Too many scholars add to many layers of bureaucracy, and now he admits that the procedure should be streamlined. I have a tip for him. Go and look at all your procedures, not only Riot Control, and you will find that many of them can be streamlined too. I don't understand why the Riot Police/SOC cannot be activated right away. If the rioting turns out to be nothing, they can be called back to Mt Vernon. Or else, just treat it as a training exercise. They should have already been activated and on the way, while the cockups are running around getting approval for their deployment. If approval not given, they can always turn back and return to camp.
SINGAPORE: The decision to send specially-trained troops to deal with the Little India riot on December 8 last year ought to have been faster.
Commissioner of Police Ng Joo Hee said the time taken before a decision was made to send the troops was unacceptably long.
He was testifying on Tuesday at the Committee of Inquiry hearing into last year's riot.
He also said that while the police performance in Little India may not have been perfect, it was far from inadequate.
It took 18 minutes before approval was given to send the Special Operations Command (SOC) -- the riot control force -- to the riot site.
This request was made at 10.45pm by ASP Jonathan Tang, the third police officer to arrive at the incident site.
Ng admitted that this was "unacceptably long".
He said: "I will readily admit the failings, our failings on that night, and the first failing is communications and sense-making.
"Our communications were non-existent; our sense-making was almost zero. That is something we really need to work on."
He also admitted that the process leading up to troops being sent was "far too cumbersome".
He said he has asked for the process to be streamlined, and this has already been done.
Previously, the police divisional commander would need to seek approval from the head of operations at the Police Headquarters before activating the SOC.
But now, the police divisional commander can activate the SOC directly.
This will serve to significantly cut down the time between the first request and formal clearance for the troops to move out.
Ng also defended his officers' decision to not fire warning shots and commended them for keeping their heads cool as their restraint meant no lives were lost unnecessarily.
He also said the police can only fire a warning shot only to put an immediate end to violence by getting a person's attention and to signal the police's intention to use lethal force.
But he said it was "highly improbable" that a warning shot would have stopped the rioting that night.
He also addressed criticism of the perceived inaction by the first responders.
He said police first responders are neither trained nor equipped to fight a riot and hence it would be "irresponsible" to ask them to.
Ng said: "The assertion and expectation that the 50 or so first responders -- who had walked into a riot and found themselves stranded and dislocated in several small groups -- who are untrained in public order tactics and armed with a few shields, and no other protection, should have somehow been able to launch a coordinated assault on the several hundred rioters facing them, and then bring the mayhem to an immediate end is speculative at best."
He added that training police patrolmen to be effective riot fighters will not only be costly but also impossible, given the level of resourcing and their current shift system.
One of the main concerns highlighted by Ng was the manpower constraints that the Singapore Police Force is facing.
Currently, the police-population ratio stands at 1:614 and he said this is exceedingly low, especially when compared with other cities like Tokyo and Hong Kong.
He also made a plea to the committee for another 1,000 police officers.
This would allow for more resources to be assigned to hotspots like Little India and Geylang, and for first responder resources to be beefed up.
SINGAPORE: The decision to send specially-trained troops to deal with the Little India riot on December 8 last year ought to have been faster.
Commissioner of Police Ng Joo Hee said the time taken before a decision was made to send the troops was unacceptably long.
He was testifying on Tuesday at the Committee of Inquiry hearing into last year's riot.
He also said that while the police performance in Little India may not have been perfect, it was far from inadequate.
It took 18 minutes before approval was given to send the Special Operations Command (SOC) -- the riot control force -- to the riot site.
This request was made at 10.45pm by ASP Jonathan Tang, the third police officer to arrive at the incident site.
Ng admitted that this was "unacceptably long".
He said: "I will readily admit the failings, our failings on that night, and the first failing is communications and sense-making.
"Our communications were non-existent; our sense-making was almost zero. That is something we really need to work on."
He also admitted that the process leading up to troops being sent was "far too cumbersome".
He said he has asked for the process to be streamlined, and this has already been done.
Previously, the police divisional commander would need to seek approval from the head of operations at the Police Headquarters before activating the SOC.
But now, the police divisional commander can activate the SOC directly.
This will serve to significantly cut down the time between the first request and formal clearance for the troops to move out.
Ng also defended his officers' decision to not fire warning shots and commended them for keeping their heads cool as their restraint meant no lives were lost unnecessarily.
He also said the police can only fire a warning shot only to put an immediate end to violence by getting a person's attention and to signal the police's intention to use lethal force.
But he said it was "highly improbable" that a warning shot would have stopped the rioting that night.
He also addressed criticism of the perceived inaction by the first responders.
He said police first responders are neither trained nor equipped to fight a riot and hence it would be "irresponsible" to ask them to.
Ng said: "The assertion and expectation that the 50 or so first responders -- who had walked into a riot and found themselves stranded and dislocated in several small groups -- who are untrained in public order tactics and armed with a few shields, and no other protection, should have somehow been able to launch a coordinated assault on the several hundred rioters facing them, and then bring the mayhem to an immediate end is speculative at best."
He added that training police patrolmen to be effective riot fighters will not only be costly but also impossible, given the level of resourcing and their current shift system.
One of the main concerns highlighted by Ng was the manpower constraints that the Singapore Police Force is facing.
Currently, the police-population ratio stands at 1:614 and he said this is exceedingly low, especially when compared with other cities like Tokyo and Hong Kong.
He also made a plea to the committee for another 1,000 police officers.
This would allow for more resources to be assigned to hotspots like Little India and Geylang, and for first responder resources to be beefed up.
