, then the low ceiling of support for the party would miraculously be lifted. In such a situation, in the eyes of middle ground voters – who decide on the outcome of elections – the SDP would have returned to something like the salubrious situation it found itself in back in late 1991 where it had three parliamentary seats.
However, the SDP leadership appears to have no interest in grappling with the main issue that is plaguing it. To employ an overused phrase that is often thrown at the PAP (for different reasons), the SDP ignores the elephant in the room – the person of Dr Chee and his acolytes – while spending time sniping at the PAP. The party leadership wants to engage in politics on terms it lays down to the electorate instead of the reverse. This is a curious way of practising politics: it is a practice that would work for civil society organisations but not for political parties, especially if they are based on the fundamental principle of democracy.
The only other party requiring mention here because it still has a chance of getting something out of the next GE, if it plays its cards right, is the National Solidarity Party. Here, for the NSP, “playing its cards right” involves coming to terms with both electoral and political realities. The main electoral reality is the formidable logistical challenge in fighting a general election.
The NSP should scale back its electoral ambitions to field just half the number of candidates that it fielded back in 2011; in that election, the NSP fielded 24 candidates. A concentration of resources on a smaller number of constituencies will enhance the NSP’s electoral chances. However, the NSP would still have to contend with a major political reality – the widespread perception by middle ground voters that the WP is the only opposition game in town.
One way for the NSP to change that perception is to arrive at an early agreement with the WP – preferably before 2014 is out -- on the general areas both will contest so as to avoid over-lapping claims to a straight fight with the PAP. (The “general areas” can be broadly defined to take into account any subsequent changes to electoral boundaries.) By doing this, the NSP would implicitly be perceived as getting the blessing of the WP. That is no small advantage given the significant goodwill that the WP commands among middle ground voters. But in order to get that blessing the NSP has to give up some of its claims.
If two parties are on an unequal footing in the process of horse-trading then, reasonably, the one with the weaker hand has to give ground, and some choice ground at that. No prizes for guessing what some of that ground might be. And no prizes for guessing which party would have to make the first approach in initiating a process that would be mutually beneficial.
Dr Derek da Cunha is author of the books: Breakthrough: Roadmap for Singapore’s Political Future (Singapore: Institute of Policy Studies, 2012), 288pp; Singapore Places its Bets: Casinos, Foreign Talent and Remaking a City-state (Singapore: Straits Times Press, 2010), 192pp; and, The Price of Victory: The 1997 Singapore General Election and Beyond (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1997), 150pp.
© Derek da Cunha
https://www.facebook.com/notes/dere...-ge-the-others-are-laggards/10153311872318797
The PAP has introduced a number of initiatives to improve its prospects with the ground. Among these initiatives are the Pioneer Generation Package, changes to the Central Provident Fund schemes, and increasing the stock of public housing and moderating housing prices. These initiatives, though likely to have some positive effect for the PAP, are expected to be only the initial tranche of populist measures that the Government will likely introduce in advance of the next GE.
The bulk of the Government’s populist measures – perhaps 80% of pre-election sweeteners – will probably be rolled out in the February 2015 Budget and subsequently in announcements to coincide with Singapore’s 50th National Day – the Golden Jubilee. Very few voters will argue with being at the receiving end of the Government’s sudden generosity, even if that generosity is to be of temporary duration.
For its part, the WP has slowly been recruiting qualified people into its ranks, including some personalities prominent within their own professions. Some of these individuals will be the WP’s likely election candidates. They will be backed up by a growing corps of party members and volunteers who will undertake the mammoth logistical challenge imposed by the multi-seat GRCs (Group Representation Constituencies).
Equally significant, is the fact that the WP has slowly but surely been establishing its own ecosystem in a part of the eastern half of the island. This has been made possible by the fact that the three WP-held constituencies – Aljunied, Hougang and Punggol East – are virtually adjacent to each other and, therefore, can be conveniently knitted together into a single whole. This makes it difficult for the WP to be dislodged from those constituencies and, more importantly, this ecosystem – that constitutes not just a geographical, but also a social and philosophical, construct -- forms a jumping off point for the WP to launch effective election campaigns into neighbouring constituencies, especially East Coast and Tampines GRCs. The WP is well poised to make further advances at the next GE.
