Noted MIT physicist Theodore Postol headlined his Technology Review article "Why Missile Defense Won't Work."
Each Iron Dome missile costs $400,000, not $20,000 according to some Israeli sources. Raytheon produces it in America.
Hitting and destroying a missile with another one is nearly possible. Claims otherwise are fabricated to maintain funding and deceive populations into believing they're safe. The probability of Iron Dome destroying the rocket warhead is essentially zero.
The same holds for Iron Dome intercepts chasing rockets from behind. Occasional Iron Dome intercept attempts arise in a near-vertical trajectory. That is the only engagement geometry where it has a non-zero chance of destroying the rocket - the artillery rocket warhead.
At least 95% of Iron Dome attempts fail. During the 1991 Gulf War, fabricated Patriot missile defense success was reported as 96% or greater. MIT researchers analyzed the data and called likely Patriot success ZERO.
When Israelis see overhead explosions erroneously called successful intercepts, they're observing Iron Dome's own warhead explosions. If a Hamas rocket is hit, warheads will fall and explode on the ground. Destroying a rocket warhead is a far more demanding mission than damaging other parts of the targeted rocket.
Success depends on approaching the rocket almost directly head-on. Engaging from the side or back has virtually no chance of success. Photos of Iron Dome contrails show most intercept attempts either chase Hamas rockets from behind or the side.
In both such cases, geometry and the speed of the interceptors and rockets make it extremely unlikely the interceptor will destroy the rocket's warhead.
Iron Dome missiles miss because of the uncertainties in the exact crossing speed and geometry of two high-speed missiles, even a perfectly operating Iron Dome fuse may fail to place lethal fragments onto an artillery rocket's warhead.
In addition, unless the distance between the Iron Dome warhead and the warhead of an artillery rocket is small (a meter or so), there will be a greatly diminished chance that a fragment from the Iron Dome warhead will hit, penetrate, and cause the detonation of the artillery-rocket warhead.
Front-on engagements guarantee no success. Their geometry merely indicates that an Iron Dome interceptor has a better-than-zero chance of destroying the target-artillery rocket warhead. Small-sized rockets are even harder to intercept.
When Iron Dome interceptors explode overhead, but contrails showed they crossed the expected rocket trajectory from behind or either side, it can be said with near certainty, that no intercept had occurred.
It is absolutely clear: Iron Dome is performing at best, close to ZERO percent. Hitting a missile with another one is like hitting a bullet with one fired at it.
Each Iron Dome missile costs $400,000, not $20,000 according to some Israeli sources. Raytheon produces it in America.
Hitting and destroying a missile with another one is nearly possible. Claims otherwise are fabricated to maintain funding and deceive populations into believing they're safe. The probability of Iron Dome destroying the rocket warhead is essentially zero.
The same holds for Iron Dome intercepts chasing rockets from behind. Occasional Iron Dome intercept attempts arise in a near-vertical trajectory. That is the only engagement geometry where it has a non-zero chance of destroying the rocket - the artillery rocket warhead.
At least 95% of Iron Dome attempts fail. During the 1991 Gulf War, fabricated Patriot missile defense success was reported as 96% or greater. MIT researchers analyzed the data and called likely Patriot success ZERO.
When Israelis see overhead explosions erroneously called successful intercepts, they're observing Iron Dome's own warhead explosions. If a Hamas rocket is hit, warheads will fall and explode on the ground. Destroying a rocket warhead is a far more demanding mission than damaging other parts of the targeted rocket.
Success depends on approaching the rocket almost directly head-on. Engaging from the side or back has virtually no chance of success. Photos of Iron Dome contrails show most intercept attempts either chase Hamas rockets from behind or the side.
In both such cases, geometry and the speed of the interceptors and rockets make it extremely unlikely the interceptor will destroy the rocket's warhead.
Iron Dome missiles miss because of the uncertainties in the exact crossing speed and geometry of two high-speed missiles, even a perfectly operating Iron Dome fuse may fail to place lethal fragments onto an artillery rocket's warhead.
In addition, unless the distance between the Iron Dome warhead and the warhead of an artillery rocket is small (a meter or so), there will be a greatly diminished chance that a fragment from the Iron Dome warhead will hit, penetrate, and cause the detonation of the artillery-rocket warhead.
Front-on engagements guarantee no success. Their geometry merely indicates that an Iron Dome interceptor has a better-than-zero chance of destroying the target-artillery rocket warhead. Small-sized rockets are even harder to intercept.
When Iron Dome interceptors explode overhead, but contrails showed they crossed the expected rocket trajectory from behind or either side, it can be said with near certainty, that no intercept had occurred.
It is absolutely clear: Iron Dome is performing at best, close to ZERO percent. Hitting a missile with another one is like hitting a bullet with one fired at it.