In contrast to the preparations by the PAP and WP, the other political parties have not done anything notable to enhance their electoral prospects. Instead of consolidation among what are effectively and very simply “bit players” in Singapore politics, there has in fact been unnecessary fragmentation in that marginal sphere. A notable example of this has been the emergence of the Singaporeans First Party. Like the pre-existing smaller parties, this new party simply gives the impression of having enough people to form a central executive committee but not enough within its rank-and-file to do the necessary grunge work (the logistics) to bring in the vote for the party and its leaders.
The lack of a critical mass of members and volunteers is also something that plagues other smaller parties. Going online to make their case in social and alternative media sites does not enhance the prospects of these smaller parties. As I have mentioned a number of times in the past, socio-political blogs are heavily populated by anti-PAP elements (i.e., those who make up the 25% of the irreducible core of anti-PAP voters). As such it is pointless to initiate political engagement in those blogs when the key demographic the opposition needs to reach out to – the around 35% of voters who make up the middle ground – hardly spend much time on those blogs. For that reason, and very wisely, the overwhelming portion of the WP’s political engagement has been offline.
For the Singapore Democratic Party, there are a number of obstacles to it improving much beyond its rather dismal average vote of 36.76% in GE2011. Chief among these obstacles is the person of Dr Chee Soon Juan. A majority of middle ground voters have a strong, and visceral, dislike for Dr Chee. They consider him to be politically toxic. This is borne out by the fact that as secretary-general of the SDP, Dr Chee led the SDP into four general elections (1997, 2001, 2006 and 2011) and suffered four crushing defeats. Yet, Dr Chee shows no sign of wanting to leave the party, whereas the honourable and decent thing for a leader who truly believes in both the spirit and letter of democracy would be to resign following an initial general election debacle.
If Dr Chee and some of his closest associates, such as his sister Ms Chee Siok Chin and party Vice-Chairman Mr John Tan, among a few others, were to depart the SDP, and were replaced by suitably qualified individuals without association to the previous 20 years of the SDP’s history, then the low ceiling of support for the party would miraculously be lifted. In such a situation, in the eyes of middle ground voters – who decide on the outcome of elections – the SDP would have returned to something like the salubrious situation it found itself in back in late 1991 where it had three parliamentary seats.
However, the SDP leadership appears to have no interest in grappling with the main issue that is plaguing it. To employ an overused phrase that is often thrown at the PAP (for different reasons), the SDP ignores the elephant in the room – the person of Dr Chee and his acolytes – while spending time sniping at the PAP. The party leadership wants to engage in politics on terms it lays down to the electorate instead of the reverse. This is a curious way of practising politics: it is a practice that would work for civil society organisations but not for political parties, especially if they are based on the fundamental principle of democracy.
The only other party requiring mention here because it still has a chance of getting something out of the next GE, if it plays its cards right, is the National Solidarity Party. Here, for the NSP, “playing its cards right” involves coming to terms with both electoral and political realities. The main electoral reality is the formidable logistical challenge in fighting a general election.
The NSP should scale back its electoral ambitions to field just half the number of candidates that it fielded back in 2011; in that election, the NSP fielded 24 candidates. A concentration of resources on a smaller number of constituencies will enhance the NSP’s electoral chances. However, the NSP would still have to contend with a major political reality – the widespread perception by middle ground voters that the WP is the only opposition game in town.
One way for the NSP to change that perception is to arrive at an early agreement with the WP – preferably before 2014 is out -- on the general areas both will contest so as to avoid over-lapping claims to a straight fight with the PAP. (The “general areas” can be broadly defined to take into account any subsequent changes to electoral boundaries.) By doing this, the NSP would implicitly be perceived as getting the blessing of the WP. That is no small advantage given the significant goodwill that the WP commands among middle ground voters. But in order to get that blessing the NSP has to give up some of its claims.
If two parties are on an unequal footing in the process of horse-trading then, reasonably, the one with the weaker hand has to give ground, and some choice ground at that. No prizes for guessing what some of that ground might be. And no prizes for guessing which party would have to make the first approach in initiating a process that would be mutually beneficial.
Dr Derek da Cunha is author of the books: Breakthrough: Roadmap for Singapore’s Political Future (Singapore: Institute of Policy Studies, 2012), 288pp; Singapore Places its Bets: Casinos, Foreign Talent and Remaking a City-state (Singapore: Straits Times Press, 2010), 192pp; and, The Price of Victory: The 1997 Singapore General Election and Beyond (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1997), 150pp.
© Derek da Cunha
https://www.facebook.com/notes/dere...-ge-the-others-are-laggards/10153311872318797
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